S. L. TALATI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-original decree-holder of civil suit no. 1396 of 1975 has filed this petition under the following circumstances: ( 2 ) THE petitioner obtained a decree in Civil Suit No. 1396 of 1975 and by that decree he became entitled to possession of the premises after 31 because the tenant was granted time to vacate the suit premises upto 31-8-1978. The decree-holder thereafter filed an execution petition being Execution Petition No. 361 of 1978 in the Court of Small Causes Judge Vadodara. Incidentally we may say that that was the Court which had passed the original decree. The defendant raised a contention and his contention was that his original landlord Pranjivan Narottamdas expired and widow Hasumatiben who had filed the execution petition had no right to file the petition without obtaining succession certificate. The second contention which was of some importance was that he had called upon the widow to express condolences on the death of the deceased and at that time he expressed his difficulty and on request being made the petitioner agreed to continue him as a tenant on payment of Rs. 200- per month and it was also agreed that further negotiations would take place by which he would like to purchase the property to which the petitioner agreed. The learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes Vadodara by an order dated 31-7-1979 negatived the objections and an order was passed by which warrant for possession was issued. Being aggrieved by that order the defendant filed Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 137 of 1979 which was heard by the Second Extra Assistant Judge Vadodara. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was not maintainable and therefore an order was passed to the effect that the appeal may be converted into a revision application and thereafter Revision Application was to be heard. The petitioner challenged that order by filing this Civil Revision Application. The contention of the petitioner is that no Civil Revision Application would lie to the District Court. The respondent appeared and raised a contention that the learned District Judge should have heard Civil Miscellaneous Appeal which was filed by him and that in fact appeal would lie from the order which was passed by the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes Vadodara. The respondent appeared and raised a contention that the learned District Judge should have heard Civil Miscellaneous Appeal which was filed by him and that in fact appeal would lie from the order which was passed by the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes Vadodara. ( 3 ) THE matter came up for hearing before my brother Judge D. N. Shukla J. where the arguments were advanced on the question as to whether an appeal would lie or would not lie from an order which was passed in execution of a decree. This Court in a case reported in 20 G. L. R. at page 711 (Mohanlal Maneklal Shah v. Bai Maniben w/o. Gordhandas Kevaldas) had decided that an appeal would not lie. However there was another judgment of the Division Bench of Patna High Court reported in A. I. R. 1979 Patna at page 308 (M/s. Parshava Properties Ltd. v. A. K. Bose) in which it was held that an appeal would lie. There were other rulings of different High Courts expressing divergent views It was therefore felt that this was a case of considerable importance and therefore it was required to be decided by a Division Bench and therefore by an order dated 18-2-1981 the matter was referred to the Division Bench so that the Division Bench might decide this Civil Revision Application. That is how this matter has come up before us. ( 4 ) THE first question which was argued at great length was as to whether after the amendment of sec 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code an appeal would lie from an order passed under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned advocates Sarvashri P. B. Majmudar V. J. Desai C. K. Takwani J. G. Shah K. S. Shah R. N. Shah and P. V. Nanavati argued the matter before us at great length. The learned advocate Shri J. G. Shah assisted by Miss D. I. Shah argued the matter on behalf of the respondent while the other advocates supported the learned advocate Shri P. B. Majmudar who had originally filed the petition and this being a matter of importance they had intervened. ( 5 ) BEFORE we deal with the problem we would like to refer to certain rulings to which reference was made by both the parties. ( 5 ) BEFORE we deal with the problem we would like to refer to certain rulings to which reference was made by both the parties. ( 6 ) THE learned advocate Shri J. C. Shah mainly relied upon a case M/s. Properties Ltd. v. A. K. Bose reported in A. I. R. 1979 Patna at page 308 In that case it was held that whenever the adjudication in question conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy and the determination is in respect of a controversy in a suit it must be considered to be a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. It was also held that the word suit occurring in sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code must be construed in its wider meaning as including proceedings which are continuation of the suit in the eye of law the determination in a proceedings such as an appeal from or execution of the decree would be a determination in the suit so as to amount to a decree within sec. 2 (2 ). In order to further canvass this argument reliance was placed on certain other rulings which are also required to be referred to. ( 7 ) THE first case to which reference was made is a case of Sadashiv Ganpatrao a minor v. Vitthaldas Nanchand reported in (1896) I. L. R. Vol. XX Bombay at page 198 where it was held that application for execution of the decree are proceedings in the suit. A vakalatnama remains in force until all proceedings in the suit