Judgment Kader, J. 1. Fifty year old Baby Alias Varghese, the appellant herein, has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life under section 302, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of Abraham, his brother-in-law (sister's husband) by stabbing him with M.O. 1 dagger. The occurrence took place on the pathway running east to west leading to the river situated near the house of the appellant and was at about 8 P.M. on 8th April, 1979. 2. Leela, sister of the appellant was married to Abraham, the deceased. Abraham was illtreating Leela and making her life miserable. On account of this the appellant was inimically disposed towards Abraham. Thomas (P.W. 4), brother of Abraham, who was residing at Otakkayani in the neighbouring District bad come for a short visit to the house of his brother and was there on the date of occurrence. Some time prior to the occurrence, Skaria (P.W. 1) who is residing near the house of Abraham paid a visit to the house of Abraham to meet P.W. 4 knowing that the had come there. Abraham who was there in the house told P.W. 1 that P.W. 4 had gone out and would return only late in the night and also offered to accompany P.W. 1 to the house of Kunju where P.W. 4 had gone. Thereafter, both Abraham and P.W.1 proceeded to the house of Kunju. But on reaching there they were told that P.W. 4 and Kunju had gone out to the near by river for taking their both. P.W. 1 and Abraham then proceeded to the river side along the pathway leading to the river. When they reached near the house of the appellant, the appellant came out of his house with a dagger and asking him whether he had not ill-treated and threatened to kill the appellant's sister, stabbed Abraham thrice with the dagger. Seeing this P.W. 1 raised a hue and cry ana some persons residing in the neighbouhood and also P.W. 4 came running. The appellant then went back to his house with the dagger. Seeing this P.W. 1 raised a hue and cry ana some persons residing in the neighbouhood and also P.W. 4 came running. The appellant then went back to his house with the dagger. Abraham was immediately removed to the Medical College Hospital, Calicut, where, while under treatment, he died at 11-35 p.m. on the same day, P.W. 1 went to the Tamarasserry Police Station and laid on the first information statement, Exhibit -P-l, at 11-45 a.m. on the next day which was recorded by the Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.-10) who registered a case on that basis and on reaching the hospital, held inquest over the dead body under Exhibit P-11, inquest report. Assistant Professor of Forensic Medicine held autopsy over the dead body and issued Exhibit P-9, post mortem certificate. Taking up investigation into the case P.W. 11, Circle Inspector of Police, inspected the place of occurrence, prepared scene mahazar and questioned witnesses. On 16th April, 1979, at 9-30 A.M. the appellant surrendered before P.W. 11 and produced MO. 1 dagger which was taken into custody under mahazar Exhibit P-4. 3. The plea of the appellant was One of complete denial. 4. The death of Abraham as a result of the injuries sustained by him on the date of occurrence is a fact not in dispute and is amply proved by the evidence of P. Ws 8, 9 and 10 and Exhibit P-9 and P-11. during autopsy three incised injuries, four contused abrasions and two abrasions were noticed on the dead body of Abraham and these have been described in detail as injury Nos. 1 to 9. In Exhibit P-9 Injury No.1 is an incised oblique wound 3.5×0.5× muscle deep, while Nos. 8 and 9 are vertical stab wounds. Injury No. 8 is a vertical stab wound 3×0.6 cm. on the front of left side of abdomen, withomentum protruding through the wound No. 9 is another vertical wound 4.5×2 cm. on the left flank of a paomen. Coils of small intestine were found protruding through the wound. Small intestine was found injured at six sites and large intestine at two sites. According to the doctor, injury Nos. 1, 8 and 9 could have been caused by stabbing with a weapon like M. O. I and injury Nos. on the left flank of a paomen. Coils of small intestine were found protruding through the wound. Small intestine was found injured at six sites and large intestine at two sites. According to the doctor, injury Nos. 1, 8 and 9 could have been caused by stabbing with a weapon like M. O. I and injury Nos. 8 and 9 are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and the injured died as a result of sustaining these injuries. Whoever be the assailant, considering the nature of the injuries, the vital parts chosen for the attack and the type of weapon used, there can be no doubt that he intended to cause the death of Abraham. 5. The vital point for decision in this case is whether it was the appellant who caused the injuries on Abraham which resulted in his death. 6. The prosecution sought to prove the case against the appellant by the direct testimony of P.W.1, the dying declaration of the deceased person and the evidence of P.W.4, the medical evidence and the subsequent conduct of the appellant. At the trial the solitary eye-witness P.W. 1 did not speak in terms of the fist in formation statement laia by him. It was relying on the dying declaration made by the deceased and the evidence of PW. 4 and the subsequent conduct of the appellant that the trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforesaid. 