Judgment Sharad Manohar, J.:---This is an application filed by the original complainant invoking this Court's power under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 227 of the Constitution of India in connection with the order passed by the learned Trial Magistrate dated 3-3-1980 upon the complainant's application requesting the Court not to allow the accused to indulge in any rambling and scandalising cross-examination. 2. It is necessary to state briefly the facts out of which the present application arises :--- (a) The petitioner, original complainant (who will be referred to hereinafter as ''complainant'') has two sons Prithwiraj and Pushpendra. Prithwiraj has let out certain premises consisting of ground floor and first floor to respondent No. 1 (who will be referred to hereinafter as ''accused No. 1). It appears that Pushpendra is also the owner of some other building. He had let out certain premises in the said building to accused No. 2 in the year 1970, Prithwiraj had filed Regular Suit No. 135/77 against accused No. 1 for the recovery of possession of the ground floor and first floor premises in the building belonging to him. The suit was partly decreed on 31-7-73 and accused No. 1 was ordered to hand over possession of the first floor premises to said Prithwiraj. So far as the ground floor premises were concerned the suit was dismissed. Both the parties being aggrieved by the said decree filed two independent appeals to the District Court. But both the appeals came to be dismissed. Ultimately special civil applications were filed by both the parties but even these special civil applications were dismissed by this Court in the year 1976. The position, therefore, was finalised in this way that accused No. 1 became liable to hand over possession of the first floor premises to the decree-holder Prithwiraj whereas he became entitled to retain ground floor premises as before. (b) On 31-12-1975, Prithwiraj filed Darkhast No. 140 of 1975 for possession of the first floor premises in the said building. Accused No. 1 filed his defence raising two contentions. Firstly he contended that in addition to the ground floor premises and the first floor premises a loft had been let out to him which existed on the first floor. His contention was that there was no decree passed so far as loft was concerned. Accused No. 1 filed his defence raising two contentions. Firstly he contended that in addition to the ground floor premises and the first floor premises a loft had been let out to him which existed on the first floor. His contention was that there was no decree passed so far as loft was concerned. He, therefore, contended that since he was entitled to retain the possession of the ground floor because no decree in that behalf was passed and also of the loft because not even a suit in that behalf was filed, he was entitled to have access to the loft. He contended that at present the access to the loft was from the first floor. But since the first floor premises had to be handed over to the landlord it was necessary that the landlord should carve out an access from the first floor to the loft and until he had done so he was entitled to retain possession of the first floor as well. He second contention was that the decree even in respect of the first floor was obtained by the landlord by practising fraud upon him in as much as the landlord had concealed from the Court the fact that he had several other premises of his own in the City of Nandurbar, where the suit premises were situate. The connection was that if this fact was made known to the Court the decree for possession which was passed by the Court on the ground of the landlord's bona fide requirements would not have been passed by the Court. (c) During the pendency of the said Darkhast an application was made by the accused No. 1 for transfer of the said Darkhast to some other Court. But ultimately the transfer application was dismissed by the District Court. (d) The two impugned documents giving rise to this complaint were filed in the said Darkhast by present accused No. 1 who was the judgment debtor in the said Darkhast proceedings. The first document that he filed was his own application supported by the affidavit. In the said application he made a statement against Prithwiraj that he never require the premises in question for his own residence at all and that he was pressing with the demand for possession only with a view to harass accused No. 1 and with a view to damage to him. In the said application he made a statement against Prithwiraj that he never require the premises in question for his own residence at all and that he was pressing with the demand for possession only with a view to harass accused No. 1 and with a view to damage to him. It was further stated that the decree holder Prithwiraj was instigating others in the village to cause damage to the house. By the said application he therefore, prayed that execution of the Darkhast should be stayed pending Regular Suit No. 225/76 filed by him separately i.e. to say pending the final disposal of his application for interim injunction filed by his in the said suit. Along with the said application, he also produced an affidavit of accused No. 2. The fact that he was producing the said affidavit was stated by him in the application itself. The application is supported by the affidavit of accused No. 1. The other document that he filed in the said Darkhast on the said date i.e. 16-9-1976 is none other than the affidavit referred to above. That affidavit is sworn by accused No. 2 Before I set out the contentions of the said affidavit which are alleged to the defamatory, it is necessary to set out how the accused No. 2 comes into picture. (e) As already mentioned above, accused No. 2 was the tenant in the house which is owned by Pushpendra, the other son of the present complainant. He too had filed a suit against accused No. 2 and had also obtained decree for possession against him. In fact he even executed the decree and evicted accused No. 2 from the premises. It was thereafter that the above mentioned affidavit was sworn by accused No. 2. It purports to have been sworn on 21-8-1976, in the first instance. The affidavit with identical contends is sworn by him on 10-9-1976. In the affidavit, it is stated that he was evicted by Pushpendra fraudulently. It is further stated in the said affidavit that the present complainant who is the father of the said Pushpendra had approached accused No. 2 and had instigated him to set fire to the house of accused No. 1 since accused No. 1 was not giving the possession of the shop premises on the ground floor. It is further stated in the said affidavit that the present complainant who is the father of the said Pushpendra had approached accused No. 2 and had instigated him to set fire to the house of accused No. 1 since accused No. 1 was not giving the possession of the shop premises on the ground floor. The affidavit further stated that the complainant was offering him a drum of petrol for setting fire to the said shop premises in the possession of accused No. 1. It is further stated that a sum of Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 4,000/- was offered to him for doing that work. A further offer is alleged to have been made to accused No. 2 that if the house of accused No. 1 was set on fire by him an accommodation would also be given to accused No. 2. The affidavit further went on to state that since accused No. 2 had not acceded to the desire of the complainant, several kinds of the threats were being given to him of liquidating him and his family. Several kinds of illegalities were alleged against the complainant in the said affidavits. It was further stated that he was not paying property tax and income tax and was cheating the Government. Desire was expressed in the said affidavit, stating that the complainant was a traitor, that an enquiry should be made against him through the Intelligence Department, and that the proceedings under MISA should be taken against him. Several other serious allegation were made in the said affidavit and ultimately it was stated that his life was in danger and that protection should be given to him. The affidavit which is signed on 10-9-1976 is sworn in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Nandurbar. But the affidavit itself states that information contained in the affidavit had been communicated to as many as nine authorities. They are as follows :--- 1. The Hon'ble Chief Minister Shri Shankarrao Chavan. 2. The Hon'ble Minister for Home and Forest. 3. DIG Nasik. 4. District Magistrate, Dhulia. 5. Income Tax Officer, Dhulia. 6. Inspector of Police, Dhulia. 7. Sub-Inspector of Police, Nandurbar. 8. Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies Nandurbar. 9. Anti Corruption Officer, Bombay. 3. It is stated that the contends of the affidavit were communicated to the said Authorities on 30-6-1976. 2. The Hon'ble Minister for Home and Forest. 3. DIG Nasik. 4. District Magistrate, Dhulia. 5. Income Tax Officer, Dhulia. 6. Inspector of Police, Dhulia. 7. Sub-Inspector of Police, Nandurbar. 8. Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies Nandurbar. 9. Anti Corruption Officer, Bombay. 3. It is stated that the contends of the affidavit were communicated to the said Authorities on 30-6-1976. It is, therefore, clear that the affidavit filed by the accused No. 2, in Regular Darkhast No. 140/75, dated 10-9-76 was nothing but the copy of the application made by accused No. 2 to the various above mentioned Authorities. This affidavit of accused No. 2 was filed by accused No. 1 in support of his application which is already referred to above. 