JUDGMENT : K.N. Saikia, J. 1. Govind Nayak, aged about 35 years, belonging to labour community was run over and killed by vehicle (a bus) No. ASX 2642 owned by the Assam State Transport Corporation on 19.2.77 at about 8.40 p.m. near Packmai bridge on the North Trunk Road under Dhekiajuli Police Station of Darrang District. Application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was made jointly by his mother, father, widow and four minor children claiming Rs. 2,73,000/-. The State of Assam, the Assam State Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') and the driver of the vehicle, Shri Haridam Singh, have been impleaded. The Corporation and the driver have appeared and filed objections before the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Darrang, Tezpur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'). 2. On the pleadings as many as eight issues have been framed of which material issues No 3 and 5 are as follows: (3) Whether there is any rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of offending vehicle or whether the deceased himself was negligent ? (5) Whether the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 650.00 per month ? Issues No. 1, 2, 4 and 6 are not pressed. Issue Nos. 7 and 8 are on relief. 3. The claimants examined five witness including the claimant No. 1, Smt. Mahadevi Nayak, the mother. The opposite parties did not examine any witness. The learned Tribunal held that the driver was rash and negligent, and awarded Rs. 65,000/- to be realised from the Corporation with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of claim and cost of Rs. 500/-. Hence this appeal. 4. Mr. B. Sarma, the learned Counsel for the Appellant Corporation, submits, inter alia, that the Tribunal erred in holding that the driver was negligent and that the loss of pecuniary benefit to the claimants amounted to Rs. 600/- per month without taking into consideration the acceleration of interest in their favour by reason of the death. Mr. R. D. Lal, the learned Counsel for the Respondents-claimants demurs, inter alia, that the Tribunal's findings are based on the evidence on record and acceleration of interest, even if any, in this case, was rightly not deducted. 5. 600/- per month without taking into consideration the acceleration of interest in their favour by reason of the death. Mr. R. D. Lal, the learned Counsel for the Respondents-claimants demurs, inter alia, that the Tribunal's findings are based on the evidence on record and acceleration of interest, even if any, in this case, was rightly not deducted. 5. There is no dispute that Govind Nayak was killed in the accident by vehicle No. ASX 2642 owned by the Corporation while it was driven by opposite party No. 2, Shri Haridam Singh. There is also no dispute that the claimants are legal heirs of deceased Govind Nayak. The claimant's father, Bhima Nayak, died during the pendency of the application. 6. Was there any negligence on part of the driver while causing the accident, or was there any contributory negligence on part of Govind Nayak? Has the Tribunal erred in assessing the compensation without taking into consideration any acceleration of interest in favour of the claimants by reason of the death ? 7. On the question of negligence the relevant evidence on record is that of P.W. 2, Keval Sarma and P.W. 5, Nabin Chandra Sarma, the two eye witnesses. According to the former, it was at about 8 or 8.30 p m. in dark night the bus was proceeding from Gauhati towards East with its head-lights on while Govind Nayak was proceeding towards West on his cycle with its dynamo light blazing by his left side along the grassy portion of the road. The road in that particular place had a slope and a curve. The witness was then returning home after attending a 'Nam-Kirtan' with few others on foot and was conversing with them before parting for his own house. The accident took place at that time at a distance of 40 yards from the point of turning to his house. The bus dashed against the cycle, Govind Nayak fell down and the bus ran over him and his bicycle and went away. The witness at once ran to the spot and recognised Govind Nayak who fell down on the pitched portion of the road and his head was broken and the inner substance of the head began to ooze out. A growling sound was coming through his mouth. The witness was bewildered but gave a little water on Govind's mouth but the latter could not swallow. A growling sound was coming through his mouth. The witness was bewildered but gave a little water on Govind's mouth but the latter could not swallow. Govind died almost instantaneously. P. W. 5, Shri Nabin Chandra Sarma, aged 22 years, by caste Nepali Hindu, who was walking with P. W. 2 was the other eye witness. He corroborates P. W. 2 saying that the place of the road where the accident took place had a slope and a curve first towards the right and then towards the left. The accident took place at about 8/8.30 p.m. in February. Their evidence has not been shaken in cross-examination. P. W. 3, Dr. T. Ahmed, is the S.D.M. and Health Officer of Tezpur Civil Hospital and he performed the post mortem examination on the dead body of Govind Nayak on 20.2.77 and found as follows: (1) Abrasion with acchymosis over left buttock l" X l". (2) Abrasion with acchymosis on right leg below knee 1\2" X 1\2". (3) Right leg bones broken 6" below knee. (4) Skull crushed and all bones broken. Brain matter protruding through right frontal region. In his opinion Govind died due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. This fact has not been controverted in any manner. 