JUDGMENT-An interesting question of interpretation of section 32 (I B) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, arises in this petition. 2. The facts leading to the dispute are these ;_ Survey No. 405/1 of village Kurundwad in Shirol tahsil, District Kolhapur, admeasuring 8 acres 17 gunthas admittedly belonged to two persons Balu Shripati and Nana Dada. There is also no dispute that the land was leased to Bandu Tatoba-the present respondent as a tenant some time in the year 1951. Bandu cultivated this land as tenant and his name came to be entered in the Record of Rights for the years 1951-52, 1952-53, 1953-54, 1954-55 and 1955-56 as tenant. His name seems to have disappeared from the year 1956-57. The Special Tahsildar, Shriol commenced suo motu proceedings in regard to this land under section 32 (I B) of the Tenancy Act in the year 1971 and issued notices to the landlords, Balu Shripati and Nana Dada to appear before him and to show cause why possession should not be taken from them and hand it over to the tenant Bandu. 3. In the course of enquiry, the Special Tahsildar raised three issues before him, viz. whether tenant Bandu was in possession on the appointed day i. e. June 15, 1955 and whether he was illegally dispossessed before the Tillers' day viz. April 1, 1957. Second issue framed was whether the land was in possession of the landlords Balu Shripati and Nana Dada, and the third was whether the land has been put to non-agricultural use. In the issues framed by the Tahsildar, the name of Balu does not appear. It appears at some places in the Record and the judgment. The subject matter of the proceedings is shown as half portion of Survey No. 405/1 and it is not clear therefore whether the inquiry related to whole of the land or part. The orders direct possession of only half portion of Survey No. 405/1. It is not clear as to how this reference to half portion of the land has occurred inasmuch as the name of tenant appeared to the entire Survey No. 405/1 admeasuring 8 acres 17 gunthas. In view of the or am passing in this case, this error and misconception is however of limited consequence. 4. The Tahsildar held that Bandu was in possession of the land on June 15, 1955 viz. In view of the or am passing in this case, this error and misconception is however of limited consequence. 4. The Tahsildar held that Bandu was in possession of the land on June 15, 1955 viz. the appointed day; that he was dispossessed otherwise than in the manner provided and by an order of the Tahsildar. According to hi m, Bandu was dispossessed prior to April 1, 1957. It was also the finding of the Tahsildar that the landlords were in possession of the land in suit. In that view of the matter, since the land was not put to non-agricultural use, the Tahsildar directed possession to be handed Over to Bandu. 5. Aggrieved with the judgment and order, Balu and Nana preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Karvir Division. The Sub. Divisional Officer, Karvir reversed the order passed by the Special Tahsildar, and seems to have held that Bandu had failed to prove that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and Balu and Nana. He did not record a positive finding as to whether Bandu was in possession of the land on June 15, 1955, nor also whether he was dispossessed prior to April I, 1957. Since he came to a conclusion that Bandu had not proved that he was a tenant of the land, he allowed the appeal, dismissed the proceedings and set aside the order passed by the Special Tahsildar. 6. Bandu carried a Revision Application to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal being No. MR T. KP. 169/74. The Tribunal reversed the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and came to the conclusion similar to that which was reached by the Tahsildar. It held that Bandu was in possession of the land on June 15, 1955 and as he was dispossessed prior to April I, 1957 and the land was in possession of the landlords. It held, therefore, that the land was liable to be restored to the tenant. It is aggrieved by this finding, that Balu and Nana have approached this 'Court by way of this petition. 7. Mr. V. V. Divekar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, raised only two contentions before me. He did not dispute that on June 15, 1955 the tenant Bandu was in possession. It is aggrieved by this finding, that Balu and Nana have approached this 'Court by way of this petition. 7. Mr. V. V. Divekar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, raised only two contentions before me. He did not dispute that on June 15, 1955 the tenant Bandu was in possession. In view of the evidence led both documentary as well as oral, it seems to me that this contention was rightly not raised before me and the position that Bandu was tenant on June 15, 1955 cannot be disputed. 8. Mr. Divekar did not also dispute or raise any contention in regard to Bandu having been dispossessed prior to April I, 1957. That contention also could not be legitimately raised in view of the documentary and oral evidence. The names of the petitioners appear as persons cultivating the land personally for the year 1956-57. That itself lends credence to the finding that on April 1, 1957 and some time before, the tenant was already dispossessed. The absence of any proceedings under section 32G for determination of the price of the and, also goes to show that the tenant must have been dispossessed some time prior to April I, 1957. Had the tenant been in possession such proceedings would have normally been opened. 