ORDER H.G. Mishra, J. This order shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Civil Appeal No. 68 of 1980 (Ranchhod & Ors. v. Purshottam & Ors.), as both the appeals arise out of identical facts and raise similar questions of law. The defendant-appellant started proceedings under section 21 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Samvat 2008 (Act No. 28 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Jagir Abolition Act) for acquiring rights of a Pakka tenant in his holding before the Naib-Tahsildar, Dhar. Their claim for acquisition of Pakka tenancy rights was resisted by the plaintiff-respondent Purushottam and his brothers (respondent No. 2 Gopalrao, respondent No. 3 Dhivnarain and Ramchandra, predecessor-in-title of respondents 4 to 8) on the ground that Pakka tenancy rights cannot be acquired by the defendant-appellants-herein because on family arrangement the land in dispute had been allotted to the share of Purushottam alone; that the defendant-appellants were not sub-tenants in possession of the land in dispute; that Purushottam being a person without arm is a disabled person within the contemplation of section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (Act No. 66 of 1950, hereinafter referred to as Tenancy Act). After recording evidence, by order dated 29-10-1959 the Naib-Tahsildar allowed the application submitted by the defendant-appellants. Aggrieved by this order an appeal was preferred by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Ramchandrarao before the Collector, Dhar, which has been dismissed. The revision preferred by Purushottam and others before the Board of Revenue was also rejected. Thus, the order of acquisition of Pakka tenancy rights passed in favour of the defendant-appellants attained finality. Aggrieved by this order an appeal was preferred by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Ramchandrarao before the Collector, Dhar, which has been dismissed. The revision preferred by Purushottam and others before the Board of Revenue was also rejected. Thus, the order of acquisition of Pakka tenancy rights passed in favour of the defendant-appellants attained finality. Thereafter the suit giving rise to this appeal has been brought by Purushottam, plaintiff-respondent No. 1 herein in the Court of the Civil Judge, Class II for declaration of title and restoration of possession on the grounds as detailed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the plaint, which shortly are put as under: (a) that the suit land was service holding; (b) that the defendant-appellants were not sub-tenants; (c) that the Khasra entry recording them as sub-tenants was made by the Patwari collusively and fraudulently; that on a family arrangement dated 21-2-1951 the land in dispute was allotted to the plaintiff alone and that his other brothers had relinquished their shares in the suit land in his favour; that Purushottam was a disabled person within the contemplation of section 74 of the Tenancy Act. Accordingly, no order of conferral of Pakka tenancy rights could be passed under section 21 of the Jagir Abolition Act, in favour of the defendant-appellants. The claim of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 was resisted by the defendant-appellants inter alia on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the bar enacted by section 34 of the Jagir Abolition Act. The trial Court framed issues on the basis of pleadings of the parties, one of them is to the following effect: Whether the suit is barred from cognizance of the Civil Court. After hearing arguments the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the jurisdiction of civil Court is barred by section 34 of the Jagir Abolition Act. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal, which has been allowed and it has been held that Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and has sent back the case to the trial Court for decision of other issues on merits. Aggrieved by this order of remand the defendant-appellants have preferred this appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Aggrieved by this order of remand the defendant-appellants have preferred this appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this appeal Shri S. D. Sanghi, assisted by Shri N. K. Sanghi, learned counsel for the defendant-appellants, contended that the learned Additional District Judge has erred in holding that Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit on merits, inasmuch as section 34 of the Jagir Abolition Act expressly bars jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain the suit of present character and that the construction put on the provisions of section 21 and section 34 of the Jagir Abolition Act and section 74 of the Tenancy Act is erroneous; that reliance on the ratio of Ranchhodlal v. Chhotu 1970 JLJ 84, wrongly referred to as 1971 MPLJ 88 in para 10 of the impugned order, could not be available in the facts and circumstances of the present case and that the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge runs counter to the ratio of Raghunath v. Kanhiya A I R. 7979 S C 1936. Reliance is placed on the ratio of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1 , Kamla Mills v. Bombay State AIR 1965 SC 1942 , and Rai Brij Rai Krislma v. Shaw & Bros. AIR 1951 SC 115 . Accordingly, it should be held that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit on merits and that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court deserve to be restored. Shri K. N. Pabelkar, learned counsel for the respondents-herein argued in support of the impugned order and contended that the challenge against the order passed on an application under section 21 of the Jagir Abolition Act is on the count that it is not "under the