8. The opposite parties No. 2 and 3 in their written statement stated that at the place of occurrence there were 5/7 bullock carts which were coming from the West to East and when the driver crossed about 2/3 such carts at that moment suddenly a cyclist came to the middle of the road through the carts from the north to the south and the driver seeing him tried to swerve the bus to the southern side and as there was very little space on the southern side inspite of his best efforts the driver could not avert the accident. However, the opposite parties did not adduce any evidence in support of their written statements. P. W. 2 in his examination-in-chief states that two bullock carts loaded with house-building materials of certain dismantled house had been proceeding towards the west at a distance of one furlong from the place of accident and that excepting those two bullock carts there were nothing on the road at that time on the particular place. P. W. 2 in his examination-in-chief states that two bullock carts loaded with house-building materials of certain dismantled house had been proceeding towards the west at a distance of one furlong from the place of accident and that excepting those two bullock carts there were nothing on the road at that time on the particular place. In cross-examination he states that at the place of accident the breadth of the road would be about 30 feet. The bus having crossed the curve caused the accident which took place on the southern side of the road and he saw the man falling on the middle of the road. He denied that the bullock carts were near the place of accident. He had no idea at what speed the bus was running, but says that the bus did not stop. From the above evidence on record there can be no doubt that the driver was rash and negligent. He ought to have negotiated the curve and the slope carefully. The deceased cyclist was on the grassy portion of the road by the left and only after he was knocked down his fell on the pitched portion and the bus ran over him and his bicycle breaking his head resulting in almost instantaneous death. 9. Under the above circumstances the inference of negligence on the part of the driver of the bus can reasonably be drawn. The opposite parties have not adduced any evidence to disprove the above facts, namely, that the deceased was riding his bicycle along the grassy portion of the road by his left with his dynamo light on, and that the road was 30 feet wide, curved at the place and free from any obstruction. The statement in the written statement of O.P. Nos. 2 and 3 that there were obstructions by carts, is belied by the clear statement of P.W. 2 that only two bullock carts were about a furlong away. True that P.W. 2 could not say at what speed the bus was running but the fact that Govind with his bicycle was knocked down and thrown to the pitched portion and run over causing his instantaneous death, is indicative of high speed and impact of the bus. Under the circumstances the finding of the Tribunal that the driver was rash and negligent cannot be said to be erroneous. Under the circumstances the finding of the Tribunal that the driver was rash and negligent cannot be said to be erroneous. Under the above circumstances, the cause of the accident being not otherwise apparent, even the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may reasonably be applied. There is no doubt that under the present day traffic conditions every vehicle has to adapt its own behaviour to the behaviour of other persons using the road, and over their actions those in charge of the vehicle have no control. The mere fact that an accident has happened involving a particular vehicle is by itself, therefore, no evidence that those in charge of the vehicle were at fault; but there are many highway collisions in which the accident itself suggests a reasonable probability of negligence on the part of one of the parties rather than the other. The instant is one of such cases. Where a cyclist is keeping to his left grassy portion of the road with dynamo light on, and a bus runs him over, the road being 30 feet wide and free from any obstruction, but having a curve and a slope, there is no doubt that the accident itself calls for an explanation from the driver of the vehicle that runs over the cyclist; and these may be prima facie evidence of negligence justifying the application of the doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur'. When a prima facie case of negligence of the driver has been established under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is incumbent on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle not merely to say that he had acted carefully but to rebut that presumption by proving that there was no negligence on his part, even though he could not prove how the accident happened. 