4. The said affidavit was filed by accused No. 2 also in another proceeding viz. Regular Suit No. 225 of 1976. The said suit was filed by accused No. 1 against Prithwiraj and the relief claimed in the said suit was identical one as is claimed by accused No. 1 in Regular Darkhast No. 140/75. In the said suit it is alleged that the landlord had fraudulently obtained decree for eviction against accused No. 1 on the ground of his bona fide personal requirements. The contention in the suit is that the said decree has been obtained by Prithwiraj by practising fraud upon the Court in as much as Prithwiraj was having several other premises of his own in the city of Nandurbar and hence was not entitled to claim possession of and obtain a decree for the suit premises in Regular Suit No. 135 of 1970. 5. It is the contention of the complainant that the above two affidavits which were filed by accused Nos. 1 and 2 in the two above mentioned proceedings were wholly unwarranted and a number of allegations made in the said affidavit were of highly defamatory character and they were filed in the said proceedings although they were of no warrant and relevance whatsoever in the said proceedings. It is in these circumstances that the complainant filed the above mentioned complaint against the accused complaining the commission of offence under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code against them. The said complaint was filed on 27-9-1976 and it was numbered as Criminal Case No. 1860 of 1976. It is in these circumstances that the complainant filed the above mentioned complaint against the accused complaining the commission of offence under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code against them. The said complaint was filed on 27-9-1976 and it was numbered as Criminal Case No. 1860 of 1976. In the said complaint various defamatory statements made by both the accused in the above mentioned two affidavits have been extracted and it is contended that the said defamatory statements have been made by both the accused in furtherance of their common intention of having the reputation of the complainant. Upon this complaint the complainant was examined by the learned Magistrate and process was ordered to issue. Both the accused appeared and denied that they had committed the offence of defamation or any other offence and that is now the proceeding pursuant to the said complaint stated before the learned Magistrate. 6. The application out of which the present petition arose was filed on behalf of the complainant in the following circumstances. As the complainant giving his evidence relating to the above mentioned defamatory documents published by the accused by filing the same in the courts, both the accused started cross-examining the complainant. In the cross-examination questions were asked to the complainant insinuating that he had undervalued his house and had thus cheated the Wealth Tax Authorities. Likewise questions were asked suggesting that he had cheated Sales Tax Authorities as also Municipal Authorities. According to the complainant, this accused rambled on with the plaintiff's cross-examination in the manner and the questions that were asked to the plaintiff were wholly irrelevant apart from being scandalising and or rambling character. On behalf of the complainant the questions were objected to but the learned Judge paid no heads to the objections of the complainant. The learned Judge overruled the objections and allowed the questions to be put to the complainant although they were not only irrelevant but were wholly scandalising and of rambling character and in fact constituted abuse of the process of the Court. The learned Judge overruled the objections and allowed the questions to be put to the complainant although they were not only irrelevant but were wholly scandalising and of rambling character and in fact constituted abuse of the process of the Court. On 3-3-1980 an applications Exhibit 81 was filed by Shri R.V. Desai the learned advocate for the complainant keeping on record the above mentioned grievance of the complainant and requesting the Court that the questions relating to the payment of tax by the complainant and similar questions should no be allowed by the Court and that the rambling cross-examination should be disallowed by the Court. To this application reply was filed on behalf of both the accused on 3-3-1980 itself. The substance of the reply was that the complainant's claim to being an honest tax payer was intended to be disproved by the accused and that this they could very well do by extracting admissions from the complainant in his cross-examination to the effect that in fact he had been indulging in evasion of tax. The reply further stated that it was necessary to have the value of the complainant's property to be on record so that the massive evasion of wealth tax on his part could be proved. It was contended that according to the accused though the complainant had paid wealth tax dues, he had not given the correct picture of his wealth, that he had under valued his properties and that, hence, it was necessary to ask him questions relating to the correct value of the properties owned by him. The contentions was that in this context these questions were relevant question; hence it was prayed that the application be rejected. 7. Upon this application the Court passed an order on the same date i.e. on 3-3-1980. The learned Judge took the view that the accused were perfectly within their rights to ask the questions in the cross-examination with a view to elicit from the complainant the fact that the complainant had avoided payment of taxes. He observed that in these circumstances the questions were perfectly relevant questions. The learned Judge observed that the Court would consider any objection raised at any time in future in the cross-examination. He observed that in these circumstances the questions were perfectly relevant questions. The learned Judge observed that the Court would consider any objection raised at any time in future in the cross-examination. The Court further observed that no finding could be given nor it could be anticipated as to what sort of questions could not be put by the accused in the further cross-examination of the complainant. The learned Judge, therefore, observed that nothing manifestly objectionable as such, could be found by the Court at that stage. 8. The decision of this Court regarding the scope of the cross-examination in the case of (Baburao Patel v. Bal Thackray)1, reported in 1977 U.C.R. (Bom.) 371 : 1979 Maharashtra Law Journal page 11, was relied upon on behalf of the complainant before the learned Judge. The learned Judge; however, observed that the circumstances in the present case were entirely different from those obtaining in Baburao Patel's case. It was argued before the learned Judge that the questions asked to the complainant might unnecessarily embarrass him although they were of no relevance whatsoever so far as the matter in issue was concerned. The learned Magistrate, however, observed that if that was the position he could not help it. He observed that if such questions were disallowed the very purpose of the cross-examination would be defeated. With this reasoning, therefore, he rejected the complainant's said application and ordered the case to proceed. 9. It is necessary to mention here that in support of his contention that the rambling cross-examination in which the learned advocate for the accused was indulging was not warranted by the provisions of the Evidence Act, very strong reliance was placed by the learned advocate for the complainant on the judgment of the Division Bench of the Court in the case of Baburao Patel v. Bal Thackray. I will presently refer to and discuss at length the said decision and the principal of law laid down therein. At this stage however, it is necessary to point out that the learned Judge decided not to follow the said judgment of this Court on the ground that the circumstances in the present case are entirely different and that the questions put so far are relevant. He has however taken no pains to indicate as to how the case before the Division Bench was in principle different from the present case 10. He has however taken no pains to indicate as to how the case before the Division Bench was in principle different from the present case 10. Being aggrieved by the order dated 3-3-1980 passed by the learned Magistrate, the complainant has filed this application before this Court invoking its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. The contention of Mr. Gumaste, the learned Counsel appearing for the complainant before me is that the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Baburao Patel's case completely covers the positions in the present case. He produced before me the entire oral evidence of the complainant so far recorded including the cross-examination by the accused and contended that mere perusal of the cross-examination would show that if there was any instance of abuse of liberty given to the cross-examining Counsel by section 146 of the Evidence Act, this was the one. In this contention he firstly relied upon the observations of this Court in the above mentioned judgment in Baburao Patel's case which are as follows :--- ''The assault or character of a witness permitted by Clause (3) of section 146 of Evidence Act must be directed only for the purpose of shaking the credit of the witness and not for any other purpose. If the cross-examination is intended to shake the credit of the witness it must naturally be to impugn the credibility of that witness in relating to the matter which is involved and relevant under one or the other provisions of the Evidence Act. It is not permissible to have recourse to section 146(3) of Evidence Act to ask all sorts of questions which are not necessary to shake the credibility of that witness. The permission given under section 146(3)' cannot be allowed to degenerate into a licence for purpose of shaking the character of a witness indiscriminately. Clause (3) of section 146 does not open the gates to unbridled cross-examination of a witness in order to assail his character except in so far as it is necessary to shake his credit in relation to the matter in issue. Clause (3) of section 146 does not open the gates to unbridled cross-examination of a