JUDGMENT - Mohta V. J.- This is a petition at the behest of an erstwhile employee of the respondent. The challenge is to the order passed by the State Industrial Court dismissing in appeal an application under section 78(1)(D) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Act for short) claiming reinstatlment and back wages. 2. The petitioner before his employment with the respondent, was working with the Khadi and Village Industries in India like Akhil Bharatiya Charkha Sangh, All India Village Industries Association, Akhil Bharatiya Gramodyog Sangh, Sarva Seva Sangh etc. It is on bt July 1962 that he was absorbed in the services of the respondent and since then, he had been working till the date of his retirement vide order dated 28.6 1971. The petitioner was aged 56 years when the aforesaid order was passed. The petitioner challenged this order before the Labour Court at Nagpur contending inter alia that he could not be retired before completion of his 58 years. Relying on the standing orders and the relevant provisions of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, it was contended on bt)half of the respondent that the impugned order was perfectly legal. It was also contended that the respondent did not fall within the definition of the term 'industry' and that the proceedings under the Act were not maintainable. One more point regarding validity of approach notice as contemplated under section 42 of the Act was also raised. Documentary as well as oral evidence was led and the Labour Court recorded a finding in favour of the petitioner on alI the points holding that the respondent was an 'industry'. The approach notice was as per law and that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was illegal and improper. By this order, which was passed on 28-1-1974 the relief of reinstatement was not granted and in its place, payment of backwages from 1st July 1971 to 30th June 1973 was awarded. The respondent preferred an appeal under section 84 of the Act before the State Industrial Court which was pleased to maintain the order on the first two points holding further that the impugned notice of retirement Was perfectly legal and valid. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the original application came to be dismissed. 3. Two points were raised before us on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel Shri Gordey. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the original application came to be dismissed. 3. Two points were raised before us on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel Shri Gordey. The first point is to the effect that inasmuch as section 84 of the Act does not specifically refer to section 78(1)(D), it must be held that any order passed on an application under that provision, is not appealable. Reliance was placed in support, on a Division Bench decision of this Court recorded in Special Civil Application Nos. 320 and 454 of 68 decided on 5-12-1968 in the matter of (Shree Talkies Kamptee v. IndusTrial Court)l. However, it appears that the Supreme Court has already taken a different view of the matter in the case of (M /s Chhotabhai Jethabai Patel Co. v. Industrial Court, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur and others)2. Referring to the fact that section 78(1)(D) was introduced and simultaneous changes were made by Maharashtra Act No. 22 of 1965 solely with the object of supplementing the existing powlr and considering the statement of objec-tions and reasons, it has been held that it was unnecessary to mention in section 84 paragraph (D) of section 78 (1) inasmuch as matters of dismissal, removal etc. were already covered by section 78(1)(A). We can do no better in this connection than to quote the following passage from the said judgment: “It will be noted that no mention is made in section 84 of para-graph D of section 78(1) but inasmuch as orders of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service or suspension of an employee would come under section 78(1) paragraph A, the Legislature felt it unnecessary to make any mention of an order under paragraph D in section 84. Paragraph D, so far as we can see, is not referred to anywhere else in the Act.” 4. From all this, it is clear that the Labour Court had ample power to decide all such disputes by virtue of authority conferred by paragraph (A). Next paragraph B gives to the Labour Court, power to try offences, Para-graphs C and D incorporate the nature of relief that the Labour Courts are authorised to give including such directions as are found proper and necessary under the circumstances. Next paragraph B gives to the Labour Court, power to try offences, Para-graphs C and D incorporate the nature of relief that the Labour Courts are authorised to give including such directions as are found proper and necessary under the circumstances. It is obvious that the object behind introducing paragraph D was nothing but to enlarge the powers already conferred upon the Labour Courts under different provisions of law. Nowhere an intention can be spelt out for making a departure from the procedure to be adopted whenever powers under section 78(1)(D) are exercised. Thus, the Division Bench decision of this Court stands impliedly over-ruled and the conclusion is inevitable that the appeal was rightly entertained by the Industrial Court. We, therefore, find no substance in this point apart from the fact that at the time of hearing of the appeal, no such point was raised. 5. However, we notice that on merits of the matter, the petitioner's stand has to be upheld. The order passed by the Labour Court has been reversed in appeal on the basis of Standing Order No. 304 (Annexure l) in which it is laid down that the respondent has every authority to retire a person after completion of 55 years of age. Some other points are also considered in both the orders. But, in our judgment, the impugned appellate order can be quashed on one obvious ground namely, non-consideration of Standing Order No. 314 dated 20-6-1969 (Annexure 2) by which Standing Order No. 304 has been amended. In terms of Annexure 2, the age of retirement has been extended to 58 years in respect of those employees who have earlier worked with All India Sarva Seva Sangh, All India Charkha Sangh. That petitioner worked in these institutions is a common point. No doubt, there is a further rider that this extension is to be given after considering the physical fitness, efficiency in the work etc. after placing the matter befQre the Board. Unfortunately, in this Court, Board is not represented, as a result there is neither any return nor any submissions on its behalf. However, from the material on record, it seems to us that Annexure 2 has been completely lost sight of by the Appellate Court and there is no material on record to come to. the conclusion that the impugned order ha been passed in accordance with Annexure 2. However, from the material on record, it seems to us that Annexure 2 has been completely lost sight of by the Appellate Court and there is no material on record to come to. the conclusion that the impugned order ha been passed in accordance with Annexure 2. On behalf of the respondent, oral evidence was also adauced and in that also, there is not even a whisper about this aspect of the matter. Under these circumstances, in our judgment, the ultimate order passed by the Labour Court which was based on appreciation of evidence, was correct and there was no reason to interfere with the same in appeal specially in the background referred ~o above. To conclude, the order passed by the State Industrial Court (Annexure 10) dated 6th January 1975 is quashed and the one passed by the Labour Court dated 28th February 1974 (Annexure 9) is maintained. The rule is made absolute. But under the circumstances, without any order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----