10. As was observed in Lloyde v. West Midlands Gas Board (1971) 1 W.L.R. 749 , res ipsa loquitur is not a doctrine but is "no more than an exotic, though convenient, phrase to describe what is in essence no more than a common sense approach, not limited by technical rules, to the assessment of the affect of the evidence in certain circumstances. It means that a Plaintiff Prima facie establishes negligence there: (i) it is not possible for him to prove precisely what was the relevant act or omission which set in train of the events leading to the accident; but (ii) on the evidence as it stands at the relevant time it is more likely than not that the effective cause of the accident was some act or omission of the Defendant, or of someone for whom the Defendant is responsible, which act or omission constitutes a failure to take proper care for the Plaintiff's safety". Lord Denning, M.R. in Turner v. Mansfield Corporation (1975) 119 S.J. 629, has similarly observed that res ipsa loquitur is a rule as to weight of evidence from which negligence can be inferred, not a doctrine. Moore v. Fox (R) & Sons (1956) 1 All E.R. 182, should be relegated to the background. In Moore v. Fox (1956) 1 All E.R. 182 the Plaintiff employed to immerse objects in gas-heated tank and there occurred an explosion. Held, that "it was res ipsa loquitur, despite the fact that the Plaintiff was at the time operating the tank. Held, further, that although Defendants had shown ways in which it was possible for the accident to have happened without negligence, this did not amount to discharging onus which res ipsa loquitur, cast on them, which was to show that the accident was not attributable to want of care on their part". It approved the dictum in Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co. Ltd (1948) 2 All E.R. 460, that "if Defendants' omnibus leaves the road, falls down an embankment, and this without more is proved then res ipsa loquitur, there is a presumption that the event is caused by negligence on the part of Defendants, and the Plaintiff succeeds unless Defendants can rebut this presumption". 11. Ltd (1948) 2 All E.R. 460, that "if Defendants' omnibus leaves the road, falls down an embankment, and this without more is proved then res ipsa loquitur, there is a presumption that the event is caused by negligence on the part of Defendants, and the Plaintiff succeeds unless Defendants can rebut this presumption". 11. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Narain Shanker 1980 A.C.J. 411 (S.C.), where a flimsy plea was put forward by the operator to escape liability for accident caused by its bus resulting in loss of limbs to many, that the lights of the bus accident tally failed and thus the unfortunate episode occurred ; and the Tribunal disbelieved the evidence and awarded compensation in sums far lower than were claimed by the victims, Supreme Court observed: The nature of the accident and the surrounding circumstances are such that the doctrine res ipsa loquitur was rightly invoked by the court. Indeed, the terrible accidents are attributable to reckless driving and escalating year after year make our highways great hazards. One should have thought that nationalisation of road transport would have produced a better sense of social responsibility on the part of the management and the drivers. In fact, one of the major purposes of socialisation of transport is to inject a sense of safety, accountability and operational responsibility which may be absent in the case of private undertakings, whose motivation is profit making regardless of risk to life ; but common experience on Indian highways discloses callousness and blunted consciousness on the part of public corporations which acquire a monopoly under the Motor Vehicles Act in plying buses. It is a thousand pities that our State Road Transport vehicles should become mobile menaces, and we should impress upon them the need to have greater reverence for human life representing, as they do, the value-set of the State itself. 12. In N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors. 1980 A.C.J. 435 (S.C.), it has been enjoined that the accident tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances were it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances were it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. The finding of the Tribunal as to negligence of the driver, therefore, does not deserve interference in appeal. 13. The next question is the quantum of compensation. The claimant in their application demanded Rs. 2,73,000/-. P.W. 1, Mahadevi Nayak, is Govind's mother aged 62 years. According to her Govind was aged 35 years and in sound health. He was the Gaonbura (village headman), a cultivator and a business man at the same time. She further says they had been possessing about 60 bighas of land and Govind was doing the cultivation work himself and by engaging other ploughmen and that all her cultivable lands were lying uncultivated after Govind's death. While her son was alive they had been producing about 300/350 maunds of paddy which decreased to 40/50 maunds since after Govind's death. Their two pairs of bullocks, and the cows had been sold away and the proceeds spent for maintenance of the family. All properties were thus being exhausted. Govind was also running business in paddy, jute, rice and mustard seeds. Govind was her only son and since his death she had been living at Orang together with Govind's wife and his minor children. Govind used to give Rs. 600/- to 650/- per month for meeting all the expenses of their family and she used to maintain the family with the said amount. Her husband was a lunatic and died of grief after Govind's death, having no man to look after their land, had been giving the lands in adhi terms to two persons of their village, but have not received even two maunds of paddy. She had no knowledge if Govind had kept the surplus money after paying her Rs. 650/- per month. Her evidence could not be shaken in cross-examination. P.W. 4, Rai Mohan Dutta, aged 72 years, a co-villager, corroborates