Judgment R.R. Rastogi, J. 1. THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out Of proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The petitioners were served with a notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act. They contested the notice on various grounds. The Prescribed Authority, vide its order dated 8-10-1976, determined 49 bighas 14 biswas land as surplus. The petitioners filed an appeal which was allowed on 8-7-1977 and the case was remanded to the Prescribed Authority. After remand the Prescribed Authority again, vide its order dated 26-8-1978, determined the same area as surplus. The petitioners filed an appeal which was allowed and again the case was remanded. Thereafter, the Prescribed Authority, vide its order dated 6-1-1979, accepted the petitioners' contentions and held that they had no surplus land and the notice was discharged. A copy of this order is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. That order became final. 2. SOME time between 8th of October, 1976 and 8th of July, 1977 possession over the aforesaid surplus land was taken by the State and the land was allotted in favour of respondents 6 to 30. After the discharge of notice the petitioners made an application under Section 144 CPC for restitution of possession on 15-9-1979. The Prescribed Authority rejected that application, vide its order dated 15-10-1979, mainly on the view that application for cancellation of the lease deeds could be moved only before the Commissioner. A copy of this order Is Annexure 4 to the writ petition. Being aggrieved the petitioners filed an appeal against that order which as well was dismissed on 2-2-1980. The learned Additional District Judge as well has taken the same view that the application for restitution could be given only before the Commissioner under Section 37 of the Act. A copy of this order is Annexure 5 to the writ petition. By means of the instant petition the petitioners seek the quashing of the aforesaid orders of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court. A copy of this order is Annexure 5 to the writ petition. By means of the instant petition the petitioners seek the quashing of the aforesaid orders of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court. Two submissions were made before me on behalf of the petitioners firstly that under section 37 of the Act the Prescribed Authority alone has power to direct restitution under section 144 CPC and that the Prescribed Authority erroneously failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it and secondly that if under section 37 the Prescribed Authority has no such power, then it has inherent jurisdiction to restore the parties to the position which existed prior to the order dated 8th of October, 1976, by which surplus land was declared and in pursuance of which possession was taken over the surplus land. It was also contended that the petitioners did make an application under section 37 of the Act before the Commissioner for restitution of possession. But, it was dismissed on 29-11-80 on the view that such an application could not be given under section 27(4) because the disputed land no longer remained a surplus area and it was the Prescribed Authority alone who could direct restitution under sections 144/151 CPC. A copy of this order has been annexed to the supplementary affidavit. 3. ON the other hand it was urged on behalf of the allottees that when during the pendency of the appeal possession of surplus land was taken and when settlement was being made under section 27 of the Act, the petitioners should have approached this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the State of U. P. not to proceed with the settlement and that since the settlement of surplus land with the allottees was an act of State, it could not be treated as illegal. It was next contended that there is no question of the Prescribed Authority allowing restitution of possession in exercise of inherent power because section 37 of the Act extends the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code only to proceedings in which the Prescribed Authority is holding an inquiry or hearing an objection. It was next contended that there is no question of the Prescribed Authority allowing restitution of possession in exercise of inherent power because section 37 of the Act extends the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code only to proceedings in which the Prescribed Authority is holding an inquiry or hearing an objection. Lastly according to the learned counsel after the rejection of the application given under section 27(4) of the Act by the Commissioner, the petitioners should amend their petition and implead the Commissioner as a party and sought a relief for cancellation of the Pattas because in case they do not do so, legal difficulties would arise. 4. I have carefully considered the respective submissions and in my opinion the petitioners' case has considerable merit. Chapter IV of the Act provides for disposal and settlement of surplus land and contains sections 24 to 31. Section 24 has been omitted by U. P. Act No. 18 of 1973. Section 25 empowers the State Government to permit the use of surplus land for other public purposes. Under section 26 the Collector is empowered to settle the surplus land vested in the State on behalf of the State Government in accordance with the provisions of sections 26A and 27. Section 26A provides for settlement of land which had been let out for an interim period under section 26(2) as it stood before the commencement of Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969. Under section 27 the State Government has been empowered to settle the surplus land. Under sub-section (4) of this section the Commissioner may of his own motion and shall, on the application of any aggrieved person, enquire into such settlement and if he is satisfied that the settlement is irregular he may after notice to the person in whose favour such settlement is made to show cause, cancel the settlement and the lease, if any and direct the person holding or retaining possession to be evicted. The order passed by the Commissioner under subsection (4) has been made final under sub-section (5). The order passed by the Commissioner under subsection (4) has been made final under sub-section (5). Section 28 provides for terms and conditions of settlement and sections 29, 30 and 31 provide for subsequent declaration of further land as surplus land, that is, where some accretion has taken place in the holding of the tenure holder under a decree or order of any Court, or as a result of succession or transfer, or by prescription in consequence of adverse possession, or when an unirrigated land becomes irrigated or by recession of any river. In the present case admittedly during the pendency of the appeal on the first occasion possession of surplus land was taken and its