JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---A point of law which is more tantalising than challenging has been raised in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petition arises out of proceedings instituted by the first two respondents, hereinafter referred to as "the respondents", under the provisions of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, hereinafter referred to as" the Bombay Rent Act. The proceedings started with the filing of a suit, being Suit No. 1259 of 1966, by the respondents against the petitioner for possession of some shop premises situated in House No. 15/1 in Kirkee at Pune, hereinafter referred to as "the suit premises". The facts may be stated chronologically as follows :--- 6th January, 1969 : Suit No. 1259 of 1966 filed by the respondents against the petition decreed by the Small Causes Court, Pune. 31st January, 1970 : Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1969 preferred by the petitioner re jected under Order VII, Rule 11 read with section 107 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground that the decree was a nullity and that section 29 of the Rent Act was not applicable. 22nd July, 1971 : Suit No. 993 of 1970 by the petitioner treated as a proceeding under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and decided that the decree in Suit No. 1259 of 1966 was a nullity by Small Cause Court as an executing Court. 2nd June, 1972 : Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act 1957 amended by Act 22 of 1972. 24th July, 1972 : Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971 preferred by the respondents against the order of 22nd July, 1971 dismissed by the learned Joint Judge, Pune, by confirming that the decree passed in Suit No. 1259 of 1966 was a nullity. 12th February, 1974 : Miscellaneous Application No. 242 of 1973 by the petitioner for reviewing the order passed in Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1969 dis-missed by the learned Assistant Judge of Pune. 28th August, 1975 : Regular Darkhast No. 2652 of 1972 filed by the respondents dismissed by the Additional Judge, Small Cause Court, Pune as an executing Court on holding that the darkhast was barred by res judicata in view of the decision in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971. 10th April, 1978 : The impugned order passed allowing Civil Appeal No. 650 of 1975. 2. 10th April, 1978 : The impugned order passed allowing Civil Appeal No. 650 of 1975. 2. Before considering the very short question, which I have with some liberty described as tantalising, it would be necessary to mention some legislative facts. Till the year 1969 and definitely till the suit filed by the respondents was decided, the legal position was understood to be that the Bombay Rent Act without anything more being done by the Central Government was applicable to areas comprised in the cantonments of the various cities and more particularly to the Kirkee Cantonment of Pune. By a decision given in the year 1969, to be precise on 29th of April, 1969, in the case of (Indu Bhsan v. Rama Sundari)1, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 228, the Supreme Court held that this view was incorrect and neither the Maharashtra legislature nor the Maharashtra Legislature nor the Maharashtra Government could extend the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act to the areas comprised in the cantonments. 3. In order to overcome the difficulties which thus arose on account of the decision of the Supreme Court in Indu Bhusans case, the Central Government issued a Notification on 27th of December, 1969 under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 extending the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act to the cantonment areas. This notification, however, had only prospective operation and did not validate the decrees which had been passed by the various courts prior to the issuance of this notification on the assumption that they had jurisdiction to pass decrees in respect of premises situated within the cantonment areas. The decrees which had passed earlier, therefore, remained dead letters in the eyes of law. 4. In order of obviate this anomaly, the Parliament amended section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1957", by an Act, being Act 22 of 1972. By this amending Act, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) were newly inserted in section 3 of the parent Act of 1957. The effect of this amendment, which came into force on 2nd of June, 1972, was to validate all decrees which had been passed prior to the notification issued on 27th of December, 1969. This had undoubtedly the effect of validating the decree passed in the present case. The effect of this amendment, which came into force on 2nd of June, 1972, was to validate all decrees which had been passed prior to the notification issued on 27th of December, 1969. This had undoubtedly the effect of validating the decree passed in the present case. While enumerating the facts leading upto this petition I have mentioned that in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971 decided on 24th of July, 1972, that is more than a month after the amending Act 22 of 1972 had come into force, it had been held that the decree passed on 6th of January, 1969 was a nullity. The question is : what is the effect of Amending Act of 1972 considered in the light of the decision given in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971 on 24th July, 1972? 