Act". Therefore, it is beyond the mischief of section 34; that the construction put by the learned Additional District Judge on the provisions placed in section 21 and section 34 of the Jagir Abolition Act and section 74 of the Tenancy Act is proper; that by wrongly deciding jurisdictional facts the Revenue Court functioning under section 21 of the Jagir Abolition Act could not gi\e itself jurisdiction. This being the ground of challenge to the impugned order, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit; that the challenge to the impugned order is within the permissible limits even according to the ratio of Raglutnath's case (supra); that the impugned order cannot operate as a bar to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to adjudicate upon the question of status: that the defendant-appellants were not sub-tenants and the Khasra entry recording them as sub-tenants being collusively and fraudulently procured with the aid of the Patwari, could not afford basis for holding that the defendants were sub-tenants and that the land in dispute having been allotted on family partition to the plaintiff, who at the relevant time was a disabled person within the contemplation of section 74 of the Tenancy Act, Pakka tenancy rights could not be acquired by and conferred on the defendants. Reliance is placed on the ratio of Nichaldas v. Askaran 1959 MPLJ 1061 : 1960 JLJ 105 , Sukhsen v. Shravankumar 1972 MPLJ 95 : 1972 JLJ 193 , Amarsinghv. Anopa 1971 JLJ 88 and Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi AIR 1962 SC 547 . Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I have come to the conclusion that these appeals deserve to be allowed partly and the cases deserve to be sent back to the trial Court for the purpose indicated hereinafter. The analysis of the reasoning employed by the learned Additional District Judge for holding that the suit is cognizable by Civil Courts is as under: (a) before going into the question of jurisdiction we have to look into the allegations of the parties and on that the question of jurisdiction can be decided; (b) the case of the appellant (plaintiff) before the trial Court is that the appellant is a disabled person and, therefore, application under section 21 of the Act is not maintainable; that a person will not be entitled to make the application if the original tenant is a disabled person; (c) that the question of disability has to be decided under section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Thus, the decision is not under section 21 of the Act, but it is one under the Tenancy Act; (d) what section 34(1) of the Jagir Abolition Act bars is the jurisdiction to decide any questions which 'under the Act' required to be decided by the Tahsildar and not under any other Act or law.-(See Paras. 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the impugned order- it is to be noted that while numbering the paras there appears to be jumping of para No. 8). So far as reasoning No. (a) above employed by the learned Additional District Judge goes, it runs counter to the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Fatechand Ganeshram v. Wasudeo Shrawan 1941 NTJ 417 : AIR 1948 Nag 334, in-as-much as it is only the averments in the plaint which have to-be looked into for the purpose of deciding the preliminary issues and the statement of the defendant has to be ignored for the purpose of deciding such points. In the case of Fatechand Ganeshram (supra), it has been ruled as under : Where the defendants ask the Court to decide an issue, such as a preliminary point as to limitation, on the very allegations of the plaintiff, they must be taken to admit for the sake of argument that the allegations of the plaintiff in his plaint are true reserving to themselves the right to show that these allegations are wholly or partially false in the further stages of the action, should the preliminary point be overruled. Hence for the purpose of deciding such point the statement of the defendants has to be ignored." The principles underlying the aforesaid dictum can very well be extended and applied to the present situation. Accordingly, when the learned Additional District Judge observed that for deciding the preliminary issue in question Courts have to look into the allegations of the parties, his approach in the matter cannot be regarded to be correct. The other reasoning as per No. (b) above employed by the learned Additional District Judge also does not appear to be legally tenable. Accordingly, when the learned Additional District Judge observed that for deciding the preliminary issue in question Courts have to look into the allegations of the parties, his approach in the matter cannot be regarded to be correct. The other reasoning as per No. (b) above employed by the learned Additional District Judge also does not appear to be legally tenable. The benefit on the basis of disability cannot be regarded to have been claimed by Purshottam, plaintiff-herein, in proceedings under section 21 before the Revenue Courts on the basis of section 74 of the Tenancy Act, but will be deemed to have been claimed by virtue of the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 21 of the Jagir Abolition Act. Section 21 of the said Act reads as under: Section 21. Acquisition of Pacca tenancy rights by a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant.-(1) A sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant, who is in possession of any land in a resumed Jagir land, may, within the relevant period, apply to the Tahsildar within whose jurisdiction that Jagir-land is situated (hereinafter referred to as "the Tahsildar") for acquiring the rights of a Pacca tenant in his holding. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, the expression "relevant period" shall mean- (a) if the holding be in the possession of a tenant of a sub-tenant, a period of (eight years) from the date of resumption, in case of the tenant and if the tenant fails to apply within the said period, a further period of six months, in case of the sub-tenant; (b) if the holding be in the possession of a sub-tenant, a period of (eight years) from the date of resumption. (2) An application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a receipted Chalan showing the payment into the treasury of the amount specified in section 22 : Provided that a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant shall have no right to make an application under this section if the original tenant or the sub-tenant, as the case may be, is under a disability, specified in section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007: Provided further that if the holding be in possession of a tenant of a sub-tenant, the right of applying for the acquisition of Pacca tenancy rights under this section shall firstly be that of the tenant of the sub-tenant and the sub-tenant may exercise his said right only after the failure of his tenant to exercise the right within the period prescribed in clause (a) of the above explanation. (Emphasis supplied) It appears that the learned Additional District Judge proceeded on the assumption that the question of disability is to be decided by virtue of the provisions of section 74 of the Tenancy Act. But it is only by virtue of the first proviso to the enacting part of sub-section (2) of section 21 that the Court acting under section 21 gets jurisdiction to decide the question of disability of the original tenant or the sub-tenant, as the case may be, vis-a-vis the person making application for acquisition of the rights of a Pakka tenant in his holding. The Abolition of Jagirs Act on the point is a self contained Code. Section 21 provides for acquisition of Pakka tenancy rights by a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant. The right to apply for acquiring the rights of a Pakka tenant has been conferred by sub-section (1) on a sub-Jenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant, who is in possession of any land in a resumed Jagir-Iand. Application for the purpose has to be made to the Tahsildar. Sub-section (2) of section 21 provides that an application under sub-section (1) shall be made in such form as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a receipted Challan showing the payment into the treasury of the amount specified in section 22. Two provisos have been placed below sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) of section 21 provides that an application under sub-section (1) shall be made in such form as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a receipted Challan showing the payment into the treasury of the amount specified in section 22. Two provisos have been placed below sub-section (2). The first of those provisos provides that a sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant shall have no right to make an application under this section if the original tenant or the sub-tenant, as the case may be, is under a diyability specified in section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. It is for the purposes of describing the nature of disability that the first proviso refers to section 74 of the Tenancy Act. Section 74 of the Tenancy Act by itself is not applicable to the proceedings under section 21, but it applies to them by virtue of the first proviso referred to above. It is a case of incorpo-ration by reference merely. Thus, it is a question which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar or the Collector 'by or under the Act', and not under section 74 of the Tenancy Act as such. Now, I turn to the examination of the nature of power and authority conferred by sections 21, 22 and 23 of the Jagir Abolition Act in the matter. Section 21(1) clothes inter alia a sub-tenant with a right to make an application for acquisition of rights of a Pakka tenant. The second proviso to sub-section (2) lays down the order of the persons who can exercise the aforesaid right. The first proviso to the enacting part of sub-section (2) of section 21 provides that if the original tenant or the sub-tenant, as the case may be, is under a disability specified in section 74 of the Tenancy Act, the sub-tenant of a tenant shall have no right to make an application under that section. An application under section 21 has to be accompanied by a receipted Challan showing the payment into the treasury of the amount specified in section 22. Section 22 specifies the amount to be deposited with the application under section 21 in its clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d). An application under section 21 has to be accompanied by a receipted Challan showing the payment into the treasury of the amount specified in section 22. Section 22 specifies the amount to be deposited with the application under section 21 in its clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d). Thereafter section 23 lays down the entire procedure to be followed in the matter of issuance of a certificate of Pakka tenancy rights, which is as under: S. 23.-Issue of certificate of Pakka tenancy.