G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Rent Controller, dharwad, in No. RNT, SR. 182/78-79, dated 10-10-1979 ordering under S. 21a (1) (c) of the Karnataka Rent Control act, 1976, that the present writ petitioners shall vacate and hand over possession of the suit premises to the landlord who is arrayed as respondent-1 in the writ petition giving a period of six months to vacate. ( 2 ) PRESENT respondent-1 purchased the suit premises from its original owner on 22-6-1978. Earlier, the suit premises were held by the writ petitioners, on lease from the original owner Present respondent-1 in the writ petition was in occupation of the building belonging to one Deshpande, who instituted a petition after the coming into force of Act No. 66 of 1976 for regularisation of tenancy in favour of present respondent-1 under s. 31b of the Amended Act and the proceedings ended in favour of the landlord regularising the tenancy in favour of respondent-1. Thereafter when the present landlord, viz , respondent-1 in the writ petition, purchased the building, he applied to the Rent Controller under S. 21-A of the Karnataka Pent Control Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) that he must be given possession by summary eviction of the present writ petitioner of the suit premises which he purchased on 22-6-1978. It is in that proceeding that the Rent Controller has ordered eviction of the present writ petitioner under S. 21a (1) (c) of the Act and that. order is challenged in this writ petition before me. ( 3 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners vehemently contended that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to invoke the provisions of S. 21a (1) (c) of the Act. According to him, present respondent-1 fell within the provisions contained in S. 21a (2) ( f the Act, and, hence, he submitted that the order passed by the Rent Controller is illegal, arbitrary and capricious and, hence, he prayed that the same should be quashed ( 4 ) AS against that, the learned Advocate appearing for respondent-1 in the writ petition strenuously urged that the entire section read as a whole could mean that even in the case of S. 21a (2) of the act, the provisions of S. 21a (1) (c) of the Act could be invoked. He invited my attention to the doctrine of construing the section as a whole, each part shedding light on the other part, for harmonious construction and he further "invited my attention to the doctrine of causus omissus as explained by the Supreme Court. ( 5 ) THE only point, therefore, that arises for my consideration in this writ petition is : 'whether the Rent Controller had the authority to order eviction under S. 21 A (1) (c) of the Act ?' ( 6 ) SECTION 21a (1) of the Act reads:"vacation of residential building in certain cases :- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, on and from the date of coming into force of this section, (a) any person who is in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment by the Controller, shall, within one year from the said date vacate such building if he owns in his name or in the name of any member of his family, a residential building in the same city, town or village (hereinafter referred to as to his own building' ). " ( 7 ) THUS, it is clear that a person who claims any right and who is referred to under S. 21a (1) (a) of the Act is a person who is in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment by the Controller and he shall within one year from the said date i. e. , the date of application of the Act no. 66 of 1976, i. e. , 20-8-1976, vacate such building if he owns in his name or in the name of any member of his family a residential building in the same city, town or village. Thus, the ingredients are that the person concerned must be in occupation of a residential premises on allotment; that he shall vacate the suit premises within one year from the said date and further he should own in his own name or in the name of any member of his family a residential building in the same city, town or village. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, respondent-1 in the writ petition purchased the suit premises on 22-6-1978. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, respondent-1 in the writ petition purchased the suit premises on 22-6-1978. Thus, on the date on which Act No. 66 of 1976 came into force, i. e. , 20-8-1976, respondent-1 in the writ petition did not own a residential building of his own in the City of Hubli. He did not own any such building even within one year from that date and, in fact, he has purchased it nearly two years after coming into force of Act No. 66 of 1976. Hence, it is obvious that S. 21a (1) (a) of the Act cannot be invoked on the facts of the present case ( 9 ) SECTION 21a (1) (b) of the Act reads :"vacation of residential building in certain cases :-Not with standing anything in this Act , on and from the date of coming into force of this section, (a) xx xx xx xx (b) such person shall be entitled to recover possession; of his own building, in case it is let out to any other person and he may apply to the prescribed authority for eviction of such other person :" ( 10 ) THUS, S. 21a (1) (b) of the Act is in continuation of S. 21a (1) (a), which is explained above. 'such person' used in S. 21a (1) (b) of the Act refers to a person described in S. 21a (1) (a) of the Act, which reads : "vacation of residential building in certain cases :- (1) Not with standing anything in this Act, on and from the date of coming into force of this section, (a) xx xx xx xx (b) xx xx xx xx (c) the prescribed authority shall, after making such summary inquiry as it deems necessary, evict such other person, if necessary by using force and put the applicant in possession of his own building. " ( 11 ) THUS, the scheme of S. 21a (1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Act are consistent and harmonious. " ( 11 ) THUS, the scheme of S. 21a (1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Act are consistent and harmonious. It refers to a person who was in occupation on allotment of a house from the Rent Controller and who owned his own residential building in the same city either in his name or in the name of any member of his family and these conditions are not satisfied by present rcspondent-1 in the writ petition It is, therefore, obvious that the Rent Controller grossly erred in invoking the provisions of S. 2ia (1) (c) of the Act. His order, therefore is highly illegal, arbitrary and capricious. ( 12 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners further invited my attention to S. 21a (2) of the Act, which, according to him, applies to the facts of the present case. ( 13 ) S. 21a (2) of the Act reads:"notwithstanding anything in this Act, any person who being in occupation or possession of a residential building as a tenant on allotment by the Controller acquires or constructs on or after the 20th day of August 1976 either in his own name or in the name of any member of the family a residential building in the city, town or village shall within such time as may be prescribed, vacate the building of which he is the tenant. "section 21a (3) of the Act reads :"any person who contravenes the provisions of clause (a) of subsection (1), or sub-section (2) shall on conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. " ( 14 ) THUS, the scheme of sub-section (2) of S 21a of the Act is entirely different from what is contemplated under sub-section (1) of S 21a of the Act. When the Legislature says under sub-section (2) of S. 21a of the Act that any person who being in occupation or possession of a residential building as a ten- ant on allotment by the Controller acquires possession of or constructs a residential building on or after 20th day of August 1976, it obviously means that he constructs a house or acquires possession of a house in which he can reside. In other words, what he constructs or acquires is a vacant premises. In other words, what he constructs or acquires is a vacant premises. It is for that reason that the Legislature in its wisdom has not thought it necessary to provide for eviction as is done in S. 21a (1) (c) of the Act. Hence, there is no occasion of there being any absurd result, unless, the sub-section is otherwise construed as is explained by the Supreme Court of india in. the aforesaid decision (vide AIR 1980 SC. 485 ). Neither the doctrine of causus omissus nor the doctrine of harmonious construction would play its role on the facts of the present case. ( 15 ) THE sections, as they are, are clear and unambiguous. When that is so, the golden rule of interpretation is the grammatical rule of construction. ( 16 ) IT may be noted that there is no challenge that the house purchased by respondent-1 in the writ petition is a residential building construed in the light of the decision rendered by the Supreme court of India in the case of Busching schmltz (P) Ltd. x. P. T. Menghani (2 ). ( 17 ) IN the view that , I have taken, it is not necessary for me to deal with the other aspects raised under I. A No. II, with regard to regularisation. ( 18 ) IN the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Rent Controller, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-A, is hereby quashed. No costs. --- *** --- .