9. The only questions which were raised by Mr. Divekar were firstly that the Sub-Divisional Officer had recorded a finding of fact. That finding according to him was that the tenant had not proved the relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and the petitioners. That being a finding of fact is binding upon the Tribunal which the Tribunal could not set aside in its revisional jurisdiction. Second contention which was raised was that even assuming that Bandu was in possession on June 15, 1955 and dispossessed prior to April I, 1957, the land cannot be said to be in possession of the landlord, so that it can be taken away from him and handed over to Bandu. Mr. Divekar pointed out that on January 16, 1969 a possessory mortgage deed was executed by the petitioners in favour of the "Kolhapur District Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd., Kolhapur" (hereinafter referred to as the "Kolhapur Land Mortgage Bank"). On the same day it was pointed out that the land was obtained from the mortgagees-in-possession upon a lease by the petitioners. Therefore, on the relevant date viz. On the same day it was pointed out that the land was obtained from the mortgagees-in-possession upon a lease by the petitioners. Therefore, on the relevant date viz. July 31, 1969 as the mortgage was not redeemed and was subsisting as also the lease, the land cannot be said to be in possession of the landlords. Mr. Divekar pointed out that though the learned Tribunal had taken a note of this fact it has held that "the possession was not taken from the landlord by the Bank." There is no warrant for this finding, according to Mr. Divekar, in view of the possessory mortgage deed and the lease-deed produced on record. It was, therefore, contended that even if actual possession was that of the petitioners, that possession was in their character as lessees of the mortgagees-in-possession, and not on their own account. He, therefore, urged that unless the landlord was in actual possession, and was also entitled to possession in his own right as a landlord or an ex-landlord, the provisions of section 32 (IB) of the Bombay Tenancy Act are not attracted. He relied upon the decision reported in Mian Feroz Shah v. Sohbat Khan1 in support of his contention. 10. Now, in the present ease as pointed out, there is no dispute in regard to three other requirements of section 32 (1 B) of the Act. The relevant provisions of section 32 (1 B) which fall for consideration in the present case are:- "the land is in the possession of the landlord or his successor~ in-interest on the 31st day of July 1969." The question is as to what is the meaning of the words "the land in possession of the landlord or succession interest on 31st July 1969." There can be no doubt, that the relevant date is 31st July 1969 on which date the question of possession must be considered. But the other relevant words and the expressions which are to be taken into account are the words:- "his successor-in-interest", which have been explained in the explanation attached to this section and the further provisions as to the power of the Tahsildar to take the land "from the possession of the landlord or, as the case may be, his successor-in-interest, and shall be restored to the tenant." In other words, where the provisions of section 32 (1B) are attracted and are found to be satisfied, then the 1. 35 Bom. L R 877 (P.C.) Tahsildar bas a right in a proceeding commenced by the tenant or by the Tahsildar suo motu, to take the land from the possession of the landlord and restore it to the tenant. 11. Now, the words "successor-in-interest" as pointed out have been explained in the explanation of this section. It will be seen from this explanation that contrary to the normal connotation of the expression "Successor-in-interest" it has been given a restrictive meaning for the purpose of section 32 (1 B). A "successor-in-interest" of a person would also mean a person upon whom the interest, right and title of the person concerned has devolved by any means, namely by succession, testacy or act of parties. The restricted meaning given to the expression in the explanation however leaves out those persons upon whom the interest devolves by act of parties. The only persons who are recognized as successors-in-interest of the landlord are persons "who acquire the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death". In other words, it is only the person who succeeds under the personal law by inheritance or by reason of testamentary succession to the property of the landlord, who is sought to be included in the definition "successors in interest". This indicates that the section was intended by the Legislature to apply in accordance with the terms and language of this section in a restrictive manner, at least, so far as the "successors-in-interest" of the landlord were concerned. 