JUDGMENT M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order dated 17.3.79 passed by the Prescribed Authority, Ballia, under Section 2-A(5) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The certified copy of the said order is Annexure-3 to the petition. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. The contesting respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are the landlords of the disputed accommodation. Their case was that they had given the disputed accommodation on temporary licence to the petitioner on 1.3.1977 under the provisions of Section 2-A of the Act. The petitioner contended that she not a licensee but she was a tenant of the said respondents to whom the disputed accommodation had been leased out in June, 1975. The Prescribed Authority by the impugned order allowed the application of the contesting respondents for the eviction of the petitioner holding that the aggrieved, the petitioner has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, we have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, Shri S.N. Srivastava, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, made his submissions. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there was a jurisdictional error in the impugned order in as much as there was no compliance with the first Proviso to Section 2-A which lays down that the intimation of the grant of such licence shall be given jointly by the licensor and the licensee to the District Magistrate within one month from the date of occupation of the building or part by the licensee. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that there was no compliance with the second proviso to Section 2-A which required that the District Magistrate may be order extend the maximum period of such temporary occupation upto six months in the aggregate. On the other hand, Sri S.N. Srivastava, learned counsel for the contesting respondents contended that even if there was no compliance with the said two Provisos, still, the nature of the occupation of the licensee will not be affected and will not be changed. The person concerned, would continue to remain a licensee and the provisions of Section 2-A will be available to the landlord for seeking the eviction of such a person. The person concerned, would continue to remain a licensee and the provisions of Section 2-A will be available to the landlord for seeking the eviction of such a person. In our view, it is not necessary to decide the said controversy because in the facts of the case, we are not called upon to do so. It should be seen that before that impugned order, under Section 2-A was passed, there had been some prior litigation's between the parties. The petitioner moved an application on 27th August, 1977 and the said application was decided by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 13th June, 1978. A certified copy of the said order has been brought on record along with the supplementary counter-affidavit of respondent No. 3. It is stated in the said order that an application for allotment had been made by the petitioner under Section 16(1) and further when the controversy arose whether there was any vacancy or not, the landlords had set up the plea that the petitioner had been given a licence and that she was a licensee in the disputed accommodation and that, therefore, there was no vacancy or not, the landlords had set up the plea that the petitioner had been given a licence and that she was a licensee in the disputed accommodation and that, therefore, there was no vacancy and the matter stood covered under Section 2-A. The petitioner's case was that she had been inducted in the disputed accommodation as a tenant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected petitioner had been allowed to occupy the disputed accommodation as a temporary licensee under Section 2-A of the Act. It was also held that the necessary information under the first Proviso to Section 2-A had been given to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Thereafter, a revision was filed by the petitioner under Section 18 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 against the aforesaid order dated 13th June, 1978 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The said revision was also dismissed. It seems that during landlords had acted in a manner as attracted the Provisions of Section 19 of the Act. The revisional Court while dismissing the revision, ordered that the petitioner would be entitled to move a fresh application under Section 19 of the Act before the District Magistrate, Ballia. 3. The said revision was also dismissed. It seems that during landlords had acted in a manner as attracted the Provisions of Section 19 of the Act. The revisional Court while dismissing the revision, ordered that the petitioner would be entitled to move a fresh application under Section 19 of the Act before the District Magistrate, Ballia. 3. It further seems that the petitioner had also filed a regular suit wherein she claimed to be the tenant in the disputed accommodation and sought an injunction. The plaint of the suit is not before us but it seems from the record that the said suit was ultimately dismissed as having become infructuous on 28th August, 1980. It has been stated before us that the petitioner is no more in occupation of the disputed accommodation. 4. It seems to us that after the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and thereafter, the District Judge held that the petitioner's status was that of a licensee and that there was no vacancy and that her case was covered under Section 2-A, it was not open to the parties to seek a different verdict in the impugned order. If the petitioner was aggrieved with the revisional order, then she could have questioned it by way of a writ petition but she did not do so. Further, looking into the various aspects of the matter, it seems to us that we should not interfere in this writ petition even if some technical point might be raised in favour of the petitioner. It was open to the petitioner to have sought a clear verdict of the Civil Court about her claim to be the tenant but she failed to do so. After the dismissal of the suit, she did not prefer any regular appeal or any further proceeding against the Civil Court's verdict. It seems that before different authorities and in different proceedings, the petitioner has failed to establish her claim that she was tenant in the accommodation in question. She is now out of possession. Therefore, it is not expedient ad in the interest of justice to put the parties in future litigation again. 5. We accordingly dismiss the writ petition but make no order as to costs.