witness in order to assail his character except in so far as it is necessary to shake his credit in relation to the matter in issue. Questions cannot be asked for the purpose of scandalising and embarrassing the witness." He pointed out that the questions which are being asked and are being allowed to be asked to the complainant in cross-examination are not only irrelevant in the context of matter which is in issue and relevant under the provisions of the Evidence Act, but are also ex facie scandalising and embarrassing without being in any way connected with the matter in issue or facts in issue. The substance of his contention is that the case of the accused is not going to be further improved whatever might be the reply given by the complainant to these questions. But the questions are certainly such which unnecessarily embarrass and scandalise the complainant. For example he took me through the evidence of the complainant in cross-examination which showed that the Counsel for the accused were not satisfied with the evidence given by the complainant in his examination-in chief relating to the fact that he had filed his Income-tax returns and Wealth tax returns. He stated that he did file his Income-tax returns, wealth tax returns and Sales-tax returns, that he had been assessed for the said tax on the basis of the said returns and that he had in fact also paid the taxes. In cross-examination the complainant was further asked the questions with a view to elicit that the information that he had given to the Sales Tax Authorities, Income Tax Authorities and the Wealth Tax Authorities was in fact false information. Mr. Gumaste's argument as regards these questions is two fold. His first contention is that such questions cannot be asked to any witness in any proceeding other than in the proceedings under the Income Tax Act. However, in view of the fact that I have accepted his second contention, I wish to express no opinion on this contention. 12. Mr. Gumaste's argument as regards these questions is two fold. His first contention is that such questions cannot be asked to any witness in any proceeding other than in the proceedings under the Income Tax Act. However, in view of the fact that I have accepted his second contention, I wish to express no opinion on this contention. 12. His second argument in this behalf is that whatever might be the answers given by these witnesses to these questions, the answers are not going to be help full to the accused in any manner whatever, because form the answers at the most it might be elicited that the complainant had been amiss in the matter of payment of his tax. But in order to wriggle out of the liability incurred by the accused regarding defamations as is patently manifest from the above mentioned two documents, it is not enough for the accused to show or prove that the statements made in the said documents were true. It is further necessary that there existed some circumstances and reasons which justified the making of such statements. The contention is really very simple. The contention is that this is a case of statement which are per se defamatory. The fact that these statements have been made by the accused is not in dispute at all. The question of believing or not believing these statements, therefore, does not arise. No doubt the complainant has sought to give evidence to the effect that the statements made by the accused in the said two documents were false. But even if he had led no evidence as regards the correctness or incorrectness or about truth or falsehood of these statements, still in view of the fact that the statements are defamatory per se, the accused would be hard pressed to satisfy the Court that the making of such statements was protected or justified by some one or the other provisions of the Penal Code. For this purpose the credibility or incredibility of the complainant was of no relevance. I may state here that even while assenting that the question whether the accused had committed the offence or not was not the question arising for my consideration of this Court in these proceedings. Mr. For this purpose the credibility or incredibility of the complainant was of no relevance. I may state here that even while assenting that the question whether the accused had committed the offence or not was not the question arising for my consideration of this Court in these proceedings. Mr. Agrawal, the learned Advocate appearing for accused No. 1, made a clean breast of the fact that if this was a case of defamation per se, the accused were claiming protection under Exception No. 3 and 9 of section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and under no other exception to the section. This being the position Mr. Gumaste, pointed out that so far as the defamatory character of the statement was concerned, this was a case of nothing but defamation per se. We have just to read the two documents to be satisfied that they are patently of defamatory character and no evidence as such would be required to be led by any person for proving the defamatory meaning of the statement. No amount of challenge to the voracity of the complainant's evidence or to the credibility of his evidence would make even a whit of difference in the ultimate inevitable conclusion that the said statements are patently defamatory. Cross-examining the complainant on the question of the defamatory character of the statements, is, therefore, wholly without any purpose. The question then arises; how is the present cross-examination of the complainant related to the right of the accused to invoke Exceptions Nos. 3 and 9 of section 499 Indian Penal Code? Assembly, the cross-examination aims at establishing that the imputations was true, may be that they were also defamatory. The contention of the accused has consistently been that it is open for them to elicit from the complainant by cross-examining him that the statements made by the accused in the said two documents were true statements. Mr. Gumaste contends, and to my mind with quite some force, that for considering this section it is necessary to consider as to what is the matter in issue in this litigation. The expression matter in issue is no doubt somewhat vague expression. What the matter in issue is will depend upon the facts, denials, assertions, allegations and reliefs prayed for in each case. The expression matter in issue is no doubt somewhat vague expression. What the matter in issue is will depend upon the facts, denials, assertions, allegations and reliefs prayed for in each case. So far as the heart case is concerned what the matter in issue is has got to be decided in the context of the fact that the statements were made by the accused not before any appropriate authorities and not with a view to get relevant reliefs but in totally irrelevant proceedings and were statements defamatory per se. Mr. Gumaste contends with quite some force that if the self some statements relating to the alleged tax evasion on the part of the complainant were made before the Tax Authorities, the statements might have been protected by Exception 8 or Exception 9 provided of course they were proved to have been made in good faith. Likewise, if the statements were made, say, in some newspaper, in the context of the larger public issue, they would, in certain cases be protected by Exception 3, provided, again that they were made in good faith, and were expressions of opinions. However, the position in the present case is that the defamatory statements have been made before the Court for no reason whatsoever and without any purpose whatsoever except of course for the purpose of defaming and scandalising the complainant. The only matter in issue, therefore, in this case is as to whether the defamatory statement is in any way saved by the provisions of Exception 3 or Exception 9 of said section 499. Under Exception 3, all that the accused is required to prove is that he had expressed his opinion in good faith in respect of the conduct of the complainant touching the public question. The word "good faith" as defined in section 52 of the Indian Penal Code which reads as follows :--- "Nothing is said to be done or believed in 'good faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention". It is, therefore, necessary for the accused to prove that they have made these statements with due care and caution. Mr. Gumaste rightly asked the question to himself as to how that "due care and caution" of their own be proved by the accused with the help of all those scandalising questions to the complainant regarding his evasion of tax. It is, therefore, necessary for the accused to prove that they have made these statements with due care and caution. Mr. Gumaste rightly asked the question to himself as to how that "due care and caution" of their own be proved by the accused with the help of all those scandalising questions to the complainant regarding his evasion of tax. He further rightly asked to himself the question as to what was the public question touching which this defamatory statement was made and as to how the cross-examination of the present nature convert that question into a public question. The most that can be elicited from such cross-examination is that the complainant had in the past indulged in tax evasion. That at the most proves truth of the impugned statements, neither the public character of the statement nor the "due care and attention" on the part of the accused. The second part of the defamatory character of the statement relates to instigation given by the complainant to accused No. 2, to set fire to the ground floor premises of accused No. 1. Exception 3 relates only to the statements of opinion whatever in respect of the conduct of any person touching any public question. The instigation to set fire to the house of accused No. 1, cannot in the first instance, be considered to be a public question within the contemplation of 3rd Exception. In the second place, the statement has got to be made in good faith meaning thereby with due care and attention. The question whether accused made the said statement with due care and caution or not could not be found out from any conceivable answer to any question that may be put to the complainant in relation to his tax evasion. 