JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - By an order dated January 25, 1980 the present appeal along with the suit, out of which it arises, were abated by this Court under section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. That order was, however, subsequently recalled and the case directed to be put up again for orders. 2. When the appeal was called on for hearing it was submitted by Sri R.N. Singh, appearing for the applicant, that an order of abatement under section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act deserved to be passed in it again. This submission was countered by Sri Faujdar Rai for the plaintiff-respondent who, inter alia, pointed out that a notification under section 52 of the Act having been published on May 25, 1981 in respect of the area involved in the appeal, no such order could be passed. 3. A perusal of the plaint shows that the principal allegation therein is that by practising fraud and misrepresenting that a deed of security was to be executed in connection with the allotment of a fair-price shop, the defendant-appellant made the plaintiff to sign some documents which was later utilised to prepare sale-deeds in respect of the land in suit. The plaintiff, according to the prayer made in the plaint was entitled to a decree for cancellation of the aforesaid documents. The case of the defendant was that the plaintiff had voluntarily executed the sale-deeds in his favour. Both the courts below accepted the plaintiff's case and passed a decree in his favour. 4. The first question which has to be considered is whether on the allegation contained the plaint, there was fraudulent misrepresentation in regard to the character of the document or as to its contents so that the document could be described to be void or a voidable one the allegation, as noticed earlier, of the plaintiff' is that the representation that was made to him was that a security deed was to be executed. On this representation, according to him, the plaintiff was made to sign a document which was subsequently used for preparing a sale-deed. It is obvious that the fraudulent misrepresentation alleged by the plaintiff is in regard to the character of the document and not to its contents so as to make the transaction only voidable and not void. On this representation, according to him, the plaintiff was made to sign a document which was subsequently used for preparing a sale-deed. It is obvious that the fraudulent misrepresentation alleged by the plaintiff is in regard to the character of the document and not to its contents so as to make the transaction only voidable and not void. In this situation the consolidation courts can ad judicate upon its effect. See Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shidappa Hirekurabar and others, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 95; Baijnath and others v. Binda and another, 1978 R.D. 77 and Chaithoo v. Khedu and others, 1979 R.D. 66 5. It was contended by Sri Rai that in the proceedings before the consolidation courts the stand taken by the defendant was that the transaction being voidable, the consolidation courts had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of the documents and that on that account the plaintiff lost before the consolidation officer. He has mentioned that the matter is pending in appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). It may be observed that having secured an order of abatement in this court on the ground that the challenge to the document was on the footing that it was void, it will not be open to the defendant to take a contrary stand before the consolidation authorities now See : Dalip Singh and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Moradabad and others, 1976 A.W.C. 112 (D.B.). 6. The fact that the notification under section 52 of the Act has been issued will hardly make a difference so far as the present case is concerned for, admittedly, the matter is pending before the consolidation authorities and can be proceeded with by them on account of the provisions of section 52 (2) of the Act. 6. The fact that the notification under section 52 of the Act has been issued will hardly make a difference so far as the present case is concerned for, admittedly, the matter is pending before the consolidation authorities and can be proceeded with by them on account of the provisions of section 52 (2) of the Act. This is clear from the plain language of sub-section (2) of section 52 of the Act and was now ruled by the Supreme Court in Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and others, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2451 wherein it observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 6 of the report that "...........despite a notification under section 52 (1) of the Act, closing consolidation operation in a village, cases of proceeding pending under the Act on the date of the issue of notification under section 52 (1) will be decided as though consolidation operations had not terminated" and that "the result is that the parties are not deprived of an appropriate forum for a decision on the merits of the case......" 7. In consequence, the appeal as well as the suit, out of which it arises, are abated under section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, I direct that the defendant-appellant shall pay costs to the plaintiff-respondent of this court.