5. Mr. Paranjpe, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the petition, has made three submissions. In the first place he has supported the reasoning contained in the judgment of the trial Court wherein it was held that the order passed in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971 on 24th of July, 1972 was binding upon the parties because when that order was passed the validating Act 22 of 1972 had already come into force and despite this a Court which had undoubtedly jurisdiction to decide that question decided it against the respondents. Secondly he contended that if the validating Act of 1972 is applied and the dead decree is now revived, all the remedies against the decree so revived must be made available to the petitioner. In other words, it was his contention that the District Court should be directed to hear Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1969 which was dismissed on the ground that no appeal lay against a decree which was itself a nullity. The third submission of Mr. Paranjpe is somewhat more elaborate. It was contended that the notification of December 1969 made the Bombay Rent Act applicable as it was then existing. The Rent Act was to expire in 1970 and the subsequent amendments made in the Rent Act extending the time of the said Act could not by incorporation be included in the notification of December 1969. 6. The last argument of Mr. The Rent Act was to expire in 1970 and the subsequent amendments made in the Rent Act extending the time of the said Act could not by incorporation be included in the notification of December 1969. 6. The last argument of Mr. Paranjpe may straight away be disposed of by reference to the judgment given by V.S. Deshpande, J. (as he then was) with Kotwal J. in (Second Appeal No. 323 of 1978, with Special Civil Applications No. 1713 of 1978 and 5053 of 1976)2. That decision was given on 11th of November, 1980 and it holds that the notification issued on 27th of December, 1969 has made the Rent Act permanently applicable with amendments upto that date and the period of expiry mentioned in section 3 of the Bombay Rent Act has no effect upon the continuance of the Rent Act in the cantonment area. 7. The first two submissions made on behalf of the petitioner need to be examined. I have given in great details chronologically the events which have dogged this litigation. From the said chronology it is clear that the decision given in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971 was after the amending Act of 1972 came into force on 2nd of June, 1972. In fact, before the appeal Court it was argued on behalf of the respondents that an amending Act is in the offing and the hearing of the appeal should be stayed for some time to Judge the effect of the Amending Act. This request was not acceded to by the learned Appellate Judge who therefore proceeded to hold that the decree passed on 6th January, 1969 continued to be null and void. This decision has been given after the amending Act has come into force. If the respondents were aggrieved by this decision which was binding upon them they could have challenged the same on the ground that the decision was wrong being contrary to the Amending Act of 1972. The proposition that even a wrong order is binding upon the parties does not need any authority in its support. The respondents did not challenge the decision given in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971. In my opinion, therefore, that decision which has remained unchallenged must be held to govern the rights and liabilities of the parties. 8. The proposition that even a wrong order is binding upon the parties does not need any authority in its support. The respondents did not challenge the decision given in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971. In my opinion, therefore, that decision which has remained unchallenged must be held to govern the rights and liabilities of the parties. 8. The fact that an Amending Act has been passed and it validated the decree passed on 6th of January, 1969 does not make the difference to the legal effect of the decision given in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971 because that decision has been given, though wrongly, after the Amending Act of 1972 had come into force. A wrong decision can be avoided only by challenging the same in appropriate proceedings. 9. Mr. Dudhat, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, has referred me to several judgments in support of his contention that because of the Amending Act 22 of 1972 which validated the decree passed on 6th of January, 1969, the decision given in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971 cannot be binding. In the first place he referred to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of V.S. Deshpande, J. (as he then was) with Gadgil, J., in a group of Special Civil Applications led by (Special Civil Applications No. 2564 of 1974)3. That decision is given on 18th of February, 1978. In my opinion, that decision is of no assistance to Mr. Dudhat because in that case the decision holding the decree as invalid had been given before the amending Act had come into force. The Division Bench held that the consequence of the Amending Act was to erase the legal effect of the decision given that the decree was a nullity. Indeed the Division Bench has proceeded to point out that on the date on which the order holding the decree passed as nullity was passed it was correct in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indu Bhausans case. It is only after the fiction created by the amending Act of 1972 that the judgment itself became legally of no consequence. That judgment was given on 19th of November, 1971, which was before the Amending Act came into force. 