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1981 DIGILAW 105 (PAT)

Hare Krishna Sahay v. State of Bihar

1981-05-20

S.ROY, S.SHAMSUL HASAN

body1981
JUDGMENT S. Shamsul Hasan, J. These two writ applications were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment because they involve the same questions for determination. 2. Cr.W.J C No: 18/81 (R) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ranchi Case') seeks quashing of the police investigation pending in Ranchi Kotwali P.S. Case No. 17(6)76, and Cr. W.J.C. No. 19/81 (R) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Hazaribagh Case') seeks quashing of the police investigation pending in Hazaribagh Sadar P.S. Case No. 13/(4)76. 3. The Ranchi case is being investigated on the basis of a F.I.R. lodged by the Additional District Magistrate, Ranchi, on 7.6.1976 under sections 420, 406, 409 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The Hazaribagh case is being investigated on the basis of a F.I.R. lodged by the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh, dated 16.4.76 -Attached to the F.I.R. of Ranchi case is a statement of cheques and a note of expenditure of accounts maintained by the District Lottery Officer, Ranchi, recorded by P.S. Prasad, District Accounts Officer, Ranchi, on 14.3.76, 15.3.76, 17.3.76 and 18.3.76. Also similarly attached is a statement of cheques with the Hazaribagh case. 4. Taking up the Ranchi case first, it would be advisable to set out the allegations as made in the F.I.R. for proper appreciation of the matter. "From the report or the District Accounts Officer dated 19.3.76 it appears that 31 cheques amounting to Rs 13,01,697.75 has been issued by Sri H.K. Sahay, Proprietor M/s Sahay Agency, Hirapur, Dhanbad (Lottery Agent) during the period from 15.3.74 to 20.12.75 Those cheques were issued in favour of District Lottery Officer, Ranchi, upon different Banks. A tabuler statement showing details of the cheques is enclosed below. 2. The District Lottery Officer of Ranchi, Shri B.P. Shrivastava issued lottery tickets to the above named agent H.K. Sahay from time to time' against those cheques inspite of the fact that his earlier cheques out of 31 cheques in question were not honoured by the Bank. This indicates that the District Lottery Officer acted against financial rules and all Cannons of propriety in collusion with the Lottery Agent H.K. Sahay and thus they put the State Government to a loss of Rs. 13,01,697.75. 3. It appears from D.O. letter no. This indicates that the District Lottery Officer acted against financial rules and all Cannons of propriety in collusion with the Lottery Agent H.K. Sahay and thus they put the State Government to a loss of Rs. 13,01,697.75. 3. It appears from D.O. letter no. 2584/LF dated 12.5.76 from Shri N.K. Singh, Director of State Lotteries, Bihar, Patna, that the District Lottery Officer, Ranchi, had indicated On 25.9.75 in the meeting of District Lotteries Officers held at Patna that accounts till 59th Draw were clear and the amounts were already deposited in the Treasury. Further, it appears from the D.O. letter in question that in his written statement furnished on 30.7.75 to the Director State Lotteries, the District Lottery Officer, Ranchi, had indicated that the amounts till 57th draw were clear and that the amounts had been deposited in the Treasury. By another letter no. 21 dated 25.2.76 addressed to the said Director, the District Lottery Officer had reported that only a sum of Rs. 49,000/- was outstanding for realisation till 62nd.Draw against cheques of Shri H.K. Sahay. From the said D.O. letter it also appears that in course of review of sales and deposits of 63rd draw towards the end of February, 1976, the District Lottery Officer, Ranchi, had indicated that only a sum of Rs. 1,42,670/- was outstanding: or realisation against cheque issued by H.K. Sahay. Thus it will appear that the total outstanding dues till the 63rd draw as reported by the District Lottery Officer, Ranchi, was Rs.13,01,968.75 as per report of the District Accounts Officer, Ranchi, referred to above. 4 On the basis of fact' stated appear it is requested that the matter may kindly be investigated against H.K, Sahay, Agent. Sri B.P. Srivastava, District Lottery Officer, Ranchi, and any other person or persons involved in the matter and legal action. be taken against them u/s 420, 406, 409, 120B and other sections of I.P C." The following statements in the annexed report is also relevant for consideration of the matter in issue. "26. From the statement of cheques given above, it may be seem that cheques drawn right from the year 1974 are pending for encashment. The District Lottery Officer said that several cheques had been sent to the bank for encashment and being credited to Govt. "26. From the statement of cheques given above, it may be seem that cheques drawn right from the year 1974 are pending for encashment. The District Lottery Officer said that several cheques had been sent to the bank for encashment and being credited to Govt. account, but they had been returned uncashed, He has informed me that he had already requested Sri H. K. Sahai of M/s Sahai Agency about the return of some of the cheques by his letter no. 134 dated 3.12.75 and Sri Sahai replied to the D.L.O 's letter in his letter dated 20.12.75 stating therein that large sum of money was pending with the Govt. for payment on account of bonus, special commission, advertisement cost etc and after the amount was received from the Govt. the entire pending cheques would be cleared off 27. The District Lottery Officer has informed me that M/s Sahai Agency is the main seller of lottery tickets in Bihar including in Ranchi district and from 37th draw to 64th draw he lifted tickets from office of the District Lottery Officer numbering 4307875 for the value of Rs. 32,28,202. = 50 and out of this amount cheques for Rs. 13,01,697.75 only are pending for encashment and the rest amount had been deposited in the treasury. 