are ended. In a case of Virupakshappa v. Shidappa and Basappa minors reported in (1902) I. L. R. Vol. XXVI Bombay at page 109 it was held that sec. 462 (old) (New Order XXXII Rule 7) of the Civil Procedure Code applies to a compromise of execution proceedings. In a case Arunachellam Chetty v. Ramandhan Chetty reported in (1906) I. L. R. Vol. XXIX Madras it was held as under:"the provisions of see. 462 (old) of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to compromise after decree: and no adjustment by compromise of a decree by the guardian of a minor can be certified under sec. In a case Arunachellam Chetty v. Ramandhan Chetty reported in (1906) I. L. R. Vol. XXIX Madras it was held as under:"the provisions of see. 462 (old) of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to compromise after decree: and no adjustment by compromise of a decree by the guardian of a minor can be certified under sec. 258 of the Code of civil Procedure when the guardian had not applied for leave to enter into the compromise under sec. 462 of the Code". In a case Muthalakkamal v. Narappa Reddiar reported in (1933) I. L. R. Vol. LVI Madrasat page 430 (Full Bench) it was held that Order XXXII Rule 7 of the first Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908 applies to execution proceedings. In a case Dokku Bhushayya v. Katragadda Ramkrishnayya and Others reported in A. I. R. 1962 Supreme Court at page 1886 in paragraph 20 after having referred to the above rulings it was observed as under :" The next limitation is that the protection is only during the pendency of the suit. When does a suit come to an end? It has been held that for the purpose of the said rule an execution proceeding is a continuation of a suit". A reference was also made to a case Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and Others reported in A. I. R. 1957 Supreme Court at page 540 where it was observed that the legal pursuit of a remedy suit appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding In a case Abdul Gani Sumar v. The Reception Committee of the 43th Indian National Congress reported in (1936) I. L. R. Vol. I;x Bombay at page 645 it was held that a suit is an original proceeding between a plaintiff and a defendant. The term plaintiff includes every person asking any relief against any other person by any form of proceeding whether the same be taken by cause action suit petition motion summons or otherwise. The term defendant includes every person served with any writ of summons or process or served with notice of or entitled to attend any proceedings. The term plaintiff includes every person asking any relief against any other person by any form of proceeding whether the same be taken by cause action suit petition motion summons or otherwise. The term defendant includes every person served with any writ of summons or process or served with notice of or entitled to attend any proceedings. It was a case where there was a dispute between a timber merchant and the reception committee of the 48th Indian National Congress which was held in Bombay in October 1934 The dispute was referred to the sole. Arbitration of S. D. Prabhavalkar an Engineer who gave his award on 2/02/1935 The award was filed in Court in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act. Thereafter the question arose as to whether the proceedings could be taken against the reception committee and it became necessary to amend the title of the petition. An application was presented under Order 1 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code and the contention was raised that such a petition under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code could not be given in the proceedings which were taken under the Indian Arbitration Act. It therefore became necessary to examine the meaning of the word suit. Justice Wadia referred to Whartons Law Lexicon and it was observed that the word suit was not defined in the Civil Procedure Code and it is also not defined in the General Clauses Act. After referring to Whartons Law Lexicon it was observed that the suit would include action and action would mean a civil proceeding commenced by a writ or in such other manner as may be prescribed by Rules of Court. A case of Burro Chunder Roy v. Shoorodhonee Debia was referred to where Peacock C. observed as under:"the word suit does not necessarily mean an action nor do the words cause of action and defendant necessarily mean cause upon which an action has been brought in the ordinary restricted sense of the words. Any proceeding in a Court of Justice to enforce a demand is a suit; the person who applies to the Court is a suitor for relief; the person who defends himself against the enforcement of the relief sought is a defendant; and the claim if recoverable is a cause of action". Any proceeding in a Court of Justice to enforce a demand is a suit; the person who applies to the Court is a suitor for relief; the person who defends himself against the enforcement of the relief sought is a defendant; and the claim if recoverable is a cause of action". It was also observed as under:"there is authority for the view that the term suit has not a narrow significance but is a very comprehensive one and that it applies to all contentions proceedings in a Civil Court in which the rights of parties are in question and in which the Court is asked to determine them". The real crux of the problem is as to whether the order passed under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code could be considered a decree after the amendment of sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. We have no doubt in our mind that an appeal is a continuation of a suit. We have also no doubt in our mind that an execution proceeding is a continuation of a proceeding which originally started after presentation of a plaint as a suit. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion it would be necessary first to reproduce sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code as it stood before the amendment and after the amendment also. Sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code before the amendment ran as under:"2 in this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context - xxx xxx xxx xxx (2) decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within sec. 47 or sec. 144 but shall not include. (A) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or (B) any order of dismissal for default. (B) Explanation. A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposed of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final. ( 8 ) SEC. (B) Explanation. A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposed of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final. ( 8 ) SEC. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code after the amendment runs as under:2 In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context (1) xxxx xxxx xxx (2) Decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within sec. 144 but shall not include. (A) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or (C) any order of dismissal for default. EXPLANATION: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of it is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final. It was urged that an order passed under Sec. 7 conclusively determines the rights of the parties it would be a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code even after the amendment. It was submitted that though formerly it was provided that it shall deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within sec. 47 and now because of the amendment the only words taken out are sec. 47 therefore; the deeming provision is only taken out and it was submitted that if one can come to a conclusion without the aid of the deeming provision that the question is conclusively determined between the parties and an order is passed in a civil proceedings by a civil court it must be held to be a decree. We may mention Here that the amendment came into force on 1-2-1977 and Civil Miscellaneous Appeal came to be filed in the year 1979. Therefore this is a case which has arisen after the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code. We may mention Here that the amendment came into force on 1-2-1977 and Civil Miscellaneous Appeal came to be filed in the year 1979. Therefore this is a case which has arisen after the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code. This Court in Mohanlal Maneklal Shah v. Bai Maniben w/o Gordhandas Kevaldas reported in 20 G. L R. at page 711 came to the conclusion that if any order passed by an executing court prior to the coming into force of the amending Act of Civil Procedure Code in 1976 was subjected to an appeal and if such an appeal was pending on 1-2-77 when the amending Act came into force Such appeal was saved under sec. 97 of the amending Act but the appeals instituted for the first time after 1-2-77 challenging the orders of the executing Courts passed even before 1-2-77 could not be entertained on the dates on which such appeals came to be filed after 1-2-77. Thus on the date of the institution of any appeal after 1-2-77 there would be no order of any executing court which would remain clothed with the deeming effect of a decree as such a deeming effect had stood withdrawn on 1-2-77 when the amending Act came into force and consequently no appeal could be filed after 1 against any order passed by the executing Court whether such an order was passed before or after 1-2-77. The same view has been taken by the other High Courts and we may refer to some of the judgments referred by the learned advocate Shri Majmudar: ( 9 ) IN a case Mohan Das and Others v. Kamla Devi reported in A. I. R. 1978 Rajasthan at page 127 it was held that the definition of decree having been amended by omitting the words S. 47 or as a result of the Amending Act 1976 any order passed under sec. 47 C. P. C. which otherwise treated as decree is no more a decree and as such the first appeal and the second appeal which were provided earlier against the orders passed under sec. 47 are no more there. In a case Mohammad Khan v. State Bank of Travancore reported in A. I. R. A. I. R. 1978 Kerala at page 201 The Full Bench considered the effect of the amendment and it was observed that the express omission of orders under sec. 47 are no more there. In a case Mohammad Khan v. State Bank of Travancore reported in A. I. R. A. I. R. 1978 Kerala at page 201 The Full Bench considered the effect of the amendment and it was observed that the express omission of orders under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code from the definition of decree in sec. 2 (2) has rendered orders under sec. 47 not appealable since the commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act 104 of 1976. In Pratap Narain Agarwal v. Ram Narain Agarwal and others reported in A. I. R. 1980 Allahabad at page 42 the Full Bench came to the conclusion that an order passed on an objection filed under sec. 47 after the amendment of 1976 does not amount to a decree and is not appealable. In a case Chelaram v. Bhagatram reported in A. I. R. 1980 Madhya Pradesh at page 16 it was held that the amendment brought about in sec. 2 (2) of C. P. C. by which the determination of any question under sec. 47 does not now amount to a decree cannot be construed to take away a vested right of appeal in pending executions. Thus in that case the effect of the amendment in pending executions was only considered. ( 10 ) NOW in view of the divergent views expressed by different High Courts the question was allowed to he argued at length and we have come to the conclusion for the reasons that will follow that after the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1976 came into force on 14 an order passed