JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal in the suit filed by the plaintiffs for the recovery of damages amounting to Rs. 10,000/- from them. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and the same was maintained by the lower appellate Court. 2. The plaintiff No.1 is the father of the deceased Pancham. Plaintiff No.2 is his widow and the plaintiffs Nos.3 to 5 are the children of the deceased. It was alleged that on 6-3-1968, at about 1 p.m. Pancham while driving his bullock-cart in the town of Baberu District Banda was killed by the defendants when he was attacked by defendants who were armed with Farsa, Barchhi and Lathis. Pancham, at that time was 38 years of age and was enjoying good health. He used to look after the cultivation work and also flour-mill business, from which he was earning about Rs. 1,000/- p.m. Pancham had 20 Bighas of land, on which agriculture was being done in village Uchetu and 24 Bighas of agricultural land stood in the name of Pancham's father, plaintiff No.1 in another village. As the plaintiff No.1 was quite old, the agriculture was being mainly looked after by Pancham. It was alleged that on account of the death of Pancham, the plaintiffs have incurred pecuniary loss of Rs. 1,000/- p.m. and looking to his health he would have lived another 40 years and as such a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was claimed by way of damages. 3. The defendants in the written statement denied having assaulted Pancham and having killed him and they also denied their liability to pay any damages. It was alleged, that he was not doing any cultivation or he was earning Rs. 1,000/- p.m. as alleged. On 1 these grounds, the plaintiff's claim was sought to be defeated by the defendants. 4. After the evidence of the parties, the trial Court came to the conclusion that Pancham had been assaulted by the defendants and that the plaintiffs were entitled to the amount of compensation claimed by them. The plea of the defendants that Pancham's widow had remarried was also not accepted, and it was held that the defendants were liable to pay Rs. 1,000/- by way of damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants then filed an appeal which too was dismissed. By the order under appeal, all the findings of the trial Court were maintained. The plea of the defendants that Pancham's widow had remarried was also not accepted, and it was held that the defendants were liable to pay Rs. 1,000/- by way of damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants then filed an appeal which too was dismissed. By the order under appeal, all the findings of the trial Court were maintained. Aggrieved the defendants have come up in appeal before this Court. 5. Sri G.P. Bhargava, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has mainly argued that the claim of the plaintiffs was barred by limitation, that there was no evidence to support the finding of compensation, thirdly the Courts below were wrong in treating the first information report and the dying declaration as a substantive piece of evidence in support of the plaintiff's case and finally that the widow of Pancham had remarried and the finding to the contrary was not supported by any evidence on record. 6. I will now take up each of these submissions separately. 81. By executors, administrators, or representatives under the Legal Representatives Suits Act, 1855 (12 of 1855) One year The date of death of the person wronged. 7. As far as the question of limitation is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that the alleged murder of Pancham took place on 6-3-1968 while the suit was filed on 4-8-1969. According to him, the period of limitation would be governed by Article 81 of the Indian Limitation Act which provides for one year limitation from the date of death of the person wronged. On this basis, it was sought to be argued that the suit was barred by time. Article 81 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under :- Before this Article can he applied, it must be proved that it was a suit of the nature envisaged, under any of the provisions of Legal Representatives Suits Act, 1855. The preamble of the Act which was enforced on 27th Mar.,1855 says:- "Whereas it is expedient to enable executors, administrators, or representatives in certain cases to sue and be sued in respect of wrongs which, according to the present law, did not survive to or against such executors, administrators or representatives; it is enacted as follows :-" From the preamble, it would be clear that the provisions contained in the Act were enabling. Under the law of Torts on the death of person, all rights which were in the nature of personal wrong came to an end and died with the person concerned. This is on the principle of Actio Personalis Moritur Cum Persona. However, this law was enacted in order to enable the executors, administrators or representatives to pursue the remedy of the suit in respect of wrongs which were committed in the lifetime of such person causing any pecuniary loss to his estate, in respect of which that deceased person was entitled to maintain a suit. The second condition for the applicability of this provision is that the alleged wrong must have been done within one year of the death of the person. The important words to be noted in this provision are that the wrongful act must have occasioned pecuniary loss to the estate and would not cover a case in which any personal injury has been caused to the person concerned. This Act, therefore, clearly is not applicable in a case in which a loss to the estate is occasioned either after the death of the person or where some injury is caused by the wrongful act by the defendant to the deceased during his life-time. In both these kinds of cases, the provisions of this Act cannot apply. 