JUDGMENT CHANDURKAR, J.-A Trust for a Charitable purpose has been created by members of Kale Family at Nagpur and the settlors shown in the Trust-deed dated 30th June 1950 (Annexure-A to the statement of the case) were: (1) Shri Purushottam Balkrishna Kale, (2) Smt. Anasuyabai Purushottam Kale (husband. and wife); and (3) Shri Kashinath Purushottam Kale and (4) Shri Balkrishna Purushottam Kale, who were the sons of the first two settlors. One of the properties settled in Trust is known as “Kale Bhawan” the value of which was, shown in the Trust-deed at Rs. 274,000 and belonged exclusively to settlor No. 31, Shri Kashinath Purushottam Kate who died on 18th October 1959. The respondent in this reference is the accountable person being the widow of the deceased Shri K.P. Kale. It is not necessary to refer in detail to the charitable purposes for which the Trust was created because it has now been found as a fact by the Tribunal that the Trust is a Public Trust for a charitable purpose. The surplus income of the Trust properties was to be utilised for charities which according to the Trust would include "donations to erect funds for scholars-hips, prizes, medals" etc. establishment of Technical Schools and Colleges and other Educational Institutions and 'Hostels for student of either sex, medical relief of all kinds, help to the destitute and poor and aid for people stricken by calamities such as floods, tires etc. and no distinction was to be made on the basis of caste, creed or religion in respect of beneficiaries who would benefit by the Trust. So far as ‘Kale Bhawan' is concerned, it appears that the property was transferred to the Trust subject to the Trust accepting the liability of Rs. 50,000 which was the encumberance in the form of a mortgage debt on the said property. The settlors were themselves to be the trustees. 2. One of the clauses of the Trust-deed provided that the Managing Trustee or Managing Trustees were to be paid “25 per cent of the Trust Income' as emoluments for him or them for managing the trust property" but at no time the total remuneration of the Managing Trustee or Trustees could be more than Rs. 2,000 per month. 2. One of the clauses of the Trust-deed provided that the Managing Trustee or Managing Trustees were to be paid “25 per cent of the Trust Income' as emoluments for him or them for managing the trust property" but at no time the total remuneration of the Managing Trustee or Trustees could be more than Rs. 2,000 per month. Clause 11 of the Trust-deed provided for the first two settlors, namely, Shri Purushottam Balkrishna Kale and Smt. Anasuyabai Kale to stay free of rent in one of the Trust properties, namely, 'Anand Bhawan'. It would, however, be noted that Trust in respect of this property is not in question in the present proceedings. Smt. Anasuyabai Kale was to be the first Trustee for life under Clause 19, or until she resigns or relinquishes her office. Clause 19 further provided that if Shri Purushottam Balkrishna Kale survived, anyone of the events putting an end to the Managing Trusteeship of Mrs. Anasuyabai Kale and if he chose to accept the office of the Managing Trustee, he shall be the second Managing Trustee for life or until he resigns or relinquishes his Office. Then comes clause 23 on which the Revenue is heavily relying on the applicability of the provisions of section 12 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. It is, therefore, proper to reproduce this clause in full. It reads as follows:- "23. If at any further time, this Trust cannot function for any reason whatsoever the trust shall be dissolved and the Trust property respectively be returned to the settlors and future contributories to the Trust Fund or their heirs, representatives, administrators or assigns. However, under no circumstances the Settlors shall be entitled to revoke the Trust hereby created for a period of ten years from 7th day of October 1951." After the death of Shri K. P. Kale when proceedings for determination of the estate duty payable by the accountable person were taken up by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, he took the view that there was a reservation of interest by implication in the Trust-deed and as such section 12(1) of the Estate Duty Act was applicable to the facts of the case. The Assistant Controller also took the view that there was mortgage-loan of Rs. The Assistant Controller also took the view that there was mortgage-loan of Rs. 50,000 on Kale Bhawan which was transferred to the Trust and the Trust having accepted that liability, the deceased was benefited to that extent. The market value of Kale Bhawan was determined at Rs. 400,000 and deducting the amount of Rs. 50,000 which was mortgage-encumbrance, the Assistant Controller added a sum of Rs. 3,50,000 as a part of the dutiable estate of the deceased. We are not concerned with the other assets which consisted mainly in the form of goodwill in certain firms. 3. The Zonal Appellate Controller took the view that on the terms of the Trust-deed it could not be said that the settlor had reserved any benefit from the estate. It may be mentioned that section 12 of the Estate Duty Act was invoked by the Assistant Controller on the grounds that the Trust was advancing monies out of Trust funds to the Provincial Automobile Company Limited, Nagpur, in which the deceased partner was holding 8 annas share. During the life time of the deceased one of the Trust properties was sold and the sale-proceeds were advanced as loans to the wife of the deceased and the Trust-funds have been invested in various firms in which the deceased was the partner. He had also taken the view that under Clause 10 of the Trust-deed, the children of the Settlors as well as descendants were also entitled to receive educational Scholarships or medical help and marriage bounties and therefore the Explanation to, section 12(1) of the Estate Duty Act was applicable. All the reasons given by the Assistant Controller for holding that the deceased had reserved interest in the Trust properties were held by the appellate Controller to be not justified. He, therefore, deleted that value of the Trust property amounting to Rs. 3,50,000 from the value of the dutiable estate of the deceased. 