Raj K. Mehra v. Anjali Bhaduri — 1981 DIGILAW 121 (DEL)

Judgement ORDER :- This is an application by the defendant under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to implead Major Shankar Bhaduri and Mrs. Madhuchanda Haldar as co-defendants on the ground that their presence is necessary to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon the matters in dispute in this suit. 2. The application is being resisted by the plaintiff on the ground that the said two persons, sought to be impleaded as defendants, though son and daughter respectively of the defendant, yet are strangers to the agreement to sell house No. C-189, Defence Colony, New Delhi, entered into on 30th November, 1978, between the parties. Their presence, it is urged, is not at all necessary to adjudicate upon the questions arising in this suit for specific performance of that agreement. 3. In order to decide this application it is necessary to give a brief resume of the facts of this case. The plaintiff was occupying the ground floor of house No. C-189, Defence Colony, New Delhi as a tenant under the defendant Smt. Anjali Bhaduri for the last about 18 years on a monthly rent of Rs. 325/-. Some time in the month of November, 1978, it was agreed between the parties that the defendant will sell and the plaintiff will buy the said house for a consideration of Rs. 2,85,000/-. An agreement to sell the said property was executed on 30th November, 1978. In pursuance of the agreement a sum of Rs. 5,000/- vide cheque No. 17483984 drawn on the United Commercial Bank, Defence Colony, New Delhi, was paid to the defendant. The balance price of Rs. 2,80,000/- was to be paid to the defendant at the time of registration of the sale deed. It is averred that the defendant had accepted the cheque in part payment of the sale price. 4. The allegation of the plaintiff is that as the defendant had been offered more money for the property in dispute, she wants to (resile) from the agreement although she has accepted part payment towards the price of the house. With that object in view she wrote to the plaintiff on 27th Jan., 1979, stating that she was not the owner of the property; that the property was built by her with the funds left by her late husband and therefore her children had an interest in the same. With that object in view she wrote to the plaintiff on 27th Jan., 1979, stating that she was not the owner of the property; that the property was built by her with the funds left by her late husband and therefore her children had an interest in the same. Hence, this suit for specific performance against the defendant who is stated to be the sole owner of the property agreed to be sold. 5. During admission and denial of documents filed by the parties the defendant had admitted the execution of the agreement dated 30th November, 1978. Before settlement of the issues it was considered necessary to record the statement of the defendant. On 6th Feb., 1981, she made the following statement : "The house in question bearing No. C-189, Defence Colony, New Delhi, stands in my name. I pay the house tax. The entry regarding the ownership in the records of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi is in my name. I constructed this house in the year 1960. I had let out this house in the year 1960. I know the plaintiff. He was my tenant on the ground floor of the said house. I had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff on 30th Nov., 1978, to sell that house. That agreement is Ex. P-1. Exhibit P-2 is the certified copy of the lease-deed dated 27th Dec., 1957, relating to the plot of the said house. Since 1960, the rental income derived from this house was being shown as my personal income. My children were minor at that time. All the income which was derived from that house was spent on their up-keep as well." The plaintiff also made a statement on that date. It is in these words : "I am prepared to buy the property, subject-matter of the suit whatever be the defect in the title, if any, of the defendant and even if the property is not vacated by the tenant occupying the first floor of the property. I did receive a notice from the defendant stating that she was not the only owner but this was after two months of the date of the said agreement, Ex. P-1. The cheque of Rs. I did receive a notice from the defendant stating that she was not the only owner but this was after two months of the date of the said agreement, Ex. P-1. The cheque of Rs. 5,000/- which I had paid to the defendant at the time of the execution of the agreement was also returned along with the notice." Before, however, the issues could be settled, the present application was moved by the defendant. 