JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal in a suit for declaration that the order, dated 8 March 1973, passed by the security officer, Central Railway, Jhansi, removing the plaintiff from his post, and order, dated 30 April 1973, passed by the chief security officer, Railway Protection Force, Bombay V. T., were illegal and void. 2. The grounds on which these orders were challenged as null and void are recited in Cls. (a) to (k) of Para. 10 of the plaint. It was claimed on the basis of the said grounds that "the orders were illegal, null and void, arbitrary, mala fide, discriminatory, against rules and the principles of natural justice, and are also in violation of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India." The trial Court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate Court has dismissed it, hence this second appeal. 3. It is not necessary to set out facts of the case in detail, in view of the limited scope of the present second appeal. Suffice it to say, that the only issues on which the parties went to trial were : "(1) Whether the order removing the plaintiff from his post and order dismissing the appeal are illegal, null and void for the reasons mentioned in Para. 10 of the plaint ? (2) Whether the notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, is illegal and invalid? (3) Plaintiff's relief if any ? " On issue (1) the trial Court found that the enquiry was not conducted fairly ; that the enquiry officer ignored the rules of natural justice ; that the enquiry in question was a quasijudicial enquiry hence the plaintiff was legally entitled to all benefits available in ordinary Courts ; that the reliance on the evidence by the enquiry officer is not based on legal provisions; and that, therefore, the order passed on the basis of the findings of enquiry officer, are illegal and not binding upon the plaintiff. It further held that the failure of the appellate authority to give a personal hearing contravened the intention of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, the appellate order was also null and void. On issue (2) the trial Court held that the notice under S. 80, Civil Procedure Code, was valid and legal, and in view of the said findings decreed the suit with costs. 4. On issue (2) the trial Court held that the notice under S. 80, Civil Procedure Code, was valid and legal, and in view of the said findings decreed the suit with costs. 4. On appeal by the railway administration, the lower appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court and held that a reasonable opportunity was given to the plaintiff and that the impugned orders could not be said to be bad on any such ground as held by the learned Munsif. A new point appears to have been raised before the lower appellate Court by the plaintiff, to the effect that his services could be terminated only by the chief security officer. An application No. 15 Ga 2 was also moved before the lower appellate Court on 17 November 1975, by the plaintiff along with copy of an order, dated 15 September 1964, praying that the original thereof may be summoned. The learned Additional District Judge, vide his order of that date, summoned the paper, but it appears that the original was not produced on behalf of the railway administration and ultimately the counsel appearing for the railway administration dispensed with the formal proof of the copy of the order, dated 15 September 1964, by an endorsement made thereunder. It reads as follows : "The following HRKs of Arms Wing empanelled for promotion to the post of ASI Gr. Rs. I10-170 (AS) are hereby transferred and posted to officiate as ASI at the station shown against each on two years' probation. It reads as follows : "The following HRKs of Arms Wing empanelled for promotion to the post of ASI Gr. Rs. I10-170 (AS) are hereby transferred and posted to officiate as ASI at the station shown against each on two years' probation. They will draw the pay of ASI on and from the date of their resumption at their new place of work as an A.S.I. Serial (5) will revert to his substantive post of HRKs, on restoration of ASI, Mohan Singh, at present reverted to the rank of HRK for a period of three months" Sr.l No. Name of place of work Promoted and posted at (1) ,, HRK No. AW/502 Gopal Singh of Chink Hill A/Coy ML ND (2) ,, HRK No. AW/511 Anwar Khan of Chink Hill B. Coy ML ND (3) ,, of 13 S. A. Sawant of SEE GKP A. Coy SEE GKP (4) ,, 503 Kalu Ram of Chink Hill S. Coy SEE GKP (5) ,, 506 B. N. Gidde of Chink Hill@ E. Coy/JHS At the preliminary hearing of the second appeal on 14 July 1978, under Order 41, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, the following was the question formulated as the substantial question of law involved in the case : "Whether the authority who removed the appellant from service was his appointing authority and competent in law to remove him from service." The point now raised was, it appears, raised for the first time by the plaintiff, who was the respondent in the appeal, before the lower appellate Court. The plaintiff had not raised the point in any of the grounds in Para. 10 of his plaint or in any of the other pleas contained therein. Nor, did he raise it in the notice under S. 80, Civil Procedure Code. The parties were not on issue on that point before the trial Court and no evidence appears to have been produced either way in respect thereof. I have seen the entire record of the departmental enquiry and there too the point was not raised by the plaintiff at any stage. 5. The parties were not on issue on that point before the trial Court and no evidence appears to have been produced either way in respect thereof. I have seen the entire record of the departmental enquiry and there too the point was not raised by the plaintiff at any stage. 