4. The Department then preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the Trust was a Charitable Trust. The Tribunal also found that the property in dispute did not pass on the death of the deceased and that there, was no scope for applying the provisions of section 12 as there was no interest created or reserved in favour of the deceased by the trust-deed. The Tribunal found that the Trust was a Charitable Trust. The Tribunal also found that the property in dispute did not pass on the death of the deceased and that there, was no scope for applying the provisions of section 12 as there was no interest created or reserved in favour of the deceased by the trust-deed. One of the circumstances considered by the Tribunal while dealing with Clause 23 of the Trust-deed, which according to the Department, had the effect of reserving the power of revocation by the settlors was that the Trustees had approached the Assistant Charity Commissioner for treating the Trust as dissolved, but the Assistant Charity Commissioner by his order dated 21-4-1962 had held that the Trust was neither dissolved nor extinct nor' revoked. The finding of the Assistant Charity Commissioner was thus treated as final. The Tribunal, therefore, upheld the order of the Appellate Controller. Arising out of this order of the Tribunal, the following three questions have been referred to this Court under section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953:- 1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified on the construction of the Trust deed dated June 30, 1950 that it did not create any interest in the property for life or any other period determinable by reference to the Settlors' death or that no right has been reserved to the settlor by the exercise of which it was possible for him to restore to himself or to reclaim absolute interest in the property, namely, Kale Bhawan ? 2. -Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the finding given by the Assistant Charity Commissioner that' it was an irrevocable trust was binding on the authorities under E. D. Act and also the Tribunal? 3. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the value of Kale Bhawan was includible in the dutiable estate under section 12 ? 3. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the value of Kale Bhawan was includible in the dutiable estate under section 12 ? The relevant part of section 12 the Estate Duty Act, 1953, on which Shri Joshi, the learned counsel for the Department, was relying reads as follows :- "Property passing under any settlement made by the deceased by deed or any other instrument not taking effect as a will whereby an interest in such property for life, or any other period determinable by reference to death is reserved either expressly or by implication to the settlor or whereby the Settlor may have reserved to himself the right by the exercise of any power, to restore to himself or to reclaim the absolute interest in such property shall be deemed to pass on the settlor's death." The rest of the provisions of section 12 are not relevant for our purpose. Section 12 (1) is in two parts: the first part deals with reservation of interest in the Trust property for life or any other period determinable by reference to death, whether expressly or by implication; and the second part deals with the reservation by the settlor by the right to revoke the Trust, with the ultimate result of restoring to the settlor the trust property or enabling him to reclaim the absolute interest in such properties. In anyone of these contingencies such property though a Trust may have been created in respect thereof has been provided to deem to pass on the death of the settlor. 5. The first question referred is a composite question turning on the applicability of the two contingencies referred to in section 12 (1). We shall first deal with the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the Revenue that clauses 6 and 19 of the Trust-deed has the effect of reserving the kind of interest contemplated by section 12 (1) and, therefore, according to the learned Counsel, Kale Bhawan property must be deemed to have been passed on the death of the deceased. Clause 6 refers to the remuneration payable to the Managing Trustee which, as already pointed out, was to be 25 per cent of the Trust income subject to maximum of Rs. 2,000/- per month. Now, the Managing Trustee, under the terms of the Trust-deed, were initially to be Mrs. Clause 6 refers to the remuneration payable to the Managing Trustee which, as already pointed out, was to be 25 per cent of the Trust income subject to maximum of Rs. 2,000/- per month. Now, the Managing Trustee, under the terms of the Trust-deed, were initially to be Mrs. Anusayabai Kale till her life time and thereafter if Mr. Kale chose to accept the office of the Managing Trustee, then he was to so act as the Managing Trustee further for his life time. Under clause 19, after the death of Mr. Purushottam Balkrishna Kale, there were to be two Managing Trustees and there is no doubt that the deceased and his brother Balkrishna Purushottam Kale were to be the Managing Trustees, who were also to hold office for life or till one or both of them resigned or relinquished his or their office and appointed his or their successors. Now, unless we go as far as to hold that where the settlor himself provides by the deed of settlement that he will be the Managing Trustee for