-(1) Where the Tehsildar is satisfied that an application made under section 21 is not in the proper form, or is not accompanied by the receipted Challan referred to in sub-section (2) of that section, he shall reject the application. (2) Where the Tehsildar is satisfied that an application made under section 21 is in the proper form and is accompanied by the receipted Chalan referred to in sub-section (2) of the section, he shall proceed to make an enquiry according to the rules prescribed by the Government in this behalf, and pass orders accordingly. (3) If after enquiry the amount deposited by the applicant is found to be less than the amount determined to be due from the applicant under section 22, the Tehsildar shall by order in writing direct him to deposit within a reasonable time the further amount in the treasury and if he fails to deposit the said sum accordingly, his application shall be rejected. (4) If the applicant deposits the sum as directed under sub-section (3) the Tehsildar shall issue a certificate of Pucca tenancy in favour of the applicant, in the prescribed form. (And the araount deposited in accordance with section 22 shall be given to the concerned Gair Maurusi tenant, Maurusi tenant, sub-tenant, Jagirdar or Zamindar, as the case may be.) (5) Rent at the village rate assessed in the current settlement shall be charged from every sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant to whom a certificate is granted under sub-section (4): Provided that the rent charged from such of them including Sakitul-milkiyat tenant who had been fully assessed in the current settlement shall continue to be the same as assessed in the said settlement till their re-assessment in the next settlement. (6) Till the expiry of the period allowed for submitting an application under section 21 or till the final decision of such application under this section, whichever may be earlier, the farmer status of the tenant or the sub-tenant, as the case may be, shall continue. (Emphasis supplied) The Act thus sets up a complete machinery for investigation of those matters upon which jurisdiction of the Teasildar in the matter of issuance of a certificate of Pakka tenancy depends. By virtue of section 28 the order passed by the Tehsildar under section 23 is made appealable and appeal against it has to be preferred to the Collector, whose decision shall be final. In this view of the matter, it is dear that the Jagir Abolition Act empowers the Tahsildar alone to decide whether or not the conditions for acquisition of Pakka tenancy rights exist or not. Such being the provisions of the Act, it has to be seen as to whether it is at all possible to question the decision of the Tahsildar and/or that passed on appeal by the Collector on a matter which the Act dearly empowers him or them to decide. The law on this subject has been very lucidly stated by Lord Esher, M. R. in The Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income-tax (1888) 21 QBD 313, at p. 319, in these words; When an inferior Court or Tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the Legislature has to consider. what powers it will give that Tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such Tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively fo decide whether that state of facts exist and if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The Legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts, exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. But there is another state of things which may exist. The Legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts, exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the Legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the tvvo cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the Legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction. On the same line are the following observations of Sir James Colville in Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan (1874) I7 RTP 417 atp 443 (43 LJP 29.) which is a case dealing with the principles on which a writ of certiorari may be issued : Accordingly, the authorities............established that an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject-matter is, if no defects appears on the face of it, to be taken as conclusive of the facts stated therein; and that the Court of Queen's Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however, essential, has been erroneously found." The aforesaid exposition of law has the approval of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. Shaw & Bros. In view of the nature of the provisions placed in sections 21, 22 and 23, there can be no doubt that the present casa falls within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, because here the Jagir Abolition Act has entrusted the Tahsildar with jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine all conditions essential for acquisition of Pakka tenancy rights. Accordingly, orders passed by Tahsildar and/or by the Collector on appeal in the aforesaid proceedings cannot be questioned on merits in Civil Courts. Accordingly, orders passed by Tahsildar and/or by the Collector on appeal in the aforesaid proceedings cannot be questioned on merits in Civil Courts. I am further fortified in the aforesaid conclusion by the following observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Naresli Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1 : (a) It is only if the condition prescribed by the statute is satisfied that the Tribunal derives jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Proof of such a condition is regarded as the proof of a collateral fact, and an erroneous decision of the Tribunal as to the existence of this collateral fact is not regarded as binding on the parties and can be challenged by a writ proceeding under Article 226. (b) But in cases where the Tribunal is given jurisdiction to deal with certain matters, then its decision on those matters cannot be regarded as a decision on collateral facts. (Division into (a) and (b) parts is mine.) Similar is the view taken in M/s Kamla Milh Ltd. v. State of Bombay. The present case falls within the dictum (b) above. In view of the foregoing discussion and that follows, the jurisdiction given to Tahsildar and /or Collector in the matter cannot be