JUDGMENT M. Wahajuddin, J. - The applicants, who filed a complaint under Sections 420 and 109 Indian Penal Code against the opposite parties, compromise dated 7-7-1979 (Annexures "3" & "4") and another order dated 30-8-1980 of the VII Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, in revision, quashing the order dated 8-2-1980 of the Magistrate, summoning the opposite parties (Annexure "6") be all quashed and the order dated 8-2-1980 of the Magistrate be given effect to. 2. It is urged that opposite party No. 2, being the successor and daughter of late Lakhan, executed a registered sale-deed dated 2-3-1973 in favour of seven persons, namely, (1) Brijlal, (2) Sobran, (3) Ram Bharose, (4) Ganga Sahai, (5) Sobran s/o Darbari Lal, (6) Het Ram and (7) Ram Sewak receiving a consideration of Rs. 20,000/-. According to the applicants, in mutation proceedings opposite party No. 1 moved an application that she was not daughter of late Lakhan, but one of Chittar, hence names of vendees could not be mutated. It is, further, alleged that she professed herself to be the Bhumidhar of the land involved and also applied for the acquisition of Bhumidhari rights, depositing' the requisite amount before the execution of the sale-deed, as to thereby induce the vendees to pay the sum of Rs. 20,000/- as condsideration, but later applied that the amount deposited by her for acquiring Bhumidhari rights may be returned. 3. What transpired was that one of the vendees, namely, Ram Sewak son of Darbari Lal, filed a complaint u/s 420, Indian Penal Code on 2-3-73 against the opposite parties registered as case No. 119 of 1973. The Munsif Magistrate passed an order of discharge on 16-6-75, but the learned Sessions Judge allowing the complainant's revision vide its order dated 26-8-75 remanded the case to the trial court and the matter then came before this Court in a criminal revision. Vide judgment dated 6-12-1978 (Annexure "2"), this Court allowed the revision of some of the accused persons, namely, Pati Ram, Holasi, Panchi and Nawab, holding that the case should not have been remanded for their trial, as it would necessarily result in their harassment. It was held that Smt. Suraj Shri, present opposite party No. 1, and Munshi Lal, present opposite party No. 2, deserved to be tried and the remand order concerning them was good. It was held that Smt. Suraj Shri, present opposite party No. 1, and Munshi Lal, present opposite party No. 2, deserved to be tried and the remand order concerning them was good. This would mean that by the final order in revision, the order of discharge against the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6 became final, but a prima facie case against opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 was found to be established and the direction for their trial given by the Sessions Judge became final. 4. Thereafter a compromise purporting to have been entered into between aforesaid Ram Sewak and opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 was filed in the court of Munisf Magistrate, Mainpuri, praying for the dismissal of the case and the Munsif Magistrate vide its order dated 7-7-79 (Annexure "4" to the applicants' affidavit) allowed the compromise and the earlier complaint case was disposed of accordingly. 5. The present applicants then preferred a fresh complaint relating to the same matter (Annexure "5") on 25-7-1979 and the Special Judicial Magistrate, Mainpuri, passed an order on 8-2-1980 summoning the opposite parties to stand trial under Sections 420 and 409, Indian Penal Code ; and against such order a revision was filed and the Additional Sessions Judge vide its order dated 30-8-1980 allowing the revision held that prosecution cannot be launched against the opposite parties, four of them namely, opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6, having been discharged and the remaining persons, namely, opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2, having been acquitted in terms of the compromise by the court of II Additional Munsif and the provisions of Section 300, Code of Criminal Procedure, bar subsequent prosecution. 6. Having stated all the facts of this case, I may now consider the legal implication. I may at the very out set observe that so far as opposite parties, Nos. 3 to 6 are concerned, they have been finally discharged not in pursuance of the compromise, but on the merits of the case vide this Court's earlier judgment, and it is opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 alone who have been acquitted in pursuance of a compromise entered into by one Ram Sewak. I may also mention that in the case on previous complaint, the accused persons were summoned u/s 420, Indian Penal Code , only and the complaint was also u/s 420, Indian Penal Code . 1 and 2 alone who have been acquitted in pursuance of a compromise entered into by one Ram Sewak. I may also mention that in the case on previous complaint, the accused persons were summoned u/s 420, Indian Penal Code , only and the complaint was also u/s 420, Indian Penal Code . An offence u/s 420, Indian Penal Code , is compoundable with the permission of the court concerned, where the case is pending by the person cheated. This would be borne out by Sub-clause (2) of Section 320, Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 320(3) Code of Criminal Procedure provides that composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded and Sub-section (9) of the aforesaid section lays down that no offence shall be compounded, except as provided by the aforesid section. The court, has, therefore, to examine whether Ram Sewak, son of Darbari Lal, who alone filed the earlier complaint could compromise the offence u/s 420, Indian Penal Code , and whether such a compromise could be recorded and permitted. 7. The sale-deed (Annexure "1") is also on the record and would show that actually there were 7 vendees and the joint share of Ram Sewak and his two brothers Sobran and Het Ram was 1/5th only and the consideration paid by them together was Rs. 4000/- only, while the present applicants had advanced Rs. 8000/- as consideration for purchasing 2/5th share of the property sold and has a major interest. 