which he will receive certain amount of remuneration out of the Trust-fund such a provision by itself would amount to reservation of interest as contemplated by Section 12 (1), it will be difficult to accept the submission advanced by Shri Joshi, where a settlor creates a Trust, it lies within· his power to also make a provision as to the management of the Trust property. It is perfectly permissible for a settlor to nominate any person as trustees or first trustees and where there were more than one trustee, a Managing Trustee. It is also within his power to regulate the appointment of trustees in future as well as the Managing Trustee. There is no prohibition in law if the settlor himself takes over the function of the Managing Trustee after the Trust has come into being. When the settlor himself becomes a Trustee or Managing ·Trustee a change undergoes his capacity from one of an owner of property to that of Trustee holding the Trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries or for the purpose of working out the directions in the Deed of Trust. When the settlor himself becomes a Trustee or Managing ·Trustee a change undergoes his capacity from one of an owner of property to that of Trustee holding the Trust property for the benefit of the beneficiaries or for the purpose of working out the directions in the Deed of Trust. If for such work, any remuneration is provided for by the terms of the Trust Deed, that would not, in our view, amount to the reservation of any interest for the purposes of section 12 (1). Though no authority for this proposition is really needed, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Controller of Estate Duty, Bombay City I. v. Sultan Alam Khan.1 to which one of us was a party. In that case, we were dealing with a Waqf, one of the clauses of which was that the settlor who was himself the Trustee was permitted to occupy one of the flats in the Trust property in order to manage the Trust properties and it was held that a provision permitting occupation of the Trust property by the trustee for the purposes of the management of the Trust property did not amount to a reservation of any interest in the property settled by the settlors. The department, was, therefore, not entitled to rely on clauses 6 and 19 to contend that there was reservation of interest of the trust property and, therefore, the value of Kale Bhavan was liable to be treated, as a part of dutiable estate. 6. Second limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the department is based on clause 23. Clause 23 which we have reproduced above expressly reserves the power to the settlors to dissolve the trust. This power is conditional by two conditions; firstly, there is absolute prohibition against revocation of the trust for a period of 10 years from 7th October, 1951. The second restriction on the power of revocation is that the power of revocation can be exercised only if "this Trust cannot function for any reason whatsoever". This power is conditional by two conditions; firstly, there is absolute prohibition against revocation of the trust for a period of 10 years from 7th October, 1951. The second restriction on the power of revocation is that the power of revocation can be exercised only if "this Trust cannot function for any reason whatsoever". What is contended by Shri Joshi is that notwithstanding the fact that the power to revoke the Trust is controlled by the recitals in clause 23 and it can be exercised only after a period of 10 years and further only if thereafter if it is seen that the Trust cannot function for any reason, the power is essentially one of revocation and this according to the learned counsel is enough for the purposes of the applicability of the provisions of section 12 (1). What is contended by Shri Manohar on behalf of the accountable person is that apart from the fact that the power is circumscribed by conditions and there is no absolute power reserved to the settlors to revoke the Trust, in this particular case when the settlors wanted to revoke the Trust, their efforts to do so have proved to be futile because according to the learned counsel, they had approached the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 after the trustees had passed a resolution revoking the Trust in terms of clause 23 of the Trust-Deed. The order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner is dated 21-4-1962 which is clearly after the death of the deceased whose estate is now being brought to tax. The resolution itself is dated 20-12-1961 which is also after the death of deceased. The order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner is Annexure G to the statement of the case. The Assistant Charity Commissioner referred to the several provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act and took the view that the public trust is created for the purposes of education, relief of poor and distressed and for other objects of general public utility. He took the view that the power of revocation in the trust-deed is not unconditional and, therefore, the mere wish of the trustees to dissolve the public trust cannot dissolve it when the trust properties could be applied to the objects set out in the trust-deed. He took the view that the power of revocation in the trust-deed is not unconditional and, therefore, the mere wish of the trustees to dissolve the public trust cannot dissolve it when the trust properties could be applied to the objects set out in the trust-deed. Now, as already pointed out there can hardly be any doubt that clause 23 of the Trust-deed is a repository of the express power of revocation which could be exercised after the period of 10 years from the date specified therein and if the Trust cannot function for any reason. If the mere reservation in the case of a public trust was sufficient to