Judgment Brishketu Saran Sinha, J. 1. By a notification dated 26th September, 1980, the Governor of Bihar has referred an industrial dispute existing between the indian Oil Corporation and their workman, Shri C. D. Singh (respondent no.3), represented by the Indian Oil Employees Union, Eastern Branch (respondent no 4), to the Labour Court, Patna, under clause (c) of sub-section (1)of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). A copy of this notification is annexure 1 and the reference reads thus :- "whether in view of the order of Labour Court, Ranchi, in B. S. E. Case no.23 of 1969, Sri C. D. Singh should be allowed the scale of 1025-1625 from the date his juniors were promoted to this scale of pay If so, what consequential benefits in scale of pay should be given to him from that date onwards. " 2. Mr. K. D. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Indian oil Corporation Limited, has challenged this notification primarily en two grounds ; namely, (i) that in regard to the matter referred to adjudication, no dispute was raised with the Management and, as such, there is no industrial dispute which could be referred for adjudication, and, (ii) that the alleged dispute did not arise in Bihar and consequently the State of Bihar has no jurisdiction to make the reference under the Act. 3. Relevant facts are that respondent no.3 who, for convenience hereafter shall be referred to as Singh only, is a Sales Officer in the employment of the petitioner who was dismissed from service with effect from 3rd september, 1969. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, Singh filed an application under section 26 (2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953, before the Ranchi Labour Court for setting aside the order of dismissal. The aforesaid Labour Court, by an order dated 26th September, 1973, set aside the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement with full back wages from the date of his dismissal as if he was in service throughout. The petitioner moved the Supreme Court against this order of the Labour Court which was dismissed. In other words, the order of reinstatement with full back wages, as passed by the Ranchi Labour Court, became final. Singh joined his post again on 3rd May, 1974. By then employees junior to him had been put in a higher grade. The petitioner moved the Supreme Court against this order of the Labour Court which was dismissed. In other words, the order of reinstatement with full back wages, as passed by the Ranchi Labour Court, became final. Singh joined his post again on 3rd May, 1974. By then employees junior to him had been put in a higher grade. Singh, therefore, demanded removal of Ms supersession by his junior colleagues which was not considered by the Management. Concilliary efforts made by the Concilliary Board of the Government of Bihar failed. Subsequently, the Government of Bihar, by notification dated 22nd September, 1975, referred a dispute to the Labour Court, Patna the terms of which were as follows :- "whether Shri C. D. Singh, Sales Officer of Indian Oil Corporation, marketing Division, after being reinstated, should be deemed to be superseded by his junior colleagues in service due to their promotion during the period he (Shri Singh) was out of service. If his supersession is not justified, what relief he is entitled to ?" This was reference no.13 of 1975. In the said reference, the award was that there was no supersession of Singh but certain directions were given regarding his promotion and consequential benefits. The said award of reference no.13 of 1975 was challenged by the petitioner in this Court by c. W. J. C. no.2957 of 1979 which was allowed by a judgment dated 4th may, 1930. In it was held that the award suffered from legal infirmity and the directions given by the Labour Court regarding the promotion of Singh was beyond the scope of reference and, therefore, was quashed to that extent. 4. After the decision of this Court, the petitioner has asserted that no representation, claim or demand was submitted either by Singh or by respondent no.4 nor any steps were taken for conciliation of any purported dispute. The petitioner also never received any kind of notice from any authority in respect of the purported dispute prior to the notification in Annexure 1. It has, therefore, been stated in the writ petition that no industrial dispute existed on the date of the reference. 5. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no.1, the State of Bihar. It has, therefore, been stated in the writ petition that no industrial dispute existed on the date of the reference. 5. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no.1, the State of Bihar. A counter-affidavit has, however, been filed on behalf of singh and respondent no.4, the Union concerned, in which it has been stated that after the disposal of C. W. J C.2957 of 1979, referred to above, the respondent, Union, approached the State Government by letter no.101, dated 21st July, 1980, to make proper reference so that the workman concerned, namely, Singh, could get appropriate relief through adjudication under the act and a copy of this letter was also sent to the Management. Thereafter, the Government of Bihar issued the aforesaid notification. According to these respondents, the dispute arose in Bihar and the Government of Bihar had the jurisdiction to make the reference. It has further been asserted in the counter-affidavit that at the relevant time when the dispute arose Singh was working in the State of Bihar and the cause if action and the dispute accrued here. It may also be stated that the respondents have filed as annexure A a complete copy of the impugned reference made on 26th September, 1980, which is in Hindi, along with the annexures appended thereto to which I will refer as and when occasion arises. A reply has been filed by the petitioner to the counter affidavit filed by respondents no.3 and 4. 