8. My attention was drawn to the provisions contained under Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (Act No. XIII of 1855), which too was enforced on 27th March, 1855. The Preamble of this Act says: "Whereas no action or suit is now maintainable in any Court against a person, who by wrongful act, neglect or default, may have caused the death of another person, and it is often times right and expedient that the wrong-doer in such a case should be answerable for damages for the injuries so caused by him............." Therefore, this Act has been enacted primarily to cover those cases in which a death has been caused by a person by wrongful act and due to the principle Actio Personalis Moritur Cum Persona no action would normally lie for damages against the wrong doer but for the provisions made in this Act. The relevant portion of Section 1-A of the Act reads as under :- "Whenever the death of the person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not caused) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been liable if death had not caused shall be liable to an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony or other crime.............." This section creates fiction. A person who has died on account of an injury caused by wrongful act could not normally maintain a suit but this Act enables the executors, administrators or representatives of such person to maintain a suit against a wrong doer provided the deceased himself could have legally claimed compensation against the defendant, in spite of the fact that the wrong may be liable in law for felony or other crime. From this it clearly follows that merely because a person is liable under the Penal Code for being prosecuted for particular offence, yet a right to claim damages is not taken away. This right, however, is subject to the conditions that the deceased himself should have had a right to claim compensation from the wrong doer if he had been alive. As a matter of fact, the provisions contained in this Act are exception to general principle of Actio Personalis Moritur Cum Persona. However, this provision does not apply to the loss that may be caused on account of the injury or death from the wrongful action of the defendant to the estate of the deceased. There is, however, enabling provision which is to be found under Section 2 of this Act which entitles the executor, administrator, or representative of the deceased to include a claim for loss to the estate also along with the claim for compensation falling under Section 1-A of this Act. This is, however, merely an enabling provision in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings where executors, administrators or representatives are entitled to compensation both for the loss on account of the death of the person and also loss caused to the estate of the deceased. This is, however, merely an enabling provision in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings where executors, administrators or representatives are entitled to compensation both for the loss on account of the death of the person and also loss caused to the estate of the deceased. On an examination of the provisions of the two Acts, it would be obvious that they operate in different fields. In the one it applies to the loss which has been caused on account of wrongful act of the defendant causing loss to the estate of the deceased while in the latter case it applies to the compensation which would be payable to the deceased on account of the wrongful act of the defendant which has caused the death and such suit could be filed by the executors, administrators or representatives of that deceased person. In the instant case, the suit has been filed by the father, widow of the deceased and minor children of the deceased for damages resulting in the loss to them on account of the death of Pancham. No damages caused to the estate are involved and, therefore, Legal Representatives Suits Act, 1855 could not be applicable to the facts of the present case. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, does not appear to be correct that the suit was barred by limitation. In fact, it appears to me that Article 82 of the Indian Limitation Act is a proper article which would be attracted in the instant case, which provides for two years limitation from the date of the death of the person killed. Since the present suit was filed well within that period, it was within the time and the suit cannot be thrown out on that ground. 9. It was next contended that the deceased Pancham was not doing anything and, in fact, none of the plaintiffs was dependant upon him for their maintenance. Plaintiff No.1 Indra Pal has specifically stated before the Court that Pancham was running flour mill, from which he used to earn about Rs. 300/- p.m. but after his death it is giving an income of only Rs. 150/- p.m. and in manner, Rs. 150/- p.m. loss has been caused to the plaintiffs. Plaintiff No.1 Indra Pal has specifically stated before the Court that Pancham was running flour mill, from which he used to earn about Rs. 300/- p.m. but after his death it is giving an income of only Rs. 150/- p.m. and in manner, Rs. 150/- p.m. loss has been caused to the plaintiffs. Pancham also held some agricultural land and it has come in evidence that it was being cultivated on Batai basis even during his lifetime and after his death also. Naturally there may not have been any loss on that account to the plaintiffs. It is surprising that not a question was put to Indra Pal Singh while he was in the witness box to elicit the exact loss of income from the flour mill, apart from asking whether he was maintaining any account books or not, which he denied. Therefore, in this state of the evidence, it is difficult to hold that the finding recorded by the court below was wrong or it was not supported by any legal evidence on record. 10. It was next contended that the two courts below have treated the first information report and the dying declaration as a substantive piece of evidence, and this has vitiated the finding that the defendants had killed Pancham Singh. I am afraid, this is not correct state of affairs. I have gone through the judgment of the Court below and I find that the first information report has been taken as a corroborative piece of evidence and not a substantive piece of evidence. The dying declaration also was not considered as a substantive piece of evidence. This argument, therefore, has also no force. 11. Lastly, it was argued that the widow of Pancham Singh had remarried and as such she was not entitled to compensation. There is a dead finding of fact by the two courts below that she had not remarried. This question, therefore, cannot be reopened at the stage of second appeal. The finding is based on cogent evidence and there is nothing on record to show that it was in any manner vitiated. Under the circumstances, this argument has also no force. 12. In the result, I find no merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.