bring the case within the latter part ofsection.12 (1) of the Estate Duty Act, the Revenue would be entitled to succeed if the decision is to be given only on a reading of document of Trust. It appears to us, however, that the reference cannot be decided merely on the footing that the deed of Trust contains a clause reserving the power of revocation to the trustees by the settlors, who were themselves the trustees. We were dealing with a public trust and unless we are satisfied that a public trust can be validly put an end to or that it lies within the powers of the settlors to retrace their steps leading to the creation of the public trust with or without the power of revocation, it will be difficult for us to hold that merely because in the case of a public trust a power to revoke is reserved by the settlor, such property must be deemed to pass on the death of the settlor for the purposes of section 12 (1) of the Estate Duty Act. When section 12 (1) refers to the reservation by the settlor of the right to exercise the power of revocation, it obviously pre-supposes that such a power of revocation can be validly and legally reserved by the settlor. In other words, even if the document of Trust does contain a clause expressly reserving the power of revocation if in law such a power of revocation is impossible to be either reserved or exercised, in our view the Department would not be entitled to rely on the latter part of section 12 (1) merely because in the settlement the settlors purported to reserve the power of revocation. 7. 7. It becomes, therefore, necessary to ascertain whether in the case of public trust it is permissible in law for the settlor to revoke the public trust. In this context, Shri Joshi had relied on the provisions of sections 77 and 78 of the Indian Trusts Act. Section 17 provides for how the Trust is exting\1ished and one of the cases in which a Trust is stated to be extinguished is where the Trust being revocable is expressly revoked. Section 77 reads as follows:- "77. Trust how extinguished :- A trust is extinguished (a) when its purpose is completely fulfilled; or (b) when its purpose becomes unlawful; or (c) when the fulfilment of its purpose becomes impossible by destruction of the trust property or otherwise; or (d) when the trust, being revocable, is expressly revoked." Clause (d) of section 77 has to be read with section 78 which expressly deals with revocation of Trust and it reads as follows: - "78. Revocation of Trust :-A trust created by will may be' revoked at the pleasure or the testator. A trust otherwise created can be revoked only- (a) where all the beneficiaries are only competent to contract':-by their consent; (b) where the trust has been declared by anon-testamentary instrument or by word of mouth in exercise of a power of revocation expressly reserved to the author of trust; or (c) where the trust is for payment of the debts of the author of the trust, and has not been communicated to the creditors-at the pleasure of the author of the trust." Shri Joshi had relied on the provisions of clause (b) of section 78. According to the learned counsel, the Trust in question is declared by a non-testamentary instrument which is not disputed, and the learned counsel then contends that there is a power of revocation reserved by the· author of the trust and the instant case, therefore, is one in which revocation can be brought about and, therefore, section 12 (1) will apply. 8. Now, a reference to the provisions of sections 77 and 78 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, seems to us to be wholly out of place. The Trusts Act, 1882, does not apply in the case of a religious or a charitable Trust. Section 1 of the Trusts Act is in two parts. The first part gives the title of the commencement of the Act. The Trusts Act, 1882, does not apply in the case of a religious or a charitable Trust. Section 1 of the Trusts Act is in two parts. The first part gives the title of the commencement of the Act. The second part deals with the legal extent and savings provision. The material portion of section 1 reads as follows :- "This Act may be called the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, and it shall come into force on the first day of March 1882. It extends to the whole of India ……But nothing herein contained affects the rules of Muhammadan Law as to Waqf or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, or applies to public or private, religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors; and nothing in the Second Chapter of this Act applies to trusts created before the said day." The portion italicized by us above would clearly indicate that the applicability of the Trust Act is expressly excluded in the case of public or private religious or charitable endowments. 9. At one stage, Shri Joshi wanted to contend that when section 1 refers to religious or charitable endowments, only Trusts made in favour of deities and the properties dedicated to deities were contemplated by section 1. That however, does not appear to be the correct position. Endowment is a. word of wide import and according to the Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary, the word 'endowment' means 'that which is settled on any person or institution.' In Black's Law Dictionary Fifth Edition, the meaning of the word 'endowment' has been given as "the act of settling a fund, or permanent pecuniary provision, for the maintenance of public institution, charity, college etc." Therefore, any charitable Trust which is either of a public or a private character would be wholly outside the provisions of the Trust Act. The provisions of the Trusts Act will therefore not be of much help so far as the power of revocation in the case of a public charitable Trust is concerned. The provisions of the Trusts Act will therefore not be of