13. I am inclined to accept this contention of Mr. Gumaste. I will refer to the replies given by Mr. Agrawal in this behalf. But I may state at this stage itself that to my mind Mr. Gumaste's contention is based on sound reasoning in the context of the facts of the present case. I will, therefore, elucidate the above points here itself. Gumaste. I will refer to the replies given by Mr. Agrawal in this behalf. But I may state at this stage itself that to my mind Mr. Gumaste's contention is based on sound reasoning in the context of the facts of the present case. I will, therefore, elucidate the above points here itself. The allegations made against the complainant in the said two documents relate to two matters : (a) tax evasion on the part of the complaint, (b) the instigation by complainant to accused No. 2 to set fire accused No. 1's house and to do other acts of hooliganism. So far as the first part of the allegation was concerned if the allegation was made in a newspaper in the context of general discussion relating to tax evasion and if the statement was made by way of expression of opinion by giving instance of tax evasion by the complainant, it is quite likely that the Third Exception would have applied provided it was proved that the expression was in good faith and the question which was discussed was a public question. Likewise Exception No. 8 might have been attracted if the allegations regarding tax evasion was made before some Income-tax Officer of Income-tax Authorities with a view to bring to book the alleged tax evasion. It would have been open for a tax payer or perhaps even any public spirited person to move the Income-tax Authority with a view to invite his attention to the fact that some particular assessee had evaded certain tax. It might turn up in fact there was no evasion made by a tax payer and still the statements made by a public spirited person before Income-tax Authorities might have stand fully protected by 8th Exception provided of course they were made in good faith. Even if the accused were required to make such defamatory statements with a view to protect themselves against some evil results or for public good such defamation might protected by 9th Exception subject of course to the proviso that the said statements were made in the good faith. But in the instant case the statement was made before a Court, in totally irrelevant circumstances. The Court was dealing with the application filed by the complainant for execution of the decree and for recovery of possession of the first floor premises. But in the instant case the statement was made before a Court, in totally irrelevant circumstances. The Court was dealing with the application filed by the complainant for execution of the decree and for recovery of possession of the first floor premises. In these execution proceedings any amount of tax evasion on the part of the complainant or any amount of hooliganism and vandalism on the part of the complainant would be totally irrelevant. Even a tax evader, or hooligan or goonda is entitled to execute a decree obtained by him legitimately and lawfully against any other person. To state in defiance of such execution that the decree holder is a tax evader and goonda or hooligan, is nothing but hurling infectivities at and ventilating the summering rancour and animosity against decree holder. This is nothing but oath and vengeance set at large. Such vent to vengeance is not something which is protected by any of the exception to section 499, far less by Exception Nos. 3, 8 and 9 of the same. 14. Coming to the crux of the matter and to the quintessence of the discussion the point is that in the instant case the cross-examination of the complainant could be directed only for the purpose of showing that the accused fell squarely within the protection given by Exceptions 3 and 9 of section 499. No doubt under section 146 of the Evidence Act, the question can be asked to the witness 1) to test his veracity, 2) to discover who he is and what is his position in life, or 3) to shake his credit, by injuring his character. But in the instant case the veracity of the complainant is relevant only for the purpose of proving defamatory character of the statement. Once it is held that the statement is defamatory per se the question ceases to be a matter in issue at all and also it becomes irrelevant. As regards the attempt to discover the complainant's position in life the matter is not in dispute at all. So far as shaking of the credit of the complainant is concerned, by injuring his character no amount of shaking of his credit would turn the defamatory statement into an innocent statement if the case of the accused does not fall in any of the exceptions to section 499. So far as shaking of the credit of the complainant is concerned, by injuring his character no amount of shaking of his credit would turn the defamatory statement into an innocent statement if the case of the accused does not fall in any of the exceptions to section 499. I have pointed out that in the context of the admitted facts of the instant case the question as to whether the accused are entitled to avail of any of the exceptions to section 499, evidence relating to tax evasion on the part of the complainant is totally irrelevant. 15. In this connection it is necessary to read the provisions of section 146 of the Evidence Act in the light of the provisions of subsequent section 148 of the same. Said section 148 proves as follows :--- "If any such questions relates to a matter not relevant to the suit or proceeding, except in so far as it affects the credit of the witness by injuring his character, the Court shall decide whether or not the witness shall be compelled to answer it, and may, if it thinks fit, warn the witness that he is not obliged to answer it. In exercising its discretion, the Court shall have regard to the following considerations :--- (1) Such questions are proper if they are of such a nature that the truth of the imputation conveyed to them would seriously affect the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter of which he testifies; (2) Such questions are improper if the imputation which they convey relates to matters so remote in time, or of such a character, that the truth of the imputation would not affect or would affect in a light degree, the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter to which he testifies; (3) Such questions are improper if there is a great disproportion between the importance of the imputation made against the witnesses's character and the importance of his evidence; (4) The Court may, if it sees fit, draw, from the witness's refused to answer, the inference that the answer if given would be unfavourable. To my mind, it was necessary for the learned Judge to bear in mind the provisions of said section 148 of the Evidence Act and particularly to the guidelines provided therein. To my mind, it was necessary for the learned Judge to bear in mind the provisions of said section 148 of the Evidence Act and particularly to the guidelines provided therein. So far as guideline No. 1 is concerned, the learned Magistrate should have seen that in the instant case the credibility of the complainant was a measure matter in the context of the facts that the statement made by the accused against him are per se defamatory and that they were evidently made in circumstances which have no bearing to the relief that would be expected by the accused from the making of the said statement. The learned Judge should have seen that whatever the answer the complainant may give to the questions put to him relating to his tax evasion, the fact that the statement was per se defamatory would not be obliterated at all. Guidelines No. 2 under section 148, therefore, would be directly applicable. Moreover, if the statement are per se defamatory and if they do not fall in any of the exception to section 499 the damage that would be caused to the complainant by asking these questions and by eliciting answer to these questions was bound to be disproportionate with the benefit that the accused would get from any answer to such questions. It was on this ground that objection was raised on behalf of the complainant to the said question. To my mind this is a case where the learned Magistrate has thought it fit to wish away these objections. The learned Magistrate has held that the questions were relevant questions, but his thinking in this behalf appears to be too very superficial. An attempt was sought to be made to rely upon the provisions of section 149 of the Evidence Act and it was contended that with a view to show imputations were well founded it was open for the accused to ask the said questions to the complainant. To my mind this is an inverted view of said section 149. The said section provides that no question as is referred to in section 148 should be asked unless the person asking the question has reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation is well founded. The contention was that by cross-examining the complainant the foundation of the imputation would be elicited. The said section provides that no question as is referred to in section 148 should be asked unless the person asking the question has reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation is well founded. The contention was that by cross-examining the complainant the foundation of the imputation would be elicited. The simple answer is that for asking the question it is not enough that imputation is well founded. What is further and imperatively necessary is that the statement is made either in good faith and for the public good or for the protection of the person making it. I may repeat that this question has also to be decided in the context of the