ORDER: — An interesting as well as an important question relating to the deduction of time taken for furnishing stamps called for on an application for a certified copy as ‘time requisite’ under section 12(2)and (3) of the Limitation Act, 1963, arises for consideration. 2. The judgement appealed against in the instart case, was delivered or 17th April, 1980 and an application for certified copies of the judgement and decree was filed on 19th April, 1980. The copy stamps required for complying with the application were called for on 3rd September. 1980. The deposited or 6th September, 1980. The certified copies were made ready on 4th November, 1980, taken delivery of on 5th November, 1980, and the appeal was presented on 31st January. 1981. The office returned the papers stating that the appeal had been filed out of time. In doing so the office counted against the appellant two days viz., 5th September, 1980 and 6th September, 1980 as time not requisite. Thereafter, the papers were re presented with an endorsement that in view of the decision of this Court in Ponnuswamy Nadar v. Ananthappa Nadar and another1, the appeal had been preferred in time. Even thereafter, the office entertained a doubt whether the decision relied on can be applied also to cases where the appeal is filed with certified copies. On the counsel maintaining that it would apply even to such cases, the office has sought orders of Court and that is how the matter has come up. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant was heard in support of the stand taken up by him and having regard to the importance of the question and the likelihood of its affecting the established practice obtaining in this Court, the Secretary of the Advocates’ Association was requested to appear and assist the Court. 4. Under section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provision is made for the exclusion of time in the commutation of the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal or application etc. The day from which the period is to be reckoned for any suit or annual or application stands excluded under section 12(1). 4. Under section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provision is made for the exclusion of time in the commutation of the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal or application etc. The day from which the period is to be reckoned for any suit or annual or application stands excluded under section 12(1). The first part of section 12(2) excludes the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced from entering into the computation, while the latter portion excludes the “time requisite” for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed. Section 12(3) provides that the requisite for obatining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is found shall be excluded where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order. In relation to proceedings to set aside an award, section 12(4) provides that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall stand excluded. The Explanation appended to section 12 states that the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for copy thereof is made shall not be excluded in computing the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order. Rules 129 and 135 of the Civil Rules of Practice make provision for the deposit of stamp papers and printing charges respectively with reference to applications for certified copies of the judgments and decree and the printed copies as well. 5. The established practice of this court as revealed by the office note, is to deduct a period of two days from the date when the copy stamps were called for to the date when the copy stamps were furnished irrespective of the nature of the copy viz., certified copy or printed copy of the judgment or a certified copy of the decree accompanying the memorandum of appeal. It has also to be noted that the endorsements usually made on the copies furnished to litigants do not disclose the time allowed for furnishing the copy stamps or for payment of necessary charges. 6. It has also to be noted that the endorsements usually made on the copies furnished to litigants do not disclose the time allowed for furnishing the copy stamps or for payment of necessary charges. 6. It is in the background of the provisions of the Limitation Act referred to above, the provisions in the Civil Rules of Practice as well as the prevalent practice of this Court that the question has to be considered No doubt, the word “time requisite” occuring in section 12 of the Limitation Act has been interpreted by numerous decisions Simply, the words connote the necessary time properly required and taken up in order to secure a copy for the purpose of preferring an appeal. The Privy Council in Jijybhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettiyar (a firm1 has pointed out that the word “requisite” is a strong word. and means something more then the word “required”. According to the Privy Council, it also means “properly required” and that it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default. The Privy Council also held that section 12 of the Limitation Act contained a positive direction for exclusion of time and that such a direction was unconditional and applied irrespective of whether the rules permitted the filing of the appeal or an application without annexing a copy of the order or judgment. In Additional Collector of Customs. Calcutta and another v. M/s. Best and Company2. it was held that the provisions of section 12(2) and section 12(3) of the Limitation Act contain a positive direction excluding the time taken in obtaining a copy of the judgement and decree or order, as the case may be, and those provisions are irrespective of the Code of Civil Procedure or the rules made by Court under section 122 of the Code. Again in State of U. P. v. Maharaja Narain and others1, the Supreme Court held that the expression “time requisite” cannot be understood as the time absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy of the order, but that the section would permit the deduction from the time taken for filing the appeal, the time required for obtaining a copy of the order appealed from and not nay lesser period which might have been occupied, if the application for copy had been filed at some other date. It was also pointed out that the section does not oblige the appellant to be prompt in his application for the copy of the order and that a plain reading of section 12(2) would indicate that there is no justification for restricting the scone of that provision and that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the day on which the judgment or order complained of was propounced and the time taken by the Court to make available the copy applied for have to he excluded. The practical difficulties that would arise with reference to the ascertainment of the minimum time required for obtaining a copy of the order annealed from has been pointed Out by the Supreme Court at page 961 in the following terms: “If the appellate Courts are required to find out in every appeal filed before them the minimum time required for obtaining a copy of the order appealed from, it would be unworkable. In that event every time an appeal is filed, the Court not only will have to see whether the appeal is in time on the basis of the information available from the copy of the order filed along with the memorandum of appeal but it must go further and hold an enquiry whether any other copy had been made available to the appellant and if so what was the time taken by the Court to make available that copy. This would lead to a great deal of confusion and enquiries into the alleged laches or dilatoriness in respect not of copies produced with the memorandum of appeal but about other copies which he might have got and used for other purposes with which the Court has nothing to do”. This would lead to a great deal of confusion and enquiries into the alleged laches or dilatoriness in respect not of copies produced with the memorandum of appeal but about other copies which he might have got and used for other purposes with which the Court has nothing to do”. The above observation would apply even to a case as on hand as in view of the nature of the endorsements made or the certified copies furnished, the Court would, in every case, be obliged to engage itself in an enquiry concerning the laches or diatoriness on the part of a litigant in respect of the time taken to furnish the copy stamps with reference to each one of the days allowed for furnishing the stamps. 