JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– In this Rule, a charge-sheet dated 30th October, 1975, being Annexure 'A' to the writ petition, an Investigation Report dated 3rd January 1978, being Annexure 'N' to the writ petition and the second Show-cause Notice issued to the petitioner on 8th March, 1978, being Annexure 'P' to the writ petition, are under challenge. 2. It appears that the petitioner joined the Engineering side of the Telegraphic Department in December 1952 as Telegraphic Supervisor and, thereafter, the petitioner was transferred from Bhubaneswar and joined Calcutta Telephones some time in March, 1976 and had been working there as Sub-divisional Officer in 43/44 Exchange. The petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated the 30th October, 1975 in connection with an enquiry under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The charge-sheet and imputation of charges accompanying the charge-sheet were issued by one Sri Dubey who was the Deputy Inspector General (Vigilance). The petitioner asked for various documents mentioned in the petitioner's letter. But all such documents were not made available to the petitioner and the petitioner was informed that some of the documents were relevant. 3. It may be noted here that with regard to the other documents, it was not even stated that the said documents were not relevant. It also appears that the synopsis of the statements made by several persons examined during the investigation prior to the issue of the charge-sheet to the petitioner were made over to the petitioner but the detailed evidence were not given to the petitioner and, in the affidavit-in-opposition, it has been stated that the detailed evidences were shown to the petitioner. It also appears that the preliminary investigation report was not made available to the petitioner and the witnesses intended to be examined by the petitioner could not be examined by the petitioner as the said persons could not and/or did not appear on the date fixed for their examination. 4. In the instant Rule, the petitioner contends that the charge-sheet discloses a closed mind and bias of the disciplinary authority against the petitioner and, on that score, the charge-sheet must be quashed. 4. In the instant Rule, the petitioner contends that the charge-sheet discloses a closed mind and bias of the disciplinary authority against the petitioner and, on that score, the charge-sheet must be quashed. It is also contended by the petitioner that under the provisions of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 the charge-sheet and the second show-cause notice can be issued only by the punishing authority. But, admittedly, in the instant case, such charge-sheet and the show-cause notice have been signed by the Deputy Inspector General (Vigilance) who is, admittedly, not the punishing authority so far as the petitioner is concerned. It is contended that on that score also, the charge-sheet and the second show-cause notice issued to the petitioner should be quashed. The petitioner also contends that the investigation report was the basis for issuing the charge-sheet to the petitioner and the said document was extremely relevant and vital for enabling the petitioner to defend himself effectively in the departmental proceeding. But, despite demand for the said document, the said report was not made available to the petitioner. It is, therefore, contended that the departmental proceeding is vitiated for not following the procedure as laid down in the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control Appeal) Rules and for not giving a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself in the said departmental proceeding. 5. Mr. Banerjee the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, raises a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of this Rule on the ground that the writ application is premature and the petitioner should not be permitted to challenge the departmental proceeding up to the stage of issuing the show-cause notice in this Rule, because the petitioner has not yet given his answer to the second show-cause notice and the concerned authority has not yet considered the objection to be filed by the petitioner. Mr. Banerjee contends that if the petitioner's objections are upheld by the disciplinary authority, there would be no occasion for the petitioner to feel aggrieved. If, on the other hand, the petitioner's objections are overruled and the disciplinary authority imposes punishment, there is still alternative remedy open to the petitioner by preferring an appeal in accordance with the provisions of Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. In this connection, Mr. If, on the other hand, the petitioner's objections are overruled and the disciplinary authority imposes punishment, there is still alternative remedy open to the petitioner by preferring an appeal in accordance with the provisions of Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. In this connection, Mr. Banerjee refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (1) Chanan Singh v. Registrar, Co-operative Society, Punjab, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1821 and also a Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (2) Sudhir Chandra Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1976(1) CLJ 483 . 