6. It is averred by the defendant that she has received summons from the Court of the Additional District Judge. Delhi, in a suit for declaration filed by Major Shankar Bhaduri (her son) and another in which those plaintiffs have prayed for a decree for declaration that they are joint owners in respect of the property, C-189, Defence Colony, New Delhi. According to her as that suit relates to the subject-matter of the present suit (No. 448 of 1979), it is necessary that those plaintiffs be impleaded as co-defendants in the instant suit. 7. Similar question arose for consideration of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlal Mathoo Khatik, AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148 (FB). The following question was referred by a Division Bench to the Full Bench of that High Court, "whether in a suit for a specific performance of a contract for sale, instituted by a purchaser against the vendor, a stranger to the contract, who, contending that the contracted property is a joint family property, of which he is also the co-owner, wants to intervene in the suit, is entitled to be added as a party". After noticing the case law on the subject, including a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 , it was held that (at p. 152 of AIR 1976 MP) : "If the plaintiff, even after notice of claim of title hostile to his vendor by an intervener, does not want to join the intervener, he takes the risk. He cannot be forced upon to join the intervener. He cannot be forced upon to join the intervener. We are in agreement with the view taken by Bhargava, J. (as he then was) in Gajanandrao v. Babulal, 1970 MPWR (SN) 69 (supra) that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale in respect of a property against the defendant, some person who applies for being impleaded as a party to the suit on the ground, he has a right by birth in the suit property, cannot be joined as a party under O.1, R.10 of the Code, because if such a person was allowed to intervene in the suit as a party, the nature of the suit will change from a suit for specific performance of a contract to that of a suit for title. It has further been held that the proper course is to institute another suit for title, impleading parties to the suit in which the interveners had prayed for being joined as a party." 8. The answer by the Full Bench to the question referred to it in the abovecited case was "Strangers to the contract making a claim adverse to the title of the defendant (vendor) contending that they are the co-owners of the contracted property are neither necessary nor proper party and are, therefore, not entitled to be joined as parties to the suit." 9. In view of this clear enunciation of law it is not necessary to notice all the authorities cited before me by Mr. A.K. Tandon, learned counsel for the applicant-defendant. Most of the decisions relied upon by him have been discussed by the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the above cited case. 10. In support of his contention that the son and daughter of the defendant be impleaded as necessary parties in the present suit, Mr. Tandon relied upon a decision of this Court in Harbans Singh v. E.R. Srinivasan, AIR 1979 Delhi 171. In a suit for ejectment by the landlord against the tenant, S. Ranganathan, J. held that a third party claiming to be the real tenant was entitled to be impleaded as a defendant. The Court, therefore, it was observed, in exercising its discretion under Order 1, Rule 10 can implead that person as a party so as to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and for completely and effectively adjudicating upon a dispute. 11. The Court, therefore, it was observed, in exercising its discretion under Order 1, Rule 10 can implead that person as a party so as to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and for completely and effectively adjudicating upon a dispute. 11. The ratio of this decision is not applicable to the present case. In the event of the prayer of the defendant in the present application being granted, the nature of this suit for specific performance will necessarily change to that of a suit for title, as held by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Panne Khushali's case (AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148) (supra). Law is very clear that parties should not be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of a different character. Proper course for the son and daughter of the defendant was to institute another suit which, according to the defendant, they have already filed. In Harbans Singh"s case (AIR 1979 Delhi 171) (supra) by impleading the person claiming to be the real tenant, the character and nature of the suit could not have changed. 12. In view of my discussion above, the application has no force and the same is dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. Judgement S. B. WAD, J. :- This second appeal filed by the tenant-appellant raises the question of interpretation of cl.