ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of a suit No. 244 of 1978 filed by the opposite party No. 3 Shri Shyam Lal against the petitioner for ejectment and arrears of rent and damages. The petitioner is the tenant of the premises situate on Chakrata Road, Mohalla Khumran, Saharanpur. The petitioner had taken the property on rent from the opposite party No. 3 by means of a written document. In the said document it was categorically stated that the construction had been made in the year 1973. When the suit was filed by the opposite party No. 3 for ejectment as according to the opposite party No. 3 the premises having been constructed in the year 1973, the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 were not attracted. A defence was taken by the petitioner that the suit premises was built prior to the year 1968 and as such the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 were applicable and a decree for ejectment cannot be passed against the petitioner. The judge Small Causes Court by judgment dated 21-2-79 dismissed the suit holding that the property was constructed in the year 1968 and as such the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 applied. Against the decision dated 21-12-1979 a revision was filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act before the District Judge Saharanpur. The IVth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur by judgment dated July, 8, 1980 allowed the revision, set aside the judgment dated 21-12-1979 and decreed the suit for ejectment. The revisional court recorded a finding that the property in dispute was not governed by provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 and as such the petitioner was liable for ejectment. The judgment dated 8th July, 1980 has been impugned in the present petition. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the revisional court has acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction in reversing a finding given by the trial court that the property was constructed in the year 1968. According to the submission made by the learned counsel the only course open to the revisional court was to remand the matter to the Judge Small Causes Court and the revisional court could not have recorded a finding itself. 3. According to the submission made by the learned counsel the only course open to the revisional court was to remand the matter to the Judge Small Causes Court and the revisional court could not have recorded a finding itself. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 4. In Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Pd. Chaturvedi, AIR 1959 SC 492 a question arose under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act No. 3 of 1947 which has been replaced by the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. In the case of Chaube Jagdish Prasad (supra) precisely the same question arose as to when the property was constructed and as to whether the revisional court can go into this question to determine whether the Act was applicable or not. The Supreme Court after examining the provisions came to the conclusion that the question as to what was the date of construction of the accommodation was a jurisdictional fact and therefore, the revisional court had jurisdiction to decide that fact. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows :- "The High Court had the power to interfere and once it had the power it could determine whether the question of the date of construction was rightly or wrongly decided. The High Court held that the Civil Judge had wrongly decided that the construction was of a date after June 30, 1946 and therefore fell within Sec. 3-A." 5. This decision in Chaube Jagdish Prasad, (1959 All LJ 626) (SC) (supra) fully applies to the present case. Here also the question which is to be determined is whether the construction in dispute was made prior to 15th July, 1972 when U.P. Act XIII of 1972 came into force or not and on this depended the applicability of the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. This clearly is a jurisdictional fact and therefore, the re-visional court was fully justified in going into that question in determining as to when the property should be deemed to have been constructed under the provisions of the Act. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this connection had relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Laxmi Kishore v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1979 All WC 746. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this connection had relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Laxmi Kishore v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1979 All WC 746. It was held by the Division Bench that if a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such orders as the justice requires; but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for itself. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact. 7. The case of Laxmi Kishore (supra) applies where the revisional court is called upon to determine a question of fact. This principle would not be applicable to a case where the revisional court is called upon to decide a jurisdictional fact. In the case of jurisdictional fact the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chaube Jagdish Prasad, (1959 All LJ 626) (supra) would apply. The case of Laxmi Kishore (1979 All WC 746) (supra) of this court is, therefore, distinguishable and would not apply to the facts of the present case. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the revisional court was fully justified in going into the evidence on record and thereafter recording a finding as to when the property should be deemed to have been constructed for the purposes of applicability of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. 8. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for time to vacate the premises. This prayer is justified. I grant the petitioner three months time to vacate the premises. Immediately after the expiry of three months the petitioner will hand over the vacant possession of the premises and the rent up to date as well for three months from today to the opposite party No.3