7. The learned advocate appearing for the appellant strongly assailed the conviction and sentence of the appellant contending that it is quite unsafe to rely on the dying declaration and enter a conviction in this case and that the trial Court committed a serious illegality in allowing the prosecution to re-examine P.W. 4 with reference to the statement given by him at the time of inquest. 8. The only eye-witness in the case is P.W. 1 and he turned hostile to the prosecution. On all the material particulars stated in Exhibit P-l he deviated at the trial and gave an entirely efficient version. When confronted with Exhibit P-l, he admitted having signed the same and that at the time of giving Exhibit P-l statement, he told the police all that he knew about the death of Abraham. He admitted that Abraham was found lying with injuries on the pathway near the house of the appellant. When confronted with Exhibit P-l, he admitted having signed the same and that at the time of giving Exhibit P-l statement, he told the police all that he knew about the death of Abraham. He admitted that Abraham was found lying with injuries on the pathway near the house of the appellant. On a reading of the evidence of this witness, as a whole, we are satisfied that this witness is deliberately suppressing truth with a view to help the appellant. 9. The remaining items of evidence, we are left with are the evidence of P.W.4, the dying declaration made by Abraham, the subsequent conduct of the appellant and the medical evidence. 10. There is no legal bar of entering a conviction solelyon the basis of a dying declaration if it is complete, categoric, and reliable. It is now settled law that a Court is entitled to convict an accused en the sole basis of a dying declaration, if it is found to be true and reliable. A dying declaration cannot be equated with the evidence of an accomplice which requites corroboration, as a rule of prudence. It stands on the same footing as any other piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances and with, reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence. In order to pass the test of reliability a dying declaration has to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and the closet circumspection. If a Court of fact is satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind to make a statement that he had sufficient opportunity to observe and identify his assailant and that he had made the statement at the earliest opportunity without any influence or as a result of tutoring and that the dying declaration is a truthful version as to his assailant then, without insisting on corroboration and without any hesitation, a. conviction can be entered on the sole basis of a dying declaration. On the other hand, if the Court, after subjecting the dying declaration to the test of reliability and examining the same in all its aspects, comes to the conclusion that the dying declaration is not reliable by itself and that if suffers from an infirmity, then the Court has to insist on coffobotagion as without corroboration such a dying declaration cannot be made the basis of a conviction. The value of a dying declaration depends upon the circumstances under which it is made. The law on this point has been clearly and authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay1. The principles enunciated in the said decision have been re-affirmed and reiterated by the Supreme Court in Harfans Singh v. State of Punjab1, Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab2Lallu Bhai Dev Chand Shah and Munnu Raja v. State of Madhya Pradesh4 11. In the case on hand, the dying declaration of deceased Abraham is sworn to by P.W. 4. The evidence of this witness was attacked on two grounds. The main attack against the evidence of P.W. 4 is that he did not tell anything about the dying declaration to the Circle Inspector of Police (P.W. II) and therefore his evidence cannot be relied on. It was two days after the occurrence that P.W. 11 questioned this witness for the first time and there was a further questioning. It may be noted that there is nothing in the evidence of P.W. 11 even to indicate that he questioned P.W. 4 in detail about the incident or about the statement of the deceased. P.W. 11 was aware of the previous statement made by this witness on 9th April, 1979 to P.W. 10 and that was why P.W. 11 stated that he only further questioned this witness. In the context the further questioning by P.W. 11 must have been to elicit further materials in addition to what the witness stated to the Sub- Inspector Police. Admittedly when questioned at the inquest P.W. 4 had stated to P.W. 10 that Abraham on seeing him declared that he was stabbed by Baby. Therefore it cannot be said that there was an omission as alleged in the statement given by this witness under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. There is also not a case where the witness omitted to mention an important fact in his first statement to the police but mentioned the same only in a subsequent statement. 12. Another attack in this regard is that the Session Judge has committed a serious illegality in allowing P.W. 4 to bare-examined with reference to his previous statement made to P.W. 10 at the time of inquest. 