Judgment :- Swamikkannu, J. — This is an appeal by the accused Thangaraju against the judgment, dated 30th April, 1980 in Sessions Case No. 89 of 1979, on the file of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Salem, finding him guilty under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, convicting him there under, and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. The case against the accused before the trial Court is that on 18th February, 1979, at about 10 a.m. in Alamarathu Field in Chinna punavasal Village, the accused Thangaraju intentionally cut his mother Alamelu Ammal with a spade and thereby the deceased died at that place instantaneously. 2. To substantiate the charge of murder against the accused, appellant herein, the prosecution had examined before the trial Court P.W.1 to P.W.12 and filed Exhibit P-1 to Exhibit P-20. It also produced before the trial Court M.O.I spade, M.O. 2 blood-stained earth, M.O. 3 gunny bag, M.O.4 saree and M.O.5 petticoat. In Chinnapunavasal Village, Kanagappa Udayar lived with his wife Alamelu, the deceased herein. They are the parents of P.W.1 Gnanambal. Sarasu is the younger sister of P.W. 1 Gnanambal. Kanagappa Udayar and the deceased Alamelu were having two sons apart from the above mentioned two daughters. P.W.1 Gnanambal is their eldest daughter. She had lost her husband and has been living in the said village in the house of her father-in-law as a. widow. She has been eking her livelihood by doing cooly work. P.W. 4 Marudha Udayar is the eldest son of Kanagappa Udayar. The accused Thangaraju is the second son of the said Kanagappa Udayar. P.W. 4 Marudha Udayar and the accused are the elder brothers of P.W.1 Gnanambal. P.W.5 Subbu Udayar is the maternal uncle of the accused, P.W. 1 Gnanambal and P.W. 4 Marudha Udayar, Thangammal is the wife of P.W.4 Marudha Udayar, P.W. 2 Manivel and P.W. 3 Kumaravel belong to Chinna punavasal village, and they are acquainted with P.W. 1 and their family. The members of the family of the accused have been living mainly on cultivation as their occupation. P.W. 4 Marudha Udayar and the accused Thangaraju, after their marriage, were living separately partitioning their properties. Kanagappa Udayar and the deceased Alamelu Ammal were living together in a house separately from their sons and daughters. The members of the family of the accused have been living mainly on cultivation as their occupation. P.W. 4 Marudha Udayar and the accused Thangaraju, after their marriage, were living separately partitioning their properties. Kanagappa Udayar and the deceased Alamelu Ammal were living together in a house separately from their sons and daughters. For the benefit of Kanagappa Udayar and his wife the deceased Alamelu Ammal, about 14 ‘Kuzhis’ of land were allotted separately. About six months prior to the occurrence in this case, Kanagappa Udayar, without the consent of his wife the deceased Alamelu Amma1, sold away her jewels. On account of the same, there was quarrel between them. Hence the deceased Alamelu Ammal came away separately and had been living in the house of her daughter P.W.I Gnanambal and was eking her livelihood by doing cooly work. P.W.1, Gnanambal was also eking her livelihood by doing cooly work. Thereafter, the deceased Alamelu Ammal did not go to the house of her husband. She was living with only with P.W.1 Gnanambal. Kanagappa Udayar did not give any amount towards maintenance to his wife the deceased Alamelu Ammal. A panchayat was held in the village for providing food and cloth to the deceased Alamelu Ammal. One Marudha Udayar, Ramalinga Udayar and Chandrasekara Udayar were the persons who constituted the panchayat in arriving at a decision that 7 ‘Kuzhis’ of land had to be allotted to Kanagappa Udayar and 7 ‘Kuzhis’ of land hadto be allotted to his wife the deceased Alamelu. They were nanja lands. The accused Thangaraju was cultivating the land belonging to Kanagappa Udayar on lease. The accused Thangaraju, who is the elder brother of P.W. 1 Gnanambal, asked his mother the deceased Alamelu Ammal to give the land allotted to her share in the partition for his personal cultivation. The deceased Alamelu did not heed to the request thus made by the accused Thangaraju. In fact, the deceased had given the land on lease to P.W.4 Marudha Udayar and the lease was 5 bags of paddy. Even after demand by the deceased about two weeks prior to the occurrence, P.W. 4 Marudha Udayar did not give her share of paddy from the proceeds in the harvest. Even thereafter Marudha Udayar ploughed the land and transplanted paddy seedlings in the field. Even after demand by the deceased about two weeks prior to the occurrence, P.W. 4 Marudha Udayar did not give her share of paddy from the proceeds in the harvest. Even thereafter Marudha Udayar ploughed the land and transplanted paddy seedlings in the field. On the day of the occurrence, i.e., on a Sunday, at about 9 or 10 a.m., the deceased Alamelu went to P.W.4 Marudha Udayar and asked him as to why he trans-planted paddy seedlings in her portion of the land without paying her share of paddy and that she would pluck out the seedlings from the transplanted portion of the field. The said information was given to P.W. 1 Gnanambal by a girl. At once P.W. 1 ran towards the nanja land which is situated on the southern side of the village. There was drizzling at that time. At that time, just ahead of her, P.W.2 Manivel was proceeding covering his head with a towel. He had to traverse a distance of about 1½ furlongs in order to go to his land by passing through the land in question. It was at that time P.W.1 saw the accused Thangaraju cutting the deceased Alamelu twice with the spade with which he was armed then by pushing down the deceased with his right hand also by holding the tuft of the deceased with his left hand. He delivered two cuts on the reck and one cut on the chest of the deceased with the blade portion of the spade. P.W.1 Gnanambal and P.W.2 Manivel raised alarm. “Aiyo, appa” and came back running. Without reaching the place of occurrence, they had returned to the village in order to inform about the occurrence. It was then P.W. 3 Kumara-vel was coming through the land belonging to one Maradappa Chettiar. P.W.2 Manivel informed the details of the occurrence that he Witnessed to P.W.3 Kumaravel and thereafter P.W.2 Manivel ran towards the village saying that he would inform the villagers about the occurrence. Following P.W.3 Kumaravel, P.W.1 proceeded towards the scene of occurrence. At that time, P.W. 1 Gnanambal found her mother lying dead. On seeing P.W.3, the accused, the appellant herein, threw away the spade and ran away from that place. P.W.1 went near the dead body of the deceased. She found cut injuries on the person of the deceased. Following P.W.3 Kumaravel, P.W.1 proceeded towards the scene of occurrence. At that time, P.W. 1 Gnanambal found her mother lying dead. On seeing P.W.3, the accused, the appellant herein, threw away the spade and ran away from that place. P.W.1 went near the dead body of the deceased. She found cut injuries on the person of the deceased. There was pool of blood remaining and flowing at the place of occurrence. The head of the dead body was lying on the ridge of the field and her body was lying in the cultivated portion of the land. It was at that place in the filed, paddy seed lings to a quantity of about a gunny bag were found plucked and destroyed. Soon thereafter, the persons in the village gathered there. Kanagappa Udayar, father of P.W.1 had gone to Manjanai to attenda marriage. The maternal uncle of P.W.1 came to know about the details of the occurrence. After inspecting the place of occurrence and after enquiry, regarding the occurrence, the said maternal uncle of P.W.I proceeded to give a complaint regarding the occurrence. 3. P.W. 2 Manivel who had been to his land at about 12 noon also found the accused Thangaraju dragging the deceased Alamelu Ammal and cutting her with a spade, by standing at a distance of about 15 feet from the actual place of occurrence. It was in the Alamarathu field, the occurrence had taken place. The said land was being cultivated by P.W.4 Marudha Udayar who is the elder brother of the accused. P.W. 2 came running from the place of occurrence and informed about the occurrence to P.W.3 Kumaravel, as well as others who were coming opposite to him and thereafter went to his village. In the village, P.W. 2 Manivel informed about the occurrence to P.W-4 Marudha Udayar, one Sarasu and other persons of the locality. 