28. I wanted to know Govt. instructions regarding acceptance of cheques and the District Lottery Officer drew my attention to letter no. 4314 dated 25.11.74 of the Directorate of State Lottery, Patna regarding acceptance of cheques in satisfaction of the sale price of tickets. 29. I shall advise the District Lottery Officer to take necessary steps for the realisation of the amount of cheques at the earliest and credit it to Govt. account, since the cheques are pending for encashment for a long time. 30. Rs 215.75 has been found kept in the almirah of the District Lottery Officer, the denomination of which are as detailed below: 100 X 1 - 100.00 10 X 11 – 110.00 1 X 5 Coins – 0.75 Rs. – 215.75 “A register for passed but unposted vouchers has been kept showing total expenditure for Rs. 7,500/-.” 5. 30. Rs 215.75 has been found kept in the almirah of the District Lottery Officer, the denomination of which are as detailed below: 100 X 1 - 100.00 10 X 11 – 110.00 1 X 5 Coins – 0.75 Rs. – 215.75 “A register for passed but unposted vouchers has been kept showing total expenditure for Rs. 7,500/-.” 5. The allegations, as mentioned in the F.I.R. of Hazaribagh case, are as follows :- "Though the said Shri H.K. Sahay (who was appointed agent for the sale of Bihar lottery tickets) did not furnish any Bank guarantee as envisaged under rule 9A, yet he kept on issuing cheques as the price of tickets to the District Lottery Officer and the District Lottery Officer. Shri B.N. Singh. kept on accepting the said cheques on different dates during the period from 1973 to 1976. Some of the cheques are dating back to the period before the insertion of Rule 9A. When the cheques were presented to the Bank, they were returned with various endorsement like "refer to drawer" "not arranged for" etc. implying thereby that there was not adequate balance in the account of the drawer, Shri H.K. Sahay, for the encashment of the cheques. When some of the cheques got time barred, they were revalidated by the drawer, Shri H.K. Sahay, only to be dishonoured again by the Bank when presented. The endorsements of the Bank go to show that the said Shri Sahay had never kept adequate balance in these accounts on which he had drawn cheques in favour of the District Lottery Officer, Hazaribagh. It is learnt that Shri Sahay has been using his money for purposes other than the payment of the price of tickets. Thus it is seen that Shri Sahay dishonestly issued the cheques knowing full well that there was not adequate balance in the accounts for the cheques to be honoured. On a random checking the details of 42 unencashed cheques involving sum of Rs. 31,88,775.00 could be ascertained which are enclosed herewith. On an examination of the aforesaid transaction. it is clear that the said Shri H.K.Sahay with the intention to cheat the State Govt. entered into a criminal conspiracy with some dishonest officers and employees of the Lottery Department (including Shri B.N. Sinha, District Lottery Officer and of the Banks, who can be identified during the course of police investigation. On an examination of the aforesaid transaction. it is clear that the said Shri H.K.Sahay with the intention to cheat the State Govt. entered into a criminal conspiracy with some dishonest officers and employees of the Lottery Department (including Shri B.N. Sinha, District Lottery Officer and of the Banks, who can be identified during the course of police investigation. It is clear that the said Shri H. K. Sahay and his co-conspirators in their capacity as agent, public services and bankers committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the sum involved in the aforesaid unencashed cheques and cheated the State Govt. of the said amount. It is, therefore, clear that the said Shri H.K. Sahay, Shrl B. N. Sinha and their co-conspirators have committed serious offences under sections, inter alia, 420/409 /120B of the Indian Penal Code for which a case may be instituted and necessary action under law taken against them." 6. Two points have been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the applications. Firstly, the F.I.Rs. in both the cases do not make out an offence justifying the investigation in terms of Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and secondly, the fact that no final form has been submitted for the last five years, since the institution of the two cases, indicates that the police ha, no material against the petitioner and the whole proceedings smack of mala