question as to before which forum the defamatory statement is made. If the statement was made by the accused before the Tax Authorities, it may be that the complainant would have no recourse to section 499 and section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, but if chooses the forum such as the Court for making the statement for no rhyme or reason, neither public good nor the personal protection of the accused is any way furthered. In such case the accused becomes entitled to avail of none of the exceptions to said section 499. To allow the accused to indulge in further cross-examination of the complainant the only fruit of which would be that the accused would have the mental and spiritual satisfaction of having made further imputations against the character of the complainant without any corresponding benefit to the accused is nothing but adding insult to the injury. Such cross-examination is not at all warranted either by the provisions of section 146 of the Evidence Act read with section 148 of the Act or under section 149 of the Act. 16. At this stage I may make a brief reference to the distinction between civil and criminal liability of a person guilty of defamation. In the case of civil liability for defamation, proof of truth of the defamatory statement is a complete defence. In a case where the plaintiff comes to the Court alleging that certain defamatory statement has been made against him by the defendant, he has to plead not only the fact that the statement is defamatory but also that it is a false. The position in criminal law, however, is entirely different. In a case where the plaintiff comes to the Court alleging that certain defamatory statement has been made against him by the defendant, he has to plead not only the fact that the statement is defamatory but also that it is a false. The position in criminal law, however, is entirely different. Even a cursory perusal of the provisions of section 499 of the Indian Penal Code is enough to show that truth of the defamatory statement is no defence to the charge of defamation. It is worthwhile to set out the operation provisions of section 499 in this behalf. Section 499 runs as follows :--- "Whoever, by words either spoken to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person." It will thus be seen that mere publication of the imputation which results in causing harm to the reputation of any person constitutes an offence. It is not necessary that the imputation should be a false imputation. The operative part of the section 499 does not refer to the truth or falsehood of the imputation at all. The scheme of section 499 is that criminal law not only looks down with disfavour upon a false statement being made against any person injuring his reputation, but even true statements against him relating to his character are looked down upon with disfavour if they unwarrantedly harm or injure his reputation. In other words the criminal law looks down upon the act of washing the dirty lines of respectable persons in the public . Even person has got his own right of privacy, to his reputation and to the protection of his public image. It may be that for the public goods it might be sometime necessary to reveal the true character of the person. But revelation of such character only with a view to seek vengeance against the person is not something which is looked upon by the criminal law with approbation. It may be that for the public goods it might be sometime necessary to reveal the true character of the person. But revelation of such character only with a view to seek vengeance against the person is not something which is looked upon by the criminal law with approbation. That is the precise reason why not only in the operative provision of section 499 but even in the explanation thereof as well as in the exceptions carved therefrom, not a word is found even to have been whispered that mere truth of the defamatory allegations against the injured person offers to the maker of the allegations any shield or protection. As a matter of fact what in protected is furtherance of public good and preservation of self interest. Reference to Exception 1 to section 499 in this connection will be fruitful. Said Exception No. 1 makes true statement immuue from liability but only if the same is made for public not on account personal vendetta. On the other hand even an incorrect statement made with public good in mind or with protection of personal interest in mind will be protected by the exceptions to section 499. I am deliberately using the word incorrect statement and am avoiding the user of the word "false statement". 17. To my mind the antithesis of the expression "truth" in the context of the scheme of section 499 is not falsehood. In the instant case even if an incorrect statement was made by the accused regarding the tax evasion by the complainant, even such incorrect statement would have been fully protected, if the statement was made, say before the Tax Authorities, with larger public interest in mind. On the other hand even a true statement made without the public good in mind or without the motive of self protection would be exposed to criminal liability. 18. The long and short of the above discussion is that all that is sought to be elicit by cross-examining the complainant is the fact that the statements made by the accused, though they are manifestly defamatory of the complainant and they were not actuated by the desire for the public good or for the preservation of the self interest of the accused they were true statements. Such questions are totally irrelevant in the context of the matter in issue. Such questions are totally irrelevant in the context of the matter in issue. The learned Judge's view that the questions are relevant must, therefore, held to be wholly incorrect on the backdrop of the admitted facts and circumstances of the case. 19. This brings me to the arguments strenuously advanced by Mr. Agrawal in support of the view taken by the learned magistrate. His first argument is that the matter in issue in the case is not only the question as to whether the case of the accused falls in any of the exceptions or not. His contention is that in the first instance it must be seen as to whether the complainant has made good his case about the application of operative portion of section 499 or not. Mr. Agrawal was not prepared to agree that the statements made by the accused in the said affidavit were defamatory per se. To my mind his argument is an argument of desperation. The gist of the documents is already set out above. If any person has even a cursory look at them, he will notice that their defamatory character not only sticks and protrudes out of the said documents but strikes the reader in his face. If saying that a person, in affluent circumstances, belonging to a respectable family of business men is a tax evader, a traitor, is indulging activities harmful to the Country, is a person deserving to be detained under MISA, is a person indulging in activities of goondaism and hooliganism, is a person instigating others to set fire to the property belonging to the accused are not defamatory per se, then the expression defamation per se itself becomes devoid of any contend. The argument of Mr. Agrawal on this point, therefore, needs just to be stated to be rejected. As argument on similar lines was also advanced by Mr. S.M. Paranjpe, learned Advocate appearing for accused No. 2. It is unnecessary to deal with the said argument separately. At one stage I did feel that the second argument of Mr. Agrawal is not devoid of some force. But after hearing Mr. Gumaste's reply to the said argument I find that it cannot be accepted in view of the legal position which is already discussed above. I will, therefore, refer to this argument and deal with the same very briefly. Agrawal is not devoid of some force. But after hearing Mr. Gumaste's reply to the said argument I find that it cannot be accepted in view of the legal position which is already discussed above. I will, therefore, refer to this argument and deal with the same very briefly. The contention that he was ingenuously advanced is that the complainant has himself taken upon him the responsibility of proving that he is a most innocent and diligent taxpayer. This means that according to the complainant the statement made by the accused in the two documents were false statement. Mr. Agrawal, therefore, contends that the complainant has got to be cross-examined to show that he is not an honest tax payer and that he is a chronic and investerate tax-evader. Mr. Agrawal contends that this could be done only by subjecting the complainant to an elaborate cross-examination with a view to prove instances showing his ingenious or mass scale tax evasion. Mr. Agrawal contends that if the accused were not allowed to be cross-examined the complainant on this point, it would mean that the fact that the complainant is not a tax-evader has been admitted by the accused and in that case it would follow that the allegations made by the accused in the said two main documents were false allegations. Mr. Agrawal, therefore, further contended that by not cross-examining the complainant on this point, the accused would be practically admitting the falsehood of their imputations containing in the said two documents and in that case it would be impossible for the accused to contend that these imputations were made by the accused in good faith. As a matter of fact Mr. Agrawal advanced even a broader argument to the effect that if any statement is made by the complainant in his evidence the accused had a birth right to cross-examine the complainant on that point, whether the cross-examination was conductive to any benefit to the cross-examining party or not. 20. The answer to this contention of Mr. Agrawal will be sufficiently found in the analysis already given above and the law relating to defamation. In the first place, the truth or accuracy of the imputations made by the accused is of very measure relevance in criminal trials. 