P.W. 1 in material particulars. According to him Govind had 80/85 bighas of both homestead and cultivable lands, was of sound financial position and he used to purchase paddy, mustard, jute, etc., with a view to sell them and this witness himself purchased those commodities from Govind. Govind had three pairs of bullocks with which he himself cultivated certain lands and rest he gave in adhi terms. Govind had three pairs of bullocks with which he himself cultivated certain lands and rest he gave in adhi terms. He had yearly income of about Rs. 30/35 thousand. After Govind's death, his father, Bhima Nayak became mad and died ; the financial position of Govind's house worsened, the lands, etc., given in mortgage and bullocks sold out. He had no brothers and all his children were minors. P.W. 5, Nabin Chandra Sarma, also corroborates that Govind was a Gaonbura, in good health, well to do and that the condition of his family turned pitiable after his death. 14. From the above evidence the Tribunal accepted Rs. 600/- to be his monthly income. While P.W. 1 stated Govind's age to be 35 years in the post mortem report it was given as 35/40 years, while P.W. 2 stated it to be about 40/42 years. The Tribunal accepted his age as 40 years and expected longevity to be 60 years ; and reckoned the total amount of 20 years' purchase at Rs. 1,44,000/-. It estimated Govind's personal expenses at Rs. 200/- per month and deducting that amount per month reckoned Rs. 95,000/-, but made an award of Rs. 65,000/- only reducing Rs. 25,000/- on account of lump sum payment. It may be noticed that what was stated by P.W. 1 was that Govind's contribution Rs. 600/- to 650/- per month for maintenance of his family but she did not know what was the total income of Govind per month, or if he kept the surplus to himself. P.W. 4, on the other hand, stated that Govind had an income of about Rs. 30/35 thousand per year, but did not pay income tax. This would calculate at Rs. 2,500/- per month. If out of this amount, Rs. 600/- used to be contributed to the family, there would be no justification for deduction of Rs. 200/- per month from that amount on account of personal expenses. For maintenance of a family of eight members a monthly contribution of Rs. 600/- cannot be said to be unreasonable. A person having 60 bighas of land and also carrying on business in paddy, mustard seeds, and jute can reasonably be held to have been capable of contributing Rs. 600/- per month. Considering the ponderables and imponderables the assessment of compensation at Rs. 65,000/- has to be held to be most moderate and not excessive. 15. A person having 60 bighas of land and also carrying on business in paddy, mustard seeds, and jute can reasonably be held to have been capable of contributing Rs. 600/- per month. Considering the ponderables and imponderables the assessment of compensation at Rs. 65,000/- has to be held to be most moderate and not excessive. 15. Even so, Mr. Sarma for the Corporation assails the assessment on two grounds, namely, that there are no sufficient evidence to show monthly contribution of Rs. 600/- and the Tribunal failed to deduct the acceleration of interest in favour of the claimants by reason of Govind's death. The first contention is untenable in face of the evidence of P.W. 1, the mother, on record discussed above. Considering the nature of the family it would not be reasonable to expect maintenance and production of accounts of monthly expenses in the claimants family, as submitted by counsel, particularly when no rebutting evidence was adduced by the opposite parties. 16. Mr. Sarma strenuously argues that the Tribunal failed to take into account the acceleration of interest in favour of the claimants by reason of the death, namely, that they inherited at least 60 big-has of land which would surely yield some income to them, and the same ought to be deducted. Can every property inherited by and devolving on the claimants on the death caused by the accident be truly regarded as acceleration of interest by reason of the death ? Can an inheritance of agricultural land subject to law of tenancy be treated as a perennial source of income so as to justify deduction from compensation ? 17. Acceleration of interest in English law means the hastening of the vesting in possession of a reversion or remainder by determination of the prior particular estate by surrender, etc., before its natural termination. Where an estate or interest in any property in remainder or expectancy falls into possession, sooner than it otherwise would, by reason of the preceding interest being or becoming void or determined by surrender, mortgage, lapse or extinguishment, there is acceleration of interest. Acceleration means the shortening of the time for the vesting in possession of expectant interest. Under the Hindu Law a widow can accelerate the reversion by surrendering her interest in favour of the next reversioner. (See Jai Kaur and Others Vs. Sher Singh and Others, 18. Acceleration means the shortening of the time for the vesting in possession of expectant interest. Under the Hindu Law a widow can accelerate the reversion by surrendering her interest in favour of the next reversioner. (See Jai Kaur and Others Vs. Sher Singh and Others, 18. We may notice that there is difference between on account of the death and as a result of the death. By reason of the death may mean the former and not the latter. 