fide. 7. It was first to be determined now whether this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on quash the investigation. It was held in S.N. Sharma V. Bipin Kumar Tewary in paragraph 7 as follows: "It appears to us that though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a Police Officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers. The fact that the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate to stop investigation by the Police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must be read in Section 159 of the Code. Similarly, 2 Bench decisions of this Court had also quashed the investigation, one decision being reported in the case of Nilu Devi V The State of Bihar and the other analogous Cases (Rajeshwar Roy and others Vs. State of Bihar). 8. The situation that emerges, therefore, is that although the police has unfettered power to investigate a criminal case, this Court, in appropriate cases in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can quash the investigation. 9. The next question to be examined is whether these two cases are fit to be quashed. It appears from the following decisions that a case could be quashed either on the ground of mala fide or on the ground of there being no case to be investigated, that is to say that if the F.I.R. does not make out an offence that could be investigated by the police in terms of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1) A.I R. 1970 Supreme Court 786 (S.N. Sharma Vs. Bipin Kumar). 2) State of Bihar V. J.A.C. Saldanna A.I.R 1980 Supreme Court 326, paragraph 27) 10. Taking up the question of mala tide, a protracted investigation has been held to be by itself an act of mala fide justifying the quashing of the investigation. Two Patna decisions may be usefully noticed in this regard Krishna Bahadur V. State and Nilu Devi V. The. State of Bihar (supra). In the former decision the investigation was not completed within 40 months. It is true that during that period the accused was in jail and the offence was one of theft only, yet the principle on which the Court acted is relevant for this case also. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of this decision may be usefully cited. "5. In connection with the statutory duty of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence, it is necessary to bear in mind what was stated by Lord Porter in King-Emberor V. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 71 Ind. App 203 (AIR 1945 PC 18). Paragraphs 5 and 6 of this decision may be usefully cited. "5. In connection with the statutory duty of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence, it is necessary to bear in mind what was stated by Lord Porter in King-Emberor V. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 71 Ind. App 203 (AIR 1945 PC 18). While recognising the statutory right on the part of the police in India to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from judicial authorities and considering that it would be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, the noble Lord made the following observation :- "The functions of the judiciary and the Police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of Course subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus". The aforesaid decision of the Privy Council has been approved by the Supreme Court in a number at cases. At the same time it has been pointed out in Abhinanandan Jha V. Dinesh Mishra, that from the provisions contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it will be seen that very elaborated provisions have been made for securing that an investigation does take place into a reported offence and the investigation is carried out within the limits of the law, without causing any harassment to the accused. The latest decision bearing On the point under consideration is S.N. Sharma V. Bipin Kumar Tiwari, AIR 1970 S.C. 786 where also while recognizing the statutory power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence, uncontrolled by the Magistrate, reference was made to the observations of Lord Porter, to which I have already referred, and it was held: "It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the Police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they respect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers." It will thus be seen that the power of this Court to give direction in appropriate cases in the nature of habeas corpus is in no way affected by the statutory right of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence, where the Court is satisfied from the materials placed before it that the delay in the submission of the final form is not bona fide, but really in pursuance of the mala fide exercise of the powers of investigation which the police possess. The meaning of the expression "mala fide exercise of powers" was explained by Ramaswami, J. in Jaichand Lal Sethia V. The State of West Bengal, in the following terms:- "It may be stated in the context that a mala fide exercise of power does not necessarily imply any moral turpitude as a matter of law. It only means that the statutory power is exercised for purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended. It only means that the statutory power is exercised for purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended. In other words, the power conferred by the statute has been utilised for some indirect purpose not connected with the object of the statute or the mischief it seeks to remedy" "6 Considering the simple nature of the case under investigation, it is impossible to think that the delay of over 40 months in the submission of the final form, resulting in the continued detention of the prisoner in jail can be attributed to the bona fide exercise of the statutory power of the police It is obviously designed to keep the petitioner under detention for an indefinite period without trial. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this is a fit case in which this Court would be justified in issuing a, direction in the nature of habeas corpus. 11. The observation of his Lordship Ramaswami, J. in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 483 at page 485, already cited in the above decision, fortifies the finding that inordinate delay itself constitutes mala fide. In the case of Nilu Devi (Supra) also the investigation was quashed due to inordinate delay, the only distinction being that on a prior occasion the Court had granted one month's time to the police to complete the investigation. 12. Coming to the facts of the present cases, the Ranchi case was instituted on 7.6.1976 and the Hazaribagh case, on 16.4.76. Admittedly, therefore, five years have elapsed in the Hazaribagh case and nearly five years, in the Ranchi case. No explanation was offered by the State before us for this inordinate delay. The offence alleged is the dishonouring of cheques which, according to prosecution, constitutes an offence of cheating. On the allegation itself, if any offence is made out, which has to be examined also, one can not appreciate why such a long period has elapsed, unless there is total absence of evidence, and the idea is only to keep up the prosecution pending as a sword of democles hanging over the head of the petitioner. There is always some limit to the period for completing the investigation. There is always some limit to the period for completing the investigation. In the absence of any explanation I am unable to find any reasonableness in the delay caused in investigation of these two cases, surely, the intention of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not be to grant unlimited time to the police to go on investigating the Case without any justifiable reasons for the delay. The power has to be exercised for the purpose which is not foreign but for which the law was intended. If it is not so exercised, it has to be inferred that it is being utilised for some indirect purpose not connected with the object of the statute. It has been laid down under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as' the Code) that the investigation should be completed without unnecessary delay. Under section 167 of the Code it is stated that if the investigation is not completed within 24 hours, the accused must be forwarded to the Magistrate. This indicates that the intention of the Legislature is that the investigation must be completed without any delay and should not go on for five years, as has been done in the instant cases. The purpose of the Code, as engrafted in the aforesaid section, appears to be that the investigation should be done with utmost ex edition. If investigation, continues for five years without any reasonable explanation, then, undoubtedly, that is being utilised for purposes other than the object of the statute. On this ground alone the investigation in these two cases is fit to be quashed. 13. It has now to be examined whether a case has been made out in the two reports submitted to the police which would justify an investigation. Section 154 of the Code provides the steps that the police has to take when an information of the commission of a cognizable offence is given at the police station. Section 156 endows the police with the power to investigate such an offence. Section 154 of the Code provides the steps that the police has to take when an information of the commission of a cognizable offence is given at the police station. Section 156 endows the police with the power to investigate such an offence. Under this section the Police can investigate without the order of a Magistrate or by an order of a Magistrate, who is empowered to take cognizance under section 190 of the Code The next relevant section is section 157 of the Code which requires the police officer to send necessary report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance upon a police report, when he suspects the commission of a cognizable offence which he is empowered under section 156 of the Code to investigate and shall then proceed in person or depute one of his subordinate officers who is not below such rank as the State Government mw by general or special order prescribe to proceed to the spot to investigate the case. The effect of these three sections is that unless a cognizable offence is made out in the information the police has no jurisdiction to investigate the same. 14. It has now to be examined whether in the two reports in question any cognizable offence is made oat. It may be stated at the very out set that section 406 or 409 of the Penal Code has no application whatsoever and rightly the learned counsel for the State did not canvass the application of these two sections to the facts of both these Cases. There is no doubt that the transaction involving the delivery of lottery tickets on receiving payments by cheques was an outright sale. There is, therefore, no need to go into any detailed discussion on this point. I have already discussed this question at great length in the case of Hare Krishna Sahay V. State of Bihar, 1980 BBCJ 156 . 