3. The matter to be resolved is as to who could compromise and Section 320(2) Code of Criminal Procedure is clear on the point that the person cheated can compromise ; and in the present case it is not only one person, who filed the earlier complaint, is the person cheated, but all the seven vendees are equally the persons cheated. It has to be determined whether only one of such persons could compromise in such circumstances. The earliest case cited on this point is Emperor v. Sultan Singh ILR (1909) 606. In that case three persons were assaulted and one of the persons assaulted died. It was held that it was not competent to the survivors to compound the case with their assailants in respect of injuries caused to the person deceased. The earliest case cited on this point is Emperor v. Sultan Singh ILR (1909) 606. In that case three persons were assaulted and one of the persons assaulted died. It was held that it was not competent to the survivors to compound the case with their assailants in respect of injuries caused to the person deceased. The provisions contained in the then Section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure, analogous to present Section 320(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, were considered. It was held that in regard to the offence committed against Teekam Singh (deceased) the only person who could compound was Teekam Singh. On this analogy it would follow that the crux is as to who are the persons cheated and if the present complainants as two of the vendees are equally the persons cheated, the earlier complainant Ram Sewak alone could not compromise the offence of cheating committed against the present complainants. 9. In the case of State of U. P. v. Janni 1970 AWR 324 , it was held that the offence under Sections 147 and 323, Indian Penal Code , are different and the composition of the offence u/s 323, Indian Penal Code cannot operate as an acquittal u/s 147, Indian Penal Code . While this ruling may not be directly on the point of cheating, the following observations are important:- In compromise case, the acquittal is recorded simply because the parties come to terms. It does not mean that no offence was committed at all. On the other hand, admitting that the offence had been committed, the parties patch up their differences and enter into compromise, so that they may live peacefully in future. It is or this end that composition of certain kind of offence is permitted. 10. The case of Shib Chandra Chakravarti v. Rabbani Mondal 27 CWN 168 is important. In that case Shib Chandra Chakravarty was not a party to compromise. There was a charge u/s 342, Indian Penal Code . This charge related to wrongful confinement of Harinath, the complainant, as well as Shib Chandra. There was conviction. Only Harinath compounded the offence in appeal. In that case Shib Chandra Chakravarty was not a party to compromise. There was a charge u/s 342, Indian Penal Code . This charge related to wrongful confinement of Harinath, the complainant, as well as Shib Chandra. There was conviction. Only Harinath compounded the offence in appeal. It was held that Harinath could compound the offence of hurt and wrongful confinement committed against him, but so far as wrongful confinement of Shib Chandra Chakravarty was concerned, he is the only person who could compromise and as he was no party to the compromise, the acquittal was bad. 11. In the case of Emperor v. Rahmat 37 ILR All 419 it was held that out of the persons assaulted one, namely, P died and it was not open to his widow to compound the case with P's assailants in respect of injuries caused to P and such an order of acquittal has to be set aside. 12. The case of Khilawan Singh v. Emperor (1937)38 CriLJ 344 is an authority for the proposition that the High Court, even in absence of any appeal, would interfere where a person, in respect of whom a charge of wrongful confinement has been framed, has not compounded and yet acquittal has been made, if the acquittal is not on merits. Any ruling to the contrary has not been cited. 13. The acquittal of opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 in pursuance of a compromise entered into by only one of the person cheated and not by all the person cheated is bad and the offence could not be compounded by Ram Sewak alone, nor an acquittal could have been recorded in pursuance of any such compromise. When there is a flouting of the mandatory provision of law as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the compounding of offences resulting into abuse of the process of law and failure of justice, the Court will not hesitate to exercise its powers u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. So far as the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned the matter had come in revision before this Court and the directions were that the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 deserved to be tried. This order could not have been flouted, unless all the persons cheated later entered into a compromise, and the order of acquittal of opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned the matter had come in revision before this Court and the directions were that the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 deserved to be tried. This order could not have been flouted, unless all the persons cheated later entered into a compromise, and the order of acquittal of opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 is therefore, bad and Section 320(8) would not stand as a bar to the entertainment of fresh complaint filed by the present applicants. So far as the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6 are concerned, their final discharge was on merits as per earlier order of this Court in revision and that being the position the Court will not exercise any inherent powers against them. 14. In the result, the application u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure as well Criminal Revision No. 1967 of 1980 are partly allowed and the order dated 7-7-1979 of II Additional Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri, according permission to compromise and operating as acquittal is quashed ; and the order dated 30-8-1980 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri (Annexure 6') is also quashed and set aside so far as it relates to opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 and it is hereby directed that the Special Judicial Magistrate in pursuance of its order dated 8-2-1980 may proceed only against the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2, namely Smt. Suraj Shri and Munshi Lal, on the complaint of the applicants in accordance with law. Ordered accordingly.