ORDER V. K. Mehrotra, J. - By this petition under Art 226 of the Constitution, the Government Opium and Alkaloid Factory, Ghazipur, a departmental Undertaking of the Government of India has assailed an order dated Sept. 27, 1979 (Annexure `7 to the petition) by which Labour Court (I) Kanpur held that it had jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of some Standing Orders applicable to the workmen of the petitioner. The case of the petitioner is that, inasmuch as the Labour Court was not one constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and specified for the disposal of proceedings in question by the appropriate Government, namely, the Central Government by notification in the official Gazetee, it was not competent to determine the question about the application or interpretation of the standing Orders in dispute. 2. Section 13-A, which was added to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (Parliament Act No. 36 of 1956) is in these terms : "13-A, Interpretation etc. of standing Order. If any question arises as to the application or Interpretation of a standing order certified under this Act, any employer or workman may refer the question to any one of the Labour Courts constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), and specified for the disposal of such proceeding by the appropriate Government by notification in the official Gazette, and the Labour court to which the question is so referred shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the question and such decision shall be final and binding on the parties." The "appropriate Government" has been defined in the Standing Orders Act in Section 2 (b) thus : "2 (b), "appropriate Government" means in respect of the Central Government or a Railway Administration or in a major port, mine or oil-field, the Central Government, and in all other cases, the State Government." It is not in dispute that the petitioner is an industrial establishment within the meaning of that term under the Standing Orders Act. Parliament Act No. 36 or 1956 received the assent of the President on August 28, 1956. 3. By the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957), which received the assent of the President on Dec. Parliament Act No. 36 or 1956 received the assent of the President on August 28, 1956. 3. By the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957), which received the assent of the President on Dec. 20, 1956, S. 11-C was added to the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. It is in these terms : "11-C. Interpretation, etc. of Standing Orders If any question arises as to the application or interpretation of a Standing Order certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 any employer or workman may refer the question to any one of the Labour Courts specified for the disposal of such proceeding by the State Government, by notification on in the official Gazette, and the Labour Court to which the question is so referred, shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the question and such decision shall be final and binding on the parties." By the same Act, S. 4-A was added to the U. P. Act providing for constitution of Labour Court, sub-sec. (1) of i ..4-A, which alone is material in this case, reads thus : "4-A. Labour Court - (1) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the first schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act...................". The first schedule to the U. P. Act also was added by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957. It provided for the matters within the jurisdiction of Labour Courts. At item No. 2, it provided "the application and interpretation of Standing Order" as one of the matters which fell within the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts. 4. The plea of the respondents is that Labour Court (I), Kanpur, which passed the impugned order had necessary jurisdiction in the matter for it had been provided by the notification dated Dec. 4, 1957 that the Labour Courts constituted "under the U. P. Act shall be deemed to be Labour Courts constituted under the U. P. Act for purposes of S. 13-A of the Standing Orders Act within their respective areas of jurisdiction. 5. 4, 1957 that the Labour Courts constituted "under the U. P. Act shall be deemed to be Labour Courts constituted under the U. P. Act for purposes of S. 13-A of the Standing Orders Act within their respective areas of jurisdiction. 5. The Labour Court, in its impugned order has, inter alia, taken the view that, inasmuch as, there was a specific provision contained in the U. P. Act, in S. 11-C, about the question of application and interpretation of Standing Orders being determined by Labour Courts constituted under the U. P. Act and specified in that behalf, the provision would prevail over the corresponding provision made in the Standing Orders Act by the Parliament. In other words, what has been held by the Labour Court in the impugned order is that notwithstanding provisions for specification by the Central Government of a Labour Court appointed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for determining the question of applicability or of interpretation of a Standing Order in relation to an industrial establishment like the petitioner, the presence of the provision as contained in S. 11-C of the U. P. Act enabled the Labour Court (I), Kanpur to determine that question. 6. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is an enactment conferring powers to settle industrial disputes and other incidental matters, only in so far as they related to industrial disputes as defined in the U. P. Act. Since the definition of an industrial dispute contained in S. 2 (1) of the U. P. Act excluded an industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority, inter alia, of the Central Government, determination of any question even in regard to the interpretation of Standing Orders applicable to the petitioner's establishment was outside the jurisdiction of a Labour Court constituted under the U. P. Act. The argument also is that the U. P. Act itself contemplated the question of applicability or interpretation of a Standing Order to be an industrial dispute as was clear from a combined reading of S. 4-A and the first schedule to the U. P. Act. 7. The argument also is that the U. P. Act itself contemplated the question of applicability or interpretation of a Standing Order to be an industrial dispute as was clear from a combined reading of S. 4-A and the first schedule to the U. P. Act. 7. The submission that the U. P. Act provides only for resolution of industrial disputes and nothing more is not acceptable particularly in view of the language in which S. 4-A dealing with the constitution of Labour Courts, is couched. That provision, as would be clear from its perusal, specifically provides that the State Government may constitute a Labour Court, not only for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the first schedule but also for performing such other functions as may be assigned to it under the Act. By S. 11-C, which was inserted in it, simultaneously with S. 4-A, the State Legislature provided also for the decision by the Labour Court of a question about the applicability or interpretation of a Standing Order certified under the Standing Orders Act. On its language, S. 4-A would empower the Labour Court to deal with the matter of applicability or interpretation of a Standing Order, when referred to it as an industrial dispute under S. 4-K of the Act, as well as to determine that question when any employer or a workman refers that question to it directly. The U. P. Legislature clearly followed, in this respect, the scheme which was provided for by the Parliament for determination of such question at the instance of an individual workman or employer by a Labour Court, appointed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and specified by the appropriate Government, by enacting S. 13-A in the Standing Orders Act. If there was no provision like S. 11-C in the U. P. Act it could have been contended that the matter of applicability or interpretation of a Standing Order duly certified under the Standing Orders Act, could be entertained by a Labour Court appointed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and specified for the purposes by the appropriate Government in terms of S. 13-A of the Standing Orders Act. The enactment of S. 11-C by the State Legislature has, however, made the requisite change in the forum in so far as the State of U. P. is concerned. 8. The enactment of S. 11-C by the State Legislature has, however, made the requisite change in the forum in so far as the State of U. P. is concerned. 8. Under Entry No. 22 of the concurrent list of Schedule VII to the Constitution, it was competent for the State Legislature to enact a provision like S. 11-C. The Parliamentary legislation contained in S. 13-A of the Standing Orders Act, as enacted by Parliament Act No. 36 of 1956, would yield to S. 11-C of the U. P. Act as inserted in it by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957. That would be on account of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution for, as seen above, U. P. Act No. I of 1957 being a later enactment, which was passed with the assent of the President, would prevail in the State of U. P. 9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it must by held that Labour Court (I) Kanpur had the necessary jurisdiction to deal with the question of applicability and interpretation of Standing Orders and that the order passed by it, which has been impugned in the present petition does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction. The petitioner has not been able to point out any such error in the decision recorded by the Labour Court, on the merits of the dispute, which may amount to an apparent error of law enabling this Court to interfere with it in these proceedings. The petition fails and is dismissed but, without any orders as to costs.