12. This indicates that the section was intended by the Legislature to apply in accordance with the terms and language of this section in a restrictive manner, at least, so far as the "successors-in-interest" of the landlord were concerned. 12. Before proceeding to consider whether the word 'possession' which is a generic word used in he section, means actual possession or constructive possession or both, and whether it means not only actual physical possession but also a right to possession, it is necessary to consider the history of this section and possible object from the scheme of the Act and the intent of the present section. 13. Section 29 (I) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the "Bombay Tenancy Act"), empowered the tenants who are entitled to possession to apply for possession to the Mamlatdar. Such an application shall be made within two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land accrues to a tenant. Therefore, if the tenant bas lost possession of the agricultural land and that possession is lost by him because of dispossession by the landlord and not pursuant to the order of the Tahsildar, be is entitled to make an application within two years from dispossession. It follows that if the tenant does not apply under this section to obtain possession on account of dispossession within a period of two years, his right to restoration of possession is gone. 14. Section. 32 (1B) was introduced for the first time in the Act by the Maharashtra Amending Act No. 49 of 1969. It is common knowledge that large-scale amendments were made in the· Bombay Tenancy Act by the Amending Act No. 13 of 1956. By the amending Act, rights of ownership were sought to be conferred upon the tenants with effect from 1-4-1957 subject to the provisions of that Act. Therefore, if the tenant was in possession on 1-4-1957 and his tenancy was not terminated by an order of the Tahsildar, then he became a statutory purchaser of that land subject to the other provisions of the Act. The right to take possession of such land which was in possession of the tenant, were also provided for and it was subject to those rights that the tenants were to become the owners. The right to take possession of such land which was in possession of the tenant, were also provided for and it was subject to those rights that the tenants were to become the owners. Once these rights had been worked out as between the landlord and tenant, then the tenant became a statutory owner and the landlord lost all his rights to possession. 15. As pointed out, section 32 (1 B) was introduced by the Amending Act No. 49 of 1969. It was intended to confer afresh a right upon the tenant to be put back in possession and to be declared as a statutory owner of the land of which he had ceased to be in possession. In Pandharinath v. Bhagwan2 a Division Bench of this Court has held that section 32 (1 B) not only restores the lost remedy to the tenant but that the section also created a "legislative fiction of his continued subsistence of the tenant's tenancy" though he has lost possession. The intention therefore is clear 10 place not only a remedy afresh in the hands of the tenant to get back possession, but also a power in the Tahsildar to remove the landlord from possession and give it back to the tenant if he is willing and also to confer ownership upon him. The Division Bench also held in Pandharinath's case that the provision was intended to give "benefit" to ignorant, docile, gullible and unfortunate" tenant. Considering the drastic provisions of the amendment Act the landlords may have also accomplished their object of retaining the land by ousting the tenant who then by force of circumstances or ignorance did not take any steps within the statutory period. It is with a view to remedy the mischief and to defeat the designs of landlords, who by means other than lawful have deprived the tenants of their possession of the land and thereby defeated the provisions of the Act, seeking conferral of proprietary lights upon them, that this section seems to have been enacted. But the intention does not seem to be to grant a wholesale restoration of the position which prevailed before. The object clearly seems to do so in a limited manner and to a limited extent. Whether it could be so done, and the vireos of the section are not challenged before me. But the intention does not seem to be to grant a wholesale restoration of the position which prevailed before. The object clearly seems to do so in a limited manner and to a limited extent. Whether it could be so done, and the vireos of the section are not challenged before me. The object of the section therefore is to cure the mischief and to assist dispossessed tenants who on account of their social weakness have not been able to assert their rights. It was intended to give them a fresh right and also a power to the Tahsildar to exercise that right on their behalf, if it came to light that the circumstances indicated in the section exist. It is this background and history of the section and context which has to be borne in mind, while interpreting the material words and expressions in the section. 16. It is pointed out that the relevant word is "possession" which is the centre of controversy in the present case. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the "possession" of the landlord in this case would only mean of ex-landlord, since section does not use the word 'owner'. From the definition of the word 'landlord', it must mean not only actual possession but right to possession. That right to possession, it was contended, must exist in the landlord, as also actual possession. In other words, it was said before possession can be taken from the ex-landlord and restored to the ex-tenant, not only must the actual possession be with the ex-landlord, but that be must also have that right to possession so that it can be conferred upon the tenant. It was contended that even if actual possession may be with the landlord if he has no right to possession, then his possession cannot be taken away as it is not the possession of the landlord. Even if it was his physical possession, if it was not in his own right, but on behalf of somebody that is not the possession contemplated by the section which can be taken away. The intervention of an estate would obstruct the operation of the section. 17. Even if it was his physical possession, if it was not in his own right, but on behalf of somebody that is not the possession contemplated by the section which can be taken away. The intervention of an estate would obstruct the operation of the section. 17. Though it is clear that the word 'possession' is a generic word meaning and capable of incorporating there under both possession actual as well as constructive the question is what is the meaning to be attributed to the word 'possession' appearing in this section: Whether it means only actual possession or that there must also be a present right to possession. I am inclined to take the view from what I have said above, looking to the background, the history, the import of the section and its restrictive intendments, the word 'possession' must be construed consistent therewith. In that view the word must be intended to mean not only actual physical possession of the landlord or ex-landlord but also right to possession. It must not be overlooked that the consequence of the section operating on all titles subsidiary or otherwise lawfully vested are extinguished and taken away without even any compensation. If such a fearful consequence is to follow then the qualifying words must be interpreted not in a wide manner but in a narrowing consequence. 18. A simple it Stance and example may illustrate this aspect of the matter. The underlying idea under this section seems to me to be, that all that has come into existence and all intervening rights which may come into being, between the date of dispossession and the loss of rights of the tenant up to July 31, 1969, are not intended to be disturbed. Even otherwise that seems to be a reasonable intention of the Legislature. It is clear that where the tenant's right to restoration of possession is lost on account of failure to take proceedings within a period of two years from the date of dispossession, and in any case if the tenant does not take any steps under section 29 before March 31, 1959, before which he could do so, then his right was permanently lost. This section as interpreted by the Division Bench fictionally restores it. This section as interpreted by the Division Bench fictionally restores it. If thereafter the landlord transfers his land between the date of dispossession and before 30th July 1969, the purchaser who purchases or the donee who gets the property, even in terms of section 32 (1B) cannot be affected. The intention obviously is not to disturb the estate which has been created or rights which have accrued during this period bona fide in others. It is only such person to whom the property has come from the landlord on account of his death or on account of bequest by him under a testament, that they are sought to be affected and none others. Similarly, a landlord could have created a fresh tenancy in favour of any other person subsequent to dispossession, and before 30th July 1969. Such a tenant would be entitled to all the protections and rights which the Bombay Tenancy Act would confer upon him. The landlord in such a case would be in constructive possession only, if at all. There are other sections in the act which can confer ownership on the tenant. Even in a case where the land is sold by the landlord to a third person within the aforesaid dates and he obtains that land from such a purchaser on a lease, though in actual possession of the land, his possession is not in his own right but on behalf of another. The question in such a case will be whether the possession of the landlord under the provisions of this section can be disturbed. Whether he would be liable to be deprived of the land or land taken by the Tahsildar and conferred upon the ex-tenant. The answer to that must obviously be in the negative. It may be pointed out that the Division Bench in Pandharinath's case was not concerned with this question. It was not called upon to consider the character of the possession of the landlord to attract the operation of the section. 