JUDGMENT : Hari Lal Agrawal, J. The petitioner Britannia Biscuit Co. (Limited) has filed this application for quashing the ORDER :of the Judicial Magistrate, Patna, taking cognizance against it along with one Ram Saran Sao under Section l6(1)(a) and (b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short "the Act"). The ORDER :has been impugned on behalf of the petitioner mainly on the grounds that (i) the sanction for prosecution was invalid; (ii) there was a violation of the mandatory provision of Rule 9 (j) of the Rules framed under the Act; and (iii) no prosecution could be initiated against the petitioner-company, i.e. manufacturer of the commodity in question in view of the provision contained in section 20-A of the Act. 2. The relevant facts, briefly stated, are that the petitioner company carries on the business of manufacture of biscuits and confectionaries having its place of business and office in the town of Calcutta. On 22.4.1973 the Food Inspector of New Capital Circle, Patna, Sri Rajeshwar Mishra purchased some quantities of "Glasco" Biscuits from the Co-accused Ram Sewak Sao of Chandmari Road One of the quarters of the town of Patna for verification of its quality and sent the same to the public analyst for examination and report. The public analyst submitted his report dated 15.5.1973 about its quality who found the biscuit adulterated because of the presence of lead 3.5 per million part. 3. On the basis of receipt of the aforesaid report of the public Analyst by the Health Officer of the Patna Municipal Corporation, he drew up a petition of complaint in the prescribed form to be filled in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, against the petitioner and the aforesaid vendor Ram Saran Sao and submitted a prosecution report on 26.8.1973 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The prosecution was sanctioned by the Health Officer of the said Corporation which resulted in passing the ORDER :of taking cognizance of the offence against both the accused by the learned Magistrate. 4. The petitioner's case is that he had information of these events until February, 1977 when it got information of the same and then after entering appearance, got ascertained of the above facts. 5. I shall now take up for consideration the first ground of attack to the ORDER :taking cognizance. 4. The petitioner's case is that he had information of these events until February, 1977 when it got information of the same and then after entering appearance, got ascertained of the above facts. 5. I shall now take up for consideration the first ground of attack to the ORDER :taking cognizance. The relevant provision contained in Section 20 of the Act prescribes the procedure for taking cognizance and trial of offences committed under the Act. According to this provision, the prosecution has to be instituted with the written consent of (i) the General Government, (ii) the State authorised in this behalf by general or special ORDER :of any of these three agencies. Apparently the case has been instituted against the petitioner and another by a person supposed to be authorised in this behalf, namely, a local authority of the Patna Municipal Corporation. 6. Mr. B.K. Banerji appearing on behalf of the petitioner argued that if a local authority is to be empowered to institute a prosecution under section 20 of the Act, there should be a notification to that effect and then a rule has to be framed either by the Central Government or the State Government under the Act in this behalf as required by clause (viii) of section 2 of the Act. 7. This at once brings us to the consideration of the definition of a "local authority" as defined in Section 2(viii) of the Act. This clause contains two parts. The first part contemplates three kinds of local authorities in a local area having Municipal Powers, such as a Municipality, a Cantonment and a Notified Area. The "local authority" for such local areas has been mentioned in the Act itself as (a) the Municipal Board or the Municipal Corporation, (b) The Cantonment authority, and (c) the Notified Area Committee respectively. The second part of this clause prescribes that if any other kind of local area is to be brought under the definition of "local authority" then the local authority for such an area has got to be prescribed by either of the Governments. The case before us concerns a local area situated within Patna Municipal Corporation and, therefore, the "local authority" for such a body has already been mentioned namely, the Municipal Corporation. The case before us concerns a local area situated within Patna Municipal Corporation and, therefore, the "local authority" for such a body has already been mentioned namely, the Municipal Corporation. Nonetheless in ORDER :to bring the local area appertaining to Patna Municipal Corporation, it was necessary that a notification in this regard should have been issued in the official gazette for declaring the said area as a local area for the purposes of the Food Adulteration Act as required by clause (vii) of section 2 of the Act. The petitioner has not made a positive and categorical statement to the effect that no such notification has been issued and only a halfhearted statement has been made in the petition. No argument was either addressed by Mr. B.K. Bannerji appearing in support of this application in this regard. However, on reference to the case of Banarasi Lal vs. The State of Bihar (1978 P.L.J.R. 551) which was also a case from an area situate within the then Patna City Municipality we find that the relevant notification issued under clause (vii) of section 2 of the Act was considered and the argument that after coming into force of the Patna Municipal Corporation, the force of that notification ceased, was repelled. 