4. P.W. 3 Kumaravel was proceeding to the lake for bringing water towards lock of the lake during the time of the occurrence. In order to reach the Alamarathu field, one has to go through the land belonging to Varadappa Chettiar. That was the course taken by P.W.3 Kumaravel on that occasion. It was during that time two persons were coming opposite to him in the land belonging to Varadappa Chertiar. P.W.2 Manivel came running saying that the accused Thangaraju had cut his mother Alamelu Ammal. That was the course taken by P.W.3 Kumaravel on that occasion. It was during that time two persons were coming opposite to him in the land belonging to Varadappa Chertiar. P.W.2 Manivel came running saying that the accused Thangaraju had cut his mother Alamelu Ammal. At once P.W.2 ran away towards the village. P.W. 1 Gnanambal and P.W. 3 Kumaravel went to the place of occurrence. At that time when they reached the place of occurrence, they found that the life of Alamelu Ammal got extinct. There were two cut. wounds on the neck and one cut wound on the chest of the deceased. The accused Thangaraju ran towards east. 5. P.W.4 Marudha Udayar, the elder brother of the accused and the elder brother of P.W.1 Gnanambal, had a share in the land which was partitioned about 7 months prior to the occurrence in between himself and his younger brother. Even according to P.W.4, 7 ‘Kuzhis’ of land were allotted to his father and 7 ‘Kuzhis’ of land were allotted to the deceased Alamelu towards their maintenance. Initially, the said land as a whole was given to them on partition. Subsequently they partitioned the land among them. The deceased was living separately, It was about six north’s prior to the occurrence, the panchayat took place between them. P.W.4 was cultivating the land allotted to the deceased. The accused wanted the lands allotted to both of his parents to be given to him. The deceased did not heed to the said request. At that time, the deceased observed that even if she were to be given six bags of paddy or five bags of paddy, yet she would not give the land for cultivation in favour of her second son, but would give on lease the said land only in favour of her eldest on who is going to lit her funeral pyre. Accordingly P.W.4 Marudha Udayar had been cultivating the land allotted to the deceased. P.W.4 was assuring that he would give paddy as lease to her. But he did not give her the lease paddy at all. So, the day-prior to the date of occurrence, the deceased Alamelu Ammal was quarrelling with her eldest son P.W.4 Marudha Udayar regarding the lease paddy and was remarking that she would pluck and throw away the paddy seedlings. P.W.4 thought that she was saying so as a matter of course. So, the day-prior to the date of occurrence, the deceased Alamelu Ammal was quarrelling with her eldest son P.W.4 Marudha Udayar regarding the lease paddy and was remarking that she would pluck and throw away the paddy seedlings. P.W.4 thought that she was saying so as a matter of course. On the day of the occurrence, which was a Sunday P.W.4 Marudha Udayar was in his house. Even on that day, the deceased asked P.W.4 whether he was going to give the lease paddy or not. So asking, she left for her house. Within a short time, P.W.4 was informed by a boy residing in the adjacent field that the deceased was engaged in plucking the seedlings planted in the field. P.W.4 kept quiet thinking that if she wanted she could do so. It was at that time P.W.2 Kumaravel came running to P.W.4 and informed him that the deceased had been cut by a relative of P.W.4 and that the assailant had run away firm that place. At once P.W.4rushed to the place of occurrence. By that time a crowd bad gathered there. The dead body of the deceased was lying at that place. P.W.4 sat down at that place itself. 6. P.W.5 is also a resident, of Chinna-punavasal Village. He is an agriculturist by profession. P.W.4 Marudha Udayar is the son of the younger sister of P.W.5. The younger sister of P.W.5 and her husband were living separately. They also got partitioned and were living separately. Even according to P.W.5, about six months prior to the occurrence, there was a panchayat in which a decision was arrived at to the effect that the deceased had to own 7 ‘Kuzhis’ of land and her husband had to own 7 ‘Kuzhis’ of land. The land allotted to the deceased Alamelu was being cultivated by her eldest son P.W. 4 Marudha Udayar. The accused was cultivating the land allotted to his father. On the day of the occurrence, i.e., on a Sunday, P.W.5 had been to attend a marriage. After the marriage, when P.W.5 came out at about 12 Noon, one Marudha Gounder informed him that the deceased Alamelu Ammal who is related to P.W.5 as his younger sister had been cut, and that the assailant had run away from the village. At once P.W.5 went to the place of occurrence and saw the dead body lying. After the marriage, when P.W.5 came out at about 12 Noon, one Marudha Gounder informed him that the deceased Alamelu Ammal who is related to P.W.5 as his younger sister had been cut, and that the assailant had run away from the village. At once P.W.5 went to the place of occurrence and saw the dead body lying. P.W.5 went to the house of the village Munsif in order to give a complaint regarding the same. The Village Munsif was not available in the village during that time. Thereafter, P.W.5 informed the Village Karnam about the occurrence. P.W.9, the Village Karnam came to the place of occurrence and saw the dead body of the deceased lying there. The report orally made by P.W. 5 was reduced to writing by P.W.9. After the said report was reduced to writing, the contents of the same were read over to P.W. 5 and after he acknowledged the contents to be correct, his signature was obtained in the report. The said report is Exhibit P.1. When P.W. 5 appeared before P.W.9 and gave Exhibit P-1 report, it was about 3 p.m. on 18th February, 1979 P.W.9 took a carbon copy of Exhibit P-1 which is Exhibit P-14. P.W.9 thereafter proceeded and reached the scene of occurrence. The dead body was seen by P.W. 9 and thereafter printed reports; were prepared by him. They are Exhibit P-15 and Exhibit P-16. Then Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit P-15 printed report were sent by him through Vettian Perumal to the Veeraganur Police Station. The carbon copy of Exhibit P-1 namely, Exhibit P-14 and Exhibit P-16 printed report were sent by him to the Court of the learned Judicial Second Glass Magistrate, Attur. Till police arrived at the scene, he was remaining in the scene of occurrence. 7. On that day, the Sub-Inspector was on casual leave. Therefore, P.W. 11 Head constable 828 of Veeraganur Police Station received the complaint, registered the same as Crime No. 62 of 1979 under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and prepared express reports and sent them to his superior officers. Thereafter, he went to the place of occurrence along with constables. On that day. at about 12 midnight, the Deputy Inspector, who returned to the police station, took further investigation in this case. Thereafter, P.W.11 assisted him in his investigation. Thereafter, he went to the place of occurrence along with constables. On that day. at about 12 midnight, the Deputy Inspector, who returned to the police station, took further investigation in this case. Thereafter, P.W.11 assisted him in his investigation. On that night, due to drizzling as well as non-availability of light, the Deputy Inspector of Police remained in the Village and on the next day during morning he continued his investigation. He prepared Exhibit P-19 rough sketch showing the topography of the place of occurrence. He also perpared Exhibit P-17 observation mahazar by inspecting the place of occurrence. P.W.12, the Deputy Inspector of Police received the express report in this case at about 12 midnight on 18th February, 1979 at Attur. He was working as the Deputy Inspector at Attur from 15th February, 1977 to 27th November, 1979. As the Inspector of Police, Attur, was on casual leave, P.W.12, took up investigation in this case as mentioned above. On 19th February, 1979, P.W.12 caused the dead body to be photographed. The same morning at about 6 a.m. he prepared Exhibit P-17 observation mahazar and Exhibit P-19 rough sketch of the place of occurrence as mentioned above. At the place where the dead body was lying, P.W. 12 found paddy seedling plucked and thrown away in an area of about 27 feet in lengh and 11 feet in width and half foot in height. Near the dead body, M.O.1 spade was found lying in the field. M.O.3 gunny bag was found underneath the dead body. P.W.12 seized M.O.1 to M.O. 3 at about 6-30 a.m. on that day under Exhibit P-18 mahazar. P.W.12 himself attested the said mahazar. Thereafter, in the presence of Panchayat. dars, P.W.12 held the inquest from 6 a.m. to 10-30 a.m. He examined P.W.I to P.W.5 as well as one Kanagappa Udayar during the inquest. Exhibit P-20 is the inquest report prepared by him. The dead body was handed over by P.W.12 to P.W. 10 P.C. 1068 of Veeraganur Police Station with a requisition Exhibit P-8 for being taken to the hospital for post-mortem being conducted on the dead body. 8. P.W. 7, Dr. Pushpam, Civil Assistant Surgeon, attached to Government Hospital. Attur, received Exhibit P-8 requisition from the Deputy Inspector of Police at 2.15 p.m. on i9th February, 1979 for conducting post-mortem over the dead body of Alamelu Ammal. 8. P.W. 7, Dr. Pushpam, Civil Assistant Surgeon, attached to Government Hospital. Attur, received Exhibit P-8 requisition from the Deputy Inspector of Police at 2.15 p.m. on i9th February, 1979 for conducting post-mortem over the dead body of Alamelu Ammal. The body was in charge of P.C. 1068 Asathullakhan of Veeraganur Police Station. P.W.7 commenced the postmortem examination at 3-30 P.M. on the body of the deceased and found the deceased to be aged about 50 years. The condition of the body then was, decomposed slightly, rigor mortis passed off in all four libs. On examination he found the following external injuries: “1. A lacerated injury in the front of the neck at the level of upper border of thyroid cartilage of size 4” X 2" cutting the subcutaneous tissues, trachea, esophagus, left jugular vein and left carotid artery. The wound penetrates the body of underlying vertebrate to a depth of ½”. 