(h) of proviso to Sub-S. (1) of S.14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 59 of 1958. The order of eviction was passed against the tenant under the said clause. Clause (h) which affords ground of eviction to a landlord reads as follows : "that the tenant has whether before or after commencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence;" 2. Admittedly the appellant-tenant had acquired possession of new premises at Y-42 Hauz Khas, New Delhi on May 18, 1967 and reverted to the suit premises in October 1969 before the notice of termination of tenancy was given by the landlord. The learned single Judge (B.C. Misra J.) faced some difficulty in reconciling certain decisions of this Court and Supreme Court. Admittedly the appellant-tenant had acquired possession of new premises at Y-42 Hauz Khas, New Delhi on May 18, 1967 and reverted to the suit premises in October 1969 before the notice of termination of tenancy was given by the landlord. The learned single Judge (B.C. Misra J.) faced some difficulty in reconciling certain decisions of this Court and Supreme Court. The learned single Judge has, therefore, set out the following questions of law for our decision : "The question of law that needs to be decided in this appeal is whether in view of the Supreme Court decisions in Gajanan Dattatraya v. Sherbanu Hosand Patel's case (1976) 1 SCR 535 , and Avadh Behari J. in Mum Lal's case (1976 Ren CR 220) (Delhi) and of the Division Bench of this court in Battoo Mal's case (ILR (1970) 1 Delhi 748), the cause of action to the landlord to obtain eviction on the ground mentioned in cl.(h) of the Act must exist and continue; a) on the date of the notice b) on the date of the institution of the petition c) during the pendency of and decision of the petition; and d) during the pendency of the proceeding before the competent authority (slums) or if accrued any time prior to the institution of the petition it renders the tenant liable to eviction irrespective of any considerations except the plea of waiver and estoppel, which are different concepts and which may or may not afford adequate defence to claim eviction in respect of old or fresh cause of action". 3. The learned single Judge has further referred for decision the question, about the eviction of the appellant on the grounds mentioned in cl.(d) and cl.(e) of Sub-S. (1) of S.14 We find that the Rent Control Tribunal has rejected the landlord's prayer for eviction on the grounds mentioned in cls.(d) and (e) of proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S.14 and no appeal is filed by the landlord-respondent against the said part of the judgement of the Tribunal. So far as the landlord is concerned, the matter stands concluded in regard to these two grounds and we, therefore, do not find any need to decide the question of eviction on the said two grounds. 4. So far as the landlord is concerned, the matter stands concluded in regard to these two grounds and we, therefore, do not find any need to decide the question of eviction on the said two grounds. 4. The decision of the Division Bench in Battoo Mal's case is a direct authority on the interpretation of cl.(h) of the proviso to S.14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The decision is a binding precedent for a single Judge and a Division Bench of this Court. The judgement in Battoo Mal's case was pronounced by the D.B. on May 6, 1970. On July 20, 1970, Safeer J. pronounced the judgement in Ved Prakash v. S.H. Chuni Lal*wherein he took a view contrary to the ratio of Battoo Mal's case which was not noticed by the learned single Judge. Had the Division Bench judgement been noticed the learned single Judge would not have held contrary to the Division Bench judgement as he was bound by the Division Bench judgement. Five years later, in Gian Singh v. Tarlok Singh's case (ILR (1975) 2 Delhi 215), Avadh Behari J : again took a view contrary to the Division Bench judgement in Battoo Mal's case and agreeing with the view taken by Safeer J. in Ved Prakash case. From the reading of the judgement of learned single Judge in Gian Singh's case we find that the learned single Judge has not noticed the ratio of the Division Bench judgement on interpretation of cl.(h) of the proviso to S.14(1). It appears that the learned single Judge thought that tile only ratio of Battoo Mal's case was that the landlord delay in filing an eviction Proceeding might defeat his claim to eject a tenant under the said Cl.(h). In a Subsequent decision rendered by Avadh Behari J. in Muni Lal's cast the learned single Judge reiterated his interpretation of the said cl.(h) of provisos to S.14 (1) of the Act and further ***** the correctness of his own judgement in Grin Singh's case and judgement of Safeer J. in Ved Prakash's case. As regards Division Bench Judgement in Battoo Mal's case learned single Judge observed that the law on interpretation of the cl.(h) of the proviso to S.14(1) was rendered 'foggier', by the decision of the D. B.* 1971 Delhi LT 59 5. As regards Division Bench Judgement in Battoo Mal's case learned single Judge observed that the law on interpretation of the cl.(h) of the proviso to S.14(1) was rendered 'foggier', by the decision of the D. B.