JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, C.J. - Defendants in a suit for declaration that Plaintiffs termination of service with effect from 30-12-1968 was illegal, void and wrong and without jurisdiction and for a further declaration that he continues to be in service along with other ancillary reliefs are in appeal against the reversing judgment and decree Of the Additional District Judge of Cuttack. 2. Plaintiff was appointed as a Warrant Sarkar by the Executive Officer of the Cuttack Municipality from 1-10-1959. Later, he was promoted as Assistant Tax Daroga and while he was serving as such, his service was terminated without assigning a by reason whatsoever. Plaintiff alleged that the order of termination was illegal, incompetent and had emanated from an authority not competent to terminate the service. He applied for review but no favourable orders were obtained. He preferred an appeal to the Director, but the same was also dismissed. In these circumstances, Plaintiff instituted the suit on 8-9-1972. 3. Two separate written statements were filed by Defendants 1 and 2, but similar pleas were taken. Defendant No. 3. State of Orissa did not file any separate written statement. It was maintained that while the Plaintiff was in the promotional post, he was found guilty of mi conduct and demoted to the post of Tax Collector. The minimum educational qualification prescribed was matriculation which the Plaintiff did not possess. In the circumstances his service was terminated by the impugned order. 4. Issue No. 7 was as to whether the claim was barred by limitation. The trial Court found that the Plaintiff had been denied natural justice and, therefore, the order of termination was defective but as the claim was barred by limitation, the suit having been filed beyond three years, no relief was available to him. The judgment and the decree of the trial Court have been reversed by the Additional District Judge. Hence this second appeal. 5. The main question for consideration in the second appeal is as to whether the claim was barred by limitation. There is no dispute before me that the suit is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. That Article runs thus: Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years When the right to sue accrues. The question for consideration, therefore, is when did the cause of action accrue? There is no dispute before me that the suit is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. That Article runs thus: Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years When the right to sue accrues. The question for consideration, therefore, is when did the cause of action accrue? The Plaintiff clearly indicated that the cause of action arose on 30-12-1968, when the services were illegally terminated. Ext. 2 is that order. Though the order was communicated by the Executive Officer, Ext. F/3 clearly shows that the District Magistrate in whom the powers of the Chairman of the Municipality at the relevant time had vested, had accepted the proposal of the Executive Officer and authorised the termination. The main contention that the termination was unauthorised having been made by the Executive Officer s no foundation. Petitioner had a statutory right of appeal u/s 77 of the Orissa Municipal Act against imposition of punishment. The termination in this case was not by way of punishment and, therefore, the impugned order was not open to statutory appeal. Plaintiff for his suit was at the most entitled to three years under Article 113 of the Limitation Act and a period of two months required for the statutory notice u/s 349 of the Municipal Act. His suit, had, therefore, to be filed within a total period of three years and two months from the termination of service which was an event of December, 1968. The suit instituted on 8-9-1972 was thus clearly barred by limitation. The trial Court was right in its conclusion that the Plaintiff s claim was barred by limitation. The learned Additional District Judge fell into a confusion in deciding to the contrary. The appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are vacated and those of the trial Court are restored. In the facts of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Final Result : Allowed