7. Be that as it may, the only argument that was advanced on this score was that for prescribing the "local authority", there should have been a rule framed under Section 24 of the Act in this regard as provided in the second part of clause (viii) of section 2 of the Act. Mr. Banerji also referred to a Bench decision of this court in the case of Verendra Singh & others vs. The State of Bihar & another (1976 B.B.C.J. 659). I have already said above that the application of the provision contained in the second part of clause (viii) would apply only when the Government intends to bring any other kind of local area than those as enumerated in the various sub-clauses of the first part of clause (viii) and then the "authority" for such area has got to be prescribed under the rules. In the decision which has been cited, the local area was the Jharia Mines Board an area certainly not covered by any of the three clauses mentioned above and, therefore, it was held that the "local authority" has got to be prescribed by the rules. In the decision which has been cited, the local area was the Jharia Mines Board an area certainly not covered by any of the three clauses mentioned above and, therefore, it was held that the "local authority" has got to be prescribed by the rules. The decision relied upon by Mr. Banerji in the above authority is, therefore, entirely distinguishable and does not help him. 8. Perusing this point Mr. Banerji also argued that in any view of the matter, on account of the super-session of the Patna Municipal Corporation on the 1st of March, 1965 the authorisation in favour of the Health Officer by the resolution dated 30th March 1957 ceased to have any force. This argument on the face of it is untenable. The only effect of the super-session of the Corporation as prescribed in Section 531 of the Corporation Act itself is that the administrator of Patna is to become the "Corporation Sole" and entitled to perform, as prescribed, all the functions, powers and duties which are being exercised for its various bodies. The argument that on account of super-session of the previous acts, ORDER :s, rules, or notifications etc. issued were to cease to be operative would make the position ridiculous. The Administrator simply steps into the shoes of the previous authority and all the previous actions such as appointments, rules, bye-law, form, Notification, tax, fee, scheme, or permission as previously ORDER :ed, made, issued, imposed, sanctioned, or given so far, in force on the date of the super-session, must be deemed to be in full force. Somewhat similar view was taken by the learned single Judge in the aforesaid case of Banarasi Lal. The first point has therefore no merit and it must be held that the sanction for prosecution of the accused by the Health Officer of the Corporation was valid. 9. The next argument of Mr. Banerji is that on account of non-compliance of Rule 9(j) of the rules framed under the Act, the prosecution should not be allowed to proceed. This argument is not available to the petitioner, inasmuch as, according to the aforesaid requirement a copy of the report of the public analyst has to be sent only to the person from whom the sample is taken. This argument is not available to the petitioner, inasmuch as, according to the aforesaid requirement a copy of the report of the public analyst has to be sent only to the person from whom the sample is taken. Admittedly, the sample of the biscuits in question had not been taken from the petitioner-company but was taken from the other accused, namely, Ram Sewak Sao. The grievance, therefore, apparently is not available to the petitioner. It is not necessary at all to discuss the authorities cited by Mr. Banerji in support of his contention. 10. Now remains for consideration the 3rd and the last point and this is the effect of Section 20-A of the Act which empowers a court trying an offence, if it feels satisfied on the evidence adduced before it that the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer is also concerned with the offence in question then notwithstanding anything contained in Section. 