20. The answer to this contention of Mr. Agrawal will be sufficiently found in the analysis already given above and the law relating to defamation. In the first place, the truth or accuracy of the imputations made by the accused is of very measure relevance in criminal trials. I have already pointed out that even if the imputations were true, still making imputation before an irrelevant authority is unwarranted and hence not protected. On the contrary, in certain circumstances, even incorrect imputations would be protected if they were made before appropriate authorities in the interest of public good or in the interest of self protection. 21. It is true that no person is entitled to make false imputation as such. By false, it is meant that the person makes incorrect imputations knowing fully well that they were incorrect. If a person believes the wrong statements to be correct statements, he would not be guilty of making any false statements. But if he makes a statement which he himself knows to be incorrect then obviously he had made a false statement and such statement could not be treated as being made in good faith. To that extent, it could be said that it would be necessary for the accused to prove his good faith by showing that the statement were not false statements. But for the purpose of showing that he had not made false statement it is not necessary at all for him to show that the statements are true. All that he has to show is that he has genuinely believed them to be correct and further that he made them in the interest of public good or in his personal interest. It is here that the question of sense of proportion envisaged by section 148 arises. The guidelines provided by section 148 clearly shows that if the question of accuracy of the imputation statement is not very much relevant, then asking to the complainant all sorts of questions relating to his tax evasion is wholly disproportionate to the relevance of the matter in issue. Mr. Gumaste stated rightly, all that the complainant has stated is that he has paid the taxes as were due and payable by him. But the question as to whether he has really paid taxes or not was not really of very much relevance in any of the proceedings. Mr. Gumaste stated rightly, all that the complainant has stated is that he has paid the taxes as were due and payable by him. But the question as to whether he has really paid taxes or not was not really of very much relevance in any of the proceedings. The question was as to whether the accused had any justification to make a hue and cry before the Court that the complainant had not paid taxes. It is this question which is the matter in issue and it is something inordinately disproportionate to allow the accused to cross-examine the complainant on his various tax liabilities. The above argument of Mr. Agrawal, therefore, has not to be rejected. 22. The next argument of Mr. Agrawal is that this Court should look at the application made by the complainant and say whether any relief could be granted to the present applicant. Mr. Agrawal further wants to know as to whether any fault could be found with the order passed by the Court in relation to the application. He particularly invited my attention to the following observations of the learned Magistrate : "This is an application general and hence a general order is passed that is I mean to say a common order regarding the objections raised so far. The cross-examination was stayed for a short time on this application. Court will consider any objection raised at any time in future in the course of cross-examination, and no finding can be given, nor it can be anticipated as to what sort of questions would be put in further cross-examination. No order can be passed to the effect according to my opinion that the defence Counsel is barred in further cross-examination from asking any questions relating to Income tax or other taxes and it would depend upon the merits of each questions. Suffice is to say that at present stage the application given by the complainant deserves to be rejected." Relying upon these observations of the Lower Court, Mr. Agrawal contended the such question has got to be decided on its own merits and this is what the learned Magistrate has decided to do. He contended that no fault can be found to such approach. 23. I am afraid Mr. Agrawal is taking too very pedestrian view of the order passed by the learned Magistrate. It is true that Mr. He contended that no fault can be found to such approach. 23. I am afraid Mr. Agrawal is taking too very pedestrian view of the order passed by the learned Magistrate. It is true that Mr. Gumaste himself rightly conceded that there cannot be any hard and fast rule regarding the extension or curtailment of the scope of cross-examination. But the point in the instant case is that as a matter of fact the learned Magistrate has allowed the accused to cross-examine the complainant indiscriminately and wantonly. He has expressed opinion in his order which is under challenge before me. He has stated in so many words that all the questions which were put to the complainant by the accused and which were objected to before him and allowed by him were relevant question. I have found that most of the questions are irrelevant questions in the context of the admitted facts in the instant case and in the context particularly of the fact that the imputation are per se defamatory. Evidently when the learned magistrate has stated that he would deal with each question on its own merits what he means to say that if similar questions as are found by him to be relevant and appeared to him to be relevant are asked, he will go on allowing the accused asking these questions. In the first place this would cause in calculators damage to the complainant with on corresponding gain to the accused to all. Consequently this will lead to indefinite protraction of this litigation. From any stand point such a state of things cannot be tolerated by the Court. To the extent to which the learned Magistrate proposed to allow the accused to put to the complainant irrelevant questions such as those mentioned above by the said order, the said order has got to be quashed and set aside and direction has got to be given to the learned Magistrate to restrict the complainant's cross-examination to the reasonable bounds as delineated above. 24. The point is that the provisions of sections 146 to 151 of the Evidence Act have got to be read together and all those sections read as a whole spell out a duty for the Court, viz. the exercise of its sense of proportion. I have already mentioned above that 'truth' by itself, is not a defence to a criminal action for defamation. the exercise of its sense of proportion. I have already mentioned above that 'truth' by itself, is not a defence to a criminal action for defamation. By itself, therefore, it is not a matter in issue in the present case. But 'truth', quite frequently, forms an ingredient of good faith, that is to say, of "due care and attention". The accused can prove that he took due care while making the statement by proving that he took pains to ascertain the truth relating to the statement. Only to this extent truth indirectly becomes, to a slight extent, relevant fact, though not a matter in issue. But there is a further restriction upon the part to be played by "truth" as a defence. Good faith means due care and attention, not due care or attention. Attention connotes circumspection; even truth cannot be stated without circumspection. Truth stated about complainant's tax evasion before Income-tax Authority could be said to have been stated with circumspection. But stated in totally irrelevant proceedings, such as the instant Darkhast proceedings, it could not be said to have been stated with circumspection. 25. Further the accused can prove his good faith, that is to say, his due care and attention, by his own positive evidence. But it is practically inconceivable that he can prove his own good faith, that is to say, his own due care, attention and circumspection by cross-examining the complainant. The scope of cross-examination of the complainant on the point of good faith of accused themselves must, therefore, be from the very nature of things, very limited, and it is in this connection and in this view of the matter the Court has to bring to bear upon this question the sense of proportion. The kind of question asked by the accused to the complainant relating to the truth of their allegations regarding the complainant's tax evasion and the impunity with which he has been allowed to ask the question do not betray the sense of proportion having been brought to bear upon this question by the trial Court. 26. This brings me to the authorities relied upon by Mr. Agrawal in support of his contention that cross-examination facilitated by the learned Magistrate was perfectly legal, valid and necessary. 