D. H. SHUKLA, J. ( 1 ) THE applicants in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 38 of 1976 filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Surat are the widow minor sons and minor daughters of the deceased Vanmalibhai Ratanji Chauhan who met with a fatal motor accident at about 3-30 P. M. on 14/12/1975 near Dholikui Varachha Road Surat. ( 2 ) DECEASED Vanmalibhai started on his scooter with his son Manojkumar on pillion from his residence. On crossing the gate of his residence he approached the main road and had turned a little left to proceed further when opponent No. 1 Ismailbhai Gulambhai as a result of driving the Ambassador Car bearing No. GJC 5628 in a rash and negligent manner collided with the scooter. The impact caused damage to the car itself and a heavy damage to the scooter and further caused serious injuries to Vanmalibhai who succumbed to his injuries on the very day at the Civil Hospital Surat at about 5-00 p. m. The applicant alleged that the accident was caused solely due to the negligence of opponent No. 1 and consequently opponent No. 2 Mulchandbhai Nagarji Sheth and/or opponent No. 3 Narendra Shantilal Patel are liable vicariously and further opponent No. 4 the United India Fire and General Insurance Co is also liable as the insurer of the car. Opponent No. 5 Ruxmaniben later on applied to be joined as a party to the petition claiming that being the mother of the deceased she is also entitled to receive her share of compensation. The applicants claimed a total compensation of Rs. 2 lacs for the death of the deceased on the basis that the deceased was a proprietor of three concerns a partner in three concerns and a director in one concern as well as on the further basis that he was running a Nursery known as Nandenvan. It was their case that the deceased was a talented person and by earning a huge amount he constructed vast properties and by his untimely death the applicants are left destitutes. It was their further case that had the deceased not met with the same fatal accident he could have lived at least for 35 to 40 years more. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It was their further case that had the deceased not met with the same fatal accident he could have lived at least for 35 to 40 years more. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 3 ) THE Tribunal framed issues at Exh. 38 For the reasons stated in his judgment the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the accident occurred solely due to the negligence of Vanmalidas himself. Consequently be dismissed the petition with no order for costs by his judgment and order dated 30/07/1977 The applicants have filed the present appeal having been aggrieved by tie same judgment and order. ( 4 ) THE Tribunal has discussed the contents of the Panchnama (Exh. 62) in great details. The details of the Panchnama have been rightly recorded by him but he has erred while he drew inferences from the admitted positions. The Tribunal appears to have relied upon the three factors in coming to the conclusion that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the deceased. The first position which he noted was that the accident occurre as soon as the scooter emerged from the gate of the residence. The second position which he noted was that the opponent No. 1 drove his car on the left hand side which was the correct side for him to drive. The third position which he noted was that the speed of 70 to 75 kms. is a reasonable speed and therefore the driver could not be blamed if the deceased did not take sufficient care before putting the scooter on the road. ( 5 ) WE have considered the oral testimony of the witnesses and the contents of the Panchnama carefully. It appears to us that the Tribunal has grossly erred in drawing an inference that the opponent No. 1 was not negligent for causing the accident. The Tribunal has failed to consider the fact that the gate of the residence was situated at a distance between 20 to 28 feet from the edge of the road and therefore the driver of the on coming Ambassador car had an opportunity to observe the scooter when it come out from the gate. The accident occurred on the asphalt road itself and the scooter must have travelled a distance of about 25 feet. The accident occurred on the asphalt road itself and the scooter must have travelled a distance of about 25 feet. It cannot therefore be stated that emergence of the scooter was all too sudden. It was 3-30 p. m. and there was no obstruction to the visibility of opponent No. 1 driver of the car. It has been emphasised on numerous occasions by this High Court that the driver must so drive the vehicle as to be able to bring it to a halt immediately on noticing a danger. ( 6 ) IT is true that the driver was driving his vehicle on the left hand side of the road but that circumstance alone is not sufficient to exonerate him from the charge of negligence. He was driving at a speed of 70 to 75 kms. per hour and we do not agree with the Tribunal that such a fast speed can be said to be a reasonable speed particularly when the vehicle was being driven within the short distance of the city of Surat. It is also to be noted that opponent No. 1 driver applied the brakes only after the accident. The impact was so forceful that the scooter as thrown off the considerable distance and Manoj fell down in a ditch. Again examining the damage which was done to both the vehicles it transpires that the left front of the Ambassador car had dashed against the scooter. It was not as if the scooter had collided with the rear of the car which would in its turn create different considerations. The Tribunal commented that the opponent No. 1 driver could not have expected the emergence of the scooter all of a sudden from the compound of the bungalow but that inference with respect is not correct. The driver of a vehicle must always take care for such emergent situations beforehand so as to be able to control the vehicle in time to avert the accident. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons aforestated we do not uphold the finding of the Tribunal on the question of negligence. We set it aside and our finding on the question is that it was opponent No. 1 who was liable for the occurrence of the accident. ( 8 ) THE tribunal having held that opponent No. 1 was not guilty of negligence further held that other issues did not survive. We set it aside and our finding on the question is that it was opponent No. 1 who was liable for the occurrence of the accident. ( 8 ) THE tribunal having held that opponent No. 1 was not guilty of negligence further held that other issues did not survive. It did not give its findings on the rest of the issues. It has been times out of number pointed out that this is an incorrect approach. The Tribunal must give his finding on all the issues involved in the matter. We are required to give findings on other issues on the basis of the evidence that is before us without the assistance of the opinion of the Tribunal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) THE last question which we must now consider is that of the quantum which must be awarded to the applicants and opponent No. 5. ( 10 ) DHANGAURIBEN widow of the deceased does not know about the yearly income of her husband. She has only stated that her husband was engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling wooden frames which was used for the purpose of wrapping clothes. The deceased was doing that business for about 10 years prior to the accident. The deseased was also raising bananas in the land and had a small Nursery. ( 11 ) ON behalf of the applicants there is no other oral evidence led to prove the income of the deceased but they have produced documentary evidence consisting of the income-tax assessment orders of 1970-71 1971 1972 and 1973-74 (Exhs. 52 to 55 respectively ). On the close scrutiny of these assessment orders it appears that the income of the deceased was reduced from year to year from about Rs. 20 0 or Rs. 21000 per year to about Rs. 11 0 year. No assessment orders are produced for the subsequent year but from the evidence of the window it appears that he had started running his business in a loss. She has admitted that her husband was running his business in clothes since last two to three years. 20 0 or Rs. 21000 per year to about Rs. 11 0 year. No assessment orders are produced for the subsequent year but from the evidence of the window it appears that he had started running his business in a loss. She has admitted that her husband was running his business in clothes since last two to three years. She has also admitted that during that period the income of the family was only the rental income which as further admitted by her continued after his death It is difficult to make any sure inference about the business skill or ability of the deceased since for the last about five years or so his income had started to be an the decline. But it is a common experience that a person suffers ups and downs in the business and it cannot be said that the deceased would not have earned in future at all. In is possible that he could have again come up and could have flourished but we would not make any estimate on such a bare possibility. It could not be gainsaid that the deceased had an experience of business of at least ten years prior to the accident and that it has to be taken into account when we try to assess his economic utility to the family. He would not have been on streets bad he gone to the market for service closing his business. We must also take into account that the deceased had only passed vernacular final examination and knew little English. When he died he was about 45 years of age and that would also be one of the factors to be taken into account. Mr. Dalal the learned advocate for the Insurance Co. wanted us to remand the matter but we do not think it is at all necessary since we have all the evidence before us which the parties desired to lead before the Tribunal. The Tribunal had not fettered leading of the evidence but where he erred was that he decided only the question of negligence and did not decide other issues. ( 12 ) UNDER the circumstances which we have discussed above we feel justified in assessing the monthly income of the deceased in future years at Rs. 500. 00 per month from which it would be legitimate to deduct Rs. 100. ( 12 ) UNDER the circumstances which we have discussed above we feel justified in assessing the monthly income of the deceased in future years at Rs. 500. 00 per month from which it would be legitimate to deduct Rs. 100. 00 as the approximate personal expenses of the deceased. The net balance would be Rs. 400. 00 per month that it is to say Rs. 4800. 00 annuany. To round up we take it at Rs. 5000. 00 a year and choosing multiple of 15 the total comes to Rs. 75 0 Considering the age of the deceased as well as the circumstances of his life and the fact that he was primarily a businessman in good state of health with a settled family life the multiplier of. 15 is just and proper. We have taken into account the fact that the life of the deceased was not hazardous and that he was not suffering from any disease or vice or addiction. Therefore even though he was abed 45 at the time of his death we have thought it proper to adopt the multiplier of 15. To this must be added the conventional sum of Rs. 5 0 the shortened expectation of life. The total comes to Rs. 80 0 which we award as the global compensation to the applicants and opponent No. 5. Incidentally the learned advocate Mr. G. P. Vyas sought our permission to reduce the claim of the applicants to the extent of 80 0 which permission we have granted. ( 13 ) BEFORE we part with the matter we might note that the Insurance Company has filed Cross Objections contending that the finding of the Tribunal on the point of negligence is a correct finding and in the alternative it is sought that the matter may be remanded to the Tribunal for the decision of the question as to who was driving the car and who was the owner of the car at the time of the accident and whether respondent No. 4 that is to say the Insurance Company was at the risk: at the time of the accident. As pointed out above we have hold opponent No. 1 guilty of negligence setting aside the finding of the Tribunals on that point. As pointed out above we have hold opponent No. 1 guilty of negligence setting aside the finding of the Tribunals on that point. We have also noted above that there is no necessity to remand the matter as the parties have led all the evidence they wantd to before the Tribunal and it is possible for us to decide the issues on the basis of the evidence which is already before us. The Cross objections therefore have na merit and we dismiss them with costs. .