( 1 ) THIS appeal is presented by an unsuccessful plaintiff in the suit filed by her for declaration of her title in, and recovering possession of, the suit schedule house property, relying on a defeasance clause in a, settlement deed executed by her elder sister. ( 2 ) (I) All the material facts are not in dispute. The suit property consisls of a shop premises situate at III Main Road, New Tharagupet, bangalore. One Muniswamaiah alias papaiah Setty had three daughters, one by name Muniamma by his first wife and two others Lakshamma and jayalakshamma through his second wife. The last and youngest of them, jayalakshmamma is the appellant plaintiff. By his will dated 20-9-40, muniswamaiah bequeathed the suit scheduled property in favour of lakshamma, whose husband had died during the same year. Muniswamappa died on 28-12-1940. (II) After the death of her husband, lakshamma was living with Jaya lakshsmma on 7-12-47 Jayalakshmamma gave birth to a male child who was named Papaiah. On 22-10-51 lakshmamma executed a settlement deed (Ex. P-4 ). Under that deed the suit property was settled absolutely in favour of minor Papaiah. Jayalakshmamma was appointed as minor guardian. She was required to look after and educate Papaiah, utilising the income from property and was required to hand over possession of the property to Papaiah after he attained majority. (III) Papaiah became a major on 7-12-1955. He sold the suit schedule property in favour of the defendant respondent for a sum of Rs. 50,000 by means of a registered sale deed dated 25-10-66 (Ex. D-1 ). Jayalakshmamma and her husband D. V. Krishnamurthy expressly consented to the sale and in token of their acceptance of the recitals in the sale deed attested the document. Jayalakshamma gave a declaration (Ex. D-3) on the same day to the effect that the property belonged absolutely to Papaiab and that she had no right over the same. On 26-10-66 the same property was mortgaged (vide Ex-D-2) by defendant-respondent in favour of Papaiah and his sister Vasantakumari for a sum of Rs. 45,000. Both the documents were registered on 26-10-66. (IV) On 10-6-69 Papaiah married one Chikkasampangamma. Only four days thereafter, i. e on 14-6-1969 papaiah died owing to cerebral haemorrhage. (V) On 5-12-1969 Jayalakshmamma got issued a notice (Ext. D-6) to the respondent calling upon her to pay the mortgage money. 45,000. Both the documents were registered on 26-10-66. (IV) On 10-6-69 Papaiah married one Chikkasampangamma. Only four days thereafter, i. e on 14-6-1969 papaiah died owing to cerebral haemorrhage. (V) On 5-12-1969 Jayalakshmamma got issued a notice (Ext. D-6) to the respondent calling upon her to pay the mortgage money. As the same was not paid she filed O. S. No. 62 of 1971 before the Principal Civil Judge, bangalore, for recovery of mortgage money from the respondent. Vasantha kumar Papaiah's sister, and chikkasampangamma, wife of Papaiah also joined as plaintiffs in that suit. On 30-9-1972 there was a preliminary decree in that suit (Ext. D-7 ). On 31-3-73 an application praying for a final decree was also made (Ex-D-12 ). Thereafter the respondent deposited the mortgage money. Consequently the decree was satisfied and the respondent who was already in possession continued to be in possession of the suit schedule property as absolute owner. ( 3 ) AFTER all this, about five years later the appellant-plaintiff filed the present suit O. S. No. 609 of 1978 before the II Additional Civil Judge bangalore City against the respondent. The prayer in the suit was for a declaration that the plaintiff had acquired title to the suit property by virtue of a defeasance clause in the settlement deed (Ext. P-4) and for a consequential prayer for a decree for possession. ( 4 ) THE defendant-respondent resisted the suit on various grounds. They were- (I) The clause on which the plaintiff relied was not a defeasance clause at all, but was a repugnant clause and, therefore, inoperative. (II) Even if the clause is construed as a defeasance clause, the condition set out in the clause was that Jayalakshmamma would become the absolute owner of the property if only Papaiah died during minority and therefore the clause became inoperative as Papaiah became a major and died only at the age of twenty two years. (III) The construction of the clause as suggested for the plaintiff renders the condition vague and, therefore, inoperative. (III) The construction of the clause as suggested for the plaintiff renders the condition vague and, therefore, inoperative. (IV) Plaintiff was estopped from making the suit claim in view of the representation made by her to the respondent through her attestation as a consenting witness to the sale deed as also the declaration which, she gave to the effect that Papaiah was the absolute owner and that she had no right in the suit schedule property and thereby induced the respondent to purchase the property. ( 5 ) LEARNED Civil Judge framed as many as 15 issues in the suit on the basis of the pleadings. He accepted all the above mentioned pleas of the respondent and dismissed the suit. ( 6 ) BEFORE us Sri K. N. Balasubra maniam and Sri S. G. Sundaraswamy, learned counsels for the appelllant and respondent, respectively, addressed elaborate arguments and relied on a large number of authorities ini support of their respective contentions. ( 7 ) ALL the material facts being undisputed, the case lies within a, narrow compass. The two points, which arise for consideration are: (1) The true meaning and scope of the relevant clause in the settlement (Ex. P-4) i. e. , whether it is a defeasance' clause or a repugnant clause, and if it is the former, what is the event specified in the clause on the happening of which the absolute grant in favour of Papaiah was to be determined and a; gift over had to take place in favour of Jayala,kshamma? an incidental question is, if the construction suggested for the appellant is correct, is or is not the condition void owning to vagueness? (2) The purport and effect of representation made by the appellant to the respondent by being a consenting witness to the sale deed executed by Papaiah as also by making a declaration that Papaiah was absolute owner and that she had no right over it, and whether she is estopped from making the suit claim in view of the representation. (2) The purport and effect of representation made by the appellant to the respondent by being a consenting witness to the sale deed executed by Papaiah as also by making a declaration that Papaiah was absolute owner and that she had no right over it, and whether she is estopped from making the suit claim in view of the representation. ( 8 ) BEFORE proceeding further, we shall set out the legal principles relevant to decide the points arising for consideration in this appeal, namely- (I) governing the operation of defeasance clause, as also the distinction between a defeasance clause, which has to be given effect to and a repugnant clause, which has to be discarded and (II) the principles governing the rule of construction of documents of the nature concerned in this case. (1) Re: defeasance clause and repugnant clause: (a) The dividing line between a defeasance clause and a repugnant clause, though fine in certain cases, still, it is well known. Defeasance clause is meant to determine an absolute disposition made in another clause of a document in favour of an individual on the happening or not happening of a specified event or contingency and to make a gift over of the same property in favour of another. Therefore on the happening or not happening of such specified event or contingency, the defeasance clause operates and has to be given effect to by the courts if called upon to do so. But a repugnant clause is one which imposes conditions or restrictions inconsistent with an absolute disposition. (See: Golak Behari Mandal v. Sura Dhanidasi ILR (1939) 1 Cal. 63 Suresh Chandra palit v. Lalit Mohandutta Chaudhari (1915) Ind. Cases 405 and Bachman v. Bachman ILR 5 All 583, 612 (b) If the clause is repugnant, the earlier clause creating an absolute estate prevails, i. e. , the repugnant clause is inoperative and unenforceable. (See: Radha Sundar v. Mohd. Jahadur rahim AIR 1959 SC 24 , 30 also Halsbury's Laws of england 3rd Edn. Vol. 39 p. 1090 para 1623) (c) In order that defeasance clause be effective, condition specified must be clear and certain. The persons concerned must know with certainty at all times, what is the condition contemplated by the clause, on the happening or not happening of which the absolute disposition made in favour of a person under another clause of the document stands determined. The persons concerned must know with certainty at all times, what is the condition contemplated by the clause, on the happening or not happening of which the absolute disposition made in favour of a person under another clause of the document stands determined. There should be certainty in expression as also certainty in operation. If the contingent event specified in a clause is vague and uncertain, it would be void and unenforceable. Lord Fry, J. enunciated this principle in re. Viscount Exmouth v. Praed (1883) LR 23 Ch. D. 158, 164 such contingent limitations in the nature of defeasances are, in my view, subject to all the rules which apply to conditions subsequent. One of those rules I understand to be this, that the condition must be clear and certain. That in my opinion includes, not only certainty of expression in the creation of the limitation, but also certainty in its operation. It must be such a limitation that, at any given moment of time it is ascertainable whether the limitation has or has not taken effect. But as to this contingent limitation it cannot always be ascertained whether it has or has not taken effect, and therefore I hold it void. Similar was the view expressed in Clavering v. Ellison 61 ER 957 and Noel v. Sand- brook and Lanyon v. Lanyon (1912) 2 Ch. D. 471 (See also Halsbury's Laws of England Srd edn. Vol. 39. P. P. 922-923 Para J3p6 also Vol. 34 P. 504 Para 889. (2) Re: Construction of documents: The principles governing interpretation of documents of the type concerned in the case are also well settled. In this behalf, we consider it unnecessary to refer to the decisions of various courts, Indian and foreign, cited at the bar, as we have the dictum of the highest court in the country on the point. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of navneetlal v. Gokul AIR 1976 SC 794 , 797 which are relevant for this case are- (1) In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered; but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed. (2) In construing the language of the will the court is entitled to put itself into the testator's armchair and is bound to bear in, mind also other matters than merely the words used. It must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense. . . . . But all this is solely as aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by that particular testator in that document. (3) The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by attaching importance to isolated expressions but by reading the will as a whole with all its provisions and ignoring none of them as redundant or contradictory. (4) The Court must accept, if possible such construction as would give to every expression some effect rather than that which would render any of the expressions inoperative. The Court will look at the circumstances under which the testator makes his will, such as the state of his property, of his family and the like. Where apparently conflicting dispositions can be reconciled by giving full effect to every word used in a document, such a construction should be accepted instead of a construction which would have the effect of cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by the testator. ( 9 ) BEARING in mind the above principles, we shall now proceed to construe the settlement deed. It is in kannada. The material recitals in the opening part of the deed furnish the following information: (i) The deed of settlement was executed on 22-10-1951. Lakshmamma was then aged forty years. After the death of her husband in the year 1940, she was residing at Door No. 15 of Appurayappa Lane, Nagarthpet, Bangalore city, along with her mother Munivenkatamma and younger sister jayalakshmamma. She had inherited moveable and immoveable properties under a will executed by her father, of which, she was the absolute owner. She had no children. (iii) She was treating the children of her younger sister Jayalakshmamma as her own. Jayalakshmamma had a male child by name Papaiah who was aged five years. The health of Lakshmarnma was not in good condition. She wanted to go on pilgrimage. She had no children. (iii) She was treating the children of her younger sister Jayalakshmamma as her own. Jayalakshmamma had a male child by name Papaiah who was aged five years. The health of Lakshmarnma was not in good condition. She wanted to go on pilgrimage. In the circumstances she wanted to make papaiah her legal heir and with full faith and belief that he would perform her obsequies she was executing the settlement out her own free will and desire. The material portion which followed these recitals reads: the above clause is unambiguous and clear. Substance of the clause is as follows: Minor Papaiah was made the absolute owner of 'a' schedule house property (the suit schedule property from the date of settlement deed. Jayalakshmamma was to be the guardian of Papaiah. She was required to maintain and educate Papaiah out of the income from the property. She had no authority to alienate the property. She had to hand-over possession of the property to Papaiah on his attaining majority. There is no controversy also between the panties about this clause. ( 10 ) AFTER this clause dispositions regarding a few other items of properties are provided for. The substance of these clauses are- (I) There was a fixed deposit of rs. 2,500 in Mysore Bank in the joint account of the three sisters, Lakshmamma, Jayalakshmamma and Muniamma. Munivenkatamma, the mother of lakshmamma and Jayalakshmamma, was entitled to the interest on this deposit during her life time. Thereafter Lakshmamma was entitled to one-third of the amount. This share after its receipt should be kept by jayalakshamma in fixed deposit in the name of minor Papaiah and interest thereon only should be used for the education of Papaiah. (II) Two items of shop premises at chandichowk, Civil Station, Bangalore, retained by Lakshmamma for her maintenance also should go to minor papaiah, if they were not disposed of by her during her life time subject to encumbrance if any created on these properties by her, and not discharged