M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a 1st defendant's second appeal against the divergent findings of the courts below. The appellant was the 1st respondent herein. The 2nd respondent (2nd defendant) was a formal party as he was the tenant at the relevant time cultivating the land of the 1st defendant-appellant. In the course of this judgment parties will be referred to by the ranks assigned to them in the trial Court. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF filed O. S No. 31/71 in the Court of the Munsiff, Manvi. The suit was for an injunction restraining the defendants from growing irrigated paddy crop in Sy No. 480/1 so that the fruit trees grown by the plaintiff, the adjoining owner of Sy No. 480/2 (AA) measuring about 2 acres would not be affected by such cultivation when he had painfully nurtured and reared varieties of fruit trees yielding fruits on the date of the suit. ( 3 ) THE suit prayer for perpetual injunction was resisted by the 1st defendant inter-alia on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction in view of S. 69 of the Karnataka Irrigation Act, 1965 in as much as the allegation that the 1st defendant was growing paddy in his land in violation of S. 32 of the Karnataka Irrigation act was a matter for the authorities under that Act to deal with and not for the Court to interfere ; that the plaintiff's land was on a higher level and there fore no water would affect the roots of the fruit trees in his land by the cultivation of paddy in the 1st defendant's land; that the fruit trees in the plaintiff's land were not eight years old; that the defendants had made proper arrangements for drainage of percolated water and therefore the apprehension of the plaintiff that damage would be caused. tp the fruit trees was ill founded ; that water requirements of paddy crop and the garden crop was the same and therefore the 1st defendant was entitled to raise paddy crop after seeking permission from the concerned authority. It was also urged that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary party, viz. , the Irrigation Officer under the Karnataka Irrigation Act, 1965. It was also urged that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary party, viz. , the Irrigation Officer under the Karnataka Irrigation Act, 1965. ( 4 ) THE trial Court framed as many as five issues for trial which are as follows : (1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the fruit trees in his land are eight years old ? (2) Whether he further proves that defendant No. 1 is preparing his land for transplantation of paddy crop ? (3) Whether he further proves that his gardening crops will sustain loss as alleged ?' (4) Whether he further proves that the defendants have violated his vested right ? (5) Is he entitled to the injunction sought ? ( 5 ) THE plaintiff examined himself and two other witnesses in support of his case, while the defendants examined one witness and defendant-2 in support of their case. It is necessary to state that the plaintiff also got the Assistant Director of Horticulture appointed as Commissioner to inspect the spot and give report to the Court. It is seen from the records that this report though sent by the Commissioner was not marked as one of the documents in evidence in as much as the plaintiff did not call upon the commissioner to enter the witness box and also for the reason that the Commission warrant itself was not returned by the Commissioner. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, the plaintiff got marked ex P1 the Certificate granted by the local Horticultural Officer to the effect that in the event of paddy being allowed to be grown in S. No. 480/1 of Manvi, the fruit trees, which were yielding fruits on the date of the Certificate, would get affected in their roots and virtually they would be destroyed. The two witnesses merely spoke supporting the case made out by the plaintiff and in that circumstance, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not made out a case for injunction in as much as he had failed to prove that there existed in his land Sy No. 480/2 (AA) fruit bearing trees and that they were yielding and that they were 8 years old. In the result, he dismissed the suit. ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff appealed to the Civil Judge, Raichur, in r. A. 108/1972. In the result, he dismissed the suit. ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff appealed to the Civil Judge, Raichur, in r. A. 108/1972. The learned Civil Judge, after hearing Counsel for parties and going through the evidence formulated the followings two points for consideration ; (1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendants have no right to grow paddy or other heavy irrigation crops in sy No. 480/1 (AA) ? (2) Is the plaintiff entitled to relief of injunction prayed for ? ( 8 ) ON appreciating the evidence the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the learned Munsiff was incorrect in rejecting the oral and documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff. It came to the conclusion that the munsiff erred in not giving importance to Ex. P1, the Certificate issued by the local Horticultural. Officer, which read along with the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff was conclusive of the fact of existence of fruit yielding trees on the land of the plaintiff. It further held that on the pleadings themselves defendants had admitted that the land in sy. No. 480/1 (AA) was Bhagayat and therefore, not entitled to cultivate paddy crop in view of the prohibition contained in the Karnataka Irrigation Act, 1965. It is to be seen in the judgment of the lower appellate Court that the question of jurisdiction was not seriously argued before it by the defendants. While the lower appellate Court did not rely on the commissioner's report which it had extracted in the course of its judgment, nevertheless placed reliance on Ex. P1 to come to the conclusion which it did granting the injunction as prayed for in favour of the plaintiff restraining defendants from growing paddy in Sy. No. 480/1 (AA ). Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court the first defendant has filed this appeal. ( 9 ) THE three grounds involving questions of law strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in order to persuade this Court to set aside the order of the lower appellate Court and restore that of trial Court are as follows: (1) That the lower appellate Court erred in relying upon Ex. ( 9 ) THE three grounds involving questions of law strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in order to persuade this Court to set aside the order of the lower appellate Court and restore that of trial Court are as follows: (1) That the lower appellate Court erred in relying upon Ex. P1 as the same was not properly proved by examining the Officer who issued the Certificate and therefore the contents of the Certificate could not be acted upon nor relied upon. (2) That the plaintiff had no cause of action for a suit for injunction in as much as violation of the prohibition contained in the Irrigation Act was not the concern of the Court or plaintiff and therefore the Ceurt neither had jurisdiction nor had the plaintiff made out a case for injunction. (3) That the suit for injunction without a prayer for declaration was not maintainable. ( 10 ) IT is convenient to dispose of the last ground urged, first. The learned counsel for the appellant is not correct in contending that a suit for perpetual injunction is not maintainable. On the facts of the case disclosed as above, the case of the plaintiff clearly falls under sub-sec. (3) (b) of S. 38 of the Specific relief Act, 1963. Sub-section (3) of that section provides that when the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to, or enjoyment of property, the Court may grant a perpetual injunction where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion. When there is such a right in clear terms of the provisions of law and when there is no dispute as to the title of property involved viz. , Sy. No. 480/1 (AA) and 480/2 (AA), there was no need for seeking any declaration, much less a declaration of title when the 1st defendant was attempting to grow paddy through the 2nd defendant on his land and that fact was admitted in the written statement. Therefore, this ground is rejected as not tenable. , Sy. No. 480/1 (AA) and 480/2 (AA), there was no need for seeking any declaration, much less a declaration of title when the 1st defendant was attempting to grow paddy through the 2nd defendant on his land and that fact was admitted in the written statement. Therefore, this ground is rejected as not tenable. ( 11 ) IN furtherance of the ground urged and in support of the contention, learned counsel for the 1st defendant relied upon two decisions of the Calcutta high Court to point out that the lower appellate Court ought not to have issued the injunction for the mere threat of violation of the provisions of the Irrigation act. In the case of Nandalal Ladia v. Provudayal Tikriwalla (1), a Division bench of Calcutta High Court has held as under :"under Ss. 54 an. d 55, Specific relief Act, the plaintiffs may pray for perpetual or mandatory injunction to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favour of the plaintiffs. In the present case there was no obligation contractual or otherwise on the pirt of the plaintiff towards the defendant which required that the defendant should construct on his own land in accordance with the Municipal Rules and Regulations. The plaintiffs therefore have no right to pray either for a mandatory injunction or a perpetual injunction merely on the ground that the proposed construction on the defendant's land may be in breach of Municipal Rules and By-laws. "in the case of Parulbala Roy v. Chowmal (2), another Division Bench dealing with S. 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 held that the 3rd para therein dealing with breach of obligations other than obligations that arose under a contract, in order to entitle plaintiff to obtain in junction, there should be invasion or threat of invasion to right to enjoymenof the plaintiff was rendered less beneficial, that would not entitle him to seek injunction unless he could show that there was a legal duty on the part of the defendant towards him. ( 12 ) THE ruling in the first mentioned decision has been correctly rendered. But it has no application to the facts of the case. No doubt the plaintiff has complained of the violation of the statutory provisions by the defendants But that is not his whole case. ( 12 ) THE ruling in the first mentioned decision has been correctly rendered. But it has no application to the facts of the case. No doubt the plaintiff has complained of the violation of the statutory provisions by the defendants But that is not his whole case. His case essentially is that the fruit trees in his land are likely to be affected so severely by such violation of the prohibition or on account of growing paddy in the adjoining land, the fruit trees would become extinct Similarly, the ruling in the second decision aforementioned cannot be said to be wrong. But that appears to have been said oa the facts of that case. But in this case, as already observed, the plaintiff has proved threat of injury. Therefore it must be implied that there is a duty cast on the adjoining owner not to do any act on his land which would destroy the crops on the adjoining land. Therefore, the decisions cited of the Calcutta High Court, are not of much assistance to the