settlement was made. The petitioners made an application before the Commissioner for cancellation of the leases and for restitution of possession. That application has been dismissed by the Commissioner on 29-11-80 on the view that section 27(4) is not applicable as the disputed land has ceased to be surplus area and the Prescribed Authority alone can order restitution. I do not agree with the counsel for the allottees that in view of this order the petitioners should amend the petition and implead the Commissioner as a party and pray for a relief for cancellation of the leases. The fact is that the petitioners while moving the Commissioner in this behalf have taken resort to the remedy which in the opinion of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate Court, was alone available to them. 5. THE question then for consideration is as to whether the Prescribed Authority has jurisdiction under section 37 of the Act to order restitution of possession. It can no longer be contended that after the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 6-1-1979 declaring that the petitioners had no surplus land and which order became final, the earlier order of the Prescribed Authority dated 8-10-1976 determining 49 bighas 14 biswas land as surplus became non-est and the petitioners were required to be relegated to the position which obtained prior to that order. Section 37 of the Act provides that "any officer or authority holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act, shall, in so tar as it may be applicable, have all the powers and privileges of a civil court, and follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the trial and disposal of suits relating to immovable property." Under this provision the Prescribed Authority has been clothed with all the powers and privileges of a civil court and he is required to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial and disposal of suits relating to immovable property. THE objection raised on behalf of the respondent is that while considering the application under section 144 CPC it cannot be said that the Prescribed Authority is holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act. According to the counsel the Prescribed Authority has been conferred with all the powers and privileges of a Civil Court and is required to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial and disposal of suits relating to immovable property if only it is holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act. It is correct that the Prescribed Authority has been conferred all the powers and privileges of a Civil Court and is required to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial and disposal of suits relating to immovable property when he is holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act and the question is when considering an application for restitution of possession the occasion for which is the order of the Prescribed Authority itself, can it be said that it is merely a sequence of holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act or does it constitute a proceeding which does not come within the purview of this Act. THE preamble of the Act shows that the purpose of the Act is to provide for the imposition of ceiling on land holdings and the purpose is to serve the interest of the community to ensure increased agricultural production, to provide land for landless agricultural labourers and for other public purposes as best to subserve the common good. THE preamble of the Act shows that the purpose of the Act is to provide for the imposition of ceiling on land holdings and the purpose is to serve the interest of the community to ensure increased agricultural production, to provide land for landless agricultural labourers and for other public purposes as best to subserve the common good. THE determination of the ceiling area applicable to a tenure holder and of the surplus land with him is required to be made with this purpose in view. When it is found that the tenure holder has no surplus land, the proceedings have to be dropped against him and necessary effect has to be given to consequences which flow from that order. Under section 144 CPC restitution is required to be made where and is so far as a decree or order is varied or reversed and the Court of first instance shall cause such restitution to be made. THE parties are required to be placed in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. 6. IN the instant case the Prescribed Authority did declare some surplus land with the petitioners. They filed an appeal which was allowed but during the pendency of the appeal possession was taken and settlement was made. Under section 14 of the Act possession of surplus land is to be taken in case where an appeal has been preferred under section 13, after the date of its decision. IN other words possession could not have been taken of surplus land during the pendency of the appeal. This is one aspect of the matter. Ultimately the Prescribed Authority found that the petitioners had no surplus land and thus the earlier order passed by it determining surplus land stood totally superseded. As a result of this subsequent order parties were required to be placed in the position which they would have occupied but for that earlier order. This is one aspect of the matter. Ultimately the Prescribed Authority found that the petitioners had no surplus land and thus the earlier order passed by it determining surplus land stood totally superseded. As a result of this subsequent order parties were required to be placed in the position which they would have occupied but for that earlier order. IN my opinion, therefore, restitution of possession is nothing else but giving effect to the orders passed in proceedings under the Act and would be covered by section 37 of the Act and inasmuch as, the Prescribed Authority failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, the order passed by it rejecting the application of the petitioners and similar order passed by the appellate Court are liable to be quashed. IN this behalf I may refer to a decision of a Full Bench of his Court in M/s. Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Civil Judge, Bijnor, 1969 AWR 285 (FB). IN this case while referring to the powers of the Prescribed Authority under section 37 of the Act it was laid down that the Prescribed Authority may under Order I Rule 10 (2) CPC add the name of any person as a party to the proceeding before him, if his presence is necessary to enable him effectually and completely to decide and settle the question involved in the proceeding. IN doing so and hearing in support of the claim made by him, the Prescribed Authority would not at all be enlarging the scope of the powers vested in him under the provisions of the Act. He would still be acting under section 12 because an objection under section 10 (2) has been filed by the tenure holder upon whom notice has been served and he would still be deciding that objection and determining his surplus land with only this difference that he will be deciding the objection in the presence of the persons seeking impleadment. Even if for the time being it is assumed that the present application is not strictly covered by section 37 of the Act because while considering it the Prescribed Authority cannot be said to be holding an inquiry or hearing an objection under this Act, the Prescribed Authority will have inherent power to direct restitution of possession. In Smt. Ramnandi v. Seventh Addl. District Judge. In Smt. Ramnandi v. Seventh Addl. District Judge. 