2. A lacerated injury at the level of upper border of manubrium sterni of size 4" X 3" X 2 X. 3. A lacerated injury over front of chest 2" below injury No. 2 of size 4" X 1" X bone depth. 4. Diffuse contusion over the front of chest. 5. A lacerated wound 2 X ½” X bone depth over the left side of head 4" behing the left ear”. On internal examination, Dr. Pushpam found the following injuries: ‘‘1. A diffused congestion over the left side of base of brain." The heart was weighing 6 ozs. The chambers of the heart were found empty. The lungs on the right side weighed 15 ounce?. The lungs on the left side weighed 14 ounces. They were pale in colour. Cut section contained bloodhere and there. The stomach was empty and distended with gas. Small and large intestines were distended with gas. The heads membrance was congested on the left side. There was a diffused congestion over the left side of the base of brain. In the spinal column, there was an injury to cervical vertebrae as in external injury No.1. P.W.7 is of opinion that the deceased would appear to have died about 28 to 30 hours prior to post-mortam examination, and according to P.W.7, the deceased would have died due to haemorrhage, shock and respiratory failure due to cut injury to the major blood vessels and traches. Exhibit P-9 is the post-mortem certificate issued by her. P.W.7 is of opinion that the deceased would appear to have died about 28 to 30 hours prior to post-mortam examination, and according to P.W.7, the deceased would have died due to haemorrhage, shock and respiratory failure due to cut injury to the major blood vessels and traches. Exhibit P-9 is the post-mortem certificate issued by her. P.W.7 has further stated in her evidence that if the body happened to be in the paddy field with water, ante-mortem injuries. Injuries 1 to 3 could have been caused by cutting with the blade portion of M.O.1. P.W.7 has further opined that if the injured while falling down came into contact with M.O.1 spade, injury-No.5 could have been caused. While in-flicting the third injury, the blunt bottom part of the handle of M.O.1 could have caused injury No.4. According to P.W.7, injury Nos.1 and 2 are necessarily fatal. 9. Thereafter, P.W. 12 examined other witnesses in this case. He searched for the accused. The accused was not available. On 24th February, 1979 the accused surrendered before P.W. 12 at 9 a.m. in Circle Office, Attur. P.W. 12 questioned the accused and kept him in the lock up. The accused at that time informed P.W. 12 that he was willing to give a confessional statement. In that regard P.W.12 sent a requisition to the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rasipuram. The said requisition is Exhibit P-2. P.W.12 also sent a requisition for recording the statements of witnesses and Kanagappa Udayar, under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 10. P.W. 6 Thiru Jayaratchakan, the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rasipuram received Exhibit P-2 on 27th, February, 1979, from the Deputy Inspector of Police, Attur to record the confessional statement of the accused. He addressed the Superintendent of Sub-Jail, Attur on the same day to produce the accused on 27th February, 1979 at about 3 P.M. at the Court of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Attur. The copy of the letter is Exhibit P-3. The accused was produced at the Judicial Second Class Magistrate’s Court Attur, on 27th February, 1979 at 6.25 p.m. by P.W. 11 Head Constable of Veeraganur Police Station. The said Magistrate directed the escort police and other police officials and other persons to go out of the Court-hall. Only the Magisterial Clerk and the peon were in the Court-hall. The accused was produced at the Judicial Second Class Magistrate’s Court Attur, on 27th February, 1979 at 6.25 p.m. by P.W. 11 Head Constable of Veeraganur Police Station. The said Magistrate directed the escort police and other police officials and other persons to go out of the Court-hall. Only the Magisterial Clerk and the peon were in the Court-hall. The Magistrate took all the precautionary steps to see that nobody from outside can see and give any signal to the accused. He identified himself to the accused by stating that he was a Magistrate. Then he warned the accused that he was not bound to give a statement of any sort. He administered preliminary warning to the accused. The preliminary warning is Exhibit P-4. The accused was able to understand all his questions. The accused understood the warnings. The accused signed in the record of proceedings. On the first day, the magistrate warned him that he was not under any obligation to make any statement and even if he made a statement, he might not be taken as an approver and even, the statement might be used against him. The accused understood the nature and significance of the warnings and stated that he still wanted to give a statement about the occurrence. Then the Magistrate was convinced that the accused wanted to give a voluntary confessional statement. Then P.W.6 the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rasipuram gave the accused one day i.e., 24hours time for reflection about the wisdom of his act, and directed that the accused should be kept in a separate cell where no one could approach him. The accused was directed to be brought on 28th February, 1979 at about 5 p.m. On 28th February, 1979, the accused was produced at 5.20 p.m. in the Court-hall of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate Attur by P.C.1297 of the Attur Police Station. P.W.6 the learned Magistrate cleared the Court hall and directed the police officers to keep away from the Court-hall. Except the Magisterial Clerk, all other persons were cleared off from the Court hall. He took precautions to see that no body could signal to the accused from outside. P.W.6 the learned Magistrate cleared the Court hall and directed the police officers to keep away from the Court-hall. Except the Magisterial Clerk, all other persons were cleared off from the Court hall. He took precautions to see that no body could signal to the accused from outside. Again he questioned the accused whether he wanted to make a confessional statement, and he gave him a final warning that he was not bound to make a statement and if he made any statement it would be used against him and that he would not be taken as an approver. From the answers given by the accused the learned Magistrate was convinced that he was free from outside influence and that he really wanted to make a confessional statement. Thus after satisfying himself P.W.6 began to record the confessional statement of the accused. Exhibit P-5 is the record of final warning. P.W.6 recorded the statement which is Exhibit P-6, to the narration of the accused. Then he read it over to the accused and the accused accepted it to be correct and then signed it. The learned Magistrate appended certificate Exhibit P.7 to that effect. He also recorded the section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, statements of P.Ws. 1 to 5 and Kanagappa Udayar as per the requisition of the Deputy Inspector of Police, Attur. 11. P.W.12 the Deputy Inspector of Police Attur sent the requisition Exhibit P.10 to the Judicial Second Class Magistrate Attur, to send M.O.1 spade M.O. 2 blood-stained earth, M.O.3 gunny-bag. M.O.4 saree and M.O.5 petty coat for chemical analysis. P.W.8 Thiru Somaskandan was the Head Clerk of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate Court, Attur, during the relevant time. According to him on 24th February, 1979 the Magistrate received the requisition Exhibit P.10 from the Deputy Inspector of Police Attur to send the above mentioned material objects for chemical analysis. On 26th February, 1979 M.O.I to M.O.5 were packed and sealed in the presence of the Magistrate and sent to the Chemical Examiner with a covering letter, the copy of which is Exhibit P.11. On 10th August, 1979, the Magistrate received the retort Exhibit P. 12 from the Chemical Examiner to the effect that each of M.O. 1 to M.O. 5 was stained with blood. On 10th August, 1979, the Magistrate received the retort Exhibit P. 12 from the Chemical Examiner to the effect that each of M.O. 1 to M.O. 5 was stained with blood. On 31st August, 1979 the Magistrate received the report Exhibit P-13 from the Serologist to the effect that M.O. 2 and M.O.5 were stained with human blood; the result of the test was inconclusive in respect of M.O. 2 and M.O. 5 and disintegrated in respect of M.O. 1, M.O. 3 and M.O. 5 and so the blood group could not be specified. P.W.12 the Deputy Inspector of Police Attur arrested the accused Thangaraju on 24th February, 1979. On the same day the accused was sent for remand. P.W.12, examined P.W.7, Dr. Pushpam, the same day. Then the Inspector of Police Attur took charge of the said police Station at Attur and laid the charge-sheet against the accused before the Court on 17th September, 1979 