regarded as a decision on collateral facts. The cases of Nichaldas Sukhsen and Magiti Sasamal (supra), belong to the category (a) above. As such, adjudication on matters to decide which the jurisdiction has been conferred on the Tahsildar and on Collector, hearing an appeal in the matter has to be treated as immune from challenge on merits in Civil Courts. For the same reason the decision on the question of status of the parties; the question of disabillty of the opposite party being within the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar and for Collector, adjudication of those questions is within the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts, worked out by section 34 of the Jagir Abolition Act. The reliance on Onkar v. Sabalsingh 1978 MPLJ 47 is of no avail as it turns on the construction of the provisions of section 189 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The object of section 189 of the Code as to achieve being different and the language in which that Section is couched being also different, that provision cannot be regarded as a statute in pari materia for the present purposes. The object of section 189 of the Code as to achieve being different and the language in which that Section is couched being also different, that provision cannot be regarded as a statute in pari materia for the present purposes. So also reliance on the ratio of Amarsingh's case (supra) is not available to the plaintiff-respondent because in the instant case there was no dispute before the Tahsildar and /or the Collector as to whether Purushottam was a disabled person. It was a fact not in dispute between the parties that Purushottam was a person with-out arm. Since the holding in question was, held jointly by Purushottam along with his three brothers, who were admittedly persons not under disability, it was held that the rirst proviso to sub-section (2) of section 21 of the Jagir Abolition Act was inapplicable and could not preclude acquisition of Pakka tenancy rights on the defendant-applicant-herein. Accordingly, reliance on the ratio of Amarsingh (supra) is not available in the circumstances. At this stage it may be dearly stated that by whatever precedes it is not intended to lay down that section 34 of the Jagir Abolition Act imposes a blanket ban on the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. In the case of Raghunath (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have construed the provisions of section 34 of the Jagir Abolition Act not to exclude a challenge to orders of impugned character on the ground that they were nullity. This is dear from the following observations : The High Court on a consideration of the language of section 34 of the aforesaid Act held that the suit was barred and the order of the Tahsildar could not be challenged in the Civil Court except on the ground that it was a nullity. We find no reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court. Inspite of the bar enacted by section 34 of the Jagir Abolition Act, a challenge to impugned orders can be made on grounds that they are nullity. The concept of nullity includes a challenge on the grounds that the impugned order was delivered by a Court not competent to delher it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. This is what has been provided expressly by section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The concept of nullity includes a challenge on the grounds that the impugned order was delivered by a Court not competent to delher it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. This is what has been provided expressly by section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The section 34 enacts that 'any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under sections 40, 41, 42 and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion'. In the present case the plaintiff appears to have thrown a challenge to the impugned orders on the ground that they are nullity and/or vitiated by collusion or fraud, as laid down in the plaint. The trial Court as well as the learned Additional District Judge do not appear to have examined the question as to whether, on the allegations made by the plaintiff, a real challenge on the ground that the impugned orders are nullity, is made out or not. It is needless to observe that in case the Court finds that the allegations laid in the plaint do not raise in the eye of law a triable issue, they have to be ignored, as held in Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai AIR 1951 SC 280 , the relevant ratio whereof is extracted below : In cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court oug/it to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be and the same applies to undue influence and coercion, (Emphasis supplied) The same principle can be extended and applied to cases where a plea of collusion is tried to set up. In this view of the matter, these appeals deserve to be allowed and the cases deserve to be sent back to trial Court for decision on the question whether on the allegations laid down in the plaint the challenge thrown by the plaintiff to the impugned orders does really amount to a challenge on the ground of nullity within the contemplation of the case of Raghunath (supra). Accordingly, both the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed to the extent indicated above. The impugned orders passed by the learned Additional District Judge as well as by the trial Court are set aside. Now the cases will go back to the trial Court for the purpose indicated herein-above. Costs in this Court as well as those in the first appellate Court will be provided for by the trial Court and shall abide by the event. Counsel's fee shall be according to the schedule if certified. Appeal allowed.