* 1971 Delhi LT 59 5. with respect we hold that sitting as single Judges of this court the two learned Judges were bound by the decision of the Division Bench in Battoo Mal's case. We sincerely feel that we should forever remember the observations of Gajendragadkar C.J. in Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, AIR 1965 SC 1767 in a case where a Judge is inclined to take a view different from a co-ordinate Bench. The learned Chief Justice observed : "It is hardly necessary the emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decision of the High Court whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench, or in a proper case place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constituted larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety". 6. We find that the law that was settled as early as 1970 was to some extent de-stabilised, by the said decisions of the learned single Judges. A typical problem of uncertainty and confusion created by the conflict of opinions (which could have been avoided by strict adherence to the principles of precedent) is illustrated by an observation of Avadh Behari J. in Gian Singh's case. The Rent Control Tribunal in that case decided the matter (in our opinion rightly) relying upon the decision of the Division Bench in Battoo Mal's case. The judgement was set aside in appeal by the learned single Judge. Judicial dissent is required to be expressed within judicial discipline. A landmark decision on stare decisis is in Tribhuvandas Purshottamdas Thakur v. Rati Lal Motilal Patel (1968) 1 SCR 455 . The judgement was set aside in appeal by the learned single Judge. Judicial dissent is required to be expressed within judicial discipline. A landmark decision on stare decisis is in Tribhuvandas Purshottamdas Thakur v. Rati Lal Motilal Patel (1968) 1 SCR 455 . In that case the learned single Judge refused to follow a judgement of a Full Bench of the High Court on the ground that such a practice was contrary to S.136 of the Evidence Act and oath of office of a Judge of High Court. Repelling the said pleas and emphasising need for strict judicial discipline the Supreme Court observed : "The observations made by the learned Judge subvert the accepted notions about the force of precedents in our system of judicial administration. Precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of administration of justice under our system. It has been held time and again that a single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgements of Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his Court and of this Court. The reason of the rule which makes a precedent binding lies in the desire to secure uniformity and certainty in the law". 7. So much for a stare decisis. Let us now see how the question of interpretation of cl.(h) of S.14(1) arose and what is the correct ratio of Battoo Mal's case. Decision Battoo Mal's case was rendered by the Division Bench of this court consisting of Hardy J. and Deshpande J. (as they then were) on reference of three questions by Hardy J. for the decision of the Division Bench. Out of the three questions referred, question No. 3 relates to interpretation of cl.(h) and reads as follows : "Whether in order to entitle the landlord to the benefit of cl.(h) of the proviso to S.14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the vacant possession of residence acquired or built by a tenant or allotted to him may be any time after the creation of tenancy regardless of whether the tenant is in possession of the same at the time of the institution of proceedings for his eviction by the landlord". The Division Bench expressly rejected the contention of the appellant therein that the words "has................built/acquired vacant possession of" show that the tenant must have built or acquired vacant possession of a residence before the filing of the petition for ejectment and that this state of affairs must have continued till the date of the filing of the petition." The Division Bench held : "Apart from the fact that the Legislature could not have intended that the right arisen in favour of the landlord could be so easily defeated at the sweet-will of the tenant, we are not at all convinced that the mere use of the word 'has' can support the argument of the tenant as to the meaning of the proviso (h) to S.14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ..............." The mere fact that the tenant has subsequently disposed of the residence does not efface the fact that he had once acquired it and thus gave a cause of action to the landlord for filing a petition for eviction ...................It cannot be open to the wrong-doer himself to put the aggrieved party out of court by subsequently changing the situation unilaterally." The counsel for the appellant-tenant before the Division Bench had relied upon an observation of the Supreme Court in Gappulal v. Dwarkadheeshji, (1969) 3 SCR 989 made in the context of S.13(1)(e) of Rajasthan Premises (Control and Eviction) Act, 1950. In that case the Supreme Court had observed that the present perfect tense 'has' contemplated a completed transaction even connected in someway with the present time. The Division Bench observed that the decision in Gappulal's case was in the context of the special facts of the case and was no authority for the proposition that wherever the present perfect tense is used, the state of affairs so described must continue till the filing of the petition for eviction. 