15. It has now to be seen whether section 420 of the Penal Code which is quoted below, has any application or not. I have already discussed this question at great length in the case of Hare Krishna Sahay V. State of Bihar, 1980 BBCJ 156 . 15. It has now to be seen whether section 420 of the Penal Code which is quoted below, has any application or not. "Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine," Cheating has been defined in section 415 of the Penal Code, The essential ingredients thereof are the deceiving of any person by fraudulent and dishonest inducement thereby making the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person or agree to retention of any property or to do or omit to do any act which a person would do or omit to do and which act or omission causes or likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, Basically, therefore, deception by fraudulent and dishonest inducement at the initial stage creates an offence, No offence is committed if no deception has been practised though loss of the kind mentioned in the section is suffered by a party. The distinction between a mere breach of contract and cheating is very narrow but of great depth The crucial aspect is the intention of the person cheating at the time of the alleged inducement which may be judged by subsequent act but that subsequent act is not the sole criteria. In fact, the sub sequent act is a very slender proof of the initial intention of the accused. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution. Further, non-fulfilment of promise cannot lead to an inference of dishonest intention. 16. Coming to the facts of these two cases I have no hesitation in holding that no case of any deception by fraudulent and dishonest inducement is made out. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution. Further, non-fulfilment of promise cannot lead to an inference of dishonest intention. 16. Coming to the facts of these two cases I have no hesitation in holding that no case of any deception by fraudulent and dishonest inducement is made out. Examining the Hazaribagh case first the F.I.R merely states, after citing various rules from the Bihar State Lottery Rules, that the petitioner issued cheques without furnishing bank guarantee, which were accepted by the Lottery Officer during the years 1973-1976 and on presentation the cheques were dishonoured. Some cheques were also revalidated on being returned by the bank and were not encashed again. The allegation, however, is that the petitioner dishonestly issued cheques knowing full well that there was no adequate balance in the accounts for the cheques to be honoured and it goes on to conclude that the petitioner intended to cheat the Government by entering into conspiracy with some dishonest officers of the Department, including B.N. Sinha, District Lottery Officer, and the Bank. Merely stating the ingredients of a section does not make out a case on facts. There is total absence of any incident from which it could be inferred that any attempt to deceive the authority by fraudulent and dishonest inducement was made nor it was stated that the petitioner made any attempt to show that he had plenty of money in the bank which was sufficient for encashment of the cheques. The cheques were given contrary to the rules but that does not mean that any offence under section 420 has been committed. Further details of the cheques are also missing from the F I.R. which are found in the report annexed with it giving the details of the cheques drawn, including the amount and the fate those cheques suffered. Significantly, that statement has been signed by B.N. Sinha on 11.3.76, who himself has been described as a conspirator. Shortly stated, therefore, the F.I.R. does not contain any fact which could bring the act of the petitioner within the purview of section 420 of the Penal Code justifying investigation. 17. Coming to Ranchi case, the story is no different from that of the Hazaribagh case. In fact, the report annexed to the F.I.R some portions of which I have already referred and the other I will refer shortly, makes interesting reading. 