19. Thus the opening up of inheritance at the death of the owner may not strictly be regarded as acceleration of interest. Even if it is so regarded, it may not always" merit deduction in assessment of compensation in motor accident claims. 20. Inheritance and succession opening up as a result of the death caused by accident if allowed to ensure for the benefit of the tortfeasors it may sometimes lead to anomalous results. In General Trunk Railway of Canada v. Fennings L.R. 13 A.C. 800, the Privy Council held that where a deceased person had left sums of money in some form or other--substantial sums of money which went to the widow those had to be taken into consideration, in deciding the widow's pecuniary loss, what was described as the acceleration of the payment to herself of what her husband left her as the result of his premature death. It was however, pointed out in Banchead v. Railway Executive (1949) 65 T.L.R. 435, that it was a grisly way of looking at things to say that a widow benefited from her husband's premature death because she received what he proposed to leave her. Therefore, it was held that the fact that the deceased had left a substantial house worth Rs. 50,000/- should not be taken into consideration while assessing the quantum of compensation to be awarded. 21. Acceleration of interest has been considered for the purpose of estimating the damages caused by or resulting from fatal accidents under the Fatal Accidents Act and the Motor Vehicles Act. 22. In Gobald Motor Service Ltd. and Anr. v. R.M.K. Veluswami and Ors. 1958 A.C.J. 179 (S.C.), relying on fatal accident cases in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd (1942) 1 All E.R. 657, and Nance v. British Columbia Electric Rly. Co. 22. In Gobald Motor Service Ltd. and Anr. v. R.M.K. Veluswami and Ors. 1958 A.C.J. 179 (S.C.), relying on fatal accident cases in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd (1942) 1 All E.R. 657, and Nance v. British Columbia Electric Rly. Co. Ltd. (1951) 2 All E.R. 448, it has been observed: Shortly stated, the general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be ascertained. This judgment was delivere d under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, before its amendment by Act 3 of 1951, as the accident in that case had occurred on September 20, 1947. One Rajaratnam died on September 23, 1947 in an accident and the suit was filed by his father, widow and sons for compensation u/s 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act for loss of pecuniary benefits sustained by them personally and u/s 2 thereof for the loss sustained by the estate on account of the death of Rajaratnam. The learned trial court allowed Rs. 3,600/-to the father of the deceased and Rs. 35,200/-to his widow and sons u/s 1 of the Act and Rs. 5,000/- to his widow and sons u/s 2 of the Act. But in regard to the father, the amount of compensation was reduced from Rs. 3,500/- to Rs. 1,000/-. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court as correct and dismissed the appeal. The respective scope of claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act were explained. The rights of action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Act are quite distinct and independent. If a person taking benefit under both the section is the same, he cannot be permitted to recover twice over for the same loss. In awarding damages under both the heads, there shall not be duplication of the same claim, that is, if any part of the compensation representing the loss to the estate goes into the calculation of the personal loss u/s 1 of the Act, that portion shall be excluded in giving compensation u/s 2 and vice versa. 23. In awarding damages under both the heads, there shall not be duplication of the same claim, that is, if any part of the compensation representing the loss to the estate goes into the calculation of the personal loss u/s 1 of the Act, that portion shall be excluded in giving compensation u/s 2 and vice versa. 23. The case decided under the Fatal Accidents Act cannot be taken as precedents in every case inasmuch as u/s 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Tribunal is to determine the compensation which appears to him to be just. No doubt, in some of the decided cases a deduction was made on account of acceleration of succession but no uniform rule can be laid down in that behalf. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, particularly, the nature of the property and untimely benefit accruing to the legal representatives by reason of death, while balancing the gains and losses in order to determine the just compensation to which the legal representatives are entitled. In Public Trustee (W.A.) v. Nickisson 1966 A.C.J. 194 (Aus), decided by the High Court of Australia the claimant's son inherited at the age of 7 the whole of his father's estate worth 2,700 when he died, a deduction of 500 by reason of the son's inheritance was made. Had the father not died, the son might never have inherited the whole of his estate and, furthermore it was probable that any inheritance would have been waiting for a long time and the estate of about 2,700 would produce about 3 a week leaving the capital intact, and this has sufficient significance even having regard to the son's prospects while his father was alive of getting more later, to warrant some deduction from what would have been the appropriate award if there had been no inheritance. In Ball v. Kraft 1967 A.C.J. 235 (Col), a case from Canada, the claims were made by the widow and the two sons aged 13 and 