much help so far as the power of revocation in the case of a public charitable Trust is concerned. Apart from the express words of section 1 there is also a decision of the Madras High Court in Krishnaswomy Pillai v. Kothandarama Naiyken2 where a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has observed that "Under the Trusts Act (2 of 1882), which applies in terms only to private trusts, it is not open to a settlor to revoke a completed settlement. Therefore, so far as the revocation of a public trust is concerned, the power cannot be found in the provisions of the Trusts Act. 10. The only question which, therefore, falls for consideration is whether after the dedication of the Trust property to charitable uses is made, the Trust can validly be revoked and whether the power to revoke the trust can be validly exercised by the Settlor in terms of the reservation. It cannot be disputed that once a Trust for a charitable purpose is created in a given case, the Trust fund can grow and grow to a size much larger than what was endowed originally by the Settlement in the given case. Donations may be given to the Trust or immovable property may be gifted to the trust by persons who want their property to be utilized for the same purposes for which the Trust is created. Whether the Trust is in favour of an idol and is of a religious nature or whether the Trust is intended to achieve charitable purposes would in that context be wholly irrelevant. The real question is whether in such a case, it would be permissible for a settlor to revoke the Trust so as to undo the Trust itself and thus affect not only the Trust property settled by him but certain other properties also which may have been endowed in favour of the Trust or dedicated to that charity. There is no express provision of law permitting this to be done. On first principles, permitting such a power to be exercised by the settlor would open flood-gates of a device which would enable people to use the creation of the Trust as a means for getting back larger property than what was originally settled as Trust property. There is no express provision of law permitting this to be done. On first principles, permitting such a power to be exercised by the settlor would open flood-gates of a device which would enable people to use the creation of the Trust as a means for getting back larger property than what was originally settled as Trust property. In Halsbury's laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 5, while dealing with creation of charitable trust in paragraph 624, it has been observed as follows:- "Charitable trusts have sometimes been declared subject to express powers of revocation, but there has apparently been no decision on the validity of such a power except as regards the rule against perpetuities." In Hindu law of Religious and Charitable Trusts by Justice B. K. Mukherjee, as he then was, it has been observed as ·follows in Fourth Edition on page 109:- "Of course, if a valid dedication is once complete, there would be no power left in the donor to revoke it and no assertion on his part, or the subsequent conduct of himself and his descendants contrary to such dedication would have the effect of nullifying it." These observations are made on the authority of decision of the Allahabad High Court in Damasi Sahu v. Param Shameshwar Uma Bhairabeshwar Ban Lingeshwar and another3 where a Division Bench consisting of Sulaiman and Kendall JJ. at page 317, has observed:- "The question whether it created a valid dedication depends on whether there was a real intention to dedicate the property and the dedication was completed. No doubt there may be circumstances under which the mere execution and registration of a deed of endowment may not amount to a complete dedication and the proceeding may be merely a Nominal one. No doubt there may be circumstances under which the mere execution and registration of a deed of endowment may not amount to a complete dedication and the proceeding may be merely a Nominal one. On the other hand it is also clear that if a valid dedication has once been completed there would be no power left in the don or to revoke it, and no assertion an his part or subsequent conduct contrary to such dedication would have the effect of nullifying it." The learned Author (B. K. Mukherjee J.) while deciding a case as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Radhike Mohan v. Amrite Lal4 has made the following observations in para 6 :- "A dedication of a property to a deity is irrevocable and the rules, if any, laid down by the founder at the time of dedication regulating succession to the office of the Shebait should be deemed to be irrevocable also unless the power of revocation is reserved by the grantor." That decision no doubt arose out of a dispute relating to the office of Shebai, but the first part of the observations that the dedication of the property to the deity is irrevocable clearly indicates that a dedication of property to charity must be treated as always irrevocable. On principles there is no difference between a dedication to a deity or dedication to any other form of charity or charitable purpose. There are certain observations of the Supreme Court in Ramkishorilal v. Kamalanarayan5 to support the view which we were inclined to take. In that case a village was dedicated absolutely to a public temple of Shri Ramchandra Swamy within the Dudbadbari Math in Raipur M. P. The controversy was whether by the award embodying the partition that took place between the members of a joint Hindu family, an absolute dedication of the village was made in favour of the temple or whether the village was given in full proprietorship to one of the members with only a charge on it to meet the expenses of the temple. After holding on a construction of the award that the village was