under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. When questioned under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code with respect to the incriminating circumstances available in the evidence let in by the prosecution, the accused appellant herein-stated before the trial Court that he is innocent and that he has been implicated falsely in this case. The accused has more or less denied the entire prosecution case. When questioned relating to the confessional statement Exhibit P.6 given by him which is to the effect that for about four years, the deceased had been remaining in her parents house without preparing food for his father, that 7½ sovereigns worth of jewels were given by the deceased to the persons in her parents’ house, that she had also taken with her Rs. 2,000 worth of vessels etc., that his father used to quarrel with him at least once in a month without any reason whatsoever, that it was assured to the deceased that he would give five bags of paddy every Purattasi month, that in the month of Masi, the deceased came and asked for paddy soon after the harvest, that at that time the accused asked the deceased to remain in his house and prepare food and ear in his house, that the deceased did not prepare any food but insisted that the paddy has to be handed over to her mother’s house, that he told the deceased that he would not give paddy if she remained in the house of his elder brother, that on 17th day of the month when the occurrence took place, during morning the deceased and his elder brother came to beat him saying as to why he had not given, paddy, that on the 18th day of the month in question during morning he was irrigating the field, that he had no intention to cut the deceased, that on the day in question the deceased had plucked all the crops cultivated in the field, that therefore when the deceased was plucking the seedlings he who was irrigating the field, ran towards her with a spade, that he got enraged due to the deceased plucking and throwing the seedlings, and aggrieved by her action, he had cut her with the spade the accused had stated before tie trial Court that the Deputy Inspector of Police came to his house and persuaded him to plead guilty and threatened that if he did not give a confessional statement, he would arrest his father, Wife and younger sister and keep them in lock up, that the Deputy Inspector of Police, Attur also theatened him that he would be punished with imprisonment for two or three years, and that under such circumstances, out of fear, due to threatening by the Deputy Inspector, he gave the confessional statement as per Exhibit P-6. In other words, the accused-appellant herein had resiled from the confessional statement given by him to P.W.6, the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rasipuramon 28th February, 1979. In other words, the accused-appellant herein had resiled from the confessional statement given by him to P.W.6, the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rasipuramon 28th February, 1979. The accused had further stated that after the death of his mother i.e. about four or six days subsequent to the date of occurrence in this case, the Deputy Inspector of police came and told him that he was not able to apprehend the real culprit in this case, and that he was suspecting P.W. 5 Subbu Uda-yar as the person who might have committed the murder of the deceased. It is also stated by the accused that at that time, the Deputy Inspector of Police asked him to plead guilty and so out of parsuasion, he had made the confessional statement as per Exhibit P.6. In other words, the accused states that he is innocent and that he has been falsely implicated in this case. The accused had not examined any witness on his behalf. 13. On the question whether it was the accused who cut the deceased with a spade on 18th February, 1979, Sunday, at about 10 a.m. in the Alamarathu Field, owned by the deceased, and intentionally committed the murder of the deceased, punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, after considering the evidence available on record, the trial Court found that the accused was the person who had caused the fatal injuries on the deceased with the spade and also that the offence committed by the accused is punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, found the accused guilty under the said section, convicted him there under, and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life as mentioned above. 14. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused Thangaraju has come forward With this appeal inter alia contending that the trial Court has failed to note that there Was no occasion for the accused to cut his mother, that there was no motive tor the accused to cut his mother, that P.W.I was not in good terms with the accused and that he was a tool in the hands of P.W.5, and that the delay in giving the First Information Report is not properly taken into consideration by the trial Court. It is further contended that the accused was compelled to give a confessional statement before the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rasipuram, and that the evidence of P.W.I to P.W.12 let in by the prosecution bristles with contradictions and discrepancies. 15. The point for consideration in this appeal is, whether the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that it was the accused who intentionally cut the deceased Alamelu Ammal, his mother, with M.O.I spade and caused her instantaneous death at about 10 a.m. on 18th February, in Alamarathu Field at Chinna-punavasal Village. 16. From the evidence unfurled through P.W. 7 Medical Officer attached to the Government Hospital, Attur, it is clear that the injury Nos. 1 and 2 are necessarily fatal. The injury No.1 is a lacerated injury in the front of the neck at the level of upper border of thyroid cartilage of size 4" x 2” cutting the subcutaneous tissues, trached, espohagus, left jugular vein and left carotid artery. The wound had peno-trated the body of underlying vertebrae to a depth of ½“. The injury No. 2 is a lacerated injury at the level of upper border of manubrium sterni of size 4” x 3” x 2”. Both these injuries caused the instantan-neous death of the deceased Alamelu Ammal at the very spot where she was attacked. Thus, the ocular testimony emanating from P.W.1 receives ample corroboration from the medical evidence adduced through P.W.7 Pushpam. Thus, the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 goes to show that at the hands of the accused the deceased had sustained the fatal injuries on her body. 17. Now let us discuss about the judicial confession that had been recorded by P.W.6 Jeyaratchakan, the learned Judicial Second Glass Magistrate, Rasipuram. It is seen from his evidence that P.W.6 had gone to Attur and recorded the confessional statement from the accused. The police station as well as the Court of the learned Judicial Second Glass Magistrate at Attur are situated in one and the same building. The police station is situated a few feet away from the Court of the learned Magistrate. It is contended on behalf of the accused/appellant that it was only at the instigation of the police, a confessional statement had emanated from the accused. The police station is situated a few feet away from the Court of the learned Magistrate. It is contended on behalf of the accused/appellant that it was only at the instigation of the police, a confessional statement had emanated from the accused. It is also contended that it is only because of the persuasion and at the instance of the advice given by the maternal uncle of the accused, relating to the family situation, the accused had given the confessional statement. It is relevant in this connection, to note that on the previous day to the date on which the confessional statement had been recorded, the accused, appellant herein, had been produced before P.W.6, the learned Magistrate, and as per the provision under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, P.W. 6 has given the necessary warnings to him. The preliminary warning administered to the accused is Exhibit P-4. According to P.W.6, the accused was able to understand all his questions and he had also understood the warnings. The accused has also signed in the record of proceedings. On the first day, P.W.6 warned the accused that he was not under any obligation to make any statement, and if he made one, it might not be useful for taking him as an approver, and that even, the statement emanating from him might he used against him. The accused, according to P.W.6, understood the nature and significance of the warning and staled that he still wanted to give a statement about the occurrence. Then P.W.6 was convinced that he wanted to give a voluntary confessional statement. The learned Magistrate gave the accused one day, i.e., 24 hours time for reflection about the wisdom of his act. The accused was directed to be kept in a separate cell where no one could have any access. The accused was directed to be brought before P.W.6 on 28th February, 1979, at about 5 p.m. Accordingly, the accused was produced at 5.20 P.M. on 28th February, 1979 in the Court-hall of P.W.6 at Attur by P.C. 1297 of Attur Police Station. P.W. 6 enclosed the Court-hall and directed the Police Officers to get away from the Court-hall. Except himself and his Magisterial Clerk, all other persons were cleared off by P.W.6. P.W. 6 took all precautions to see that nobody could signal or see the accused from outside. P.W. 6 enclosed the Court-hall and directed the Police Officers to get away from the Court-hall. Except himself and his Magisterial Clerk, all other persons were cleared off by P.W.6. P.W. 6 took all precautions to see that nobody could signal or see the accused from outside. P.W. 6 again questioned the accused whether he wanted to make a confessional statement, and administered the final warning to the accused saying that the accused was not bound to make a statement, and if he makes one, it would be used against him in evidence, and that he would not be taken as an approver. From the answers given by the accused, P.W. 6 was convinced that the accused was free from any influence, and that he really wanted to make a confessional statement. After that P.W.6 started to record the statement which is Exhibit P-6 to the narration of the accused. Then he read it over to the accused. The accused accepted it as correct and signed it. The learned Magistrate has appended a certificate Exhibit P-6 to the said confessional statement. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination of P.W.6 so as to discredit his evidence relating to the precautions he had taken and the procedure that he adopted as per the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, relating to the recording of the confessional statement. Therefore, it is clear from the evidence of P.W.6 that Exhibit P-6 confessional statement given by the reused is not tainted with any infirmity and that the statement had been recorded after observing all the formalities in accordance with the provisions of the procedural law of the land. Merely on the ground that the police station is situated adjacent to the Court-hall where the confessional statement had been recorded by P.W.6, it cannot be held that the confessional statement had been given by the accused only due to the pressure or influence exercised by the police. In his confessional statement Exhibit P-6, the accused had stated that he saw his mother, the deceased herein, plucking the seedlings and this made him lose his self-control, and that he acted in a violent manner without knowing the consequences of the same. In other words, the plea of the accused is that he had to be conferred the benefit of Exception 1 to section 300 of the Indian penal Code. In other words, the plea of the accused is that he had to be conferred the benefit of Exception 1 to section 300 of the Indian penal Code. We are unable to uphold this contention emamated on behalf of the accused, appellant herein. Under no circumstance, it could be held that the plucking of the seedlings by no other person than a mother could cause a grave and sudden provocation on the part of the son so as to attract the benefits of Exception 1 to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. It cannot be said that provocation of any nature had emanated from the deceased so as to make the accused, appellant herein, lose his self-control. After all, the deceased is an old woman. She had attained the matured age of 50 years. The accused is aged 26 years. It is nothing but a brutal attack that had been made with an intention which resulted in the death of the deceased instantaneously at the spot, and the attack was launched by none else than her own son who had attained the age of 26 years, whom she had given birth and reared upto the age of 26 years only to have her end at his hands. This is certainly a very unfortunate case in which the accused had indulged in a grave crime of matricide. Under no stretch of imagination, can it be said that the accused, appellant herein, had acted in a manner without knowing the consequences of the same by being initiated by any grave of sudden provocation which in turn had resulted in an emotional outburst. Plucking the seedlings from a short area of 297 square feet will not result in a great loss or harm to the owner thereof which would create a source of anger that would result in an emotional outburst. It cannot also be said that it was the last straw on the camel’s back. The learned Counsel for the accused/appellant contends that the accused belongs to Udayar caste and is a milk vendor by profession and his social psyohclogy has to be ascertained from the neighbouring disciplines. 18. It cannot also be said that it was the last straw on the camel’s back. The learned Counsel for the accused/appellant contends that the accused belongs to Udayar caste and is a milk vendor by profession and his social psyohclogy has to be ascertained from the neighbouring disciplines. 18. In support of his contention, the leaned Counsel for the accused, appellant herein, refers to the following passage under the heading "Emotional Behaviour" dealt with at page 178 in the revised edition of "Social Psychology, by Otto Klineberg Columbia University, New York, January, 1955 Edition, which runs as follows: "Even within our own society there are tremendous individual variations in the amount of expression. These may to some extent be due to organic factors, for example, to a relative stability or liability of the sympathico-adrenal system. There may be differences in the threshold for emotions generally, or for one or another emotion in particular, making one person angry, and another frightened more easily than the average. Individual training an experience will also play a part. In addition, there are undoubtedly great variations in this respect between different social and economic classes, as well as between different regions of the same country. In the United States there are marked contracts between New England and the South on the one hand and the middle West on the other. Probably in all countries the urban population is much livelier and more expressive than the rural. As for socioeconomic classes, it is usual to find more obvious emotional expression in the poorer than in the weal-their groups. In the latter, there frequently develops the ideal of the "gentleman" who does not wear his heart on his sleeve. The traditional reserve of the Englishman is apparently the product of the most exclusive schools, just as the self-control of the Chinese Scholar was largely due to his education in the confucian manner. In both cases other classes of the society were also affected, but not nearly to the same degree, so that a class distinction exists here as in other aspects of behaviour." 19. Yer another passage regarding aggressiveness is relied on by the learned Counsel for the accused-appellant herein, from this book at page 89 and it runs as follows: “Aggressive behaviour is of course found widely in the animal kingdom. Yer another passage regarding aggressiveness is relied on by the learned Counsel for the accused-appellant herein, from this book at page 89 and it runs as follows: “Aggressive behaviour is of course found widely in the animal kingdom. It must be borne in mind, however, that is by no means an invariable rule of behaviour. Gases of mutual help and co-operation also occur in abundance, even between members of different species. When aggressiveness is found it is frequently in association with other drives, such as self-preservation sex, and maternal love, and probably is not to be regarded as an end in itself.” * * * * “It has been amply demonstrated by Cannon (27) that in anger there is a whole series of biochemical and physiological changes under the influence of the sympathetic nervous system and the adrenal glands. These changes prepare the organism for an emergency; they include the liberation of glycogon from the liver so that in the form of glucose it may be used as a source of energy; the mere rapid elimination of the pro-ducts of fatigue; the quicker clotting of blood, so that wounds will not be so dangerous; the movement of blood from the digestive system to the muscles, so that these may act more efficiently, and so on. The general result of these is that in the presence of an enemy the organism may respond with an unusual output of energy over an unusually long period of time. These changes do occur in anger, but they occur also in fear and in excitement; they constitute an organic basis for violent emotional behaviour in general, lather than for aggressiveness itself.” 20. Referring to the above passage in the said book, the learned Counsel for the accused/appellant submits that the accused being a man engaged in the profession of milk vending and his social status not being very much in par with a common civilized man, an act on the part of the mother plucking out the seedlings from the field was enough for him to lose his balance of mind and resort to violence. As such, it is submitted that the benefit under Exception 1 to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, has to be given to the accused in this case, and the offence committed by the accused does not come under the purview of section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and comes only under Exception I to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. 