16. The widow remarried 19 months after the death of her husband. The loss of the widow during the period of 19 months that she remained unmarried after the death of her husband was assessed at 3,500 out of which the sum of 2,000 which she had received from her husband's portion of the real estate on his death was deducted. The widow remarried 19 months after the death of her husband. The loss of the widow during the period of 19 months that she remained unmarried after the death of her husband was assessed at 3,500 out of which the sum of 2,000 which she had received from her husband's portion of the real estate on his death was deducted. In Daniels v. Jones (1961) 3 All E.R. 24, the net benefit derived by the widow was determined at 1,200 and this amount was deducted out of 33,000 which were determined as damages payable to the widow and her children. In Whittome v. Coates (1965) 3 All E.R. 268, the claim was made by the widow on the death of her 58 years old husband. The deceased left 386 in cash and it was pleaded that the benefit of that amount would be received by the Plaintiff. Those amounts would have been payable if the deceased had lived upto the age of 65 years. The trial court had awarded 5,250 to the widow out of which the Court of Appeal deducted 1,000 on account of the assets of the estate left by the deceased including the sum of 386. 24. The above decisions appear to have been based on the observation of Lord Wright in Danes v. Powell (1942) 1 All E.R. 657 that "the actual pecuniary loss of such individual entitled to sue can only be ascertained by balancing, on the one hand the loss to him of the future pecuniary benefit, and, on the other any percuntiary advantage which from whatever source comes to him by reason of death". 25. In C.K. Subramonia Iyer v. T. Kunhi Kuttan Nair 1970 A.C.J. 110 (S.C.), the above proposition was applied. 26. This principle was reiterated in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporter Insurarance Co. 1971 A.C.J. 206 (S.C.), where their Lordships observed: Under Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the Tribunal is required to fix such compensation which appears to it to be just. The power given to the tribunal in the matter of fixing compensation under that provision is wide. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporter Insurarance Co. 1971 A.C.J. 206 (S.C.), where their Lordships observed: Under Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the Tribunal is required to fix such compensation which appears to it to be just. The power given to the tribunal in the matter of fixing compensation under that provision is wide. Even if we assume (we do not propose to decide that question in this case) that compensation under that provision has to be fixed on the same basis as is required to be done under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (Act 13 of 1855), the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. The general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be ascertained. 27. In Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Bairagarh, Bhopal v. Sudhakar and Ors. 1977 A.C.J. 290 (S.C.), it has been observed that a method of assessing damages, usually followed in England is to calculate the net pecuniary loss upon an annual basis and to arrive at the total award by multiplying the figure assessed as the amount of the annual dependency by a number of "years' purchase", that is, the number of years the benefit was expected to last, taking into consideration the imponderable factors in fixing either the multiplier or multiplicand. It has been further observed that in assessing the damages certain other factors have also to be taken note of such as the uncertainties of life and the fact of accelerated payment that the husband would be getting a lump sum payment which but for his wife's death would have been available to him in driblets over a number of years. 28. In Damyanti Devi v. Sita Devi 1972 A.C.J. 334 (P&H), the deceased had left a residential house. The question was whether the value of the house or any part thereof should be deducted from the amount of compensation assessed. 28. In Damyanti Devi v. Sita Devi 1972 A.C.J. 334 (P&H), the deceased had left a residential house. The question was whether the value of the house or any part thereof should be deducted from the amount of compensation assessed. As the house was being used by the family even when the deceased was alive the value of the house was not allowed to be deducted. It has been observed that--"in every case the nature and extent of the assets left by the deceased is to be determined, that is, if the assets are such, of which benefit was being taken by or was available to the family during his life time, the value of those assets has not to be taken into consideration in mitigation of the damages. The accelerated succession to those assets does not bring any additional benefit to the heirs which is liable to set off against the loss occasioned by the death. Again if the assets are such which were being created by the deceased out of his savings to be utilised for the benefit of the members of the family on various occasions like marriage, higher education of the children, etc., those assets should also be kept out of consideration while determining the just compensation. Such assets cannot be said to confer any undue or untimely benefit on the legal representative because of the death of the person on whom they were dependent. 