during her life time. (III) There was a mortgage debt due to the three sisters. Munivenkatamma was receiving the rent out of the mortgaged house One third of the debt was due to Lakshmamma. If the same was not received and spent by her during her life. (III) There was a mortgage debt due to the three sisters. Munivenkatamma was receiving the rent out of the mortgaged house One third of the debt was due to Lakshmamma. If the same was not received and spent by her during her life. time, it should be recovered by Jayalakshmamma and should be kept in fixed deposit account of minor Papaiah and only interest thereon should be expended for his benefit. (IV) Lakshmamma was entitled to one third share in the residential house in which she was living. As long as her mother was alive no one could claim a share. After her death, it was stated that she would try to get the house allotted to her share and if that was not possible and the house was to be sold, the amount due to Lakshmamma as her share should be taken by Jayalakshmamma and kept in a fixed deposit account of minor Papaiah in Mysore Bank and only interest amount alone should be spent. (V) There were a few shares in the mysore Bank. Munivenkatamma was receiving the dividends. Lakshmamma had one third share in that amount. It was provided that as and when moneys due to the share of Lakshmamma was received it should be kept in the fixed deposit account of Papaiah and only interest 'hereon should be utilised. ( 11 ) AFTER making the dispositions regarding the above properties, a clause was incorporated in the settlement deed and it was on that clause the claim of the plaintiff was based. It reads: english translation of the above portion is as follows:"i have no property other than 'a' and 'b' schedule properties mentioned above. You Jayalakshmamma shall abide by all the conditions set out apove, shall stand firmly and act for the benefit of minor Papaiah, shall not waste the property, shall pay municipal taxes payable, and carry out repairs to the property in due time, shall educate and look after the boy and shall hand-over the property to him immediately on his attaining majority. If I were to die during the minerity of Papaiah, you Jaya lakshmamma shall get my obsequies performed through your husband krishnamurthy. I pray God to grant minor Papaiah full span of life. If I were to die during the minerity of Papaiah, you Jaya lakshmamma shall get my obsequies performed through your husband krishnamurthy. I pray God to grant minor Papaiah full span of life. If pel chance life span of minor Papaiah were to be short and he were to die suddenly, in that event Jayalakshmamma yourself shall be the absolute owner of all these properties and shall enjoy the same according to your will and pleasure. Thus, this settlement deed executed by me out of my own pleasure and full knowledge and after having got read and heard the contents, I have affixed my left thumb mark in the presence of witnesses. From now onwards I shall have no right or interest in the A schedule property. " ( 12 ) ACCORDING to plaintiff the portion of the settlement set out above is a defeasance clause and in terms of that clause, the grant made in favour of Papaiah stood determined, as papaiah died a premature and sudden death at ,the young age of about twenty two years only, four days after his marriage, the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the property from that date and therefore notwithstanding the sale of the property by papaiah in favour of respondent, in, terms of the defeasance clause, she acquired the right to the property and the trial court on an erroneous interpretation of the clause, has rejected her claim ( 13 ) IN our view, the clause set out above is a defeasance clause as contended for the appellant. But we are unable to agree about the construction placed for the appellant on the wording of the clause. Under the clause the absolute grant of the property made in favour of minor Papaiah, was to come to an end and it was to go to Jayalakshmamma on the happening of an event, which as we presently show was the death of papaiah during his minority. The wording of the clause read with all the other clauses in the settlement deed indubitably indicates that the property which was given absolutely to Papaiah from the date of the settlement deed itself was to be under the management of Jayalakshmamma as minor guardian and it had to be handed over to Papaiah immediately on his attaining majority. The wording of the clause read with all the other clauses in the settlement deed indubitably indicates that the property which was given absolutely to Papaiah from the date of the settlement deed itself was to be under the management of Jayalakshmamma as minor guardian and it had to be handed over to Papaiah immediately on his attaining majority. If however, owing to short span of' life minor Papaiah were to die, she was to keep the property for herself. This clearly means that if Papaiah were; to die before taking possession i. e. , before becoming a major, gift over of the same in favour of Jayalakshmamma was intended. But Papaiah, became a major and took possession of property from Jayalakshmamma and died only at the age of twenty two. Therefore the happening of the event specified in the defeasance clause became impossible on and after the date when Papaiah became a major and consequently the defeasance clause became inoperative. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant, however, strenuously maintained that the event contemplated by the defeasance clause on the happening of which it was to operate was accidental and premature death of Papaiah at any time. He argued that it was not correct to interpret the words 'if minor Papaiah were to die' as to mean 'if Papaiah were to die during minority. In this behalf he pointed out that in the earlier sentence Lakshmamma had stated that if she were to die when papaiah was in the state of minority, jayalakshmamma should get her obsequies performed through D. V. Krishnamuthy i. e. , husband of jayalakshmamma and that it indicates lakshmamma made clear distinction between the period of minority and minor Papaiah and that the latter term was used only as descriptive of papaiah and had nothing to do with his death during minority. He also submitted that the settlor having prayed god for long life for Papaiah could not be expected to speculate the death of Papaiah during minority, in the next sentence. ( 15 ) READING the settlement deed as a whole and also having regard to the wording of the relevant clause, we find it difficult to accept the construstion suggested for the appellants. Contents of the deed indicate as follows: Lakshmamma had no children she was loving Papaiah as her own son. She wanted to make him her legal heir. ( 15 ) READING the settlement deed as a whole and also having regard to the wording of the relevant clause, we find it difficult to accept the construstion suggested for the appellants. Contents of the deed indicate as follows: Lakshmamma had no children she was loving Papaiah as her own son. She wanted to make him her legal heir. She wanted him to perform her obsequies. She made him absolute owner of the property forthwith and appointed Jayalakshmamma as minor guardian, who was given right only to manage the property without any right to alienate. She was directed to hand-over possession of the property immediately on his attaining majority. Similarly in respect of various items of other properties she was directed to keep the amounts in fixed deposit account of minor Papaiah and was authorised to expend only the interest there from. Jayalakshmamma was asked to get the obsequies of Lakshamma performed through her husband d. V. Krishnamurthy if Lakshmamma were to die during minority of Papaiah. Nothing was said as to who should perform obsequies of Lakshmamma if she were to die after Papaiah attained majority obviously because she expected Papaiah to perform her obsequies as is evident from the opening part of the deed. In the next sentence she prayed God to grant Papaiah a full span of life but added that if, however it turned out that minor papaiah had only short span of life and were, to die suddenly, Jayalakshmamma, should herself become the absolute owner of the properties. Another significant aspect is that there was no restriction on the right of Papaiah to alienate or dea,l with, the property in any manner he pleased after he took possession. Taking all the clauses and words in the settlement deed into account, we are of the opinion that the clause on which the appellant relies neither convertted the absolute estate created in favour of Papaiah, under the earlier part of the deed into a life estate or provided for reversion of the property from Papaiah, after it was handed-over to him on his becoming a major, to jayalakshmamma, if Papaiah were to die suddenly thereafter. Reading the settlement deed as a whole, the words 'if minor Papaiah were to die suddenly' only mean that if Papaiah were to die before the date on which jayalakshmamma was to cease to be a guardian and was required to handover the property to Papaiah, to wit the date of his becoming a major. Therefore according to the defeasance clause Jayalakshmamma was to retain the property herself if only Papaiah was short lived and did not out-live his age of minority. ( 16 ) IN this behalf, it is pertinent to point out that Lakshmamma wanted to have Papaiah as her male legal heir. She desired that he should perform' her obsequies. She was herself the victim of widowhood in her young age. It would be difficult to believe that she would have desired to deprive the widow of Papaiah or children, if any born, before his death if it had taken ,place suddenly, after his marriage and after he begot children, of the property and to render the widow