21. It is relevant in this connection to note that the plea of grave and sudden provocation has been pleaded even in his confessional statement Exhibit P-6. The relevant passage in it reads as follows: 22. Exception 1 to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows: “Exception 1-Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person, who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos: First.-That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. Second.-That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant. Third.-That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation.-Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.” 23. The first clause of section 300 pro-vides that it is murder if the offender had the intention of causing death. What is required is finding as an actual fact that the accused desired to cause death whether as an end in itself or as a means to something else. 24. It is difficult to appreciate the difference between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and murder unless one keeps in mind the meaning and import of the word “intention” as used in the Indian Penal Code and is purposeful separation from mere knowledge of the likelihood of the consequences. ‘Intention’ in the Indian Penal Code is a specific and distinct state of mind which ought not to be mixed up with the other states of mind provided for in the Indian Penal Code. ‘Intention’ in the Indian Penal Code is a specific and distinct state of mind which ought not to be mixed up with the other states of mind provided for in the Indian Penal Code. The Indian Penal Code recognises besides “intention”, “knowledge of the likelihood of the consequence”, “reason to believe the consequence to be likely” and “rashness and negligence” as mens rea which Will attract responsibility. 25. In the Civil Law responsibility for injury is determined by the well known foreknowledge test which fixes liability if the injury was actually foreseen or if it would have foreseen by an average reasonable person in the position of the wrongdoer. The basis of the test is the maxim that every man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. How this intention imputed to the wrongdoer is very different from the intention of the Indian Penal Code for it includes besides the intention of the other three states of mind as well. In other words intention under the Indian Penal Code is but a fraction of ‘intention’ referred to in the maxim. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. This maxim is as old as English Criminal Law. Mens rea means only guilty min 1. In English Law there can be no crime without a guilty mind or corrupt mind. The maxim is the bedrock of the English Common Law of Crimes and it amounts ‘‘to no more and no less than that all crime is characterized by and necessarily involves, some form of culpable intentionality. In other words, according to Stephen, it “means no more than that the definition of all or nearly all crimes contains not only an outward and visible element, but a mental element varying according the different nature of different crimes.” The two important elements that constitute a crime, from the point of view of the offender are (1) conduct on his part or act or action as it is known forming the physical act which is objective and (2) a state of mind or mental element that is blameworthy according to law which is necessarily subjective, usually prove I as an inference from the facts and circumstances of a case or with the aid of presumptions such as that, a man intends the natural consequences of his act; R v. Sheppard. 26. 26. The maxim, actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea has been rather severely criticised by Stephen, J. in R. v. Tolsons2 on the ground that it does not mean a particular state of mind and it is ‘confusing to call so many dissimilar states of mind by one name’. This criticism is rather academic and does not in any way detract from the soundness of the maxim as embodying the foundations of English Criminal Jurisprudence. On it turns the entire English Common Law of Crimes. The term actus reus or criminal act: may either bean act or an omission as it is understood or a mere state of fact or facts, and mens rea as related to the actus rea or as the latter’s motive force may-have reference to any of the states of mind in the doing of the act such as intention, know-ledge, negligence, rashness and the like. The maxim carries with it the two basic elements of a crime; whether in English Common Law or under the Indian Penal Code, viz., conduct or act are distinguishable on the basis of the mens rea specified and that exceptions a part, every case of culpable homicide is not necessarily murder. In fact, in many cases, the accused have been acquitted of the charge of murder and convicted of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder although there was no question of the applicability of any of the Exceptions to section 300, the decisions were based on the “fine but appreciable” distinction between sections 299 and 300.- Vide Reg. v. Govinda3, Inder Singh v. The Grown4 Gahbar Pande v. Emperor5and Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 27. Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code which provides punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder repeats the expressions as to mens rea stated in section 299. But section 304 of the Indian Penal Code is also applicable in cases where, though the mens rea of the higher type specie-in section 300 is present, the Exceptions to section 300 also apply. Sometimes a judge while sentencing an accused under section 304 not merely relies on one of the exceptions but also on the fact that the mens rea is of the lower type mentioned in section 299 vide Chamru Badhwa v. The State1and Thommen Thomas v. The State2. Sometimes a judge while sentencing an accused under section 304 not merely relies on one of the exceptions but also on the fact that the mens rea is of the lower type mentioned in section 299 vide Chamru Badhwa v. The State1and Thommen Thomas v. The State2. The application of the exceptions implies that notwithstanding that the act is done with the mens rea specified in section 300 the offence is still culpable homicide not amounting to murder and at the same time there is the finding that the mens rea is of the lower type mentioned in section 299. This leads one to doubt whether in such cases any effort has been made to determine the specific intention or knowledge actually present and it tends to obscure the distinction referred to in the previous paragraph. 28. A jumbled reference to the different clauses of section 300 without indicating which of them is applicable, while distinguishing between sections 299 and 300 tends to blur the distinction further vide State v. Bhairu Sattu Bharad3and Charan Singh v. The State4. In William Shaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh5, following a heated exchange of words between the accused and the deceased, the accused slapped the deceased on the cheek. The deceased lifted his fist. The accused gave one blow on the head of the deceased with a hockey stick with the result that the skull Was fractured. The deceased died in the hospital 10 days later. Chandrasekara Aiyar, J., observes: “It is obvious that the appellant did not intend to kill the deceased; the evidence of the doctor is that the injury was likely to result in fatal consequences. This by itself is not enough to bring the case within the scope of section 300. There is nothing to warrant us to attribute to the appellant knowledge that the injury was liable to cause death or that it was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. The fact that Donald lived for ten days shows that it was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The element specified in section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, are thus wanting. We take the view considering all the circumstances that the offence is the lesser one.” 29. The fact that Donald lived for ten days shows that it was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The element specified in section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, are thus wanting. We take the view considering all the circumstances that the offence is the lesser one.” 29. In England the much discussion decision of the House of Lords, in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith6had adopted the objective test in determining intention. Such a criterion would be wholly out of place under the Indian Penal Code. Nevertheless it is not unusual for judges to rely on the maxim to determine intention under the Code. 30. The intention to cause bodily injury is common to section 299, clause (2) and section 300, clause (2) and the only difference between them is that under the latter there should also be the knowledge that the injury is likely to cause the death of the person to whom the injury is caused. As this additional element of knowledge is subjective, it should be inferred from the evidence as a matter of fact and should not be imputed to the accused. Section 300 clause (2), then really appears to be a combination of clause (2) and clause (3) of section 299, which from the stand point of responsibility is equated with an intention to cause death and hence liability for murder. Vide Rahiman Ismail v. R7. section 300 clause (3) of the Indian Penal Code reads “If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is Sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.” 