5. The grounds on which the lower appellate Court negatived the point and held against the plaintiff are to the effect that the plaintiff was appointed before 1956 while the Railway Protection Force Act came into force in 1957 and, therefore, the provisions of that Act will not be applicable to the present case ; that the plaintiff was appointed by the assistant security officer while be was said to have been removed by the security officer. On the basis of the order promoting the plaintiff to the rank of assistant sub-inspector, which was passed by chief security officer, a copy of which was produced before the lower appellate Court, it was argued that only the chief security officer could have removed the plaintiff ; it also observed that "this argument has no force, because plaintiff's promotion is one thing and his termination of service is another thing." It also observed that " this argument is one force, because plaintiff's promotion is one thing, and his termination of service is another thing." "under rule 10 of the Railway Protection Force Regulations of 1966, it was laid down that promotion for the post of assistant sub-inspector shall be considered by the security officer" and that " therefore, his promotion was made by the chief security officer and the order of promotion was passed under the signature of somebody for chief security officer. But that does not mean that the plaintiff was initially appointed by the chief security officer. It is clear that since he was appointed by the assistant security officer, he could have been removed from service even by the assistant security officer." 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has been rather critical of the aforesaid reasons given by the learned Additional District Judge in Para. 10 of his judgment the aforesaid reasons given by the lower appellate Court do not appear to be correct. The plaintiff was a head rakshak when he was appointed an assistant sub-inspector under the aforesaid order, dated 15 September 1964. 10 of his judgment the aforesaid reasons given by the lower appellate Court do not appear to be correct. The plaintiff was a head rakshak when he was appointed an assistant sub-inspector under the aforesaid order, dated 15 September 1964. I do not know whether the order was signed by the chief security officer himself, but it does purport to have been signed by some one who was either the chief security officer or by some one for the chief security officer. That fact could only be elicited If the original had been produced by the railway administration. Nevertheless, on the assumption that the order was passed by the chief security officer, it follows on the terms of the order it self, that the plaintiff was appointed to officiate a; assistant sub-Inspector on two years' probation. He was not a direct recruit and was promoted from the ranks, but since the plaintiff was an assistant sub- inspector when he was removed from the post by the impugned order, dated 8 March 1973, one has to see the status of the authority who appointed him to that post and not the status of the authority who originally appointed the plaintiff as a head rakshak. The rule referred to as rule 10 of the Railway Protection Force Regulations, 1966 by the lower appellate Court is in fact a reference to rule 10 of Chap. X11 of the said regulations which constitutes the security officer as the appointing authority of an assistant sub-inspector when the appointment is made by promotion from the ranks of the head rakshak although he has to do so with the approval of the chief security officer in the manner laid down by that rule. The regulation does not, therefore, advance the case of the plaintiff any further. It rather leads to the inference that after the issue of the order, dated 15 September 1964, approving the plaintiff as one of the persons for appointment as an assistant Sub-inspector, the security officer concerned must have passed the order of appointment is his case. The relevant statutory rule read with Sch. I of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, also shows that the appointing authority of an assistant sub-inspector is the security officer, Schedule I reads as under: "SCHEDULE I (Rule 20) Powers of Superior Officers to make appointments to the force. The relevant statutory rule read with Sch. I of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, also shows that the appointing authority of an assistant sub-inspector is the security officer, Schedule I reads as under: "SCHEDULE I (Rule 20) Powers of Superior Officers to make appointments to the force. Chief Security Officer Security Officer Assistant Security Officer All members of the force Sub-Inspectors, Assistant Sub-inspectors, Head Rakshaks, Senior Rakshaks, Rakabaks. Senior Rakshaks; Rakshaks." 7. These rules were framed by the Central Government under S. 21 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, and appear to have been in force when the plaintiff was appointed to the post of assistant sub- inspector by promotion from the post of head rakshak by the order, dated 15 September 1964. From this rule it appears that the power to appoint an assistant sub-inspector was vested in the security officer. But, S. 6 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, says that " the appointment of members of the force shall rest with the chief security officers who shall exercise that power in accordance with rules made under this Act; Provided that the power of appointment under this section may also be exercised by such other superior officer as the chief security officer concerned may by order specify in this behalf". 8. Sri Tejpal, learned counsel for the appellant, invited my attention to the case of Union of India and others v. Nar Bahadur, (1972 A.L.J. 649), wherein Kirti, J., took the view that rule 20 was "clearly inconsistent with the specific provision of S. 6 of the Act itself" and that of it is settled law that statutory rules framed under an Act cannot override or ran counter to any specific and mandatory provision of the statute itself" and further that "in case of such inconsistency or anomaly, the provisions of statute must prevail over the provisions of the particular rule or rules." I have found it a little difficult to read rule 20 and Sch. I, appended thereto to be inconsistent with S 6 of the Act, the rule of constriction being that the Court should try to harmonise the statutory provisions and to avoid inconsistency, if it is possible so to do, on a reasonable construction of the language. I, appended thereto to be inconsistent with S 6 of the Act, the rule of constriction being that the Court should try to harmonise the statutory provisions and to avoid inconsistency, if it is possible so to do, on a reasonable construction of the language. The main part of S. 6 vests the power of appointment of the members of the force in the chief security officer who is directed to exercise that power in accordance with the rules made under the Act. The first column of Sch. 1 also shows that the chief security officer is empowered to appoint all member of the force. Under the proviso the chief security officer is empowered to delegate his power of appointment to such other superior officer as he may by order specify in this behalf. Rule 20, read with Sch. I, provides a guideline for the exercise of his powers of appointment by the chief security officer and the main enacting part of S. 6 also requires the chief security officer to exercise his powers of appointment in accordance with the rules made under the Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that rule 20, read with Sch. I, is in any way inconsistent with S. 6. All that was probably required to be shown further was that the chief security officer had delegated his powers of appointment, in accordance with the guidance provided by the rules by an order made by him under the proviso Probably the chief security officer thought it to be an unnecessary formality to be gone through in view of the provisions of Sch. I to the rules. 9. This would have necessitated a reference of the case to a Division Bench in view of the inconsistency of my view with that of Kirti, J., in Union of India and others v. Nar Bahadur, [1972 A. L. J. 640], (vide supra), but the insurmountable difficulty in the way of the plaintiff appellant, in the present same, is that the point that he was removed by an authority inferior in rank to that which appointed him, was not raised in the plaint nor in the notice under S. 80, Civil Procedure Code, nor was it raised at any stage of the departmental proceedings. The copy of the appointment order, dated 15 September 1964, could not have been admitted in evidence by the lower appellate Court under rule 27 of Order 41, Civil Procedure Code. Indeed, it could not have been admitted at all Inasmuch as there was no plea in the plaint and no issue on that point. It has been well said that " no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward. See Siddik Mohd. Shah v. Mt. Saran and others, [A.I.R. 1930 P. C. 57]. 10. I cannot also lose sight of the prejudice which is likely to be caused to the railway administration by the admission of this plea at the appellate stage. If the point had been raised in the departmental proceedings, the railway administration could have taken steps to remedy the error, if any. The point was not raised even on appeal which was filed by the plaintiff before the chief security officer. He was the person to say as to who had appointed the plaintiff and I have no hesitation or doubt if that plaintiff had raised before him the point that he, the plaintiff, had been appointed by the chief security officer, that officer would have ignored the mandate of Article 311 (1) in case he found that it was he who had appointed the plaintiff. Even if the point had been raised in the notice under S. 20, Civil Procedure Code, the railway administration could justifiably say that if there was any substance in the point, it would not have been slow to remedy the situation than and there. It was also not raised in the plaint. Railway administration had no opportunity to reply to it and when the copy was filed before the first appellate Court, the period that had elapsed and the bureaucratic dispensation by which all the Government departments, including the railway administration are governed, made it difficult for it to meet the point effectively before the lower appellate Court, and instead the formal proof of the copy of the order, dated 15 September 1964, was waived by the learned counsel for the railway administration at the hearing of the appeal, although earlier be had endorsed the words "not admitted " on that copy. Nearly eight years have gone by since the impugned orders were passed. Nearly eight years have gone by since the impugned orders were passed. Even the chief security officer had considered the plaintiff's case, although on appeal from the order of the security officer, and confirmed the same. 11. Sri Tejpal, learned counsel for the appellant, when confronted with the above position, urged before me that the point was raised before the trial Court and when the trial Court in its judgment pointed out that there was no evidence to show that the plaintiff was appointed by the chief security officer, as no appointment order was filed in the present case, opportunity was taken to have the appointment order produced by summoning the original before the first appellate Court and that the Court was pleased to summon it and to admit in evidence the copy filed by the plaintiff, without objection by the learned counsel for the railway administration. There is no disputing these facts and no disputing the principle, laid down by the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff on this point, namely, K Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy and others, (A.I.R. 1963 S. C. 1526) and Kamala Ranjan Roy v. Baijnath Bajoria (A. 1. R. 1951 S. C. 1). But, the difficulty in the present case is, as pointed out above, that the basic allegation which constituted the very core of the cause of action in challenging the order of removal, on the ground that it was passed by an authority subordinate to the one who appointed the plaintiff was missing in the notice under S. 80, Civil Procedure Code, and also in the plaint. Under the circumstances, the question was outside the scope of the present suit and could not have been gone into by either of the two Courts below, and that being so, there was no question of admission of any evidence to show whether the plaintiff was appointed by the chief security officer himself or by the security officer. 12. I am, under the circumstances, not disposed to Interfere in this second appeal, although on grounds wholly opposite to those which appealed to the lower appellate Court on the only question of law which was raised before it. 13. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.