under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code would not be appealable. In a case of A. I. R. 1979 Patna page 308 (supra) a distinction was tried to be made by which the court came to the conclusion that so far as the interlocutory orders which were passed under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code were concerned no appeal could lie. However the Court was of the opinion that so far as the orders conclusively determine the rights of the parties the appeal would lie. At this stage it is also necessary to refer to sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code which stood before the amendment and which stands now after the amendment. ( 11 ) SEC. However the Court was of the opinion that so far as the orders conclusively determine the rights of the parties the appeal would lie. At this stage it is also necessary to refer to sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code which stood before the amendment and which stands now after the amendment. ( 11 ) SEC. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code before the amendment:"47 (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives and relating to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) The Court may subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction treat a proceeding under this section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may if necessary order payment of any additional court-fees. (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party such question shall for the purposes of this section be determined by the Court. EXPLANATION For the purposes of this section a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed and a purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree are parties to the suit. SEC. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code after the amendment :"47 (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives and relating to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit". (2) Omitted by Amendment Act 1976 (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party such question shall for the purposes of this section be determined by the Court. EXPLANATION I: For the purpose of this section a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit. EXPLANATION I: For the purpose of this section a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit. EXPLANATION II: (a) For the purposes of this section a purchaser of property at a sale in exercise of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and (B) all questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section. ( 12 ) THERE is no manner of doubt that a suit in. Civil Court starts on the presentation of a plaint. In a case of Divan Brothers v. Central Bank of India Bombay and Others reported in A. I. R. 1976 Supreme Court at page 1503 the definition of the world decree was considered. The essential conditions were laid down as under: (I) that the adjudication must be given in a suit; (II) that the suit must start with a plaint and culminate in a decree; and (III) that the adjudication must be formal and final and must be given by a civil or revenue court". The question as to what is the meaning of the word suit is not required to be considered in this matter because this is not a matter which started by filing any proceeding in any other manner. A plaint was filed in Small Causes Court and there was a suit which as numbered as Civil Suit No. 1396 of 1975 Now that therefore the Small Causes Court had before it a civil suit which adjudicated upon it and that adjudication was final and therefore the Small Causes Court passed a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. That decree was put into execution and in that execution proceeding an objection was taken and that objection was that the decree-holder had accepted the judgmentdebtor as a tenant and therefore the decree became inexecutable. Now therefore this was a clear case where an older came to be passed in an execution proceeding and under sec. That decree was put into execution and in that execution proceeding an objection was taken and that objection was that the decree-holder had accepted the judgmentdebtor as a tenant and therefore the decree became inexecutable. Now therefore this was a clear case where an older came to be passed in an execution proceeding and under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code when analysed all questions which relate to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree are required to be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit and therefore the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court decided the questions which arose between the parties to the suit and passed an order by which he issued a warrant for possession. Now it was an order which was contemplated under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. Before the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code by the amending Act 1976 execution court had a power to treat a proceeding under sec. 47 as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and that power was especially given to the Court under sec. 47 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. By amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976 clause (2) of sec. 47 is omitted. Now that therefore the Court has no power left to convert a proceeding into a Suit and therefore the question was required to be determined as per amended sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. Now at this stage it is necessary to see the whole scheme of the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code in regard to the execution proceedings. Firstly sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code was amended and by that amendment if by any deeming provision an order under sec. 47 C. P. C. could be construed as a decree that deeming provision was deleted. Now that therefore