dedicated absolutely to the temple and the concerned member of the family was given possession of it as manager and trustee of the temple. After holding on a construction of the award that the village was dedicated absolutely to the temple and the concerned member of the family was given possession of it as manager and trustee of the temple. The Supreme Court observed :- "Once an absolute dedication of the property had been made in favour of Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple the former owners of the property had no legal authority to go behind that dedication." These observations thus indicate that even according to the Supreme Court, once there is a dedication of property to charity, that dedication cannot be undone by the original settlors. Tudor in his Treatise on Charities (Fifth Edition p. 83) has observed as follows :- "In cases not covered by the Mort and Char. Uses Act, 1888, or the repealed Act of Geo. 2, and subject to the rule against perpetuities, a charitable limitation may be subject to a power of revocation, but there can be no revocation after a valid dedication to charitable uses. (See Re Shum's Trust 1904), 91 Law Times 192." This passage is cited with approval by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami Pillai's case (cited supra). In the later edition the learned author has at page 127 observed as follows:- “... When a charity has once been formed and endowed the founder cannot by any act of his alter the endowment." There is thus unanimity of the view that in the case of a Charitable Endowment or Trust once the dedication is completed there is no power of revocation left with the settlors. Even though in a given case the settlor has reserved the power to revoke the Trust, in our view, such a reservation would be wholly invalid and the power cannot be invoked so as to undo the settlement. 11. As a matter of fact, this view taken by us is sufficient to dispose of this reference in favour of the accountable person. We may, however, in addition point out that so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned, the public trusts are subject to the control and supervision of the Charity Commissioner who has to function according to the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. We may, however, in addition point out that so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned, the public trusts are subject to the control and supervision of the Charity Commissioner who has to function according to the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. It is not in dispute that the Trust in question has been registered not only under the provision of the Bombay Public Trusts Act but that it was registered even under the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951, which was the relevant Act in force in the Vidarbha Region prior to the applicability of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Apart from the fact that none of the purposes for which the Trust has been created by the Settlor in this case can stand exhausted, even in a case where the original object of the ,Public Trust has failed, there is power in the Charity Commissioner under section 55 of the Bombay Public Trust Acts to "require the Trustees to apply within the prescribed time for directions to the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or part of the subject matter of the trust is situate." It is obligatory that the trustees should comply with the requisition. There is power in the Court under section 56 of the Act to give appropriate directions, so far as it may be expedient, practicable, desirable, necessary or proper in public interest, to give effect to the original intention of the author of the public trust or the object for which the public trust was created. If the Court is of opinion that the carrying out of such intention or object is not wholly or partially expedient, practicable, desirable, necessary or proper in public interest, there is power in the Court to "direct the property or income of the Public Trust or any portion thereof to be applied cypres to any other charitable or religious object." There is also power in the Charity Commissioner to remove and appoint fresh trustees and see that the intention of the settlor is given effect, to. Therefore, apart from the general principle that in the case of a public trust, where dedication is complete, a power of revocation does not vest in the settlor, in so far as the present trust is concerned there could not be any ground which could fall within clause 23 and indeed the provision in clause 23 would be wholly irrelevant because there are overriding provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act under which if a Public Trust is not being given effect to, the Charity Commissioner can step in and see that the Trust Funds were applied to a charitable purpose. It is, therefore, clear that the so called power of revocation is wholly redundant and ineffective. If the power of revocation was redundant and ineffective and indeed wholly invalid the mere reservation of a power by a clause in the Trust deed could not attract the applicability of the provisions of section 12 (1) of the Act. It is, therefore, wholly unnecessary for us to decide whether the Department was entitled to challenge the correctness of the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner by which he declined to give effect of the resolution passed by the trustees, the controversy relating to which has been made Subject-matter of question No.2. In the view we have taken, we answer the questions referred to the Court as follows :- Question No.1:- In the affirmative and against the revenue; Question No.2: - Need not be answered. Question No.3 :-In the negative against the revenue. Revenue to pay the cost of this reference. Questions answered accordingly.