17. Coming to Ranchi case, the story is no different from that of the Hazaribagh case. In fact, the report annexed to the F.I.R some portions of which I have already referred and the other I will refer shortly, makes interesting reading. There is total absence of arty fact which can justify an inference that there has been any deception by fraudulent and dishonest inducement. In fact, from the F.I.R. it appears that some amounts had also been paid by the petitioner towards various draws. The passages from the report may be set out and they may be read along with those passages which I have referred to above In paragraph 32 it is stated that "Prima facie, Government money does not appear to have been defalcated except heavy sum of money is involved in cheques." It is further stated in paragraph 26 as follows:- "From the statement of cheques given above, it may be seen that cheques drawn right from the year 1974 are pending for encashment. The District Lottery Officer said that several cheques had been sent to the bank for encashment and being credited to Govt. account, but they had been returned un-cashed. He has informed me that he had already requested Sri H.K. Sahai of M/s Sahai Agency about the return of some of the cheques by his letter No. 134 dated 3.12.75 and Sri Sahai replied to the D.L.O.'s letter in his letter dated 20.12.75 stating therein that large sum of money was pending with the Govt. for payment en account of bonus, special commission, advertisement, cost etc. and after the amount was received from the Govt., the entire pending cheques would be cleared off." Passages from a communication from Shri N.K. Singh, IAS, Director-cum-Joint Secretary to the Government, Slate Lotteries, Bihar, Patna, addressed to Shri N.K. Singh, Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, also makes interesting reading. This letter is also annexed to the F.I.R. It states: "Law Department has also advised that non-presentation of cheques in time in the Bank amounted to a serious lapse on the part of District Lottery Officer and as such his conduct should also be examined and if on examination his conduct is found to be collusive action u/s 120 I.P.C. be also initiated against him (extract from file No B.S.L-1022/75 enclosed)". “...As will appear from the report of District Accounts Officer, Ranchi, all cheques except seven are time barred in absence of presentation of these cheques to the Bank in time for collection by the District Lottery Officer, Ranchi” 18. It may be stated here that no action was taken against the District Lottery Officer. The above contents of the report and the Letter can also, in my view, be applied to the Hazaribagh case, though it was not annexed to the F.I.R. of that case. This indicates that when the matter was laid before the police, it appeared clearly to be a case of civil dispute. In the Ranchi case also, therefore, there is nothing in the F.I.R. which would justify the application of section 420 of the Penal Code. 19. Tickets were purchased and the amounts were paid by cheques, there being no inducement fraudulent or dishonest. It will be appropriate to cite a decision of this Court relating to presentation of cheques and that is the case of Bindeshwari Singh Vs. Sheobachan Singh the relevant passage of which is quoted below: "A cheque is nothing but a document which on the face of it is only a command of a future act and implies at least four statements (i) that the drawer has an account with the Bank, (ii) that he has authority to draw on it for that account, (iii) that the cheque, as drawn is a valid order for the payment of that amount (i.e., that the present state of affairs is such that, in the ordinary course of events the cheque will on its future presentment be duly honoured), and (iv) that it does not imply any representation that the drawer now, has money in the bank to the amount drawn for, in as much as he may well have authority to overdraw or may intend to pay in (before the cheque can be presented) sufficient money to meet it. This doctrine applies even to post-dated cheques." It will thus appear that mere giving of cheques, therefore, unless deception is played by fraudulent and dishonest inducement, does not create any cognizable offence. 20. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the two F.I.Rs. in question do not contain sufficient materials which would justify investigation of these cases. The decisions in Hari Prasad Chamaria Vs. Bishun Kumar Surekha, Satyabrata Bhattacharya Vs. Jaranail Singh. 20. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the two F.I.Rs. in question do not contain sufficient materials which would justify investigation of these cases. The decisions in Hari Prasad Chamaria Vs. Bishun Kumar Surekha, Satyabrata Bhattacharya Vs. Jaranail Singh. Manoranjan Sinha Vs. Bishambharlal Saboo, & Hare Krishna Sahay Vs. The State of Bihar may be usefully cited in regard to the applicability of section 420 of the Penal Code. I have no hesitation. therefore, in holding that since no case of cognizable offence has been made out in the two F.I.R's. the police has no jurisdiction to investigate the same. 21. Summing up I have no hesitation in holding that there has been protracted delay in completing the investigation, (ii) there is total absence of allegation justifying investigation by the police and (iii) no case is made out against the petitioner in the F.I.R., and, therefore, these are the fit cases in which the proceedings pending before the courts below, as well as the police investigation, should be quashed. 22. In the result, both the applications are allowed and the proceedings pending before the courts below, and police investigation are quashed. I agree. Applications allowed