8. In the concluding para of the Division Bench judgement the bench observed that in the exceptional case, where a landlord files the eviction petition too long after the tenant obtains vacant possession of a residence for himself then the tenant may defend the eviction petition. In other words the bench held that the landlord must diligently pursue his remedy of eviction once the default is committed by a tenant and his claim might get defeated if the court finds the claim too stale and belated. In other words the bench held that the landlord must diligently pursue his remedy of eviction once the default is committed by a tenant and his claim might get defeated if the court finds the claim too stale and belated. The D. B. expressly pointed out that the present was not such a case. 9. Two propositions appear to be well settled by the Division Bench in Battoo Mal's case. 1) that once protection is lost by a tenant by his default, under cl.(h), it is lost for ever and cannot be revived at any point of time or under any circumstances; 2) that the landlord's right of eviction might get defeated by application of general principles of waiver or laches in exceptional cases. The first proposition is a direct authority on interpretation of cl.(h) of the proviso to S.14(1) of the Act. The second proposition is a reiteration of a general principle of law, which the D.B. was careful in pointing out was of no application to the facts of Battoo's Mal's case. The learned single Judge in Gian Singh's case held that Battoo Mal's case was a decision on the particular facts of that case. With respect we do not agree. A pure question of law regarding the interpretation of cl.(h) of the proviso to S.14(1) of the Act was referred by a learned single Judge for the decision of the Division Bench in that case and, the decision, therefore, is not restricted to the facts of that case. We also do not agree with the Learned single Judge that the general principle of waiver or laches referred to in Battoo Mal's case is the "Quintessence" of Battoo Mal's case. 10. Sitting as Division Bench we are bound by the decision in Battoo Mal's case, but in order to finally end this seeming controversy we are examining the provisions of cl.(h) of S.14 (1) ourselves. The focal point of controversy in regard to interpretation of cl.(h) of proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S.14 is the interpretation of the word 'has' appearing in the said cl.(h). In specific terms the controversy is whether the word 'has' imports a concept of continuing default by the tenant till some legal step is taken by the landlord for eviction or whether it is sufficient for the purpose of that clause that the tenant has committed one default. In specific terms the controversy is whether the word 'has' imports a concept of continuing default by the tenant till some legal step is taken by the landlord for eviction or whether it is sufficient for the purpose of that clause that the tenant has committed one default. To paraphrase it in terms of the grounds mentioned in the said cl.(h), the question is, whether a construction of a building of his own by the tenant or acquisition of vacant possession of another premises or securing allotment of residence permanently takes away the protection against the eviction under the Act or whether it is possible for the tenant to revive the said protection by either selling away his house or relinquishing another premises acquired by him or allotted to him before the landlord takes legal steps for the eviction of the tenant. 11. Rent Control Legislations were passed in all the States in India after the second world war to meet the problem of shortage of accommodation. The problem of accommodation is particularly acute in Delhi where the population is increasing at an extraordinary rate of about 3 lacs a year. It is a matter of common knowledge that population of Delhi which was around 5 lacs in 1947 has now increased to about 55 lacs. The protection afforded to a tenant under the Delhi Rent Control Act proceeds on the assumption that due to severe shortage of accommodation a tenant is able to secure only one accommodation and that there is no choice for the tenant to change accommodations, according to his convenience. The simple object of the Act is to afford security of a living roof to a tenant in this thickly populated city. If the position of the housing accommodation is such that a tenant can change accommodations according to his choice, a tenant does not need any security nor protection of law, it is clear that where there is shortage of accommodation, landlord's general right to terminate tenancy according to his will, has to be restricted. Such restrictions and impediments are imposed on a landlord by the Delhi Rent Control Act on the assumption that it is impossible for the tenant to leave the present accommodation to secure another accommodation. These