M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS defendants' second appeal is against the concurrent findings of the courts below. ( 2 ) THE respondent herein was the plaintiff in O. S. No. 333/67 on the file of the Munsiff, Mercara. That suit was filed under S. 26 of the CPC read with order 1 Rule 8. In other words, it was representative in character seeking a declaration in rem. The declaration was for declaring that the foot-path shown as public foot-pa,th in the plaint map and which runs through Kanbylu estate, as foot-path for pedestrians only, and not a public road for, vehicular traffic movement and that the plaintiff has a right to keep the gate at the place where it now stands and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using the path inside the estate including the public foot-path. shown in the plaint map for public purpose of taking vehicles and to restrain them from tampering with or removing the gate erected by the plaintiff. ( 3 ) THE circumstances leading to the filing of the suit may be briefly summarised as follows as some of the facts are not in dispute. ( 4 ) THERE is a public foot-path running from Sunticoppa-Madapur road in kodugu District leading to a village called Nalkoor in Sunticoppa Nadu, north Coorg Tk. This public foot-path passes through several survey numbers of that area. But it suffices to mention that it passes through the coffee plantations of the plaintiff-respondent and some other coffee planters. Some time after 1950 and before 1952 the plaintiff-respondent's father and one Mr. White a neighbouring plantation owner got a section of that public foot-path widened and converted to a road on which motor vehicles could be used. The widening of the foot-path was done on the right side of the path leading to Mercara by cutting away one row of coffee plants in their estates. Though there has been different measurements given as to the width of the widened road, it is safe to presume that it is between 5 and 8 feet. This road came to be metalled by the aforementioned planters. The length of the road so metalled appears to be about 3 furlongs only. Though there has been different measurements given as to the width of the widened road, it is safe to presume that it is between 5 and 8 feet. This road came to be metalled by the aforementioned planters. The length of the road so metalled appears to be about 3 furlongs only. Somewhere in 1953 or thereafter the plaintiff erected a gate on the road in order to prevent public vehicular traffic and for regulating the use of their own vehicles for use in the two plantations. The gate is located at the entrance of the pulpyard of the respondent-plaintiff at the crossing of the road leading to his estate house and the pathway. It is also admitted in the plaintiff-respondent's evidence that beside the gate he, has erected a wicket gate to prevent cattle and vehicles from using the foot-path. The said wicket gate appears to have been erected in what was originally the path-way other than the widened section of the road in the plantation. As, many people began to assert the right to use vehicles on the foot-path-pathway right through including through the gate erected by the plaintiff-respondent, the plaintiff was compelled to file the suit for prayers set out earlier. ( 5 ) THE suit was resisted by the two appellants-defendants only who are father and son. They appear to have been granted in recent times 10 acres of government land near about the plantation of the respondent-plaintiff which they have now converted to a coffee plantation. They resisted the suit prayer on the sole ground that the foot-path pathway was a public path from times immemorial and that all persons had acquired absolute right to use that pathway unobstructed. On these substantial pleadings the trial court framed as many as three issues and they are as follows:"1) Whether the defendants have no right to take or run any vehicle on the suit path? 2 ). Whether the defendants have been using the said path for running vehicles for over statutory period? 3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to injunction?" ( 6 ) THE respondent-plaintiff examined as many as 9 witnesses including himself and get several documents marked. Similarly, the appellants-defendants examined 8 witnesses including the 1st defendant and got several documents marked in their behalf. Whether the defendants have been using the said path for running vehicles for over statutory period? 3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to injunction?" ( 6 ) THE respondent-plaintiff examined as many as 9 witnesses including himself and get several documents marked. Similarly, the appellants-defendants examined 8 witnesses including the 1st defendant and got several documents marked in their behalf. On appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial cout came to the conclusion that the respondent-plaintiff must succeed in his suit and therefore decreed the same and passed the following final order. ORDER" (i) The suit schedule path running through the plaintiff's Kanbylu estate and shown as public path in the village plan shall be declared as a pedestrain foot-path and not a public road for vehicular movement. (ii) It shall be further declared that the plaintiff has a right to keep the gate at the place where it now stands near the kanbylu pulp house. (iii) The defendants 1 to 2 and the members of the public who are represented by defandants 1 and 2, shall be permanently restrained by an order of permanent injunction from using the suit schedule public foot-path for the purpose of taking vehicles as of right without the permission of the plaintiff. (iv) Defendants 1 and 2 and the members of the public who are represented by defendants 1 and 2 shall further be restrained by an order of permanent injunction from tampering with or remove the gate put up by the plaintiff near his pulp house. (v) In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their costs of the suit. " ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment and decree in terms of the above order the appellants preferred appeal to the civil judge, Mercara, in R. A. No. 18 1970. The lower appellate court concurred with the. findings and judgment and decree of the trial Court. Therefore, the present second appeal. ( 8 ) SHRI B. P. Holla, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants has strenuously urged before me that the judgments and decrees under appeal deserve to be set aside in as much as the courts below failed to take note of the material evidence on record. Therefore, the present second appeal. ( 8 ) SHRI