any order passed under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be considered as a decree by any deeming provision. After that amendment the powers of the executing court to convert a proceeding into a suit under sec. 47 (28 of the C. P. C. were taken away. Now that therefore there remained a simple definition of the word decree in sec. 2 (2) without the deeming provision which included an order under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. After that amendment the powers of the executing court to convert a proceeding into a suit under sec. 47 (28 of the C. P. C. were taken away. Now that therefore there remained a simple definition of the word decree in sec. 2 (2) without the deeming provision which included an order under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore an effort was made to argue that an execution proceeding being a continuation of a suit and if the rights of the parties are conclusively determined in any of the matters in controvery the order passed under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code must be construed as a decree though the deeming provision is taken away. If we accept such a proposition an absurd result would follow. The Civil Procedure Code contemplates one decree and there cannot be two decrees passed under the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code. An appeal is a continuation of a suit. In appeal the appellate court passes an appellate decree but that merges with the original decree. Therefore what is done in appeal is that either original decree is modified confirmed or varied or reversed and the result thereafter follows is that there remains one decree which could be executed. Now that therefore in appeal a decree could be passed and that decree changes the original decree and as a result so far as the executing court is concerned there is only one decree which could be executed. Now if the executing court which has no power under the Civil Procedure Code to go behind the decree passes a decree which can neither affirm modify varry or reverse the original decree it could pass only a new decree and the result would be that there would be two decrees and such an absurdity was never contemplated when the Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 1976. This is clear from further provisions made by the Amending Act. It may be useful to refer to sec. This is clear from further provisions made by the Amending Act. It may be useful to refer to sec. 99 of the Civil Procedure Code which runs as under:"99 No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of Parties or causes of action or any error defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party". Thereafter by the Amending Act 1976 sec. 99-A is added which runs as under : ]"99 Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sec. 99 no order under sec. 17 shall be reversed or substantially varied on account of any error. defect or irregularity in any proceeding relating to such order unless such error defect or irregularity has prejudicial affected the decision of the case". Now so far as sec. 99 is concerned it starts with the words no decree shall be reversed. . . . . . In sec. 99a reference is made to orders passed under sec. 47. Now both these sections appear in Part VII of the Civil Procedure Code and part VII refers to Appeals. It therefore could be suggested that there could be orders under sec. 47 also which could be challenged in appeal. Now that therefore those orders are provided in Order XLIII Rule 1 (i) (j) and (ja) of the Civil Procedure Code. They are the rules where appeal is provided from orders passed under Order XXI and they are as under:"appeals from orders. "1 An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of sec. 104 namely :- (I) an order under rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement; (J) an order under rule 72 or rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale; (JA) an order rejecting an application made under sub-rule (1) of rule 106 of Order XXI provided that an order on the original application that is to say the application referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 105 of that order is appealable. Now these are the only order against which the appeals are provided and as the appeals against these orders are provided we find that sec. 99 is placed in Chapter VII with heading appeals. We may here also mention that before the embodiment certain orders which were passed under the provisions contained in Order XXI could be challenged by way of a suit. That resulted in prolonged litigation. The Parliament therefore found that instead of driving the parties to separate suits the objections could be treated as suits and whenever the Parliament so desired specific mention has been made and that could be found in Order XXI Rules 46h 58 and 103 of the Civil Procedure Code Rules 46h 58 and 103 of Order XXI run as under:"46 An order made under rule 46b rule 460 or rule 46b shall be appealable as a decree"58 Where any claim or objection has been adjudicated upon under this rule the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree". "103 Where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100 the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree". Now therefore it was clear that the order contemplated to be appealable as decrees were in fact not decrees but by deeming fiction it was declare that they will be treated as decrees. Now that therefore if we read the scheme as a whole it would appear that the deeming provisions of all orders under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code which could be read as decrees under the provisions of sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code were omitted. As a corollary by amendment sec. 47 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code was omitted and thereafter certain orders were made appealable as orders and certain orders though they were orders were by deeming fiction made appealable as decrees. Therefore a complete machinery was provided in order to meet with the exigencies of the removal of the deeming provision of an order under sec. 47 from the definition of a decree as provided in sec. 