12. Another attack in this regard is that the Session Judge has committed a serious illegality in allowing P.W. 4 to bare-examined with reference to his previous statement made to P.W. 10 at the time of inquest. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that although P.W. 4 had stated to P. W. 10 about the dying declaration made by Abraham, he did not tell about it to P.W.1 1 and therefore the statement given by P.W. 4 to P.W. 10 can not be used to explain the omission in the statement made by the witness to P.W. 11 as there is a prohibition under the proviso to section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, to make use of such previous statement. According to the Counsel for the appellant, the words “statement” and “any part thereof” appearing in the proviso relate only to that particular statement given by the witness to that particular officer and not to any statement given by the witness on any different date to another officer. 13. Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, imposes certain restrictions on the use of the statement, or statements made by witnesses during the course of investigation. By virtue of the proviso to this section the statement made under the section can be used only for the limited purpose of contradicting a prosecution witness by the accused and with the permission of the Court by the prosecution and when any pirt of such statement is so used, and part thereof may also be used in the examination of such, witness or the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, beginning with section 154 and ending with section 176 deals with information to the police and their powers to investigate. Under section 162, the police have been given powers to collect evidence during investigation by questioning witnesses and recording their statements, if found to be so neces sary. The “statement’ referred to ir section 162 , Criminal Procedural Code, if the statement recorded under section 161, (3), Criminal Procedure Code. It is common knowledge that auite often, particularly, in serious and complicated cases more than one police officers investigate into the same crime at different stages and each of these officers eximine the witness already examined by others. The “statement’ referred to ir section 162 , Criminal Procedural Code, if the statement recorded under section 161, (3), Criminal Procedure Code. It is common knowledge that auite often, particularly, in serious and complicated cases more than one police officers investigate into the same crime at different stages and each of these officers eximine the witness already examined by others. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case and according to the necessity, a witness may be examined during the course of investigation more than once at different times, stages and different dates by the same Investigating Officer or different Invests gating Officer. This is because, a police officer at the commencement of the investigation may not knew bow the case would develop and how even trivial things would develop into important clues in the case. After the examination of a witness, a material fact might have come into during investigation and this will necessitate the examination of the witness over again. So also at the time when a witness was examined first, the Investigating Officer might have left out some particulars as unimportant, but in the course of investigation as the case develops, those might assume importance which would compel the Investigating Officer to further examine or re-examine the same witness. The Investigating Officer might have recorded the entire statement of a witness at a stretch, but in spite of all that, the necessity of examining the witness over again might arise as the relevancy of a particular fact might have become clear to the Investigating Officer only after the first examination of the witness. The weapon used for the commission of the offence might not have been recovered at the time when the witness was examined and therefore not available to be shown to the witness during his examination. The recovery of the weapon subsequent to the examination of the witness would necessitate the questioning of the witness: a second time with reference to the weapon recovered. On such occasion, it is only for the limited purpose of showing the weapon to the witness and questioning him with reference to the weapon that he is examined and therefore it is not necessary that the investigating Officer at that time should record over again all what he stated to him about the incident on the former occasion. On such occasion, it is only for the limited purpose of showing the weapon to the witness and questioning him with reference to the weapon that he is examined and therefore it is not necessary that the investigating Officer at that time should record over again all what he stated to him about the incident on the former occasion. The word “statement” under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code, includes both oral and written statement and it will also includes signs and gestures. On going through the various provisions in Chapter XII and construing the word “statement” appearing in sections 161 and 162 , Criminal Procedure Code, in the context in which the word appears it is clear that the word “statement” in sub- section (3) of section 161 and section 162 Criminal Procedure Code means all that is stated