of Papaiah and his children destitutes. Therefore, all that she wanted was that Jayalakshmamma should look after Papaiah well, till he attained majority and to hand-over the property to him and thereafter things should take their own course, but if for any reason that such handing over could not happen owing to sudden and unexpected demise of Papaiah during minority, Jayalakshmamma was given the right to retain the property herself. ( 17 ) IF the interpretation suggested for the appellant is accepted, the defeasance clause becomes vague and consequently inoperative. The interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the crucial clause in the settlement deed, was that if at any time during the life time of Papaih, he were to die suddenly, the absolute ownership vested in Papaiah would stand determined and would stand vested in jayalakshmamma. Such clause, in our opinion would be invalid on the ground of vagueness. If the clause had stated that the absolute estate in favour of Papaiah shall stand determined and there shall be gift over of the same property in favour of Jayalakshmamma on the death of Papaiah, the condition for the operation of the defeasance clause would have been definite and it would have had the effect of creating only a life estate in favour of Papaiah. But to say that the property would revert to Jayalakshmamma in the event of Papaiah having short span of life and dying suddenly and that such an event could take place at any time in the life of papaiah ie, even after he attained majority, renders the condition vague, because whenever the death took place, the person claiming benefit under the defeasance clause would contend that the death was sudden and the person who claims through the person on whom absolute right had been conferred would contend that the death was in the natural course and again the former would contend life span was short and the latter would contend that it was not so. In one sense death is always sudden and in another it is always expected, for all are mortals. Similarly whether life span is short or long, is always comparative. Therefore, a condition of that type is too uncertain for the court to say as to whether it had taken place or not i. e. , as to whether the span of life was short or long or as to whether the death was sudden or was not so. It is, however, unnecessary to pursue the discussion in this behalf, as it is clear on a proper and reasonable interpretation of the clause, the condition imposed in the defeasance clause was only the death of Papaiath during his minority. For the same reason, we consider it unnecessary to examine the correctness of the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the clause is a repugnant clause and consequently invalid. ( 18 ) IN the result, on the first point arising in this appeal, we hold that the clause in the settlement deed on which the plaintiff relied is a defeasance clause, but the condition on the happening of which there would have been a gift over of the suit schedule property in favour of the appellant was the death of Papaiah during his minority. As the happening of thait event became impossible on, Papaiah attaining majority and taking possession of the suit schedule property, the defeasance clause became inoperative, and the suit claim based on the defeasance clause therefore must fail ( 19 ) THE next point for consideration is the alternative plea of the respondent that the appellant is estopped from making the suit claim. This is mainly based on the contents of the sale deed (Ex. D-1) dated 25-1-1966 executed by Papaiah under which the suit schedule property was sold to the respondent. The relevant portions of the recitals in the sale deed on which the plea of estoppel is based read as follows: whereas the above said Smt. Lakshmamma by a deed of settlement dated 20-10-51 executed by her in favour of the vendor and the said document is registered as No. 2350 of 1951-52 in Book I Volume 1163 pages 43 to 49 in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore City. Whereas the vendor is in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property as full and. absolute owner thereof having derived title to in the aforesaid manner. Now this indenture of the sale witnesseth that in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the said sum of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) paid by the purchaser, to the said vendor before the Sub-Registrar of Bangalore City South, the receipt of which amount the vendor does hereby acknowledge, the vendor does hereby sell, transfer, grant, assign, upto and to the use of the purchaser, the schedule property with all the right, title, interest, property claim and demand whatsoever, and all the fixtures, including the side walls, hedges, fences, passages, water courses, drains, easements, advantages, and appurtenances, whatsoever in the schedule property of the vendor