JUDGMENT C. Mookerjee, J. This application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning 8 days delay in preferring the connected first miscellaneous appeal his been heard with notice to the respondent. The appellant, being aggrieved by the order dated 7th July, 1980 of the learned Judge, 2nd Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta, dismissing his application for temporary injunction presented the appeal on 26th August, 1980. According to the report of the Stamp Reporter dated December 11, 1980, the appeal was out of time by 8 days. On 11th December 1980 the appellant filed the present application under S 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay. 2. The appellant's case is that the certified copy of the order appealed against was obtained by him on 28th July, 1980 and was handed over to Sri Debaprasad Mukherjee, an advocate of this Court on 7th August 1980. Mr. Deba Prasad Mukherjee advocate was under the impression that the prescribed time of limitation was 90 days from the date of the order of the Court below. Due to such erroneous impression, the appeal was filed beyond time. 3. Undisputedly, under S. 8(2)(a) of the City Civil Court Act 1953 the period of limitation for an appeal from a decree or order of the City Civil Court is 30 days from the date of such decree or order. But the learned advocate for the appellant was under the erroneous impression that the prescribed period of limitation for appeal was 90 days presumably under Article 116 of the Limitation Act; 1963. Having considered the averments made in the application under S. 5 of the Act the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant, affidavit in opposition affirmed by the respondent and also the affidavit-in-reply, we believe that in the instant case the delay of 8 days in preferring the appeal has occurred only because of the mistake on the part of the learned advocate of the appellant in computing the period of limitation for preferring this appeal. The respondent who has appeared in person has strenuously submitted that such a negligence and/or mistake on the part of the appellant's advocate was not a sufficient cause within the meaning of S. 5 of the Limitation Act and therefore the instant application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act ought to be dismissed. 4. The respondent who has appeared in person has strenuously submitted that such a negligence and/or mistake on the part of the appellant's advocate was not a sufficient cause within the meaning of S. 5 of the Limitation Act and therefore the instant application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act ought to be dismissed. 4. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Kunwar Ranjan Bahadur Singh v. Rai Rajeshwar Bali & ors. AIR 1937 PC 176, with reference to a mistake of a lawyer as to the valuation of the appeal vis a vis the forum held that sufficient cause had been made out, inter alia, with the observation that mistaken advice given by a legal practitioner may in the circumstances of a particular case give rise in sufficient cause within the meaning of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, though there is certainly no general doctrine which saves parties from the result of wrong advice. In fact, the respondent who argued his own case with considerable ability has fairly conceded that a bona fide mistake on the part of the lawyer would be a sufficient cause for condoning delay under S 5 of the Limitation Act but contended that in the instant case the said mistake on the part of the appellant's lawyer was a gross one and, therefore, the same cannot be considered a sufficient one. In this connection, we respectfully agree with the observations of P.N. Mookerjee and Niyogi, JJ. in Ram Charitar Singh & Anr. v. Nagendra Chandra Seth & ors. 64 CWN 223 : AIR 1960 Cal. 574 , that courts have refused to rigidly define the judicial power and discretion under S 5 of the Indian Limitation Act which the legislature for the best of reasons has left undetermined and unfettered and the court exercises its pawns with reference to the facts and circumstances of each particular case before it subject to the rider that the said exercise of discretion is judicial and not arbitrary. In Ram Charitar Singh's case (supra) the delay had occurred due to forgetfulness of the learned advocate concerned and the court held that the same was a sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 6 days in presentation of the appeal. 5. In Ram Charitar Singh's case (supra) the delay had occurred due to forgetfulness of the learned advocate concerned and the court held that the same was a sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 6 days in presentation of the appeal. 5. The courts have repeatedly recognised that when a client proves that he had acted bona fide and with reasonable care in approaching a particular lawyer who gives him wrong advice with the result that the period of limitation expired before any step was taken he is entitled to rely upon such advice as sufficient cause for the delay. It has been said that as regards these matters, lawyers do not act as agents of the clients and, therefore, the error which they may commit is limited to themselves and does not extend to affect the lay client (see the observations of Chakravarti C.J. and Lahiri J. in Kshetromoni Dasi v. Surendra Mohan Kundu & ors., 60 CWN 200). It is also the consistent view of courts that sufficient cause in S 5 of the Limitation Act would receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the party. Thus, when under the mistaken advice of a lawyer a wrong remedy is pursued, the same constitutes sufficient cause (vide the observations of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality AIR 1972 SC 749 ). In deciding whether the mistake of a counsel is a sufficient one the court, have emphasised that such mistakes are generally considered bona fide unless the same was tainted by any mala fide motive. We are not prepared to accept the submission that where the legal position is clear but the lawyer still makes a mistake, the same cannot be considered as a sufficient one. It may be regrettable that a particular lawyer entertained a wrong view about the prescribed period of limitation for appeals to this court from decrees and orders of the City Civil Court, but the same being a genuine one, the litigant is not to be penalised for such mistake of his lawyer. In this connection, reference may be also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mata Din v. Narayan AIR 1970 SC 1523. In this connection, reference may be also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mata Din v. Narayan AIR 1970 SC 1523. We find the courts have generally condoned the delay in such matters when the same was occasioned by a lawyer's mistake unless the same was made with an ulterior motive or to obtain an undue advantage or cause improper gain to his client. The Supreme Court in Udayan Chinubhai v. R.C. Bali AIR 1277 SC 2319 (2328), with reference to the laches of a lawyer in the matter of obtaining the certified copy of the decree had observed that in the circumstances of the case which disclosed sheer indifference perhaps negligence on the part of the advocate concerned and no laches whatsoever on the part of the appellant, the court would have been inclined to condone the delay of 12 days under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 6. It is unnecessary to lengthen our order by mentioning other reported decisions which have consistently taken the same view with regard to the lawyer's mistake. We not only refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Concord of India Insurance Co. v. Sm. Nirmala Devi, & ors AIR 1979 SC 1666 , which approved the following pronouncements of the Kerala High Court in AIR 1971 Kerala 211. Although there was no general proposition that mistake of a counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground, it is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to avoid the limitation in an underhand way. Legal advice given by the members of the legal profession may some times be wrong and an amount of latitude is expected in such cases for to err is human and the litigants may legitimately rely on expert counsel without probing the professional competence of the advice. The court may of course see whether in such cases there is any taint of mala fide or element of recklessness or ruse. Legal advice honestly sought and actually given are generally treated a, sufficient cause for the purpose of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 7. The court may of course see whether in such cases there is any taint of mala fide or element of recklessness or ruse. Legal advice honestly sought and actually given are generally treated a, sufficient cause for the purpose of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 7. In the instant case, there is nothing to show that the appellant did not act bona file in engaging an advocate of this court for preferring the appeal or that he hid tried to gain any undue advantage. We are also satisfied about the bona fide of the learned lawyer who gave a wrong advice about the prescribed period of limitation. 8. The Rule 13 Part II Chapter 5 of the Appellate Side Rules of this Courts lays down that the time taken by the Stamp Reporter in preparing his report that the prescribed period has expired, shall be excluded. Therefore in the instant case the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the period of time taken by the Stamp Reporter in submitting his report that the memorandum of appeal presented by the appellant was barred by limitation. 9. For the forgoing reasons, we allow this application, condone the delay and direct that the memorandum of appeal be registered if otherwise in form. There would be a stay of the operation of the order appealed against till the hearing of the appeal under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code. Put up the appeal on Monday for hearing. Sharma J : I agree. Application allowed.