defendants. ( 13 ) THE first of the grounds urged that Ex. PI was not proved and inadmissible in evidence is an argument which was advanced before the lower appellate court for the first time. When the document was marked through the plaintiff, there was no objection raised for that document being marked in evidence. But the learned Counsel has contended that marking of that document does not necessarily mean that the contents are proved. That would depend on the facts of each case In the instant case Ex. P1 is a certificate issued by the local Horticultural officer, Manvi, to the effect that on his inspection, he has found fruit yielding trees in 87. No. 480/2 of Manvi and that the trees therein are bearing fruits and were about eight years old ; that the cultivation of paddy in the adjoining land sy, No 480/1 would affect the roots of the fruit trees on account of inundation of water and the trees would get destroyed. The nature of the Certificate clearly indicates that it was issued at the instance of the plaintiff to the plaintiff. The nature of the Certificate clearly indicates that it was issued at the instance of the plaintiff to the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff was a competent person to produce that document having obtained the game from the appropriate authority to issue that certificate as an expert While it may not be treated as expert evidence in the absence of the expert himself being examined, it is sufficient proof of the facts complained by the plaintiff in his plaint. Once the document is admitted in evidence without protest or objrction from the other side, the court is always free to make use of that document in arriving at a just derision. It is too late, at this stage to contend that that document was inadmissible. Therefore, the first ground is also rejected ( 14 ) LASTLY, the appellant's contention that the Court had no jurisdiction in view of S. 69, of the Irrigation Act, 1965 which bars the jurisdiction of Civil courts for all matters arising under the act and that there was also lack of jurisdiction on account of there being no cause of action in favour of the plaintiff is not well founded. S 69 of the Karnataka irrigation Act, 1965 is as follows :"69. Bar of certain proceedings etc.- (1) No suit, prosecution or other proceeding shall lie against any officer or servant of the State government, for any act done or purporting to be done under this Act, without the previous sanction of the state Government. (2) No officer or servant of the state shall be liable in respect of any such act in any civil or criminal proceeding if the act was done in good faith in the course of the execution of duties or the discharge of his functions imposed by or under this Act. (3) No suit shall be instituted against the State Government in respect of any act done unless the suit is instituted within six months from the date of the act complained of. (4) In the case of intended suit against any officer or servant of the state Government under sub-sec. (3) No suit shall be instituted against the State Government in respect of any act done unless the suit is instituted within six months from the date of the act complained of. (4) In the case of intended suit against any officer or servant of the state Government under sub-sec. (1), the person in tending, to sue shall be bound to give the officer or servant, as the case may be, one month's notice at least of the intended suit with sufficient description of the cause, of action, failing which the suit shall be dismissed (5) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court. shall entertain any suit instituted in respect of any matter to which this act applies. "as can be seen sub-secs (2), (3) and (5) of the afore-mentioned S 69 create a bar for civil and criminal courts to entertain suits or complaints. But the threatened acts of defendants and the apprehension of injury likely to be caused to his fruit trees is not a matter arising under the act. As pointed out it is an inherent right of the adjoining land holder to protect his property which is recognised and provided for in S. 38 of the Specific Relief act Therefore, S. 69 of the Irrigation act in no way acts as a total ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Court or creates bar as contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant No doubt, the threatened action of the 1st defendant to grow paddy in his land, namely, Sy. No. 480/1 (AA) is in express prohibition of S. 32 of the Irrigation Act and therefore liable to be dealt with under sub-sec. (4) of that section. But it does not mean that if such a plea is put forward, civil courts which are competent otherwise to entertain suits should totally ignore the prohibition contained in that section and not lean in favour of the plaintiff. While Civil Courts will take notice of unlawful intention of the defendants for the limited purpose of threatened injury, it would not punish them under sub-sec. (4) of S 32 by granting injunction if the threatened injury is proved. While Civil Courts will take notice of unlawful intention of the defendants for the limited purpose of threatened injury, it would not punish them under sub-sec. (4) of S 32 by granting injunction if the threatened injury is proved. In fact, I should observe that the courts when seized with matters like this should take judicial notice of laws that exist in the State and protect the interests of the State as well when otherwise plaintiff is entitled to an injunction. ( 15 ) I, therefore, do not see any infirmity in the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court in granting the injunction to the plaintiff. ( 16 ) IN the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. ( 17 ) IN the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs. --- *** --- .