assumptions of non-availability of alternative accommodation are wiped out once the tenant builds his own house or acquires other accommodation. Such restrictions and impediments are imposed on a landlord by the Delhi Rent Control Act on the assumption that it is impossible for the tenant to leave the present accommodation to secure another accommodation. These assumptions of non-availability of alternative accommodation are wiped out once the tenant builds his own house or acquires other accommodation. Such a tenant is in no need of the protection of law against his eviction because, he has voluntarily left the original accommodation and has acquired another accommodation. Once it is found that a tenant does not need any protection of law, there is no rationale left in continuing an impediment in the way of the landlord to evict the tenant. In this setting the word 'has' imports concluded default and not a continuing default. It is only reasonable that a tenant who voluntarily gives up the original premises and disentitles himself to the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act, cannot revive the protection of law by relinquishing the new accommodation and reverting to the original accommodation. The Act does not contemplate unilateral revival of the protection by a tenant or recreation of an impediment for the landlord. We are thus in entire agreement with the ratio of Battoo Mal's case. 12. The next question is whether in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Gajanan Dattatraya's case, there is any need to reconsider the Division Bench judgement in Battoo Mal's case. In Gajanan Dattatraya's case the words 'has sublet' as a ground for eviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 fell for consideration. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gappulal v. Dwarkadheeshji, (1969) 3 SCR 989 , the appellant in that case argued that the words 'has sublet' mean that the subletting is to subsist at the date of the suit. The observations of the Supreme Court in Gappulal's case, namely, that the words 'has sublet' contemplate a completed event connected in some way With the present time was strongly relied upon by the appellant. The Supreme Court explained the said observations in Gappulal's case as follows :- "What is meant by these observations is that the vice of subletting which fell within the mischief of the Act continues to be a mischief within the Act. The Supreme Court explained the said observations in Gappulal's case as follows :- "What is meant by these observations is that the vice of subletting which fell within the mischief of the Act continues to be a mischief within the Act. In Gappulal's case there was no subletting in 1947 to violate the 1947 Jaipur Rent Control Order and, therefore, there could not be any subletting which could continue up to the 1950 Rajasthan Act....... on the date of the subletting in 1944, this Court found in Gappulal's case that there was no rent control legislation in force. This court did no consider the question as to whether the subletting put within the mischief of the relevant statute was to subsist at the time of the suit." Having explained the said observation in Gappulal's case, the Supreme Court held : "The provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, indicate that the tenant is disentitled to any protection under the Act if he is within the mischief of the provisions of Section 13(1)(e) namely, that he has sublet. The language is that if the tenant has sublet the protection ceases. To accept the contention of the appellant would mean that the tenant would not be within the mischief of unlawful subletting, if after the landlord gives a notice terminating the tenancy on the ground of unlawful subletting the tenant vacates. The landlord will not be able to get any relief against the tenant in spite of unlawful subletting. In that way, the tenant can foil the claim of landlord to obtain possession of the premises on the ground of subletting every time by getting the sub-tenant to vacate the premises. The tenant's liability to eviction cease, once the fact of unlawful subletting is proved." Thus the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms held that the protection of law ceases as soon as the default is committed. 13. However, it appears that some difficulty was created by the observation of the Supreme Court in the concluding para in Gajanan Dattatraya's case. The tenant's liability to eviction cease, once the fact of unlawful subletting is proved." Thus the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms held that the protection of law ceases as soon as the default is committed. 