7. Attain in Lal Bal Mukund (dead) by L. Rs. v. Lajwanti and others1, the Supreme Court has pointed out that since the Limitation Act deprives or restricts the right of an aggrieved person to have recourse to legal remedy, a construction which preserves and remedy should be preferred to the one that would defeat and the any interpretation which may have a penalising effect up-less it is drive to do so by the irresistible force of the language employed by the legislature, should be avoided. It was also further pointed out that all the time counted from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment which would be properly required for getting a copy of the decree including the time which must ex necessitate elapse in the circumstances of the particular case would be within the meaning of the expression “time requisite” under section 12(2). The period of delay in preparing the decree attributable to the default or negligence of the appellant has been held to be not deductible. Under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Again in Gopal Krishna Das v. Sailendro Nath Biswas and another2, it has been held that the time requisite for obtaining the certified copies undoubtedly means “time properly required” and an appellant cannot in the computation of the period of limitation for filing the appeal ask for exclusion of time which was spent negligently. Again in Gopal Krishna Das v. Sailendro Nath Biswas and another2, it has been held that the time requisite for obtaining the certified copies undoubtedly means “time properly required” and an appellant cannot in the computation of the period of limitation for filing the appeal ask for exclusion of time which was spent negligently. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. M/s.Madanlal Jain and Sons, Barelly3, lays down that the expression “time requisite”, in section 12(2) of the Limitation Act cannot be understood as the time absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy of the order and that what is deductible is not the minimum time with in which a copy of the order appealed against could have been obtained. 8. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind the provisions of the Civil Rules of practice in relation to the furnishing of certified copies my now be considered. As per rale 129 of the Civil Rules of Practice, every day between the hours of 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. a list showing the applications in which the records have been received and the number of stamp papers required, shall be prepared and affixed to the Court's notice hoard. Such list shall remain suspended for three days, or, if the last day is a holiday, till the next Court day. If the required stamp papers have not been deposited by 3 p.m. On the fourth day, counting that on which the list was suspended or, if the fourth day is a holiday then on the next Court day, the application shall be struck off. This rule therefore, contemplates that the cony application should be kept with the office at least for three working days after stamps are called for and during this period, the copy application is neither returned to the party nor struck off. The granting of three days’ time to furnish the necessary stamps after notice or intimation cannot therefore be stated to be time lost by a party owing to his carelessness or negligence or laches but should be regarded as time requisite to enable the Court to get ready the copies. If the copy stamps are furnished the next day, then no difficulty at all arises. If the copy stamps are furnished the next day, then no difficulty at all arises. in cases where the litigant furnishes the copy stamps required on the third day, his having taken that time cannot be attributed to any negligence or laches on his part as that time is made available by the rules. Having regard to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Contain interpreting the expression “time requisite” in my view the totality of the period of three days permitted under Rule 129 of the Civil Rules of Practice would also fall within the category of “time requisite” within the meaning of section 12(2) and (3) of the Limitation Art. 1963. Indeed in Vellaiyammal Bib; and others v. Koolayanna Rowthan1, a Division Bench consisting of Spencer, J. and Odgers, J. had to consider the question whether on appeal preferred before the District Court was barred. In that case, the judgment was delivered on 3rd November and on the same day, an application for copies of judgment and decree was made. The stamps were called on 13th November and were not furnished till 15th November. The copies were made ready on 12th December and the appeal was presented on 12th January. An argument was raised that the appellants were not entitled to deduct 14th November. But the Bench pointed out that 14th November had to be excluded under section 12(3) of the Limitation Act as one of the days requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgement. The same principle has also been laid down in In re Javvaji Venkateswaralu1That decision holds that the three days time given to a party to furnish copy stamps and keeping alive of the application without being struck off till then has to be construed as time properly required by the Court in getting the stamps from the party to comply with the request for a certified copy. This intepretatior accords with the spirit as well as the intendment of section 12(2) and (3) of the Limitation Act as well as rule 129 of the Civil Rules of Practice. 9. The case reported in Ponnuswami, Nadar v. Anantappa Nadar and another2. upon which considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant arose with reference to the securing of printed copies, which is not the case here. 9. The case reported in Ponnuswami, Nadar v. Anantappa Nadar and another2. upon which considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant arose with reference to the securing of printed copies, which is not the case here. In addition, provision is made under rule 135(4) of the Civil Rules of Practice that out of the seven days time allowed for the payment of printing charges the Court may allow in computing limitation as many days as it deems fit in each case as time requisite for obtaining a copy. if the printing office is five or more miles distant from the Court calling for the charges. Apparently, the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to rule 135(4) of the Civil Pules of Practice. But even so, as pointed out earlier, the present case is concerred only with the exclusion of time with reference to certified copies and not printed copies and therefore, it is unnecessary to pursue that matter further. 10. In my view, in the light of the principles laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as other decisions referred; to above, the three days time granted to a litigant to furnish copy stamps should be deemed to be “time requisite” and cannot, in any manner, be attributed to the default or negligence or laches on the part of the applicant so as to disentitle him from claiming the benefit of exclusion of the entirety of those three days. Under these circumstances, in the present case, excluding 5th and 6th of September, 1980 also as “time requisite”, the appeal would be in time. The office is directed to number the appeal, if the papers are otherwise in order. 11. The Court places on record the valuable assistance rendered by Thiru R. S. Venkatachari, Secretary of the Advocate's Association, Madras. R.S. ----- Appeal held to be in time.