31. This clause is distinguishable from clause (3) of section 299 of the basis of the higher degree of probability of death-resulting from the injury denoted by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. ‘Prof. Alan Gledhill consider the distinction between an injury likely to cause death and the one sufficient in the course of nature to cause death artificial and obseves “In many causes the result of a trial must turn on the medical evidence and a man’s life may depend upon the unchallenged opinion on the nature of an injury, given by a not over-competent member of the subordinate Medical service who has performed a casual autopsy”. (See Prof. (See Prof. Alan Gledhill "The Indian Penal Code in the Sudan and Northern Nigeria" Year Book of Legal studies 1900, Department of Legal Studies, Madras P. 17). These clauses, clause 2 of section 299 and clause 3 of section 300, are not only difficult to under, stand in the abstract but lead to considerable arbitrariness in their application to any given case. 32. The view has been expressed in interpreting the third clause of section 300 that not only should the injury be intentionally inflicted but that the accused should have further intended that it should be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would convert the clause into one of intention to cause death, i.e. (i) of section 300. It is not possible to see how ‘intention to cause bodily injury intended to be sufficient to cause death" is different from intention to cause death. (See Rehman v. R.1). 33. Another view is that if any serious injury is intentionally inflicted and that injury actually caused death, it is to be regarded as sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death; the case would fall under clause (3) of section 300. Vide Public Prosecutor v. Koramulla Narasingudu. 34. The proper view to take is that the bodily injury suffered by the deceased and found sufficient to cause death should be actually intended by the offender. Whether the injury intended by the accused and actually caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not must be determined objectively as a question of fact. In Virsa Singh v. The State3(see also Rehman v. Emperor1, Nagakhwet v. The King4, Faquira v. State5and Thannoo v. The State6the Court observes: "To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under section 300 "thirdly" First, it must establish quite objectively that a bodily injury is present; Secondly the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations. Thirdly it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Thirdly it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further ; and fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender." Though it is thus emphasised that the accused’s anticipation of the nature of the consequences is immaterial sometimes we find that the knowledge of the accused as to the injury being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death considered as being material. 35. Prof. Alan Gledhill after referring to clause (3) and (2) of section 300 observes: "....why, in the case of a victim of normal health and strength, should the knowledge of the consequences of the injury intended to be caused be irrelevant, if it is essential when death is caused to a person suffering form bodily disease or infirmity? Why, again, when the victim is a person of normal health and strength must the intended injury be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature, when intention to cause injury likely to cause death is enough, if it is caused to an infirm person?" 36. In some cases, knowledge of the accused that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is discussed while applying section 300, clause (3). In this regard, the decisions in Public Prosecutor v. Ramaswamy Nadar7, Nga Ba U v. The Emperor8are referred to. Knowledge of the accused can only be relevant under section 300, clause (2) but not under section 300, clause (3). From the above it is clear that the minute sub-divisions of the state of mind leads to practical difficulties. Further, the presumption as to intention and knowledge, sometimes, is scarcely more than speculation in the absence of anything in the evidence to disclose the actual mental condition of the accused. From the above it is clear that the minute sub-divisions of the state of mind leads to practical difficulties. Further, the presumption as to intention and knowledge, sometimes, is scarcely more than speculation in the absence of anything in the evidence to disclose the actual mental condition of the accused. This clause has probably been introduced by the framers of the Indian Penal Code so that persons in whose cases it may be difficult to prove an absolute intention to kill may not escape liability. 37. Section 300, clause (4) reads “If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid." 38. Exception I to section 300 provides: "Culpable homicide is not murder if (he offender whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident." 39. The Supreme Court in Nanavati v. The State of Mahareshtra1has answered the questions, ‘(1) Who is the reasonable man and what is the standard of reasonableness? (2) Does it refer to the man on the Clapham omnibus as in English law, i.e., to a mythical man of reasonable prudence? (3) Is there an abstract standard of reasonableness to be applied faithfully in every case?”, in the negative, and has stated that the standard of reasonableness varies from one social group to another. Subba Row, J. observed: “What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country these are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision , it is for the Court to decide in each case, having regard to relevant circumstances.” In other words, the test is not what a reasonable man judged by some abstract standard would do, but what a. reasonable man belonging to the same social! group as the accused would do. group as the accused would do. To put it differently, if the accused is found, as a matter of fact, to be a reasonable man, would be have done what he actually did? The objective test is that qualified by the circumstances mentioned by the Supreme Court. 40. In Nanavati’s case1referred to above, when Sylvia, the accused confessed to her husband that she had illicit intimacy with, the Ahaja (deceased) who was not present there, it can be assumed that he (husband) had momentarily lost his self-control. But then appellant drove his wife and children to a Cinema, left them there, went to his shop, took a revolver on a false protect, loaded it with six rounds, did some official business there and drove his car to the office of the deceased Ahuja and shot him. Three hours since the knowledge of illicit intimacy had elapsed and, therefore, there was sufficient time for him to regain his self-control even if he had not regained it earlier. The fact of the case did not attract the provision of Exception 1 to section 300, Indian Penal Code. Navavati’s case1. 41. In Gyanandra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh2, a month before the assault the deceased had attempted to outrage the modesty of the Appellant’s wife. It was held that the interval between that incident and the assault is too long to afford to the appellant the benefit of the plea of grave and sudden provocation. 42. In Datt Gaijkwad v. State of Maharashtra3 it was held that what is grave and sudden provocation in one set of society may not be grave provocation in another. Besides this there can. be no grave and sudden provocation where there is time to cool down. 43. In Amirthalinga Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu4 it was held that the chase of the deceased and P.W.3 by the appellant and four other accused was immediately after the main occurrence and was hardly any appreciable interval of time between the scuffle and giving of the fatal blow by the appellant. The later part of the incident followed upon the earlier as its sequel and there was no time for reason to interpose and passions to cool down. It is apparent that the fatal injury was caused by the appellant to the deceased without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. The later part of the incident followed upon the earlier as its sequel and there was no time for reason to interpose and passions to cool down. It is apparent that the fatal injury was caused by the appellant to the deceased without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. It was held that the case of the appellant falls clearly within the fourth exception in section 300 of the Indian Penal Code and the appellant can be held guilty only of the offence under section 304, Parti of the Indian Penal Code. 44. In Hansa Singh v. State of Punjab1the appellant on seeing the deceased committing the act of sodomy on his son, lost his power and self-control and it was undoubtedly a grave and sudden provocation for him which led him to commit the murderous assault on the deceased. It was held that the accused had committed an offence punishable under section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code. So, the sentence was altered from Life Imprisonment (under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code) to already undergone (which was almost seven years). 45. Mr. N. Arunachalam, M.A. M.L. Advocate High Court, Madras and Part-time Lecturer, Law College, Madras, in his "A Treatise in the Law of Crimes" published by M.L. Tilak & Co. Luz House, Madras-4 in 1953 has dealt with the subject "Grave and Sudden Provocation" at pages 250 and 251 as follows: "Provocation may take any form or shape. It may be by words or gestures or acts and if these things can excite violent passion tending to cause bodily violence, they will be sufficient enough with in the meaning of the section. It must always be borne in mind that the provocation which resulted in loss of self-control of the accused must not have been one sought after by the accused or voluntarily provoked by him and the provocation must be sudden and grave. In R. v. Lockan2, the accused had suspicions about his wife’s loyalty to him. He saw her leaving his house at night. He followed her with a hatchet. He found her having connection with another person and at once killed her. This was held to be murder. It can be seen that this provocation, however grave, was sought after or voluntarily provoked by the accused himself. He saw her leaving his house at night. He followed her with a hatchet. He found her having connection with another person and at once killed her. This was held to be murder. It can be seen that this provocation, however grave, was sought after or voluntarily provoked by the accused himself. So it was, he was found guilty of murder. On the other hand, in R v. Sheik Badhoo3the accused for ten years had no suspicion of the fidelity of his wife. One day when he came home, he found his wife in a compromising situation with mother. This sight maddened the accused who killed both his wife and her paramour. He was found guilty of only culpable homicide not a mounting to murder and was also dealt with leniently. If there is an interval of time between, the provocation and the act done, much will turn upon the kind of provocation that was given so as to decide the continuance of the gravity and suddenness of the provocation at the time of doing the act. Normally, of course, lapse of time might change the character of the provocation into one of resentment and resentment is no excuse for killing. There may be exceptional cases in which in spite of lapse of time, the provocation, may be considered sufficient enough to continue until the doing of the Act. In Abalu Das v. R.4the accused found a man X enter his house at night, at the invitation of his wife. He found his wife having connection with X Accused was enraged. He caught hold of X, draged him outside and took him some distance and then gave him severe beating as a result of which X died. The circumstances in which X was found in the house of the accused on the night of the crime were sufficient to cause grave and sudden provocation. The nature of the provocation was such, that it was bound to continue long enough to influence the feelings of the accused. It was found that when the beatings were given to the victim the accused was continued to be moved by the grave and sudden provocation of the sight of the illicit intercourse of his wife with X. Grave and sudden provocation may be of any variety and it depends on facts and circumstances of each case. It is always a question of fact. It is always a question of fact. The person killed must be the person who gave the grave and sudden provocation. The person killing must be the person who was provoked in the manner aforesaid. Grave and sudden provocation in the sense in which it is meant and the limitations subject to which it can be pleaded within the meaning of section 300, Exception I, apply also to the offences falling under sections 334 and 335 viz., voluntarily causing hurt and voluntarily causing grievous hurt; and sections 352 and 358 viz., assault of criminal force otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation; and assault of criminal force on grave and sudden provocation. It will not be provocation if it is sought or if it is on account of lawful conduct or if it is on account of lawful exercise of the right of private defence." 46. Not only words, but also acts may constitute a sufficient provocation. The nocturnal visit of a thief, or of a man for the purpose of intrigue, are acts which would inflame the passions of any men. There may, however, be acts which some people may look on with, equanimity, while they may throw others into a paroxysm of the deepest rage. Such are acts done in violation of one’s caste or customs. In such cases the fact that the provocation is unreasonable is nothing. If it is in act which is sufficient to provoke a person in the position and situation of the accused, it is a sufficient extenuation. It is quite impossible to hold that a person will be deprived of the power of self-control merely by being slapped, even two or three times, on the back. Being slapped on the back would not be sufficient provocation. It may have been sudden but it is certainly not grave. 47. In the instant case, the point of law is, whether the plucking of the paddy seedlings from the field belonging to her (deceased Alamelu Ammal) and which had been leased in favour of another son can be said to cause grave and sudden provocation for the accused/appellant so as to attract the benefit under Exception 1 to section 390 of the Indian Penal Code. This can be answered only in the negative. This can be answered only in the negative. The accused had been entertaining a grievance against his mother, in that, she had not given on lease the seven ‘kuzhis’ of land for his cultivation. This had created in his minds kind of inexplicable fire. The accused, appellant herein had been nurturing hatred against his mother. So, on the day of the occurrence when the deceased was plucking the trans-planted paddy seedlings from her field cultivated by her another son P.W.4 Marudha Udayar, the dissatisfaction and hatred entertained by the accused got exploded and assumed a tremendous and horrible stature which resulted in the accused/appellant cutting the deceased and causing her instantaneous death. 48. The spade in question is a formidable weapon. It had a broad and lengthy iron portion. The accused would have been certainly aware that the attack with such a weapon would result in the death of the victim. It is relevant in this connection to note that the portions of the body in which the cuts were inflicted with the spade by the accused on the deceased were the vital parts of the body of the deceased. Therefore, the intention of the accused is easily gathered from the fact that the injuries were inflicted on the vital parts of the body of the deceased. In the instant case, the death was instantaneous after the receipt of the injuries by the deceased. Therefore, the fact that the injuries were inflicted on the vital parts of the body of the deceased, that for inflicting the injuries, a formidable weapon was used, and the nature of the injuries inflicted on the deceased clearly go to show that the accused had committed an offence which is certainly punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. As I have already said, the accused had been entertaining a grievance that the land belonging to the deceased was not given on lease to him by her. Under the circumstances, it is clear that it is the accused, appellant herein, who had resorted to the act of violence in this case. There is absolutely no material available in evidence on record to hold that some other person had been responsible for the injuries on the deceased or that there is existence of any reasonable doubt under the circumstances so as to hold that the accused/appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. There is absolutely no material available in evidence on record to hold that some other person had been responsible for the injuries on the deceased or that there is existence of any reasonable doubt under the circumstances so as to hold that the accused/appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Therefore, the trial Court is correct in having held the accused guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. We, confirm the conviction of the accused, appellant herein, under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 49. The accused had resorted to violence against his own mother in the field belonging to her. It cannot be said that the accused, appellant herein, was not aware of the consequences of his action. From the evidence available on record, it is clear that the accused, appellant herein, had the intention to do away with the deceased. When the deceased was engaged in plucking the paddy seedlings from the field belonging to her, the accused/appellant had taken the opportunity to accomplish his intention to do away with the deceased. We confirm the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on the accused, appellant herein, under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by the trial Court. We find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.