B. P. Holla, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-defendants has strenuously urged before me that the judgments and decrees under appeal deserve to be set aside in as much as the courts below failed to take note of the material evidence on record. His argument is that there is no dispute that the foot-path-pathway is a public pathway even according to the finding on issue No. 1 and when admittedly the road was widened without the permission of the concerned authority or the Government, the respondent-plaintiff could not be permitted or granted the right to erect a gate to obstruct the use of the. foot-path-pathway. ( 9 ) HE has laboriously taken me through the evidence of witnesses for the plaintiff-respondent including that of the plaintiff himself. It is true, therein it can be found that there are admissions to the effect that there is a public foot-path-pathway. Some witnesses have stated that the footpath is 3 to 5 ft, wide. Some others have stated that it is 5 to 6 ft. wide while one witness has stated that the road was 5 to 8 ft. wide, it is also to be found that P. W. 1 who is no other than the neighbouring plantation owner admits that some taxies have used the road. There is also evidence that the road is generally narrow and two vehicles cannot pass each other from opposite directions. The existence of the gate is a fact evidenced by the suit itself. However, the important thing to notice is that in the plaintiff's own evidence, he has stated that at the entrance to the pulp yard of his estate, he has widened the road on his estate land and put up the gate to prevent motor vehicular traffic which has not obtained his permission and that beside the gate the foot-path deviated being about 4 to 5 ft. wide and continues towards Nalkoor. ( 10 ) SHRI Holla, therefore, strenuously urged that by widening the foot-path-pathway which necessarily was Government property though the widening be on land belonging to the planters, they could not obstruct free passage available to the public on the foot-path-pathway. wide and continues towards Nalkoor. ( 10 ) SHRI Holla, therefore, strenuously urged that by widening the foot-path-pathway which necessarily was Government property though the widening be on land belonging to the planters, they could not obstruct free passage available to the public on the foot-path-pathway. It is true such right earned by long user by the public cannot be curtailed by any action of a private individual who does not have both the ownership of the pathway or rights therein. But siderintg the totality of the circumstances of the case, this court is not concerned with the width of the gate or the width of the road. It is only concerned with the pathway that has been obstructed. Mr. Holla has not been able to point out from any part of the judgments of the courts below or the evidence on record that the pathway has been obstructed for human passage. The only thing that can be observed by this court in this behalf is that the admitted erection of wicket gate next to the main barrier gate of the plaintiff does prevent cattle and vehicles from using the foot-path. ( 11 ) MR. Holla has argued that right to the use of the foot-path-pathway cannot on the literal meaning of the term 'foot-path' be confined to human beings only. That is, from times immemorial right of user is acquired by persons to the foot-path-pathway, travelling on a horse-back or a two wheeler like cycles, scooters, motor cycles also halve the right to use the foot-path-pathway and therefore the wicket gate would be an obstruction as even human beings on foot have the right to take with them their domestic animals. ( 12 ) I should straightaway accept that there is some force in this argument in spite of Shri V. Krishna Murthy the learned counsel for the appellants vehemently opposing the same. The term 'foot-path' has been used rather loosely. The term in certain context can have very narrow connotation and in another context can have very wide connotation. The dictionary meaning of the word 'foot-path' is both path used by pedestrians or side pavement. This meaning has limited reference to roadside paved or unpaved pathway meant for use of pedestrians as opposed to its use by vehicles. The term in certain context can have very narrow connotation and in another context can have very wide connotation. The dictionary meaning of the word 'foot-path' is both path used by pedestrians or side pavement. This meaning has limited reference to roadside paved or unpaved pathway meant for use of pedestrians as opposed to its use by vehicles. But what we are concerned with in this case is not a footpath of the kind defined in the dictionary which in the United States where also English is spoken is referred to as "side walk". We are concerned with a cross country path, let it be a foot-path, pathway, or a bridle path used by human beings, it must be given a wider connotation and a larger meaning to mean a pathway that is not a road. The footpath leading from the main road to the village must be presumed to have been used by the people of the area, not only to transport themselves but also to transport their animals. With the passage of time if there are vehicles which can traverse that pathway, then there is a right acquired by the users to use those vehicles for passage in the pathway. If the wicket gate has become a hindrance to such use, then it must be left to the good sense of the plaintiff-respondent to forthwith remove the obstruction of the wicket gate and maintain his barrier on that section of the road which he has widened on his own estate This is more than sufficient to settle the matter in dispute. ( 13 ) ONLY by giving a narrower meaning to the term 'foot-path' the. courts below have passed the final order and permitted the retention of the wicket gate as well by the plaintiff, as well as declaring the footpath as meant (or use of human beings only. Therefore, It is sufficient to keep myself to the observation already made that the plaintiff shall eliminate the obstruction of the wicket-gate only and to that extent the order of the trial court is required to be modified. ( 14 ) IN the result, the word "pedestrians" in line 3 in order No. (i) and whole of order No. (iii) in the final order of the trial court as set out above is deleted and to that extent, the decree shall stand modified. ( 14 ) IN the result, the word "pedestrians" in line 3 in order No. (i) and whole of order No. (iii) in the final order of the trial court as set out above is deleted and to that extent, the decree shall stand modified. ( 15 ) THE appeal is allowed partly. There will be no order as to costs in this court. --- *** --- .