26. This brings me to the authorities relied upon by Mr. Agrawal in support of his contention that cross-examination facilitated by the learned Magistrate was perfectly legal, valid and necessary. I may state at this stage itself that to my mind, the most relevant authority on this point is one referred to by me above, namely the judgement in Baburao Patel's case. Somehow or the other Mr. Agrawal was quite reluctant to refer to this authority. Initially he wanted to go to other authorities which according to him, applied more squarely to the facts such as the facts in the instant case. He firstly relied upon the judgement of the Calcutta High Court in the case of (Lalmohansingh v. The King)2, reported in A.I.R. 1954, Calcutta, page 339, Mr. Agrawal tried to rely upon the head-note of the said authority which in fact carved out from para 7 of the judgement. The said head-note runs as follows :--- "To say something of a person which holds him to contempt is defamatory. If what is said is true then that is a defence of justification under the exception. On the other hand if there is a doubt as to whether it is true or not, there is no defence at all and as the matter tends to bring the person defamed into contempt it is defamatory under section 500." A short analysis of the facts relating to the said authority and the law laid down by the same would show that reliance by Mr. Agrawal upon this authority is wholly misplaced. The brief facts of the case before the Calcutta High Court were that one Amar Guha was tenant of the complainant. One Sitanath took assistance from said Amar Guha and got himself inducted in the premises without the consent of the complainant landlord. Eventually Sitanath and Amar Guha fell out. It seems that in the absence of Sitanath, Amar Guha took help of some other persons and tried to occupy the premises by force. In those transactions Sitanath's wife and daughter were manhandled and considerable damage was caused to Sitanath's belongings. The accused wrote a letter to the Newspaper Swaraj making allegations that the complainant was behind this entire episode and that a conspiracy existed between the complainant landlord and Amar Guha to evict Sitanath. This was no doubt a serious allegation. In those transactions Sitanath's wife and daughter were manhandled and considerable damage was caused to Sitanath's belongings. The accused wrote a letter to the Newspaper Swaraj making allegations that the complainant was behind this entire episode and that a conspiracy existed between the complainant landlord and Amar Guha to evict Sitanath. This was no doubt a serious allegation. When the complainant filed a complaint in that behalf under section 499 of I.P.C., the defence was that the case of the accused fell in Exception No. 1 to section 499; that in the first place the imputation was true and secondly that it was made for public good. This entire defence was disbelieved by the Court below and the accused was convicted. In revision application it was urged before the High Court that even if the truth of the imputation was not fully established by the accused still it could not be said that the imputation was a wholly false imputation. The contention was that it was somewhat doubtful whether imputation was true or not and hence it was contended that the accused was still entitled to the benefit of Exception No. 1 to section 499. It was this argument which was repelled by the Court and it was in answer to the above argument that the above mentioned observations made by the High Court. In that case the position was that if the imputation was not true whether it was for the public good or not was wholly irrelevant. Establishing of truth either by way of positive evidence or by cross-examination of the complainant would be not only fruitful but wholly necessary in that case. However, the facts in the present case are entirely different. It is nobody's case that Exception No. 1 to section 499 governs the facts of the present case. As a matter of fact it was strenuously argued before me by Mr. Agrawal that he was relying upon Exceptions 3 and 9 only. It is nobody's case that making imputation before a Court in respect of decree holder's application for possession was a publication of imputation in the interest of public good. Such a spurious claim cannot be made and I am happy to say that it has in fact not been made before me or even before the Lower Court. It is nobody's case that making imputation before a Court in respect of decree holder's application for possession was a publication of imputation in the interest of public good. Such a spurious claim cannot be made and I am happy to say that it has in fact not been made before me or even before the Lower Court. If that is the position, the observations made by the Calcutta High Court in the context of provisions of Exception (1) of section 499 are of no relevance in the present case. 27. The second authority relied upon by Mr. Agrawal is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab and another)3, reported in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. at page 97. I really am groping in the dark as to how this authority could have any relevance to the facts of this case. That was a case wherein it was held that the question as to whether the accused proved good faith or not in order to justify application of 9th Exception was a question of fact. It was further held in that case that in order to attract Exception 9 not only good faith but even public good have got to be established. The question relating to the degree of proof required for the purpose of availing of said Exception 9 was also considered in that case. The authority really is of no relevance so far as the present case is concerned. 28. The next authority relied upon by Mr. Agrawal is the judgement of the Supreme Court in (Chamanlal v. The State of Punjab)4, reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. p. 1372. The question before the Supreme Court in that case was practically similar as one in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. page 97. As to what is relevant and what is not relevant was not required to be examined there. The scope and condition of various exceptions fell for consideration. That question is not germane at this stage at all. So far as the present application is concerned, these authorities would not help Mr. Agrawal at all. 29. The next authority relied upon by Mr. Agrawal is the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of (Khem Karan and others v. The state of U.P. and another)5, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. at page 1567. So far as the present application is concerned, these authorities would not help Mr. Agrawal at all. 29. The next authority relied upon by Mr. Agrawal is the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of (Khem Karan and others v. The state of U.P. and another)5, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. at page 1567. It is really difficult to make out what relevance this authority has got upon the question involved in the present application before me. What we are concerned here is the scope of section 146 of the Evidence Act and as to whether under the garb of testing veracity or character of the complainant the accused can go on asking any embarrassing and rambling questions to the complainant and can thus indulge in further vilification and defamation of the complainant without in the least advancing his own case. This case before the Supreme Court did not relate even remotely to this aspect of the matter. It was held in that case that merely because a different view of the evidence is possible the Court cannot set aside the finding of acquittal. But it was also further held that all the same the Appellate Court had inherent power to reassess the evidence while giving the weight to the view of the trial Court which had ordered acquittal of the accused. Such question does not arise before me in this application at all. Stage has not yet reached for giving thought to this aspect of the matter. The said authority cited by Mr. Agrawal is, therefore, wholly irrelevant vis-a-vis the question arising in the present application. 30. It is thus clear that there is no authority of the Supreme Court which is coming to the help of Mr. Agrawal in support of his proposition that the accused has got an unlimited right to cross- examine the complainant regardless of the matters in issue. However, Mr. Agrawal sought to place reliance upon the two judgement of this Court in support of his contention that the right of the cross-examining authority was urrestricted regardless the relevance of the question in the matter in issue. The first authority relied upon by him is the judgement of this Court in (Prakash and others v. State of Maharashtra)6, reported in 1974 Maharashtra Law Journal, page 1476. Mr. Agrawal relied upon the first head-note of the said authority. The first authority relied upon by him is the judgement of this Court in (Prakash and others v. State of Maharashtra)6, reported in 1974 Maharashtra Law Journal, page 1476. Mr. Agrawal relied upon the first head-note of the said authority. I will set out the said head-note itself to show that the authority does not lay down such a spacious proposition of law as Mr. Agrawal would have the Court believe. The relevant head-note runs as follows :--- "Section 146(3) of the Evidence Act permits a cross-examiner to put questions which will not only shake the credit of a witness but which will also expose his ethical and moral behaviour which may ultimately weigh with the Court while evaluating or appreciating testimonial evidence. What could be brought before the Court under section 155 can surely be put to the witness. "Credit" including "character" of a witness is a relevant factor to be taken into account by the Court. Indecent and scandalous questions can be put if they directly relate to the facts in issue and also if it is necessary to be known in order to determine whether or not the facts in issue existed. If in a given case the Court is satisfied that even an indecent or scandalous question may have a bearing upon a fact in issue the same cannot be forbidden. If a question is merely intended to insult or annoy the witness and is offensive in form the Court has power to forbid the same and protect the witness under sections 148,150 and 152. Till however the conditions of these provisions are not satisfied the matter is at large and the witness must stand all the test before his word can be raised to the pedestal proof". It is thus clear that if the questions are asked only with a view to annoy the witness or is unduly and unnecessarily offensive the Court has power to forbid the same. It is only where the question is offensive to the witness but is all the same relevant to the matters in issue that such questions can be put to the witness and putting such questions would be legitimate exercise of the right given by section 146 of the Evidence Act. It is only where the question is offensive to the witness but is all the same relevant to the matters in issue that such questions