and every part thereof with liberties and privileges, advantages, appertaining thereto and to have and to hold the same absolutely free from all encumbrances without any lawful interruptions or disturbances, by the. vendor or any person lawfully and equitably claiming through or in trust for him or any any of his predecessors in title the vendor further covenants with the purchaser that he has full power to convey and has done nothing whereby he is prevented from conveying the same. In token of D. V. Krishnamurthy, the father of the vendor and Jaylakshmamma the mother of the vendor having had no interest in the property and having no objection for the sale of the property to the purchaser by the vendor Sri d. K. Papaiah alias Mahadevan, they have attested this document as consenting witnesses with knowledge of the contents of this sale deed. Simultanously with the execution of the sale deed a declaration was also signed by Smt. Jayalakshmamma on 26-10-1966 (Exhibit D-3 ). Simultanously with the execution of the sale deed a declaration was also signed by Smt. Jayalakshmamma on 26-10-1966 (Exhibit D-3 ). It reads- i, Jayalakshmamma, wife of sri D. V. Krishnamurthy, residing at No. 306. III Main Road, Narasimharaja Colony, bangalore solemnly affirm and declare as follows:1. That my son Sri D. K. Papaiah alias Mahadevan was born on 7-2-1. 947 and he has attained majority. 2. By virtue of the settlement deed dated 20-11-1951 registered as No. 2350 I was his guardian during his minority and as he has now attained majority. I have ceased to be his guardian. 3. I further declare that the schedule property belongs absolutely to him and I have no right over the same. On the basis of the recitals in the sale deed to which Jayalakshmamma, was a consenting witness and also the declaration given by Jayalakshmamma, it was contended for the respondent that she was estopped from taking the plea that she had acquired any right to the property. ( 20 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that the plea of estoppel is not available to the respondent in this case. Elaborating this point, learned counsel submitted that a representation, in order to form the foundation for a plea of estoppel must relate to facts in praesnti i. e. , represented to have been existing on the date when the representation was made, and sometimes it might include a past event but never any statement de futuro except in the case of a promissory estoppel which is not relevant for this case. Reliance was placed in this behalf on spencer Bower on the Law relating to Estoppel by Representation (1966) p. p. 29-30. To substantiate his sub- mission he gave the following reasons: the representation made by the appellant through the recitals in the sale deed by being a consenting witness and the declaration that Papaiah was the absolute owner of the suit house was true, because on the said date papaiah did possess absolute right to the property in terms of the settlement deed. It was to come to an end only in the event of his unexpected and sudden death. Jayalakshmamma therefore was to get the right to the property only on the death of papaiah in that manner. It was to come to an end only in the event of his unexpected and sudden death. Jayalakshmamma therefore was to get the right to the property only on the death of papaiah in that manner. Therefore there could not have been and there was in fact no representation made by jayalakshmamma as to what would happen in future, either in the sale deed or in the declaration. There was also no represenation to the effect that the defeasance Clause had already become inoperative or that she had no interest or claim under the defeasance clause on the happening of the event specified therein. Therefore the representation made had nothing to do with the nature of the claim made in the plaint and consequently the plea of estoppel raised by the respondent had no basis at all. ( 21 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent per contra contended that in view of clear and unambiguous recitals in the sale deed that Papaiah was the absolute owner, being a consenting and attesting witness to it. the appellant was estopped from making the suit claim. He relied on the decisions of the Madras High Court in Ramaswamy Gounder v. Anantha padmanabha (1971) 1 Mad. LJ. 392 and Jagannatham v. Kunjithapatham AIR 1972 Mad. 390 . Learned Counsel argued, relying on rule 71 of the Karnataka Registration Rules framed under the Registration Act, a consenting witness is deemed to be an executant and consequently, the appellant being a consenting witness to the sale deed in favour of the respondent, was bound by the transaction and could get rid of the same only by seeking a decree for cancellation of the document. In reply learned counsel for the appellant argued that under those rules a consenting witness was declared to be an executant only for a limited