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore a complete machinery was provided in order to meet with the exigencies of the removal of the deeming provision of an order under sec. 47 from the definition of a decree as provided in sec. 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 13 ) THE learned advocate Shri J. G. Shah submitted that there could be a case where a contention could be taken in the executing court that the decree is a nullity and the court may come to one or the other conclusion. It may declare that decree to be a nullity or it may come to the conclusion that the decree was not a nullity. According to the submissions made that was a question which was determined between the parties and therefore if no appeal is provided no remedy would be left. That is not the correct situation. If the decree which is not a nullity and it is declared by the executing court to be a nullity and the executing court refuses to execute the decree on the ground that it is a nullity it would be a case of failure to exercise jurisdiction. If it was a case where a decree in fact was a nullity the second suit is not barred. The parties therefore are not left without any remedy the reason is that the executing court by passing such an order does not conclusively decide the rights of the parties and the remedy is clearly open. We may here in passing refer to the question as to whether the Parliament could validly determine by the amendment that certain orders would be considered as decrees and would be appealable as such and certain orders would be orders and they would be appealable under Order LXIII of the Civil Procedure Code and certain orders would not be appealable at all. If one goes through the whole scheme one could clearly see that there is an intelligible classification and if such a classification is made one cannot argue that this classification is hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned advocate Shri J. G. Shah did not submit any such argument. We have only made this reference because such a reference has been made in A. I. R. 1979 Patna at page 308 (supra ). The learned advocate Shri J. G. Shah did not submit any such argument. We have only made this reference because such a reference has been made in A. I. R. 1979 Patna at page 308 (supra ). We may here say that in the case of A. I. R. 15879 Patna at page 308 (Supra) the definition of the word order occurring in sec. 2 (14) of the Civil Procedure Code is not referred and the definition is as under:"order means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree". Now that therefore decision of a civil court expressed in formal manner is an order if it is not a decree. The learned advocate Shri J. G. Shah submitted that if one comes to the conclusion that an order under sec. 47 is a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 (2) of the Code even after the amendment this definition of the word order would not help the petitioner. We have already come to the conclusion that an order passed under sec. 47 of the Code is an order which was deemed to be a decree within sec. 2 (2) of the Code before the amendment and which is now deemed to be a decree for the purpose of Order XXI rules 46h 58 and 103 of the Civil Procedure Code. For all other purposes they are not deemed to be decrees and therefore they are orders. We therefore with respect cannot agree with the propositions laid down in the case of A. I. R. 1979 Patna at page 308 (supra) that an order passed under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code is covered by the first part of the definition of the word decree contained in sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. We ale of the view that an order passed under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code was not covered by the definition of the word decree given in first part of sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code even before the amendment of sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. In the circumstances the Parliament had in fact made a deeming provision and releasing that unless such a deeming provision was made an order passed under sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code even before the amendment of sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. In the circumstances the Parliament had in fact made a deeming provision and releasing that unless such a deeming provision was made an order passed under sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code would not become a decree they made that order to be a decree. That deeming provision is now taken out by the amendment and we have referred to the scheme of the Amending Act and it clearly appears to us that the Parliament clearly intended that the orders passed under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code are not required to be made appealable as decrees and they made further provisions in Order XXI wherever it was thought fit that the order passed should be made appealable as decrees We have in our judgment referred to the definition of the word order contained in sec. 2 (14) of the C. P. C. and also considered the effect of the omission of sec. 47 (2) of the C. P. C. and the added provision of sec. 99a of the Civil Procedure Code. All these provisions were not considered in the judgment reported in A. I. R. 1979 Patna at page 308 (supra ). We have therefore disagreed with the views expressed in that ruling. We therefore hold that when executing court passes an order under sec. 47 of the Civil Processor Code it is an order which is not appealable as a decree unless it is expressly provided for in other provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. In this particular case the order which is passed is an order against which no appeal lies and therefore the contention raised by the respondent fails. ( 14 ) THE next contention which is required to be considered is the contention raised by the learned advocate Shri P. B. Majmudar for the petitioner. His submission is that even revision application would not lie to the District Court. His submission was that once a decree is passed the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant comes to an end and therefore Revision Application if any is required to be filed under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and that is to be filed in the High Court. The District Court had no power to entertain any revision application. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and that is to be filed in the High Court. The District Court had no power to entertain any revision application. This argument cannot be accepted in view of the clear provision contained in sec. 29 (3) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 ( here in after called the Bombay Rent Act ). Sec. 29 (3) reads as under:"29 Where no appeal lies under this section from a decree or order in any suit or proceeding in Greater Bombay the bench of two judges specified in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) and elsewhere the District Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order that was according to law call for the case in which such decree or order was made and the bench or court aforesaid or the District Judge or any Judge to whom the case may be referred by the District Judge shall pass such order with respect thereto it or be thinks fit". It is not indispute that an appeal would lie to the District Court against the orders passed under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act and which are appealable by that Act to the District Court. In respect of the matters where the right of an appeal has been taken away the legislature obviously realizing that in some cases an injustice may be done by a trial Court and in order that a trying judge may not act arbitrarily or capriciously has under sub-sec. (3) conferred a power on the appellate authority to call for the papers and records of any case with a view to satisfy itself that the decree or the order has been according to law When this provision meaning thereby sec. 29 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act was enacted the legislature was aware of the extent of the supervisory powers of the High Court contained in sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the legislature has deliberately made this provision in order to subserve its intention stated aforesaid. the powers contained in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 29 are special in addition to those vested in the High Court. The powers contained in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 29 therefore should be exercised having regard to the aforesaid manifest intention on the legislature. the powers contained in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 29 are special in addition to those vested in the High Court. The powers contained in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 29 therefore should be exercised having regard to the aforesaid manifest intention on the legislature. If one looks at the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Rules one would clearly realise that the word proceeding used in sec. 29 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act would also include execution proceedings. The learned advocate Shri Majmudar tried to urge that the word proceeding used in sec. 29 (3) should be construed in such a way as to mean proceeding in the original suit only. Such a construction cannot be given in view on a clear provision contained in sec. 29 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act and this intention becomes clear when one reads Rule 5 (3) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Rules. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gandhi Gopaldas Gordhandas v. Bai Lalitabai Marghabhai reported in 12 G. L. R. at page 492 has held that the execution proceedings arising out of the decree passed after the coming into operation of the Bombay Rent Act are included in the expression proceeding used in sub-sec. (1) of sec 28 Therefore original execution proceedings for recovery to possession between a landlord and tenant are governed by sec. 28 (1 ). Special provisions were made in sec. 29 to the Bombay Rent Act both in regard to appeal and also in regard to revision. Therefore in our view revision would lie under sec. 29 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act and it would lie in the Court of the District Judge. In view of this conclusion the order passed by the learned Second Extra Assistant Judge. Vadodara to culvert the appeal into the revision application was absolutely justified and we are in complete agreement with that order. ( 15 ) IN view of the above findings the revision application filed by the petitioner fails and is dismissed. ( 16 ) THE District Judge Vadodara now would decide the revision application on merits and in accordance with law. As the matter has become sufficiently old we direct that this matter may be given priority and may be decided as early as practicable and if possible within a period of three months. ( 16 ) THE District Judge Vadodara now would decide the revision application on merits and in accordance with law. As the matter has become sufficiently old we direct that this matter may be given priority and may be decided as early as practicable and if possible within a period of three months. ( 17 ) LOOKING to the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no orders to costs. Application dismissed. .