10. Similarly the reliance placed by Mr. It is only after the fiction created by the amending Act of 1972 that the judgment itself became legally of no consequence. That judgment was given on 19th of November, 1971, which was before the Amending Act came into force. 10. Similarly the reliance placed by Mr. Dudhat in the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai)4, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 2355 is of no assistance to him. That judgment discusses the various aspects of the doctrine of res judicata, but what is mentioned in paragraph 7 of the said judgment is, in my opinion, if anything, against the respondents :--- "Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties." On the facts of the present case we have seen that the decision which is binding upon the parties has been given after the Amending Act came into force and no Act has been passed altering the law after the binding decision has been given. Similarly I do not find that this legal position, namely that the legally binding effect of the decision in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971, is in any way impaired by the reliance placed by Mr. Dudhat on the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Lonankutty v. Thomman)5, A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court, 1645. 11. It must be remembered that Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971 had been by the respondents against the decision given by the executing Court on 22nd of July, 1971 which had held that the decree passed in Suit No. 1259 of 1966 was a nullity. The Court which decided this appeal had undoubtedly jurisdiction to decide the question which was before it. It was not a decision given without jurisdiction. Therefore, that decision, though erroneous but given in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in it by law, must be held to be binding upon the parties. 12. By the time the appeal was disposed of, the Amending Act had come into force and it was open to the respondents to get the order of the Court reversed on the ground that order is rendered erroneous in view of the amending Act 22 of 1972. 12. By the time the appeal was disposed of, the Amending Act had come into force and it was open to the respondents to get the order of the Court reversed on the ground that order is rendered erroneous in view of the amending Act 22 of 1972. That contention was raised in some form or another; a decision was given by the learned Assistant Judge on 24th of July, 1972 confirming the finding of the Court below that the decree was a nullity. To repeat, this decision has been given after the Amending Act had come into force. This decision may be wrong, but still it is a binding decision which was not challenged by the respondents in any properly constituted proceeding. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the present execution proceedings are barred by the decision given in Civil Appeal No. 778 of 1971. The view taken by the trial Court in the instant case is the correct view and the view taken by the learned Appellate Judge, which is now challenged, is erroneous. In view of this fact I find it unnecessary to refer to some of the decision relied upon by Mr. Dudhat which took the view that a decision given by a Court relating to its own jurisdiction cannot operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings. 13. There is considerable force in the contention of Mr. Paranjpe that as a result of the Validating Act the appeal which he had filed, namely Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1969, must be held to have been competently filed. He has relied upon the judgment of Deshpande, J. (as he then was) with Gadgil J. in Special Civil Application No. 2564 of 1974 and in particular upon the following observations to be found in paragraph 21 of the said judgment :--- "However, the Court can take notice of altered law with all its implications and the mandates in exercise of its inherent powers." Mr. Paranjpe contends that the District Court should now be directed to restore to its file Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1969 and to hear and dispose it of in accordance with law. With this proposition Mr. Dudhat did not seen to have much quarrel. Paranjpe contends that the District Court should now be directed to restore to its file Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1969 and to hear and dispose it of in accordance with law. With this proposition Mr. Dudhat did not seen to have much quarrel. However, it is unnecessary and it is not competent for me to decide this question because the present petition is directed against the order passed in Civil Appeal No. 650 of 1975. Moreover, this petition arises out of execution proceedings and it would be incorrect in these proceedings to direct a District Court to hear the original appeal itself. No executing Court can give such a direction. It is, therefore, not necessary for me to decide the second point urged by Mr. Paranjpe though on that there does not seem to be at the bar much contest. The petitioner is, however, entitled to succeed on the first point on which I have taken the view in his favour. 14. In the result, this petition must succeed. The order passed by the learned Extra Assistant Judge of Pune in Civil Appeal No. 650 of 1975 is set aside and the order passed by the learned Additional Judge, Small Cause Court, Pune, in Darkhast No. 2652 of 1972 is restored. In the peculiar facts of this case there will, be no order as to costs. Petition succeeds. -----