purpose, namely, for the purpose of part VI and Part VII of the Rules and was not bound by the transaction as such as the executant himself. ( 22 ) IN our view, a specific finding on the plea of estoppel or the effect of the appellant's being a consenting witness to the sale deed is redundant in view of our conclusion against the appellant on the construction of the relevant clause in the settlement deed. ( 22 ) IN our view, a specific finding on the plea of estoppel or the effect of the appellant's being a consenting witness to the sale deed is redundant in view of our conclusion against the appellant on the construction of the relevant clause in the settlement deed. However, we must observe that the representations made through the sale deed and the declaration by jayalakshmamma as also her subsequent conduct is consistent with the true meaning of the defeasance clause. As stated earlier, the defeasance clause means that Jayalakshmamma was to retain the property for herself if Papaiah were to die during minority. This event did not happen. Papaiah attained majority. In terms of the settlement deed, possession of the property was given to papaiah on his becoming a major. He sold the property to the respondent by registered sale deed dated 25-10-66. Jayalakshmamma by being a consenting witness to the sale deed through its recitals as also by a separate declaration made, categorically stated that Papaiah had absolute right to the property including the right of alienation and that she had no manner of right in the said property. This was a representation about the existing state of affairs. Again after the death of papaiah the appellant filed a suit against the respondent for the recovery of mortgage money in O. S. No. 62 of 1971 on the file of the Principal civil Judge, Bangalore. A preliminary decree (Ex. D-7) was made on 30th september 1972 in the said suit. Thereafter by an application filed under Order 34 rule 5 (3) C. P. C. the appellant prayed for a final decree ordering the sale of the mortgaged property. This application was made on 31-3-73. (Ex. D ). If, according to jayalakshmamma, the property became her property on the death of Papaiah, she would not have filed an application before the Court in the mortgage suit for the sale of the same property, to wit the suit schedule property. This clearly indicates that even after about four years after the death of papaiah on 14-6-69, the conduct of jayalakshmamma was such that she had not secured any right over the property under the defeasance clause and the property belonged to the respondent having purchased it from papaiah. Therefore, she asked for the sale of the said property for recovering the mortgage money due. Therefore, she asked for the sale of the said property for recovering the mortgage money due. It is true that the sale did not take place because the respondent deposited the mortgage money. But the fact remains that Jayalakshmamma had asked for the sale of the suit schedule property on the basis that it was the property of the respondent. Jayalakshmamma, the appellant, was the nearest among the relatives to lakshmamma, her elder sister who had executed the settlement deed. It was jayalakshmamma herself who had presented the settlement deed for registration before the Sub-Registrar. If at all any person was fully conversant with the desire and intenion of Lakshmamma, it was no other than he appellant herself. The course of conduct of the appellant right from the date on which Papaiah attained majority, was consistent with her understanding of the relevant clause in the settlement deed to the effect that she would have become the owner of the property only if Papaiah had died during his minority, but as it did no' happen and he attained majority, he became the absolute owner and she had no manner of right in the said property. The representation made in the sale deed, the contents of the declaration as also the application for sale of the suit property for satisfying mortgage money filed in O. S. 62 of 1971 as late as on 31-3-73 are all consistent with her understanding of the defeasance clause in that way. After having made a specific representation and the transaction having taken place on that basis, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to resile from that position and put forth an inconsistent plea. The interpretation of the defeasance clause put forward in the plaint is inconsistent with her own course of conduct over all these years. Obviously it has arisen as an after-thought simultaneous with a desire and hope of getting back the property on such interpretation, planted by some one in the mind of Jayalakshmamma. Significantly she did not entier the witness box and give evidence in the case. ( 23 ) THERE is no ground to interfere with the dismissal of the suit. ( 24 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and it shall stand dismissed with costs. --- *** --- .