6. Adverting to the first submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the reference is bad inasmuch as no industrial dispute was in existence between the petitioner and respondents no.3 and 4, Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that at no stage was a dispute raised by either respondent no.3 or respondent no.4 with the Management with regard to the scale of pay claimed in the impugned reference and hence, in the absence of such a demand, the reference is bad in law. Mr. Ranen Roy, on the other hand submitted that a reference made under section 10 (1) of the Act could not be challenged in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution and it was for the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to determine on the facts and materials in the case, whether an industrial dispute existed or not. 7. Ranen Roy, on the other hand submitted that a reference made under section 10 (1) of the Act could not be challenged in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution and it was for the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to determine on the facts and materials in the case, whether an industrial dispute existed or not. 7. The earliest case, on the point, referred to, by learned counsel for the parties, is the State of Madras V/s. C. P. Sarathy and another (AIR 1953 Supreme Court 53 ). It was held in that case that while the Government would not be justified in making a reference under section 10 (1) of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice, that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended in relation to an establishment or a definite group of establishments engaged in a particular industry and it is also desirable that the Government should, wherever possible, indicate the nature of dispute in the order of reference, "it must be remembered that in making a reference under section 10 (1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its fuction does not make it any the less administrative in character. The court cannot, therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government, to support its conclusion as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. " The Court further observed that "no doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award". In Shambhu Nath Goyal V/s. Bank of baroda (AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1088) the view taken in the case of State of madras (supra) was reiterated. Similarly, in M/s Avon Services Production agencies (P) Ltd. V/s. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and others (AIR 1979 Supreme court 170) it was observed :- "the adequacy or sufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Similarly, in M/s Avon Services Production agencies (P) Ltd. V/s. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and others (AIR 1979 Supreme court 170) it was observed :- "the adequacy or sufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. If the tction of the Government in making the reference is impugned by a a party it would be open to such a party to show that what was referred was not an industrial dispute and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the Award. " It was further laid down that the factual existence and expediency of making a reference are matters entirely forthe Government to decide and a Court would not be competent to hold the Reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters. In this decision also the case of the State of madras was noticed. In a Bench decision of our own High Court in management of Radio Foundation Engineering Ltd. and another V/s. State of Bihar and others (AIR 1970 Patna 295) it was held that the exercise of the powers under section 10 of the Act is the opinion of the appropriate Government and it was not necessary in all cases that the dispute must be preceded by a demand and refusal in express terms by the parties concerned. If, on the evidence adduced, the Tribunal found that an industrial dispute did not exist ot was not apprehended, reference may be held to be bad. In the aforesaid case also the case of the State of Madras was noticed and it was held on the facts of that case that a dispute in fact was in existence. 8. Mr. If, on the evidence adduced, the Tribunal found that an industrial dispute did not exist ot was not apprehended, reference may be held to be bad. In the aforesaid case also the case of the State of Madras was noticed and it was held on the facts of that case that a dispute in fact was in existence. 8. Mr. Chatterjee, however, placed great reliance for his submission on a decision in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. V/s. Industrial Tribunal of gujarat and others (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 529) where, on a consideration of the materials in the case, it was held that no dispute about reinstatement was raised by either of the respondents before the Management of the appellant and in such circumstances the State Government was not competent to refer the question of reinstatement as an industrial dispute for adjudication by the Tribunal and it was further observed that a mere demand to a Government without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer cannot become an industrial dispute. According to Mr. chatterjee, even by reference to Annexure A, filed by the respondents and their counter affidavit, all that had been sent was a letter to the Management dated 7th February, 1975, in which the Union had claimed that the penalty of supersession inflicted on Singh may be removed forthwith and he be placed in the suitable grade. This, Mr. Chatterjee has contended, was the subject of reference no.13 of 1979 which was ultimately disposed of by a judgment of this Court dated 9th May, 1980, in C. W. J. C. no.2957 of 1979. Similarly, a letter dated 14th September, 1974, which was earlier to the demand of the Management dated 7th February, 1975, also was a demand made by Singh to the Management for the removal of his supersession by his juniors. Last is a letter dated 21st July, 1980, sent to the Joint Labour commissioner, Government of Bihar, Patna, by the Union with a copy to the indian Oil Corporation i. e. the petitioner in which it was claimed that Singh was entitled to the grade of pay mentioned therein and that is the subject of the impugned reference. According to the reply to the counter-affidavit filed by the petitioner, the copy of the aforesaid letter was not received by the management. Mr. According to the reply to the counter-affidavit filed by the petitioner, the copy of the aforesaid letter was not received by the management. Mr. K. D. Chatterjee, however, urged that even assuming that it was received, a demand made to a Government without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer cannot become an industrial dispute as held in Sindhu Resettlement Corporations case. However, even this is not of much help to Mr. Chatterjee at present, inasmuch as that case had come up before the Supreme Court after the award had been given by the industrial Tribunal and on the evidenco led, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that with regard to the subject of dispute on the evidence and materials led before the Industrial Tribunal, there was no industrial dispute, since a demand made to a Government