13. However, it appears that some difficulty was created by the observation of the Supreme Court in the concluding para in Gajanan Dattatraya's case. The observation is : "At the time of the notice, if it is proved that there was unlawful subletting, the tenant is liable to be evicted." This observation led Avadh Behari J. in Muni Lal v. Dulare Singh (1976 Ren CR 220) (Delhi) to believe that the supreme Court has laid down the law contrary to Battoo Mal's decision and hence the same should be followed in preference to the Division Bench judgement in Battoo Mal's case. We feel that the said observation of the Supreme Court, if understood in the context of the facts before the Supreme Court, would present no difficulty. In the first place, the Supreme Court was not called upon to decide a question as to whether the default should continue up to the stage of the notice of eviction by the landlord or not. Indeed, the report does not disclose that any such argument was advanced on behalf of the appellant. If the said observation is to be treated as the ratio of the case, that will go completely contrary to the entire tenor of the ratio and the effort of the Supreme Court to explaining the earlier observation in Gappulal's case. If the ratio of the Gajanan Dattatraya's case is that the default must continue up to the date of the eviction notice it would mean that the Supreme Court has accepted the interpretation of the word 'has' in Gappulal's case. It may be that the special facts of the case namely, that the default was rectified after the termination notice, required the Supreme Court to refer to that fact in the judgement. Far from modifying the decision of the Division Bench in Battoo Mal's case, we find that the Supreme Court decision in Gajanan Dattatraya's case affirms and upholds the ratio of the D. B. judgement in Battoo Mal's case. 14. Far from modifying the decision of the Division Bench in Battoo Mal's case, we find that the Supreme Court decision in Gajanan Dattatraya's case affirms and upholds the ratio of the D. B. judgement in Battoo Mal's case. 14. In the light of the discussion above, we answer the questions referred to us by Misra J. as follows : Once a default is committed by a tenant he ceases to enjoy the protection of law permanently and at no point of time and under no circumstances, the protection of law is revived. In view of this answer, in regard to the interpretation of clause (h) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 14, the stages in the litigation at which the default should continue, become irrelevant. 15. Coming now to the facts of the case at hand, the tenant went to the new premises on 18th May 1967 on 7th August. 1967, the landlord made the application in the prescribed form to the Slum Clearance Authority for permission to evict the tenant. In the said application it was expressly averred that the tenant had secured another accommodation. During the pendency of the said application before the Slum Clearance Authorities, sometime in October 1967. the tenant vacated the new premises and reverted to the suit premises. On February 8, 1968, the landlord served a notice of termination on the tenant. The Slum Clearance Authorities granted the permission under the Slum Clearance Act on 14th of March, 1969. On 8th May, 1969 the landlord filed the eviction petition which is the subject-matter of the appeal. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant relying on the decision of Avadh Behari J. in Muni Lal's case submitted that the tenant had relinquished the new premises before the notice of termination was given by the landlord and hence the landlord was not entitled to a decree for eviction. The learned counsel further submitted that a decree for eviction should not be granted to the landlord as the petition suffers from laches. 17. As regards the first submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, we have already held that the Division Bench in Battoo Mal's case has correctly laid down the law and the judgement of Avadh Behari J. in Muni Lal's case does not represent correct position of law, on interpretation of proviso (h) of sub-cl. (1) of Section 14 of the Act. (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Hence the first submission of the appellant is rejected. 18. The tenant went to reside in other premises on May 18, 1967 and on August 7, 1967, the landlord filed his application before the Slum Clearance Authority and expressly mentioned the said allegation in his application. Considering the fact that in Delhi, the permission of the Slum Clearance Authority, where the premises are situated in slum area is a mandatory requirement of law, (before the eviction petition is filed by the landlord). We hold that the landlord had expeditiously taken legal steps as required by law. Since we have held that with one default the tenant disentitles himself to protection and that it is not necessary that the default should continue till the notice of termination is given by the landlord date of notice to quit has no relevance in deciding whether the petition was belated or not. The second submission of the appellant, therefore, also fails. 19. In the result we confirm the order of eviction passed under clause (h) of the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Sec. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act passed by the Rent Control Tribunal on 1st September 1976. The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.