29. In Nea Seo Thun and Anr. v. Ng Peng Hui 1976 A.C.J. 517 (Sin), the deceased aged 61 years was a poultry farmer and had a 99 years lease of a piece of land said to be about one acre in area which he used for farming and on which also stood the family house. The deceased reared hens, ducks and pigs. The leasehold with the house thereon was valued for estate duty purpose at 50,000 and the widow inherited half of the estate. Choor Singh, J. observed: In so far as the family house and the leasehold land on which it stands is concerned the widow's enjoyment of this benefit is the same before and after the death of the deceased and there is no financial gain. The widow and her children are still staying in the said family house. Choor Singh, J. observed: In so far as the family house and the leasehold land on which it stands is concerned the widow's enjoyment of this benefit is the same before and after the death of the deceased and there is no financial gain. The widow and her children are still staying in the said family house. It has not been sold and if and when it is sold the widow will have to buy or rent other accommodation. No deduction therefore falls to be made for dwelling house, furniture and other personal effects because the widow had the use of these things before the death of the deceased. The fact that she has now become part-owner of this property is not a benefit to be set off against the loss to her resulting from her husband's death. Heatley v. Steel Co. of Wales Ltd. (1953)1 All E.R. 489, and Bishop v. Cunard White Star Ltd. (1950) 2 All E.R. 22 were referred to. It was further observed: The practice which prevailed some years ago of making automatic deductions for the value of the property inherited is falling into desuetude. As observed by Munkman (Fifth Edition, page 169)--'the courts are now taking the common sense view that the family as a whole enjoyed the benefit of the father's property before the death, and it is not some new and countervailing benefit which has come to them for the first time.... 30. In Daniels v. Jones (1961) 3 All E.R. 24 the above principle was followed. In Kassam v. Kampala Aerated Water Co. Ltd. (1965) 2 All E.R. 875, both the parents having been killed in an accident all the property devolved on the children. On the question of setting off the sum Lord Guest observed: This is a highly speculative matter, and having regard to the anticipated savings which might reasonably have been expected to be made by the deceased if he had lived, no deduction ought to be made on the score of accelerated benefit, as these two figures very largely cancel out. 31. In Hira Devi and Ors. v. Bhaba Kanti Das and Ors. 31. In Hira Devi and Ors. v. Bhaba Kanti Das and Ors. 1976 A.C.J. 293 (Assam & Nagaland) Gauhati High Court following Gobald Motor 1958 A.C.J. 179 (S.C.) principle held-- While calculating amount of compensation the advantages which accrued to the claimants by the death of the deceased on whom they were depending has to be taken into account. 32. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Suresh Kalyaand Ors. 1978 A.C.J. 21 (Ori) where the Tribunal deducted from the loss sustained by the family of deceased driver a sum of Rs. 1,000/- as the claimants were enjoying and would enjoy the income of one acre of land which the deceased had and which on his death would go to the claimants, the deduction was disallowed by the High Court of Orissa relying on Damayanti Devi v. Sita Devi 1972 A.C.J. 334 (P.&H.) and Gomathi Ammal v. Ramchandran Pillai 1967 A.C.J. 15 (Mad.). In the latter case, the Court did not allow any deduction though the claimants got the family residential house from the deceased. 33. From the above decisions it is clear that the recent trend is not to allow deduction on account of acceleration of interest except in extreme cases clearly justifying such deduction. 34. In Charlesworth on Negligence, 6th Edition, 1977 we read the following on the question of setting of pecuniary gains resulting from death under Fatal Accidents Acts: Setting off pecuniary gains resulting from the death.--The rule at common law in respect of the assessment of claims for damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts was that there had to be taken into account any pecuniary benefit accruing to the dependent, by reason of the death of the deceased, and such had to be set against the pecuniary loss suffered. It is of significance in this respect that a dependant's personal income is not a benefit arising in consequence of the death of the deceased, since it is a consequence of either the dependant's own work or of investment. Likewise the fact that her husband's death has enabled a widow to realise her own earning potential, should she so choose to work in the future, it not a pecuniary gain, accruing to her as a result of the death, and, hence does not fall to be taken into account in reduction of her damages. Likewise the fact that her husband's death has enabled a widow to realise her own earning potential, should she so choose to work in the future, it not a pecuniary gain, accruing to her as a result of the death, and, hence does not fall to be taken into account in reduction of her damages. Savings, which have been set aside from a deceased husband's income, should not be regarded as the widow's capital asset but as income, part of which would be spent for the husband's benefit. The onus of proving that the loss of some dependency has been reduced by a pecuniary gain lies with the Defendant.? (Para 