JUDGMENT S.K. Kaul, J. - This is a State appeal and it is directed against the order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused-respondent by Judicial Magistrate, Pratapgarh. 2. The prosecution case is that on 25-6-1976 at about 5.30 p.m. the accused was found selling Haldi at his temporary shop situate in Gandh. Bazar Baniganj, Pratapgarh, by the Food Inspector Shri Virendra Singhi The Food Inspector suspected that this Haldi was infested with insects and was also coloured. Consequently he purchased 450 grams of Haldi from the accused-respondent and paid its price Rs. 1.62 paise. He obtained a receipt (Ext. Ka. 1) and prepared the form Ext. Ka-2 both of which were signed by the accused. Thereafter the Haldi was divided into three parts and each of the parts was put in a dry phial to which seal was appended and the phials were properly stoppered. Thereafter one phila was sent to the Public Analyst for report. The report of the Public Analyst dated 30-7-1976 was that the Haldi had living insects and it was 100 per cent infested with insects. On receipt of this report, papers were sent to the Chief Medical Officer Pratapgarh, who accorded sanction vide Ext. Ka-3 and thereafter a complaint (Ext. Ka-4) was moved on the basis of which the Magistrate took cognizance and asked the accused to stand his trial under S. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 3. The defence of the accused was complete denial. His case was that he was a customer and had purchased the Haldi from another shop in connection with Mundan ceremony at his house. 4. The learned Magistrate observed that the provisions of R. 9(j) were not observed in this case and that the sanction was not properly accorded. He also found that the accused-respondent was not a shop keeper and as such he acquitted the accused-respondent of the charge punishable under S. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 5. I find that the trial Court has given a perverse judgment and the observations made by him do not flow from the evidence. He has also not properly scrutinised the provisions of the Act. So far as the question regarding the accused-respondent being a shop keeper is concerned, it is significant to note that with the Food Inspector no enmity whatsoever was either put or alleged. He has also not properly scrutinised the provisions of the Act. So far as the question regarding the accused-respondent being a shop keeper is concerned, it is significant to note that with the Food Inspector no enmity whatsoever was either put or alleged. Indeed, the accused also does not say in his statement recorded under S. 313 Cr. P.C. why the Food Inspector would be inimical to him. If the accused, as a customer, had purchased Haldi and other articles from a different shop, he would be carrying the same and the Food Inspector would not have tried to purchase from him as he would not have come to know that the accused must be carrying some articles of food because normally their things are kept in a bundle which is not visible. It is true that in Exts. Ka 1 and Ka. 2 it was not mentioned specifically that the shop of the accused was temporary while in the complaint it is mentioned that the accused had a temporary shop but this is not a major contradiction to throw out the prosecution story that accused was found selling Haldi and the Food Inspector had purchased Haldi from him. After all, if the accused was not selling Haldi he would not have been agreeable to sell Haldi to the Food Inspector and receive money as well as sign Ext. Ka-1 and Ext. Ka-2. The accused does not say that he did not sign these two documents nor did he give any explanation as to why he signed these two documents. That shows that the accused must have been selling article of food including Haldi and the same was then purchased by the Food Inspector from him. The evidence of the Food Inspector by itself is sufficiently coupled with these documents Exts. Ka. 1 and Ka. 2 to hold that Haldi was sold by the accused to the Food Inspector on the relevant date, time and place. Indeed, the trial Court also observed that the testimony of the Food Inspector alone was sufficient proof of sale. 6. As regards the provisions of R. 2(j) it is significant to note that these provisions were amended by Act 34 of 1976 which came into force on 1-4-1976. Indeed, the trial Court also observed that the testimony of the Food Inspector alone was sufficient proof of sale. 6. As regards the provisions of R. 2(j) it is significant to note that these provisions were amended by Act 34 of 1976 which came into force on 1-4-1976. Before amendment R. 9lj) read as follows "To send by hand or registered post a copy of the report received in Form III from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken in case it is found to be not conforming to the Act or Rules made thereunder as even the case is filed in the Court." 7. The question arises whether supply of such a report is mandatory with the result that in the absence of observation of this R. 9(j) the accused should be acquitted. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Immadi Ramachandram v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1976 (II) FAC 153, observed that: "By itself the mere non-compliance with R. 9( j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules does not enable the accused for a presumption that he has been prejudiced thereby. In cases of non-compliance with R. 9(j), the Courts have to see whether the accused has been prejudiced in his defence, by such non-compliance, it would be a question of fact in each case." Indeed, P.N. Bakshi, J., in case of Jai Singh v. State, reported in 1980 (1) FAC 198, observed that, "It has already been held by the Courts about a number of times that R. 9(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, is directory and not mandatory. The applicant has failed to show that any prejudice has been caused to him as a result of non-compliance of the Rule 9 (j)." 8. Now in this case as well there is nothing to show what prejudice could have been caused to the accused by non-compliance of this Rule 9(j) because I find that the public analyst found that this Haldi had living insects and it was 100 per cent infested with insects. This report was given about 34 days after the sample having been taken. This report was given about 34 days after the sample having been taken. The complaint was filed on 28-2-1977 and even if such a report had been supplied to the accused, I am afraid, the report of Director of Central Food Laboratory to whom the sample would have been sent on the request of the accused could not have made any difference in the composition of this Haldi which was found 100 per cent infested with insects by the Public Analyst. Insects could not have disappeared in the meantime, nor could the Haldi become a pure one. Thus, the trial Court was not justified in holding that non-compliance of R. 9(j) had caused prejudice to the accused on account of which he had to be acquitted. 9. As regards the sanction for the prosecution, Ext. Ka. 3, shows that this sanction is a typed one. In the ruling of Bakshi, J. noted above the question of sanction was also involved and in that case as well the document was a typed document. Bakshi, J. held that, "No particular form of sanction has been prescribed. It is not an unusual feature for a senior officer to dictate an order and for the clerk to type out and to place it before him for his signature. This appears to have been done in the instant case." I am in respectful agreement with this observation and in the instant case as well this sanction Ext. Ka. 3 appears to have been typed under the dictation of the Chief Medical Officer, Pratapgarh, in his office as the document shows. It contains all the relevant provisions which ma e the sanction a valid one. Consequently the trial Court was not justified in holding that this sanction was not properly accorded or that the sanctioning authority had not applied its mind to it. 10. Consequently, in my view the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this Haldi which is an article of food was absolutely adulterated and therefore, the accused who sold the same was guilty under S. 7/6 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 10. Consequently, in my view the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this Haldi which is an article of food was absolutely adulterated and therefore, the accused who sold the same was guilty under S. 7/6 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Since this offence was committed on 25-6-1976 the amendment of S. 16 had already come into force as that was incorporated by Act 34 of 1976 which had come into force with effect from 1-4-1976 and as such the accused has to be sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of which he will undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months more. 11. I would, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused-respondent by the trial Court and convict him under S. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. He is awarded six months rigorous imprisonment as well as a fine of Rs. 1000/- failing which he will undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months more. The accused-respondent is on bail. He will surrender and serve out the sentence awarded to him. He is given three months time from today to deposit the relevant fine. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pratapgarh will send compliance report within six weeks.