Judgment :- 1. For several years prior to 1980-81 Toddy Shop No.52, Mannanam 9, Ettumanoor Excise Range was located in property having survey No. 908/1A. Since the owner of the property raised objection against the continued functioning of the toddy shop there it was announced by the Departmental authorities prior to the auction sale for the year 1980-81 that the toddy shop would not be allowed to be located in survey No 908/1A. In the abkari auction sale held for the year 1980-81, the 2nd respondent in this appeal was the highest bidder and as such entitled to vend toddy in accordance with the provisions contained in the Abkari Act 1 of 1077 and Rules thereunder On coming to know that the 2nd respondent was taking steps Tor locating the toddy shop in the property in Survey No. 907/14/1 of Mannanam Village a complaint, Ext. P-1 was filed on 31st March 1980, by the first respondent and five other persons who are living close to that item, before the District Collector, bringing to his notice the existence of a lower primary school, a place of worship, S N.D P. Gurumandiram and a Public Library (Kumaranasan Memorial Public Library), very near the said property and requesting him to see that the toddy shop was not located in the above said property, which according to the 2nd respondent is situated one kilometre away from the place mentioned in the notification for auction sale. A similar petition, evidenced by Ext. P-2, also was filed by the concerned member of the Panchayat stating that the distance between the lower primary school from the new site of the toddy shop is only 342 metres which is much less than the distance stipulated under the Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974. No action was taken on the petitions by the authorities. On the toddy shop being shifted to Sy. No. 907/14/1, a suit O. S.49 of 1980 was filed before the Munsiff's Court, Etturaanoor by Parvathi Bhargavi, a co-owner of the property for a perpetual injunction for restraining the 2nd respondent from using the building in the property for accommodating the toddy shop. Though an interim injunction was prayed for, it was not granted because the 2nd respondent had already started using the property for the toddy shop. Though an interim injunction was prayed for, it was not granted because the 2nd respondent had already started using the property for the toddy shop. The 1st respondent thereupon filed O. P. 1362 of 1980 before this Court for the issue of a writ of Mandamus or such other appropriate order or direction, directing the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, Kottayam and the State of Kerala (the appellants in this appeal) to take immediate necessary action to prevent the 1st respondent from conducting the toddy shop No. 52 in Sy. No. 907/14 of Mannanan village According to the 1st respondent the conducting of the toddy shop in the said premises is in violation of the provisions contained in R.6 (1) and (2) of the Kerala Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974. The 2nd respondent and the officers of the Excise Department have the statutory duty to comply with the provisions contained in the Abkari Act and the Rules mentioned since the authorities exhibited an attitude of indifference; it became necessary that they should be corrected by initiating judicial process. 2. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Excise and the State they denied that the toddy shop was situated within a distance of 409 metres from the lower primary school and the Guru Mandiram. A contention was also raised that the 1st respondent had no locus standi to maintain the Original Petition since he could not be said to be a person aggrieved. 3. The learned Single Judge who disposed of the case held that the 1st respondent, if not directly interested was at least indirectly interested in the subject-matter, and as such had the locus standi to maintain the Original Petition. It came out that as per Ext. P4 the Commissioner's report filed in O.S. No. 49 of 1980 the distance from the toddy shop to the lower primary school as the crow flies is 347.17 metres and the distance through road was 372 metres. The learned Judge held that in the absence of indications whether measurements should be taken as the crow flies or through the road, S.10 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, corresponding to S.11 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Central) applied to the case and the measurement should be taken in a straight line on a horizontal plane. The learned Judge held that in the absence of indications whether measurements should be taken as the crow flies or through the road, S.10 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, corresponding to S.11 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Central) applied to the case and the measurement should be taken in a straight line on a horizontal plane. The Court however held that since the toddy shop was being conducted for about 4 months in the premise in Sy. No. 907/14, the ends of justice would be met if a direction was given to the respondents in the Original Petition that on the expiry of the period of licence on 31st March 1981 the shop should not be allowed to be conducted in the premises in Sy. No. 907/14, unless an officer not below the rank of the Assistant Commissioner of Excise satisfies himself personally that the distance between the school and the building in which the toddy shop is to be conducted is outside the distance of 400 metres measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane or as the crow flies. The present appeal is filed by the State of Kerala and the Assistant Commissioner of Excise challenging the above decision. 4. The appellants reiterated their contention that the 1st respondent is not an aggrieved person and as such a writ of mandamus should not have been issued. The direction regarding mode of measurement was challenged on the ground of impracticability of compliance and as setting at naught the proviso to R.6 (2) of the Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974. 5. Before proceeding further we may quote R.6 (2) of Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, which is the concerned law applicable to the case. It reads: "(2) No toddy, arrack or foreign liquor shop (other than a toddy or arrack sub-sbop) shall be located outside the limits notified in the Gazette under R.4, but with the previous sanction of Assistant Excise Commissioner it may be removed from one place to another within such limits. It reads: "(2) No toddy, arrack or foreign liquor shop (other than a toddy or arrack sub-sbop) shall be located outside the limits notified in the Gazette under R.4, but with the previous sanction of Assistant Excise Commissioner it may be removed from one place to another within such limits. But no shop other than a Foreign Liquor Wholesale shop shall be located in, or removed to a place (a) within an area declared as a project area; or (b) within 400 metres from any Schools, Temples, Church, Mosque or burial ground: Provided that the Board of Revenue may, for sufficient reasons, permit any shop to be located in or removed to a place referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) subject to such restrictions and conditions, if any, as may be imposed." The contention put forward is that the first respondent who moved for the writ of mandamus is not concerned with the school, the place of worship and the reading room and as such he is not an aggrieved person. The existence of a legal right which is alleged to have been infringed being a condition precedent for the maintenance of an application under Art.226, it is argued, that since no personal right of the first respondent has been infringed, the court should not have entertained the application. Reliance was placed on the decisions Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 S. C. 41 and State of Orissa v. Madan, AIR. 1952 S. C. 12. The first respondent, who was the petitioner before the learned Single Judge, it is pointed out, does not claim that his right to worship is affected or that his children's education is in jeopardy. There is no pleading that his residence is close to the shop. Under such circumstances, according to the appellant, the petitioner should not have been heard to say that there has been violation of R.6 (2) of the Abkari shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules by the authorities 6. No doubt the right that can be enforced under Art.226 of the Constitution should ordinarily be the personal and individual right of the petitioner: see State of Punjab v. Suraj Prakash, AIR 1963 S C. 507. No doubt the right that can be enforced under Art.226 of the Constitution should ordinarily be the personal and individual right of the petitioner: see State of Punjab v. Suraj Prakash, AIR 1963 S C. 507. But over the years the approach to the question has shown a trend recognizing the right of an individual to take up causes of general concern as a representative of the public; even though no personal right of his has been infringed. This is evident from the following observations of the Supreme Court in Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v. Union of India, AIR. 1981 S. C. 344. "The question whether a person has the locus standi to file a proceedings depend mostly and often on whether he possesses a legal right and that right is violated. But, in an appropriate case, it may become necessary in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations to take a broader view of the question of locus to initiate a proceeding, be it under Art.226 or under Art.32 of the Constitution. If public property is dissipated, it would require a strong argument to convince the Court that representative segments of the public or at least a section of the public which is directly interested and affected would have no right to complain of the infraction of public duties and obligations." 7. In this connection it is pertinent to recall the observations of Subba Rao, J. in Dwarnka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, 1965 (3) S C. R.536, regarding the scope of Art.226: "This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression 'nature", for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression 'nature", for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government into a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the Article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the Article and others may be-evolved to direct the Article through-defined channels". 8. It is interesting to note that in England even as early as 1815 the expression "aggrieved person" was interpreted to include a person who by reason of his local situation has a peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public in seeing that the law is properly administered. In King v Taunton St. Mary, 3 M & S 463-105 E. R. (K. B.) 687; there was an indictment of a group of persons against a parish for not repairing a highway, they having used the way for many years for passing and re-passing from their houses to the next market town, and being obliged by reason of want of repair to take a more circuitous route. Under the law , in force the prosecutor was entitled to reasonable costs if he be a 'party aggrieved'. It was held: "Certainly a person does not answer to the character of a party aggrieved, who is only in common with the rest of the subjects inconvenienced by the nuisance; but here it appears that these persons have, by reason of their local situation, a peculiar grievance of their own. It was held: "Certainly a person does not answer to the character of a party aggrieved, who is only in common with the rest of the subjects inconvenienced by the nuisance; but here it appears that these persons have, by reason of their local situation, a peculiar grievance of their own. For living in the neighbourhood, and having been in the constant habit of passing to and fro on this highway, they have been obliged to abandon it, and take a more circuitous route, in their transit to and from the market town and their habitation, which is a peculiar personal grievance beyond that which affects the public at large". 9. In Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1960 (2) SCR 172 it is observed: "The personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest: it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in exceptional cases, as the expression 'ordinarily' indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof." 10. Interpreting "person aggrieved" in Attorney General of Gambia v. N'Fie, (.1961) A.C. 617, Lord Denning recalled the words of Lord Esher, M.R. in the following passager "The words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restriction interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him: but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his intesest." 11. There has been an elaborate discussion of the case law on the locus standi and the test to check whether an individual is an aggrieved person in Fasbhai v Roshan Kumar, 1976 (3) SCR. 58. The Supreme Court observed: "The expression 'aggrieved person' denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad, tentative manner. 58. The Supreme Court observed: "The expression 'aggrieved person' denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad, tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factor such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him 12. The Court dealt with 'locus standi' in relation to a writ of certiorari as follows: "It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (H) 'stranger'; (iii) busy body or meddle-some interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the Judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity while the alterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a gray outer circle of lessening certainly in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'person aggrieved'. In the gray outer-circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be 'persons aggrieved'. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'person aggrieved'. In the gray outer-circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be 'persons aggrieved'. It has been remarked in S. N. Sinha v. S. Lal and Co. Ltd. 1974(1) SCR. 615 that in respect of persons who are strangers and who seek to invoke the jurisdiction under Art.226. difficulty sometimes arises because of the nature and extent of the right or interest which is said to have been infringed and whether the infringement in some way affects such persons. The Supreme Court observed: "In England also the Courts have taken the view that when the application is made by a party or by a person aggrieved the Court will intervene ex debito justitiae in justice to the applicant, and when it is made by a stranger the Court considers whether the public interest demands its intervention. In either case it is a matter which rests ultimately in the discretion of the Court." The point to be considered is whether having regard to the principles discussed the 2nd respondent in the present case can be said to be a person aggrieved, having locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226. It is clearly made out from the Commissioner's report, which is marked as Ext P-4, that the toddy shop is situated at a distance of only 347 metres from the lower primary school compound if measurement in taken straight, and 378 metres away if it is taken along the road. In either case since the distance is less than 400 metres there is contravention of R.6 (2) of the Kerala Abkari shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules. There is no averment in the petition filed by the Ist respondent that he lives in the vicinity of the toddy shop or his right of worship as a Christian or his right to educate his children is prejudicially affected by the location of the toddy shop. But it is mentioned in Ext. P-1 addressed to the. District Collector appended to the petition that petitioners 1 to 5 therein (Ext. But it is mentioned in Ext. P-1 addressed to the. District Collector appended to the petition that petitioners 1 to 5 therein (Ext. P-1) are living at a distance of 5 to 15 feet from the new location of the toddy shop. Nuisance to the petitioners was one of the objections taken up in Ext. P-1 for the location of the toddy shop in the 'new site. Though under the rules vicinity to residential buildings is not by itself a criterion for fixing the location of a toddy shop it cannot be gainsaid that the presence of a toddy shop in the close proximity of one's residence is a nuisance to the occupants of the house It follows that the first respondent has a special interest in the enforcement of the provision regarding distance in R.6 (2) of the Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules than the class of people who are living away from the toddy shop. In other words be is a person aggrieved on account of the non-observance of the stipulation relating to distance contained in R.6 (2). This Court is therefore justified in exercising the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution at his instance. 13. It was then argued that even if it is held by this Court that there is violation of R.6 (2) calling for a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, in view of the proviso to the rule it is open to the Board of Revenue to permit the toddy shop to continue in the same place and thus stultify the order of this Court Relying on the decision in Kodiyatt Panchayat v. District Panchayat Officer 1977 KLT. 80 it was argued that this court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Art.226 in cases where there is the risk of its order being nullified. The decision has no application in the instant case. This court is now concerned only to see if there is violation of R.6 (2) which 'calls for interference So long as it is not disclosed that there are special circumstances, the mere possibility of the Board of Revenue invoking the proviso need not deter the Court from exercising the jurisdiction under Art.226. This court is now concerned only to see if there is violation of R.6 (2) which 'calls for interference So long as it is not disclosed that there are special circumstances, the mere possibility of the Board of Revenue invoking the proviso need not deter the Court from exercising the jurisdiction under Art.226. It is clear from the language of the proviso itself that the power conferred on the Board of Revenue is not of an arbitrary nature It is to be exercised only for adequate reasons and subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be imposed. It is to be invoked independent of. R.6 (2). 14. Alternatively it was argued that the direction by the court that the toddy shop should not be located within a distance of 400 metres from the school etc., would have the effect of nullifying the proviso to R.6 (2) and preventing the Board of Revenue to invoke the proviso in appropriate cases. There is no weight in the contention. There has been no adjudication by the learned Single Judge whether conditions exist for the Board of Revenue to invoke the proviso to R.6 (2). That may involve different considerations. Therefore the order passed by this Court need not stand in the way of the Board of Revenue in invoking the powers vested in it under the proviso to R.6 (2) if sufficient grounds exist. 15. The last point urged on behalf of the appellants relates to the direction regarding the mode of measuring the distance of 400 metres. The learned Single Judge placed reliance on S.10 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 (Act VII of 1125) which corresponds to S.11 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act X of 1897) and directed that the distance of 400 metres should be measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane or as the crow flies. S.10 reads: "Measurement of distances....In the measurement of any distance for the purpose of any Act, that distance shall, unless a different intention appears, be measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane." It was urged that the direction would cause difficulties in practice as the land in some places would be at different levels and in some other cases it may be hilly. Reference was made to the decision in Kunhunarayanan v. Aravindakshan 1974 KLT. Reference was made to the decision in Kunhunarayanan v. Aravindakshan 1974 KLT. 300 where in a case of shifting of kudikidappu under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964. S.78 (2) (e) (ii) of that Act directs that the new site should be "within a distance of one mile from the existing kudikidappu". Balakrishna Eradi, J. as he then was, held that "giving the word used in the section their ordinary meaning, the distance has to be calculated along some road or pathway over which a person will have a right to approach the alternative site when proceeding thereto from the site of the existing kudikidappu". It is however seen that S.10 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. It may be that where a different intention appears in the statute, it is open to the Court to direct measurement to be taken along a public road or public lane (See Harihara Iyer v Alwaye Municipality, AIR 1953 T. C 298). But a different intention as referred to in S.10 cannot be spelt out from the language of R.6 (2) of the Kerala Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974. We therefore confirm the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The appeal will stand dismissed. No costs.