without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer could not be an industrial dispute under section 2 (k) of the Act. But even in that case it was pointed out that the Supreme court could not examine whether the Government, in forming its opinion regarding the existence of an industrial dispute, came to the conclusion correctly or incorrectly. In other words, without referring to the case of state of Madras, the Supreme Court, even an this case has affirmed the view that a Court will not examine closely a reference made under section 10 of the act by the Government inasmuch as it was an administrative act. 9. Having given my serious consideration to the arguments advanced, i am of the opinion that this Court, at this stage, would be reluctant to strike down the reference as being not sustainable in law. Hower, it would bo open to the parties to lead evidence and bring forth materials before the labour Court and on the basis of that urge that in fact no industrial dispute was in existence on which an award could be. given by the Labour Court. 10. I will now proceed to consider the second submission made which is whether the Bihar Government had the jurisdiction to make the reference. It will be worthwhile recalling that under section 10 (l) (a) a reference is made where the appropriate Government is of opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. The appropriate Government has been defined under section 2 (a) of the Act. It will be worthwhile recalling that under section 10 (l) (a) a reference is made where the appropriate Government is of opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. The appropriate Government has been defined under section 2 (a) of the Act. Under section 2 (a) (i), it is in relation to any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a Railway Company or other companies specified therein to be the Central government and under section 2 (a) (ii), in relation to any other industrial dispute, the State Government, In other words, in the present case, it would be the appropriate Stale Government concerned According to the petitioner, which is not disputed by the respondents concerned, Singh had been posted at Gauhati from 28th April, 1975, till 16th September, 1980, and thereafter, he has been transferred to Moghalsarai and has been designated as an Operations officer and is in the same grade as a Sales Officer. In other words, itis, therefore, the claim of the petitioner that at the time when the reference was made on 26th September, 1930, the petitioner was posted as Moghalsarai and immediately before that he was posted at Gauhati and had been there for about more than five years. It has also been asserted that respondent no.4, the Union, is located at Calcutta and so also the head office of the petitioner. It has, therefore, been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that at the relevant time the party to the dispute, namely, respondents no.3 and 4 were not in State of Bihar, and as such the Bihar Government had no jurisdiction to make the reference. On the contrary, Mr. Roy has submitted that the reference itself indicates that it is the outcome of the Bihar Shops and establishment Case no.23 of 1969 which was before a Labour Court in Bihar and as Singh, at the relevant time was posted in Bihar, cause of action must be deemed to have arisen in the State of Bihar. 11. In Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. V/s. Vin (D. M.) and others (1956) 1 LLJ 557)a question of jurisdiction arose under the Bombay Industrial relations Act where also the factors which would confer jurisdiction were not provided. 11. In Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. V/s. Vin (D. M.) and others (1956) 1 LLJ 557)a question of jurisdiction arose under the Bombay Industrial relations Act where also the factors which would confer jurisdiction were not provided. In such a sitution Chagla, C. J. , observed that a Court or a tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within jurisdiction or if the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction. Therefore, the correct approach would be to ask where did the dispute substantially arise. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Indian cable Co. Ltd. V/s. Its Workmen (1962) 1 LLJ 409 where it was held that the principles applicable in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills case (supra) would equally apply for deciding which of the States has jurisdiction to make a reference under section 10 of the Act. In the case of Workmen of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd. V/s. Sri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd. and others (AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1040)it was observed that there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose. I am, therefore, inclined to take the view that in determining jurisdiction what has to be seen is what is the disputein the instant case, as the reference itself points out, the dispute is, the scale of pay Singh is entitled to, in view of the order of the Labour Court, Ranchi, in B. S. F. Case no.23 of 1969. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the dispute arises out of the decision of the Labour Court, Ranchi, and in that situation, the government of Bihar has jurisdiction to make the reference if otherwise in accordance with law. 12. Lastly, Mr. Chatterjce urged that if the question whether there was an industrial dispute or not has to be gone into by the Labour Court, it should be decided as a preliminary point. I am unable to accede to this submission. 12. Lastly, Mr. Chatterjce urged that if the question whether there was an industrial dispute or not has to be gone into by the Labour Court, it should be decided as a preliminary point. I am unable to accede to this submission. In the case of the Cooper Engineering Ltd. V/s. P. P. Mundhe (AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1900) it was observed as follows :- "we should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the high Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication. " And now in the Code of Civil Procedure, under Order XIV, Rule 2, the provision is that even if a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. Therefore, I am of the view that this issue regarding the fact whether there was an industrial dispute or not, should be dealt with by the labour Court along with all other issues so that there might not be undue delay in industrial adjudication. 13 For the reasons given above, there is no merit in this application and it is, accordingly, dismissed. But, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.