ORDER C.S.P. Singh, J. - These petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment as the point involved is similar. The petitions were dismissed on 5-12-1980, and we had indicated in the order dismissing the petitions that the reasons would be given later, which we give now. 2. The petitioners in all these cases are authorised dealers for either Government foodgrains or levy sugar or for both. Their authorisation has been cancelled in all the cases except one in which it has been suspended. Two contentions have been raised in the petition, the first being that the Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to cancel the licenses, and the second being that an opportunity should have been given to the petitioners before cancelling or suspending the licenses. In one petition it has been averred that the order cancelling the authorisation is discriminatory inasmuch as the authorisation of the other authorised dealers who are similaritily (sic) have not been cancelled while the petitioners authorisation has been cancelled. 3. Before considering the contention it is necessary to refer to the Uttar Pradesh Foodgrains and Other Essential Articles Distribution Order, 1977. This order was issued by the State Government under powers conferred on it by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. Reference to Section 2 (b)(d), Section 4 and Schedules I and II of this order is required. We may extract these provisions:- "S. 2 (b): Authorised retail distributor means a person appointed as Agent (Retail) by the District Magistrate, City Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate for sale of Government foodgrains and other essential articles; (d) other essential articles means a commodity other than foodgrains, specified in the Schedule II appended to this order which is supplied or allotted by the State Government for distribution to identity card holders, at a price fixed, from time to time, by the Central or the State Government or any authority or officer of such Government or the manufacturer, as the case may be, in respect of such commodity; Section 4. Restriction on sale of other commodity :- No authorised retail distributor shall sell or hold in stock any commodity other than Government foodgrains and other essential articles except with the permission of the State Government or sell Government food grains or other essential articles otherwise than to an identity card holder or his agent. Schedule I Foodgrains 1. Wheat, 2. Rice, 3. Schedule I Foodgrains 1. Wheat, 2. Rice, 3. Gram, 4. Jowar. 5. Bajra. 6. Maize, 7. Barley, 8. Peas. Schedule II Other Essential Articles 1. Sugar, 2. Kerosene Oil. 4. It will be seen that an authorised retail distributor is a person who is appointed as an agent (retail) by the District Magistrate, City Magistrate, or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for sale of Government foodgrains and other essential articles. Section 2 (d) defines other essential articles as meaning a commodity other than foodgrains specified in Schedule II appended to the order. Schedule II refers, amongst other, to sugar and kerosene oil, and Schedule I refers to foodgrains. In these petitions we are concerned with foodgrains and sugar. 5. The petitioners were appointed as authorised retail distributors by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. After their appointment they entered into an agreement. The agreement was entered into by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the petitioners and Cl. 16 of that agreement permitted the District Magistrate/Town Rationing Officer to terminate the agreement at any time without assigning any reason. The agreements of the petitioners were either terminated or suspended under the purported exercise of powers under Clause 16 of this agreement. In all the cases by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate except in the case of Raj Kumar Sheo Kumar, which was done by the Additional District Magistrate, Meerut. 6. Counsel urged that the contract entered into by the petitioner was an idle formality, for the distribution order of 1977 did not contemplate the grant of licenses by an agreement. This contention was raised obviously to give a colour of a statutory contract to one which we feel is purely contractual. The Control Order, 1977 does not provide the manner in which an authorised retail distributor is to be appointed. Section 4 contains a restriction to the effect that a person who is appointed as an authorised retailer will not sell or stock any other commodity. The other provisions of the order relate to how the business of sale of these foodgrains and other essential commodities is to be conducted. The order does not contain any provision for cancellation or suspension of the licenses. Inasmuch as the order does not provide the manner in which the appointment of an authorised retailer is to be made the appointment could be made by an agreement between the relevant authorities and the person prepared to act as such. The order does not contain any provision for cancellation or suspension of the licenses. Inasmuch as the order does not provide the manner in which the appointment of an authorised retailer is to be made the appointment could be made by an agreement between the relevant authorities and the person prepared to act as such. We are not prepared to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioners that Section 2 (b) excludes an appointment by an agreement and the agreements entered into by the petitioners were idle formalities gone into by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the petitioners. Once this position is reached the right which the petitioners got to sell Government foodgrains and other essential commodities supplied to them was dependent solely on the contract entered into by them. That the State Government in these circumstances was entitled to enter into agreement with retail sellers for the distribution of Government foodgrains and other essential commodities is established by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Chandra Sekharan v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu. ( AIR 1974 SC 1543 ). In that case the Central Government had promulgated the Levy Sugar Control Order, 1972. Section 2 of that order gave power to the Central Government to issue directions for supply of levy sugar. We may quote Section 2 (2) and Section 2(3) of that Order :- "S. 2 (2) Where any direction is issued to any producer or recognised dealer under sub-clause (1) (or sub-clause 1-A) for the supply of levy sugar to any State Government, that State Government may either arrange to take delivery of the sugar by itself or nominate any person, organisation or authority to take delivery of the sugar. 2(3) Any levy sugar taken delivery of under sub-clause (2) may be stored distributed or sold- (a) where such sugar has been taken delivery of by the State Government in such manner as the State Government deems fit; (b) in any other case, in accordance with such directions as may be issued by the State Government or by an officer or authority empowered by the State Government in this behalf." 7. The State of Tamil Nadu entered into agreements with sugar dealers for the sale of levy sugar. Subsequently it formulated a policy to distribute levy sugar through Model Shops and Co-operative Societies, and terminated the petitioners agreement. The State of Tamil Nadu entered into agreements with sugar dealers for the sale of levy sugar. Subsequently it formulated a policy to distribute levy sugar through Model Shops and Co-operative Societies, and terminated the petitioners agreement. This termination order was challenged by the sugar retailer in the Supreme Court, and it was held that the petitioners had no legal right to trade in levy sugar. It is relevant to point out that the Supreme Court did not disapprove of the Tamil Nadu Government entering into an agreement with sugar retailers for distributing sugar under the levy order. It will be noticed that paragraphs 2(2) and (3) of the Levy Order contemplated the nomination of the retailers, and like the U.P. order did not contain any specific provision for entering into agreement for appointing authorised retailers. The Tamil Nadu Government even in the absence of such a provision entered into an agreement and the termination order passed by it was upheld. It cannot be disputed that the State Government can enter into a contract for the disposal of its property, and the person entering into these agreements is thereafter bound by the terms of the contract. No specific authorisation by any statute is required to enable the State Government to enter into contracts, for that right whereas (inheres) in a person owning the property. Now contracts under which the petitioners took the supply had a clause for termination of these contracts without assigning any reasons. No question of a breach of principle of natural justice arises when the contract under which the petitioners are working does not grant them such a right. We are fortified in this approach by the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shitla Prasad v. M. Said Ullah ( AIR 1975 All 344 ). 8. The contention that the Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to cancel or suspend the agreements as Clause 16 of the Agreement empowered only District Magistrates/Town Rationing Officer to do so, even if accepted, does not further the case of the petitioner in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for at best that would amount to a breach of the contract, and a suit for damages would be an appropriate remedy. Counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramanna Daya Ram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ), and urged that even in the matter of contracts the Government cannot act arbitrarily and discriminate between one person and the other. We do not think that the decision in this case can be appropriately applied here. We are inclined to take the view, that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1977 SC 1496 ) is more appropriate to facts of this case, and that the principles laid down in Rammana's case apply at the stage of granting a particular privilege or other benefit once, however, that has been done and contracts have been entered into by the citizen and the State Government, the matter thereafter is governed by the agreement between the parties. 9. On this view, the ground of discrimination also does not hold good. But even if we were to examine this contention on merits, there is no sufficient material on the record on the basis of which we can come to a definite conclusion that the petitioners have been discriminated in the matter of termination of their authorization. 10. This judgment will form part of order of the 5th December, 1980 dismissing the petitions.