1980 RD (case No. 34 Summary of cases) the view taken by a learned Judge of this Court was that the Prescribed Authority has inherent powers to condone delay in filing objection under section 10 (2) and in doing so can extend the benefit of section 148 CPC. In Raj Gopal Misra v. Prescribed Authority Robertsganj, Mirzapur, 1979 AWC 740 it was held that on coming to know that a tenure holder has died the Prescribed Authority should issue notice to the legal heirs before finalizing the proceedings, and if it proceeds without effecting service on the heirs, the order cannot be said to be valid. 7. AS for inherent jurisdiction to restore the parties to the position which obtained prior to the order which has been set aside, reference may be made to certain decisions given under the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In Ram Niwas Pushkar Dutta v. Nankau Ram, 1967 AWR 830 the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotting the accommodation to the petitioner was held to be without jurisdiction and was quashed by this Court. Thereafter the Rent Control and Eviction Officer sought to eject the petitioner from the premises occupied by him in order to put the opposite party no. 1 back into possession. In these circumstances the petitioners approached this Court by way of writ petition. The petition was dismissed on the view that as the order in pursuance of the execution of which the petitioner was put in possession of the premises by ejecting opposite party no. 1 was an order which the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to pass, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has the inherent jurisdiction, being a quasi-judicial tribunal, to restore the possession of respondent no. 1 by ejecting the petitioner in order to set right the wrong that had been done in passing that illegal order and which had been found to have been passed without jurisdiction by the High Court. This decision was followed in Girish Dutt Chandola v. District Magistrate, 1977 (2) All. India Rent Control Journal 533, which arose out of proceedings under U. P. Act 13 of 1972. 8. This decision was followed in Girish Dutt Chandola v. District Magistrate, 1977 (2) All. India Rent Control Journal 533, which arose out of proceedings under U. P. Act 13 of 1972. 8. IN Shanker Lal v. M/s. Ram Kishan Baldeo Prasad, 1976 AWC 75 where a suit for the appellant's eviction was decreed by the trial Court but was dismissed by the lower appellate Court and that decree was affirmed in second appeal by this Court and during the pendency of the appeal the respondent had inducted a third person as a tenant, it was held that the appellant was entitled to claim restitution against the respondents under section 144 CPC. Reference may also be made to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Gangadhar v. Raghubar Dayal, AIR 1975 Allahabad 102 (FB) wherein it was laid down that section 144 CPC is not exhaustive and restitution can be granted by the Court under its inherent powers. On the authority of established principle and on the principle contained in the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit it is really the duty of the Court to grant restitution under its inherent powers when a person has been deprived of his property due to an order of Court which has subsequently been varied or reversed as being erroneous. 9. IT cannot be disputed that the Prescribed Authority while holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act has all the powers and privileges of a civil Court. The petitioners had filed an objection to the notice served on them under section 10 (2) and while hearing their objection the Prescribed Authority acting as a civil Court at first determined surplus land and subsequently held that they had no surplus land and discharged the notice. Since the petitioners were deprived of their land due to an order of the Prescribed Authority which was subsequently reversed by it as being erroneous, it has inherent power I ex debito justitiae to grant restitution of possession to the petitioners. 10. ON behalf of the petitioners my attention was also invited to Rules 13,14, 14B and 59 (5) of the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 13 requires the Prescribed Authority to notify surplus land and after such notification to send intimation under Rule 14 to the Collector. 10. ON behalf of the petitioners my attention was also invited to Rules 13,14, 14B and 59 (5) of the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 13 requires the Prescribed Authority to notify surplus land and after such notification to send intimation under Rule 14 to the Collector. Under Rule 14B the Collector is required to maintain a register in CLH Form 7 showing details of all land declared surplus in his district and to ensure that the necessary corrections are made in the reveune records in respect of surplus land. Rule 59 provides for settlement of surplus land and sub-rule (5) says that when a settlement or lease of any land has determined under Rule 4, the Collector may evict any person holding or retaining possession thereof and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. Determination of lease under sub-rule (4) takes place when the lessee commits breach of any terms and conditions of the lease. In the present case the determination of lease took place because of the order of the Prescribed Authority that there was no surplus land. This eventuality is not foreseen in Rule 59. It may, therefore, have no direct application to the present case but of course in the event of determination of the lease it is the Collector who is to evict the lessee. In my opinion restitution of possession should have been allowed under section 37 of the Act and any how it should have been done by the Prescribed Authority in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. 11. THE petition hence succeeds and is allowed and the impugned orders dated 15-10-1979 and 2-2-1980 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the appellate Court respectively are quashed and the respondents are directed to restore possession of the disputed land to the petitioners. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.