by a witness to a police officer or officers during the course of investigation. Thus, a statement of a witness recorded under section 161(3), Criminal Procedure Code, whatever be their number and whatever be the date or dates on which the statement was recorded, constitute the statement of that particular witness under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, and such statement can be used under the proviso to section 162 subject to the limitations prescribed thereunder. In other words, the word “statement” appearing in section 161(3) and section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, constituted the entirety offsets stated by a witness when he was examined on different dates by the same Investigating Officer or different Investigating Officers. Therefore the expression ‘statement or any part of such ‘statement……….” appearing in section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, is not confined to a single statement given by a witness, to a particular officer but takes in all the statements given by a witness at different stages or on different dates to different Investigating Officers or the same Investigating Officer. 14. P.W. 4 the elder brother of deceased Abraham is residing at a place called Otakkayam in the adjoining District. P.W.4 came to the house of Abraham on the day previous to the occurrence for a short visit. It is significant in this respect to note that even the hostile witness P.W.1 has admitted that on the date of occurrence P.W.4 was in the house of Abraham. In the afternoon on the date of occurrence, P.W.4 had gone to the house of one Parati Kunju at Kakkad. It is significant in this respect to note that even the hostile witness P.W.1 has admitted that on the date of occurrence P.W.4 was in the house of Abraham. In the afternoon on the date of occurrence, P.W.4 had gone to the house of one Parati Kunju at Kakkad. On his way back from the house of Parati Kunju P.W. 4 had a bath in the river and thereafter he came to the house of Abraham when he was told that P.W. 1 and Abraham had gone out in search of him. P.W. 4 then went out in search of P.W. 1 and Abraham. On the way, hearing a cry from hear the house of the appellant, P.W.4 rushed towards that place when he saw Abraham lying on the lap of P.W. 1 with injuries and on seeing P.W. 4 Abraham told him that he was stabbed by Baby, his brother-in-law, that his intestines had come out and that he should be taken immediately to the hospital. Baby, the brother-in-law referred to, is none other than the appellant. At the same time, P.W. 4 also saw the appellant standing near the boundary of his property with a knife or dagger in his hand and intimidating that if anyone entered his property, he would chop off his head. It was P.W. 4 who brought a jeep and removed Abraham to the Medical College Hospital, Calicut, where he breathed his last. We have already referred to the evidence of P.W. 1 in a previous paragraph. Although he turned hostile to the prosecution he has admitted having filed a complaint before the police and that the signature in Exhibit P-l was his Exhibit P-l (a) the First Information Report registered on the basis of the statement, shows that a case has been registered against the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The name of P.W. 4 finds a place in Exhibit P-l. 15. All the injuries sustained by Abraham are on his abdomen. This is a circumstance which indicates that Abraham was attacked from his front side and the assailant was in the close proximity of the victim. The medical evidence shows that Abraham was in a fit state to give a statement. It was a face to face attack at close quarters. All the injuries sustained by Abraham are on his abdomen. This is a circumstance which indicates that Abraham was attacked from his front side and the assailant was in the close proximity of the victim. The medical evidence shows that Abraham was in a fit state to give a statement. It was a face to face attack at close quarters. Admittedly the incident happened on a night three days prior to Full Moon and as such Abraham had enough light and opportunity to identify his assailant. The appellant has no case that P.W. 4 has any enmity or any motive to give false evidence against him and implicate him in a case of this nature. The cross-examination of this witness did not bring out any material or circumstances sufficient to discredit or suspect his evidence. We are satisfied that the dying declaration is complete, categoric and true and the evidence of P.W. 4 is fully reliable and dependable. His evidence is also corroborated by the medical evidence and the subsequent conduct of the appellant in surrendering before the police with the bloodstained dagger M.O.I. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of P.W. 11 regarding the subsequent conduct of the appellant which, has been corroborated by Exhibit P-4 and the evidence of P.W. 5 who attested the same. The Chemical Examiner detected human blood on M.O.I. There was also a motive for the appellant as could be seen from the evidence of P.W. 4. The prosecution has succeeded in proving the case against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt. The result is that this appeal fails and w hereby dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant. Appeal dismissed. Conviction and Sentence confirmed.