19. It follows, therefore, that if the intervening rights which can be lawfully created in favour of third persons, Were not intended to be disturbed wholesale by the provisions of section 32 (IB), the word "possession" though generic in concept, in view of the mischief intended to be cured by the section in a limited way should receive a limited meaning. It follows, therefore, that if the intervening rights which can be lawfully created in favour of third persons, Were not intended to be disturbed wholesale by the provisions of section 32 (IB), the word "possession" though generic in concept, in view of the mischief intended to be cured by the section in a limited way should receive a limited meaning. The right and power sought to be conferred in a limited class of cases without disturbing intervening titles created by law and deed, by its subject and context requires the placing of a restricted interpretation upon it, so as to be consistent and harmonious with its import. Words if they be general and not precise are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter is a principle of interpretation of statutes. (See Law Reports 1965 A C 867). The Legislature has not said that the possession must be actual, constructive or in his own right of the land lord. In its normal generic meaning, it would include all these categories of possession. For the reasons which I have given above, and in view of the intended restrictive thrust and application of the section, I am inclined to think that the word "possession" cannot be given its generic and normal unrestricted meaning. All kinds of possession cannot be said to have been intended. It must receive a restricted interprepation and a restrictive meaning. That restricted meaning is that the landlord must not only be in actual possession but he must also have a present right to possession. 20. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, though the landlord is in actual possession of the land, the question is as to whether he has a present right to possession and whether his physical actual possession can be said to be that of the landlord or otherwise. It is the mortgagees who are in possession and the mortgagees have-leased out the land or the premises to the mortgagor. The possession, therefore, is of the mortgagees though actually and physically, it is the possession of the mortgagor. It is not his possession. It is possession of the mortgagees-in-possession, and on behalf of the mortgage-in-possession. In Main Feroz Shah' case (supra) the mortgagor was in possession as a lessee from the mortgagees. The possession, therefore, is of the mortgagees though actually and physically, it is the possession of the mortgagor. It is not his possession. It is possession of the mortgagees-in-possession, and on behalf of the mortgage-in-possession. In Main Feroz Shah' case (supra) the mortgagor was in possession as a lessee from the mortgagees. It was held by the Judicial Commissioner of North-West Frontier Province that as possession was not actually taken and given the transaction was a simple mortgage. The Tribunal also held in this case that possession was riot actually given by the landlord to the mortgagee Bank. The Privy Council reversed. It was held that "the mortgagee on the expiry of the lease was entitled to posses on." It will be thus clear that the possession of the mortgagor under a lease obtained from the mortgagee-in-possession was possession of the mortgagee and though actually and physically the possession may be of the mortgagor, it was really in the eyes of law not his possession. It was not he who was entitled to possession, but it was the mortgagee who was entitled to possession. The mortgagor was bound to hand over and surrender the premises on the expiry of the lease. The two things namely actual possession and right to possession bad not united in him. Unless the right to possession and the actual possession unite in a person, he cannot be said for the purpose of section 32 (1 B) to be in possession of the land. 21. Similar, is the position in the present case. The mortgagees have leased out the land with effect from January 16, 1969 to the mortgagors landlords in the present case. Even though, therefore, on July 31, 1969 it is the land lords· mortgagors, who are in actual possession, they have no present right to possession and they are also not entitled to possession after the mortgage is redeemed. The relevant date, therefore, namely the land is in possession of the mortgagees of the landlord. The landlord has no present right to possession. His possession is of a lessee of the mortgagee. It was on behalf of Kolhapur Land Mortgage Bank and not in their own right. The third condition, therefore, for the attraction of section 32 (I B) does not subsist in the present case. If that is so, then the tenant is not entitled to take advantage thereof. The petition. His possession is of a lessee of the mortgagee. It was on behalf of Kolhapur Land Mortgage Bank and not in their own right. The third condition, therefore, for the attraction of section 32 (I B) does not subsist in the present case. If that is so, then the tenant is not entitled to take advantage thereof. The petition. therefore, succeeds and has to be allowed in the circumstances. The rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.