351 (1) of the Code of Crimina1 Procedure, or in Section 20 of the Act to proceed against him though a prosecution has not been instituted against him under Section 20 of the Act. On the basis of the above provision the argument was that inasmuch as the sale of the article in question was made by the other accused and not the petitioner who is simply a manufacturer, it could be, impleaded to stand trial only when the circumstances and conditions mentioned in Section 20-A of the Act were fulfilled; in other words, in course of the trial of the offence alleged to have been committed by the other accused, namely, the vendor, if the Magistrate, on the evidence brought on the record, was satisfied that the petitioner should be tried and not otherwise. Before, however, discussing this argument, I may refer to certain other provisions of the Act. Before, however, discussing this argument, I may refer to certain other provisions of the Act. Section 7 of the Act is the charging section and it prohibits manufacture for sale or storage, sale or distribution, by any person of (i) any adulterated food, (ii) any misbranded food, (iii) any article of food for the sale of which a license is prescribed, except in accordance with the conditions of the license; (iv) any article of food the sale of which is for the time being prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of public health; or (v) any article of food in contravention of any other provision of this Act or of any rule made thereunder. Petition of complaint in this case had been filed as usual, on filling up a prescribed form and there is no allegation against the petitioner to the effect that the sales by the other accused had been made on behalf of the petitioner-company, i.e. the manufacturer. Section 16 the punishing section would also be relevant to notice. It lays down penalties. And clause (i-a) of its sub section (i) provides that if any person on his behalf imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food which is found adulterated or misbranded, or the sale of which is prohibited etc. shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provision of section 6, punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but not exceeding six years. Clause (d) of this section also a manufacturer with the penalty if he is found in possession or in any of the premises occupied by him, any material which may be employed for the purpose of adulteration. In the complaint petition the complainant has referred to clauses (a) and (d) of this section but necessary allegations relevant for importing the mischief of clause (a) or (d) have not been made in the petition of complaint. Even clause (a) which contemplates a sale by a vendor requires that the sale should be made on behalf of the manufacturer if he is to be netted from the very beginning. Even clause (a) which contemplates a sale by a vendor requires that the sale should be made on behalf of the manufacturer if he is to be netted from the very beginning. For all these reasons the allegations made in the petition of complaint, in my view, do not make out any offence against the petitioner and, therefore, relying upon the well known decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 866) the proceeding against the petitioner has got to be quashed. 11. A similar view was taken by a Bench of this Court in the case of Morton Confectionery & Milk Products Factory v. State or Bihar (Cr. Misc. No. 2291 of 1976) disposed of on the 6th February, 1980, wherein on reference to certain other provisions of the Act it was held that a vendor shall not be held guilty of an offence under the Act even if he might have sold any adulterated or misbranded article of food, if he proves that he purchased the article of food from a manufacturer, distributor, or dealer with a written warranty in the prescribed form, and that whenever the Food Inspector wishes to prosecute the manufacturer or distributor along with the vendor, it is proper that he should ascertain from the vendor, the details and particulars of the person from whom such vendor purchased the article of food as well as about the warranty in writing which such manufacturer, dealer, or distributor is required to give. 12. Before however, parting with this case I may also refer to the case of Mr. Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration and another (AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1309) which was relied upon by Mr. Banerji for the proposition that a manufacturer or distributor etc. of an article of food can be put on trial only in the manner under section 20-A. I do not find any substance in this argument nor does the above authority lay down the above proposition as such, rather in Paragraph 13 of the report the line of cases taking somewhat similar view has been disproved. 13. For the above reasons this application must succeed and the ORDER :taking cognizance must be quashed. 13. For the above reasons this application must succeed and the ORDER :taking cognizance must be quashed. The trial of the other accused, namely, Ram Sewak Sao will proceed with liberty to the trial court to summon the present petitioner also if on the evidence during the course of the trial, the court is satisfied that the petitioner was also concerned with the offence in question.