can be put to the witness and putting such questions would be legitimate exercise of the right given by section 146 of the Evidence Act. It is observed in the said authority and even an indecent or scandalous question may have direct relevance to the matter in issue and if such relation existed then the question cannot be disallowed merely on the ground that it is indecent or scandalous or embarrassing for the witness. But the point is that it must have reasonable bearing upon the matters in issue. The said authority cited by Mr. Agrawal does not, therefore, in the least help him. 31. The next authority relied upon by him is the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in (Gajanan Laxman Bhalchandra v. Rangrao Amrutrao Deshpande and others)5, reported in 1980 Bom.C.R. 675 : 1980 Mh. Law Journal page 821. The facts of the case were that in a criminal case between the complainant and the accused, Counsel for the accused asked questions to the witness of the prosecution which the witness felt were conductive to his defamation. He answered the question in the negative but did not stop there. He filed a separate complaint against the Counsel as also against one another person by name B.K. Deshmukh for having defamed him by asking such defamatory questions in the open Court. Astonishingly enough, the trial Magistrate dismissed the complaint against said B.K. Deshmukh and probably rightly, but ordered issuance of process against the Counsel G.L. Bhalchandra who was accused No. 1 in the case. Against the order of issuance of process the said G.L. Bhalchandra Advocate filed a writ petition to this Court under Article 227. While allowing the said petition this Court had occasion to make observations relating to the power of the Counsel to put searching questions to the witness. This is what the Court observed in this connection :--- "Considering the nature of the original defamation proceedings instituted by Motilal Zanver and the consequent nature of evidence thus relevant and requisite therein witness Deshpande in his cross-examination fully justified. That these questions and/or the answers there to may ultimately happen to result in no gain to the concerned party is altogether beside the point. That these questions and/or the answers there to may ultimately happen to result in no gain to the concerned party is altogether beside the point. But converting such questions into a substratum for a singularly strange charge of criminal offence against the Advocate would be virtually skin to abuse of judicial process and rank nothing short of stultifying the very dynamic art of cross-examination and rendering its object nugatory and infractious. The very weapon of cross-examination would stand scuttled. Cross-examination is not a more continuation of examination-in-chief nor is it in all cases and circumstances supposed to fall within the routine strait-jacket formula as of examination-in-chief. Indeed, to the contrary, it is very effective instrument and a powerful searchlight to draw out the truth and further the cause of justice. Its object inter alia is to impeach the very credit of the concerned witness and shake his entire testimony. Such impeachment even assuming it not to have a direct link of nexus with the alleged offence, is nevertheless as important and a relevant element in a case of defamation. Though the rights and privileges of an Advocate are not absolute but qualified, he should not, in the exercise thereof, be unduly fettered." Relying upon the above observations it is contended by Mr. Agrawal that the question could not be disallowed merely because it ultimately results in no gain to the accused. To my mind, this observation was made by Division Bench in the context of relevance of the question in earlier criminal litigation. This Court has not held that if objection was taken to the said question by the Counsel of the complainant, the Court would not allow the said objection. The Division Bench has not held that the question would be allowed by the Court even though it had no relevance to the matter in issue. The Division Bench was considering the power of the cross-examining Counsel for putting searching questions and the Division Bench held that merely because the Counsel was performing his duties of eliciting truth from the witness he could not be said to be indulging in an act of the defamation of the witness. To my mind the observations made by the Division Bench has got to be read in this context. To my mind the authority has no application to the question arising before me at all. 32. To my mind the observations made by the Division Bench has got to be read in this context. To my mind the authority has no application to the question arising before me at all. 32. This brings me to the one authority which has to my mind the rail bearing upon the question arising in this application and to which I have already made a brief reference in the initial part of this judgment. The said authority which is also a Division Bench judgment of this Court is in the case of Baburao Patel v. Bal Thackeray and another. The relevant portion of the judgment is already set out above. The authority makes it clear beyond doubt that it is not permissible to have recourse to section 146(3) of the Evidence Act to ask all sorts of questions which are not necessary to shake the credibility of the witness. It has been held therein that the permission granted by section 146(3) of the Evidence Act to cross-examining party cannot be allowed to degenerate into a licence for the purpose of shaking the character of a witness indiscriminately. It is held therein that section 146(3) does not open the gates to unbridled cross-examination of a witness in order to assail his character except in so far as it is necessary to shake his credit in relation to the matter in issue. The words "in relation to matters in issue" are, to my mind, the clue words for appreciating the ratio of the Division Bench judgment. I very respectfully agree with all the observations made by the Division Bench in the said judgment. To my mind it is implicit in the judgment that the question un-necessarily for shaking credit of the witness are questions which cannot be allowed by the Court even under section 146(3) of the Evidence Act. If shaking the credit of the complainant is itself meaningless, malicious and without any purpose, and if in the case, such as the present one, no amount of shaking the credit of the complainant would not make a whit of difference to the ultimate result, so that the accused would not get out of the clutches of the operative part of section 499 or was not able to avail of any of the exceptions to the said section 499, the recourse to the said section 146(3) it futile. To my mind the question before me is really covered by the law laid down by Division Bench in the above mentioned case. 33. I may state here that in the Division Bench case the questions that were asked to the complainant in the cross-examination were such that he was smarting under them because according to him they were themselves un-necessarily scandalising. He, therefore, approached this Court for the purpose of protection vis-a-vis such questions. This Court has observed that it could not quash the entire cross-examination which had already taken place. This Court also proposed to do nothing at that stage so far as the questions which were already asked were concerned. Direction was however given by this Court as regards the further questions to be asked in the cross-examination. This Court held that asking similar questions which are merely scandalising without having any relevance to the matters in issue constituted abuse of the process of the Court. This Court held further that the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code was being exercised by this Court for the purpose of preventing the abuse of the process of the Court. This Court, therefore, set aside the order passed by the Magistrate disallowing the objections of the irrelevant question being allowed by the Magistrate. So far as the questions that were already passed, this Court observed that at the time of the final hearing the learned Magistrate would certainly bear in mind the test for deciding as to whether the questions should have been allowed or not. I propose to follow the identical procedure. 34. I, therefore, quash and set aside the order dated 3-3-1980 passed by the learned Magistrate. I allow the complainant's said application dated 21st April, 1980 and direct that the learned Magistrate shall not allow any questions to be asked to the complainant or his witness or cross-examination which are scandalous or un-necessarily embarrassing to the complainant or his witness, unless the questions have got any reasonable bearing upon the matter in issue. What the matters in issue are, is already indicated above. The learned Magistrate shall bear in mind the guidelines given in the above discussion in that behalf. What the matters in issue are, is already indicated above. The learned Magistrate shall bear in mind the guidelines given in the above discussion in that behalf. So far as the questions which are already asked they shall continue to remain on record; but at the time of the final examination of the evidence the learned Magistrate shall consider the relevancy of the questions in reply to which the answers are given by the complainant and in the light of the discussions made above and after applying the ultimate test for ascertaining the matters in issue, if he finds that any question was unnecessarily scandalising, annoying or embarrassing without its being related to the matter in issue, he shall disregard the answer given by the complainant to the said question. 35. The rule earlier issued, therefore, is made absolute. The impugned order passed by the learned Judge is set aside and the case is sent back to the learned Magistrate to be proceeded with in the light of the above discussion and in accordance with the provisions of law. Rule made absolute. -----