6. In answer to the aforesaid contention of Mr. Banerjee, Mr. Majumdar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contends that there is no absolute bar for the writ court to entertain the writ petition at the intermediate stage although, on the ground of expediency, it may not be desirable to interfere before the conclusion of the departmental proceeding. There may be cases where violation of the principles of natural justice or palpable irregularity in not following the statutory procedure are bound to vitiate the departmental proceeding and, in such cases, it will not be proper and just for the writ court to refuse justice to the delinquent officer but to direct him to come up before the writ court only after suffering an agony of dismissal and/or other punishment to be inflicted on him. 7. In my view, the said contention of Mr. Majumdar is very reasonable and justified and I am inclined to accept the same. According to me, there cannot be any fixed principle for not entertaining any writ petition before the departmental proceeding is finally concluded. If, a delinquent officer can satisfy the writ court that the departmental proceeding is vitiated either for violating the principles of natural justice or for not following the procedure resulting in gross injustice to the petitioner, it will be quite open to the writ court to interfere and quash the departmental proceeding even at the intermediate stage so that a proper proceeding is started and the delinquent officer does not suffer unnecessary agony for a prolonged period. 8. Whether the principles of natural justice have been violated or not or whether or not the procedure has been properly followed, are to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. 8. Whether the principles of natural justice have been violated or not or whether or not the procedure has been properly followed, are to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the merits of the other contentions made by the petitioner in support of this writ petition. 9. Mr. Majumdar, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, contends in the first place, that the charge-sheet discloses a closed mind of the disciplinary authority and, on that score alone, the charge-sheet should be quashed. In support of this contention, Mr. Majumdar relies on the Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (3) Sunil Kumar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1977 CWN 1014. He also refers to another Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (4) Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1980(2) Service Law Report 232. In both the said decisions, the charge-sheet issued in the departmental proceeding concerning assets disproportionate to income were taken into consideration by this Court and in construing the charge levelled against the delinquent officers in the said cases, it was held by this Court that the said charge depicted a closed mind of the concerned authorities. Mr. Majumdar contends that the charge-sheet issued against the petitioner in the instant case also suffers from the same infirmity and the expressions used in the charge-sheet are similar to the expressions considered by this Court in the aforesaid decisions as improper and indicative of a closed mind. If a reference is made to the charge-sheet and the imputation of facts constituting the charge-sheet issued in the instant case, it will appear that two charges have been levelled against the petitioner. It is true that, in both the charges, there has been a categorical statement that the petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him. But from the accompanying documents forming the basis of the charge-sheet, it appears that it was stated that possession of the disproportionate assets referred to in the said document would suggest that the assets were acquired by the delinquent officer in a questionable and dubious manner. But from the accompanying documents forming the basis of the charge-sheet, it appears that it was stated that possession of the disproportionate assets referred to in the said document would suggest that the assets were acquired by the delinquent officer in a questionable and dubious manner. So far as the Charge No.2 is concerned, it appears that the said charge has been made because the petitioner did not obtain prior permission about the acquisition of immovable property by the petitioner in 1976. It may be noted in this connection that the petitioner did not deny the fact that no prior permission was obtained by him in the matter of acquisition of the immovable property referred to in the said charge. But the petitioner contends that long before the charge-sheet was issued, some time in 1969, the petitioner submitted a list of assets including the said immovable property acquired by the petitioner in 1976. It should be noted that the charge-sheet and the accompanying statement of facts constituting the charge must be read together and both the said documents constitute one document. In the aforesaid circumstances it does not appear to me that in reality a closed mind was depicted in issuing the charge-sheet and the said accompanying statement of facts. Accordingly, I overrule the contention that the charge-sheet must be quashed in the facts of the case. 10. Mr. Majumdar next contends that the investigation report was an essential document, so far as the delinquent officer is concerned, in order to enable him to effectively defend himself in the departmental proceeding and/or to cross-examine the witnesses. He contends that without any valid reason, the said investigation report was not supplied to the petitioner to his serious loss and prejudice. In this connection, Mr. Majumdar refers to the decision of this Court made in the case of Sunil Kumar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal (supra) and also a decision of the Delhi High Court made in the case of (5) Jograj Singh v. Delhi Administration, reported in 1970 Service Law Report, page 400. In Jograj Singh's case, it has been held by the Delhi High Court that there are two classes of documents to which a public servant has a right to defend himself. In Jograj Singh's case, it has been held by the Delhi High Court that there are two classes of documents to which a public servant has a right to defend himself. In the first class, there are documents which are intended to be used by the prosecution agency to prove the charges against the delinquent officer and, in the second class, fall the documents which even if they are not relied upon by the Enquiring Officer to support the charges against the delinquent officer is nevertheless required by the petitioner to defend his case. Relying on the said decision, Mr. Majumdar contends that the investigation report in the instant case, even if the same does not fall in the first class, certainly falls in the second class because the charges were constituted on the basis of the said investigation report and the departmental proceeding was started against the petitioner on the basis of the said investigation report. Mr. Majumdar also contends that although expressly the said investigation report was not referred to in the finding of the Enquiring Officer but, if the report is closely considered, it win appear that the Enquiring Officer has always kept the report in his mind in basing his findings. Mr. Majumdar also contends that in the charge-sheet it will appear that calculations were made on the basis of the finding made in the investigation report. In the aforesaid circumstances, the said investigation report was a very valuable document and, as such, the same was essentially necessary for the petitioner's defence in the departmental proceeding. Mr. Majumdar also contends that, apart from the said document, the evidences recorded by the Investigating Officer were also not supplied to the petitioner despite the petitioner's demand for the same but only a synopsis of the said documents was supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner contends that supply of such synopsis of the evidences does not satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself in the departmental proceedings. In support of this contention, Mr. Majumdar relies on the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (6) State of Punjab v. Bhakat Ram, reported in AIR 1974 SC 2335 . 11. In support of this contention, Mr. Majumdar relies on the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (6) State of Punjab v. Bhakat Ram, reported in AIR 1974 SC 2335 . 11. The Supreme Court has held in the said decision that to satisfy the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard, copies of the evidences are to be given and the synopsis of such evidence does not satisfy the said requirement. 12. In reply to the aforesaid contention of Mr. Majumdar, Mr. Banerjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent contends that it is often necessary to hold preliminary investigation for the purpose of deciding as to whether or not a disciplinary proceeding should be initiated against a Government servant. Such preliminary enquiry is not the disciplinary proceeding as such but only some investigation is made for the purpose of finding out a prima facie case against the delinquent Government servant. Mr. Banerjee contends that if the preliminary report on the basis of which a disciplinary proceeding is taken is not relied on by the Enquiring Officer, then it is not necessary to supply the delinquent officer a copy of the same. In support of this contention Mr. Banerjee referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (7) Krishna Chandra Tandon v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1974 SC at Page 1589. It has been held in the said decision that preliminary investigation for the purpose of deciding as to whether or not a disciplinary proceeding will be started against a delinquent officer is in the nature of inter-departmental communications and if neither the punishing authority nor the Enquiring Officer relies on such report, the delinquent officer cannot contend failure of reasonable opportunity to defend simply because such preliminary enquiry report is not supplied to the delinquent officer. Mr. Banerjee has placed the evidence of the Investigating Officer examined before the Enquiring Officer in the departmental proceeding and he contends that the said Investigating Officer gave independent evidence at the departmental proceeding in the presence of the petitioner and he did not rely on his investigation report. The Enquiring Officer has relied on the evidence given by the said Investigating Officer in the departmental proceeding, but the Enquiring Officer has not relied upon the preliminary enquiry report made by the said Investigating Officer. In the circumstances, Mr. The Enquiring Officer has relied on the evidence given by the said Investigating Officer in the departmental proceeding, but the Enquiring Officer has not relied upon the preliminary enquiry report made by the said Investigating Officer. In the circumstances, Mr. Banerjee contends, that supply of the said preliminary investigating report was not essential and non-supply of the same has not occasioned any failure of reasonable opportunity to defend so far as the petitioner is concerned. 13. Mr. Majumdar next contends that under proviso of sub-rule (12) of Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 the Enquiring Officer is to record reasons if he chooses not to supply all the documents asked for by a delinquent officer. In the instant case, Mr. Majumdar contends that the petitioner asked for certain documents for the purpose of filing his written defence and also to defend himself in the departmental enquiry proceeding but the Enquiring Officer in contravention of the provisions of the said proviso to sub-rule (12) of Rule 14, simply observed that some of the documents were relevant. In respect of the other documents, the said Officer even did not indicate as to whether the said documents were relevant or not and no reason whatsoever was given by the said Enquiring Officer as to why the other documents were refused by him. The observation of the Enquiring Officer was placed by Mr. Majumdar at the hearing of this Rule and it appears that the Enquiring Officer did not specify any reason as to why some of the documents asked for by the petitioner were not disclosed to the petitioner. Mr. Majumdar also contends that under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the second Show Cause Notice is to be issued by the punishing authority but in the instant case such second show-cause notice has been issued by the Deputy Inspector General, Vigilance. Mr. Majumdar contends that in the affidavit-in-opposition it has been contended by the respondents that the Deputy Inspector General was authorised to authenticate the decision of the Post & Telegraph Board. He, however, submits that such authentication is not in conformity with the requirement under Article 311 of the Constitution and the punishing authority not having issued the second Show Cause Notice the said second Show Cause Notice is not legal and valid and as such the same should be quashed. 14. He, however, submits that such authentication is not in conformity with the requirement under Article 311 of the Constitution and the punishing authority not having issued the second Show Cause Notice the said second Show Cause Notice is not legal and valid and as such the same should be quashed. 14. In reply to the said contention, Mr. Banerjee the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, however, contends that the decision to issue the second Show-Cause Notice was taken by the Post & Telegraph Board and the Chairman exercising the power of the Board had looked to the records and approved the proposal for issuing the second Show-Cause Notice. It was only in accordance with the decision taken by the Board that the Board's decision to issue certain orders including the order of asking the delinquent officer to show-cause why the penalty should not be imposed on him, was to be issued by certain authorities and in accordance with such decision the authentication was made by the Deputy Inspector-General, Vigilance, who was authorised to authenticate such decision of the Board. Mr. Banerjee submits that in the aforesaid facts, there has not been any contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and the second Show-Cause Notice in the instant case has really been issued by the punishing authority but such decision of the punishing authority has only been authenticated by the competent officer. 15. After considering the aforesaid submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it appears to me that there has not been any contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution by communicating the decision of the Board after being authenticated by the Deputy Inspector-General, Vigilance, in accordance with the circular issued by the Board that such decision of the Board is to be authenticated by the officers mentioned in the circular. It, however, appears to me that in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the preliminary investigation report, should have been furnished to the petitioner to give him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. It is true that if the preliminary investigation report is not relied on either by the Enquiring Officer or by the punishing authority, such report is not required to be disclosed to the delinquent officer as a matter of course. It is true that if the preliminary investigation report is not relied on either by the Enquiring Officer or by the punishing authority, such report is not required to be disclosed to the delinquent officer as a matter of course. But reasonable opportunity of being heard cannot be defined precisely and such opportunity depends in the facts and circumstances of each case. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Jograj Singh (supra) wherein the Delhi High Court has observed that there are certain documents which even if they are not relied by the Enquiring Officer to support the charges against the delinquent, such documents are nevertheless required by the petitioner to defend his case. 16. It should be noted in this connection that the charges were framed on the basis of the Investigation Report and the calculation made by the Investigating Officer in the said Report was referred to in the charge-sheet. In my view, in the aforesaid circumstances, it was only desirable to furnish the said report to the delinquent officer to give proper and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. It also appears to me that the Enquiring Officer should have furnished the copies of the evidences of the persons examined by the Investigating Officer and not the synopsis of the same. Mr. Majumdar also contends that reasonable opportunity to defend in the departmental proceeding was also denied to the petitioner by not summoning some of the defence witnesses. He submits that Mr. O. P. Gupta, Dr. P. Boner and Mr. B. K. Mohanty were intended to be examined by the petitioner in support of his case but the said persons could not be examined and the Enquiring Officer drew an adverse inference in his report for non-examining the said witnesses. Mr. Majumdar contends that Mr. Gupta did not inform the Enquiring Officer that he was not willing to give evidence in the said departmental proceeding but on the contrary he informed the Enquiring Officer that the next date of the hearing should be informed to him in advance and he should also be informed as to who would bear the T. A. and D. A. expenses for giving evidence. Similarly Mr. Mohanty also asked for some adjournment on the ground of health but he did not inform the Enquiring Officer that he was not inclined to give any evidence. Similarly Mr. Mohanty also asked for some adjournment on the ground of health but he did not inform the Enquiring Officer that he was not inclined to give any evidence. Mr. Majumdar also submits that Dr. P. Boner also did not inform that he was not willing to give evidence in the proceeding. Mr. Majumdar submits that in the supplementary affidavit-in-opposition and in the affidavit-in-opposition it has been disclosed by the respondents that summons had been sent to the said witnesses at the instance of the petitioner but on the date fixed, the said witnesses did not come. Mr. Majumdar submits that the said statement is half truth. It is true that on the date fixed the said witnesses did not come to give evidence but they informed that for reasons indicated in their communications, it was not possible for them to come on the date fixed, but they expressed their willingness to give evidence on the subsequent date. Although such communications were received by the Enquiring Officer long before, the said fact was not disclosed to the petitioner even when the petitioner gave evidence and as a matter of fact he made an application in writing that the said witnesses should be summoned. 17. Mr. Banerjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, however, contend that the Enquiring Officer had summoned the witnesses but if the witnesses had failed to give evidence on the date fixed, it was not an obligation on the part of the Enquiring Officer to summon them on several occasions and to bring them as witnesses. He contends that it was the duty of the petitioner to examine the said, witnesses on his behalf and as the summons were issued at the instance of the petitioner, it cannot be contended that the respondents denied the reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to examine the said witnesses. In my view, the said contention of Mr. Banerjee is not justified in the facts of the case. It is true that summons had been issued by the Enquiring Officer to the witnesses who could not come to give evidence on the date fixed and they asked for shifting of the date. In my view, the said contention of Mr. Banerjee is not justified in the facts of the case. It is true that summons had been issued by the Enquiring Officer to the witnesses who could not come to give evidence on the date fixed and they asked for shifting of the date. Thereafter, it does not appear that any step was taken by the Enquiring Officer to shift the date of hearing and for to communicate the witnesses about the next date of hearing so that they could come and give evidences. It is also unfortunate that the Enquiring Officer did not disclose to the petitioner in proper time that the said witnesses had informed him that they would not come on the date fixed for the reasons indicated by them. If the Enquiring Officer had shifted the date of hearing and had informed the petitioner about the communications in proper time, it could have been reasonably contended that the reasonable opportunities were given to the petitioner to examine the said witnesses. But in the facts and circumstances indicated hereinbefore, it does not appear to me that proper opportunities were given to the petitioner to bring such witnesses for being examined in support of his case. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Rule succeeds and the Enquiry Report and the second Show-cause Notice are quashed. 18. Liberty is, however, given to the respondents to start the departmental proceeding after giving the petitioner a copy of the preliminary Investigation Report and also the copies of the depositions of the witnesses examined by the Investigating Officer so as to enable the petitioner to cross-examine the Investigation Officer and/or to lead evidences by examining his own witnesses. By way of abundant caution, it is, however, directed that the evidences which have already been adduced in the case will remain on the record but the petitioner will be entitled to cross-examine the Investigating Officer once more after obtaining the aforesaid copies of the documents as indicated hereinbefore. The petitioner will also be entitled to examine the defence witnesses and the Enquiring Officer is directed to issue summons if the petitioner prays for issuing such summons to the defence witnesses. The petitioner will also be entitled to examine the defence witnesses and the Enquiring Officer is directed to issue summons if the petitioner prays for issuing such summons to the defence witnesses. If the defence witnesses do not appear on the date fixed, the Enquiring Officer may shift the date of hearing so that the petitioner can bring those witnesses on the next date of hearing, but in such circumstances it will be the responsibility of the petitioner to bring his own witnesses. As the matter is pending for a long time, it is directed that the departmental proceeding should be concluded as expeditiously as practicable preferably within three months from the date of the receipt of this order. The Rule is, accordingly, disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.