1370) However certain statutory exceptions of this rule at common law were first made in respect of contractual benefits by the Fatal Accidents (Damages) Act, 1908 and later made in respect of national insurance benefits by the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1948. These provisions were repealed by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1959 and subsequently, have been replaced by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1976 which came into force on September 1, 1976, and applies only to a cause of action arising on a death accruing after that date. Section 4 (1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 provides: 'In assessing damages in respect of a person's death in any action under this Act there shall not be taken into account any insurance money, benefit, pension or gratuity which has been or will or may be paid as a result of the death'. (para 1371). It will be seen, as a result of the above, that the categories of benefits which must not be taken into account to lessen damages have been widened considerably and the wording is sufficient to exclude from the assessment of damages most of the pecuniary gains that a dependant most probably would receive. The probable exceptions relate to pecuniary gains originating either from the dead person's employers who unvoluntarily made weekly payments to the widow, or by way of inheritance, from the deceased himself, who had private capital. Where stocks and shares or comparable income producing investments are concerned and the dependant's interests are accelerated by the death, some deduction will have to be made, although care will be required in order to make sure that the sum deducted does not exceed the true financial gain to the dependants. Where stocks and shares or comparable income producing investments are concerned and the dependant's interests are accelerated by the death, some deduction will have to be made, although care will be required in order to make sure that the sum deducted does not exceed the true financial gain to the dependants. Except in extreme cases where the whole of the family income is derived from the deceased's investments the value of such inheritance should not normally be deducted pound for pound. 35. The author further says, relying on Nance v. British Columbia Electric Rly Co. Ltd. (1951) 2 All E.R. 448, that only the value of an accelerated receipt of the inheritance should betaken into account where a dependant had an expectation of inheriting sometime in the future ; and according to him "From a consideration of the foregoing matters it seems clear that the rule at common law has ceased to have very much practical effect". 36. In Mrs. Manjushri Raha v. B.L. Gupta 1977 A.C.J. 134 (S.C.), the need for providing adequate compensation for loss of human lives in motor accidents has been emphasised. In the instant case from the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 4 and 5 it is apparent that the family had been in enjoyment of the entire landed property even prior to the accident as they continued to do thereafter. It is further apparent that after Govind's death they have failed to receive even two maunds of paddy from the adhiars. The Corporation has not proved that the family would derive any income from the landed property in future or even that the property was heritable. It has not discharged its burden of proving that the loss of dependency had been reduced by pecuniary gain from inheritance. 37. Under these circumstances any deduction on account of this probable inheritance of agricultural land would not be justified. Besides, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis of loss of income to the family rather than loss of income from the entire estate. P.W. 1 did not know whether Govind had kept with himself the surplus income. P.W. 4 stated that Govind's annual income was about Rs. 30/35 thousand. These statements remained unrebutted. Had the compensation been reckoned on the basis of total income of Govind, as distinguished from what he gave for maintenance of the family, there may have been some justification for deduction. P.W. 4 stated that Govind's annual income was about Rs. 30/35 thousand. These statements remained unrebutted. Had the compensation been reckoned on the basis of total income of Govind, as distinguished from what he gave for maintenance of the family, there may have been some justification for deduction. As that was not done, and the assessment is very moderate, we do not find any justification for deduction of the value of the accelerated inheritance. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Corporation is accordingly rejected. 38. In the Rajasthan State Transport Corporation v. Narain Shanker 1980 A.C.J. 411 (S.C.) it has also been observed: The State Corporation has contested even the quantum of the claim. Indian life and limb cannot be treated as cheap at least by State instrumentalities. The heads of claim have been correctly appreciated by the Tribunal and the awards have been moderate. Here again, the State Corporation should have sympathised with the victims of the tragic accident and generously adjusted the claims within a short period. What is needed is not callous litigation but greater attention to the efficiency of service, including insistence on competent, cautious and responsible driving. These observations are relevant to the instant case also. 39. In the result we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs.