JUDGMENT 1. - This is a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. filed by 12 accused petitioners for quashing the order passed by Additional Munsif Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Bharatpur dated November 17, 1979 taking cognizance against the petitioners under Section 342 I.P.C. and also to set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Bharatpur dated April 21, 1980 whereby he dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners. 2. The brief facts leading to this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C are that Smt. Shanti complainant non-petitioner filed a complaint before the learned Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate. Bharatpur on 24 12-1977 under Sections 341, 342, 364, 367, 179 302 I.P.C. It was alleged in the complaint that on 10-12-1977 the accused petitioners along with two others forcefully took away her husband from his field. The complainant suspected that the accused petitioners had killed her husband. On this complaint, the learned Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate sent the case for investigation to the police under Section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The police after investigation found the allegations baseless and submitted a final report. It appears that the learned Munsif Magistrate accepted the final report vide order dated 30th May, 1978 as alleged by the accused petitioners, but that order has not been placed on record. The complainant in the mean time had filed a second complaint on the same facts on 11-5-1978. The learned trial court thereafter adjourned the case from time to time on the ground that case diary of the case was necessary to be examined. The case diary was ultimately received on 21-3-1979. Thereafter the case was posted for recording the statement of the complainant and her witnesses. After recording the statement of the complainant and some of the witnesses, the trial court registered a case under Section 342 I.P.C. against the accused by his order dated November 17, 1979. The petitioners aggrieved against the aforesaid order filed a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Bharatpur. The main contention raised by the accused petitioners in revision before the learned Sessions Judge was that the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance of the case as the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr. P.C. had already expired. The petitioners aggrieved against the aforesaid order filed a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Bharatpur. The main contention raised by the accused petitioners in revision before the learned Sessions Judge was that the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance of the case as the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr. P.C. had already expired. The contention raised was that the offence under Section 342 I.P.C was punishable with imprisonment for one year and according to Sub-Section (2) Clause (b) of Section 468 Cr.P.C., no court shall take cognizance after a period of one year. The date of offence being dated 10-12-1977, the learned trial court was not competent to take cognizance on 17-11-1979, which was obviously after a period of one year. The learned Sessions Judge however, did not agree with the contention raised by the accused petitioners and held that the Magistrate was competent to extend the period of limitation under Section 473 Cr.P.C. and in the present case the delay was caused in getting the case diary and the complainant was not at fault. The accused petitioners have now filed this petition under Section 482 for quashing the orders of the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge taking cognizance against the petitioners under Section 342 I.P.C. 3. It is contended by Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners that no reasons were given by the learned Magistrate in his order dated 17-11-1979 for extending the period of limitation and the order was passed without applying mind. It is also contended that the learned Sessions Judge was not right in making out the grounds that the extension of the period of limitation under Section 473, which were not contained in the order of the learned Magistrate. According to learned counsel, the provision of Section 468 laying down the period of limitation were mandatory and no court could have taken cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation of one year in this case, unless the trial court was satisfied for extending the period of limitation and had passed a judicial order under Section 473. According to-learned counsel the order of the learned Magistrate dated 17-11-1979 was thus, patently illegal and without jurisdiction and was liable to be quashed. Reliance is placed on Krishna Sanghi and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 Cr. L.J. 90. According to-learned counsel the order of the learned Magistrate dated 17-11-1979 was thus, patently illegal and without jurisdiction and was liable to be quashed. Reliance is placed on Krishna Sanghi and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 Cr. L.J. 90. wherein it was held that natural justice demands that the accused persons must be heard before passing an order under Section 473, as an order under this Section is bound to affect a valuable right which accrues to the accused and which cannot be allowed to be taken away lightly. Reliance is also placed on Hasim Abdul Halim v. Syed Ellahi Buksh and another, 1979 Cr. L.J NOC 140 (Cal.) in which learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court had observed that there must be an order by the Court indicating that Section 473 was considered and as the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who took cognizance of the offence gave no such indication and it was not open to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to entertain it. 4. On the other hand Mr. Garg, appearing on behalf of the complainant raised an objection that the accused petitioners having filed a revision before the learned Sessions Judge had no right to file a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. in this Court. It is contended that Section 397(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code was a for entertaining such petition According to learned counsel only one revision could be filed and the present petition was nothing else than a second revision and the accused petitioners were not entitled to circumvent the law by styling the present petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. which in substance was nothing else than a second petition. Learned counsel placed reliance on Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh and another, AIR 1979 S.C. 381 and Ghandra Kalia Devi v. The State of Bihar and another, 1980 Cr.L.J. 329. 5. I shall first deal with this objection raised by learned counsel for the complainant. There can be no dispute that under Section 397(3) if an application for revision has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person can be entertained by the other of them Thus, in case a party has already approached the Sessions Court, it is clear from the language of Sub-Section (3) of Section 397 Cr. P.C. that no revision petition shall be maintainable in the High Court. It is also correct that an application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. filed in the High Court is merely styled as such, but its real purpose and intention to file a second revision, which would certainly be a circumvention of the provision, of Sub Section (3) of Section 397 Cr. P.C. and such petition would not be maintainable. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also observed in Jagir Singh case (Supra) as under : "The object of S. 397(3) is the prevent a multiple exercise of revisional powers and to secure early finality to orders. Any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior Criminal Court is given the option to approach either the Sessions Judge or the High Court and once he exercises the option he is precluded from invoking the revisional jurisdiction of other authority. The language of Section 397(3) is clear and peremptory and it does not admit of any other interpretation." The above authority, however, does not lay down that High Courts have no power or jurisdiction, to entertain an application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. under their inherent powers. The point to be seen is whether in such circumstances a petition under Section 482 Cr. P C. is at all maintainable or not. In my view, the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C are not controlled by Section 397 Cr. P.C. Of course, it is true that while exercising inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P C., the powers of the High Court are limited, and the same can be exercised in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure ends of justice or to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the cuds of justice. The powers can be resorted to if there were no specific provisions in the Code for redressing of the grievances of the aggrieved party. It is also true that such powers should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and in a case where there is no express bar of law in exercising such power. It is also true that such powers should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and in a case where there is no express bar of law in exercising such power. The Lordships of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 S.C. 47 . have laid down the following principles to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court : (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code." Thus, subject to the above principles annunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, I am of opinion that if in a given case, the High Court is satisfied that the case falls within the purview of its inherent power, it can pass suitable and appropriate order in the exercise of its inherent power. It is a different matter that on the merits of the case, the High Court may be satisfied or not to exercise its inherent power, but I am not prepared to held that there is an absolute bar on the powers of the High Court to entertain a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in a case where a party has field a revision in the Sessions Court and thereafter moved a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. in the High Court. 6. Mr. Gagr, next contended that in any case the learned trial court had jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation under Section 473 Cr.P.C. It is not absolutely necessary to pass an order only after receiving an application for extension of the period of limitation. P.C. in the High Court. 6. Mr. Gagr, next contended that in any case the learned trial court had jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation under Section 473 Cr.P.C. It is not absolutely necessary to pass an order only after receiving an application for extension of the period of limitation. It is contended that in the present case the complainant was not at fault in as match as the present complaint was filed on 11-5-1978 which was well within a period of one year, and if the trial court itself adjourned the case from time to time in order to see the case diary, the complainant cannot be blamed for any delay occasioned on this account. The case diary was received on 21-3-1979 and thereafter the petitioner examined her self and other witnesses and the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance on 17-11-79 automatically shows that the trial Court had condoned the delay and had extended the period of limitation. It is no doubt true that the accused petitioners were not heard by the trial Court, but that would not occasion a failure of justice as the accused petitioners were to appear only after passing of this order dated 17-11-1979 and the question of hearing them before this date did not arise. In any case it is submitted that the accused petitioners have been heard on this ground by the Sessions Judge, who has assigned good and valid reasons for condoning the delay and there was no ground and justification for exercising the inherent powers of the Court to quash the orders passed by the lower Courts. 7. Mr. Gupta has cited Krishna Sanghis case (supra). In the aforesaid case, the complaint itself was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed. Another case relied upon by Mr. Gupta is only notes of case and does not contain the full report of the case. From the reading of the facts mentioned in the report, it appears that in that case also complaint itself was barred by limitation under Section 468(2) (c) Cr P.C. In the case in hand, admittedly the complaint was field on 11-5-1978 well within the period of limitation. Thereafter, the case was adjourned to 21-3 1979 by the Court itself in order to examine the case diary and till then the period of one year had already expired. Thereafter, the case was adjourned to 21-3 1979 by the Court itself in order to examine the case diary and till then the period of one year had already expired. Thereafter the complainant examined herself and other witnesses and the cognizance was taken on 17-11-1979. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the complainant alone was guilty for the expiry of the period of limitation. In the case relied upon by Mr. Gupta, it has been observed that Section 473 Cr.P C. should also be liberally construed like Section 5 of the Limitation Act, so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to the prosecutor, but cannot be construed too liberally, because the Government is the prosecutor or prosecution is upon police report. In the facts of the case before me, there was no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides on the part of the complainant, and if in these circumstances the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance, it cannot be said that the order itself was totally without jurisdiction or should be set aside merely on the ground that no reasons have been recorded for extending the period of limitation. The learned Sessions Judge has also assigned good and valid reasons for extending the period of limitation on the ground that the complainant was not at fault, and in my view, it is not a fit case in which this Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the order of the courts below. 8. In the result, this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. fails and is dismissed.Petition Dismissed. *******