Hansaria, J.- A suit for ejectment and realisation of arrear rent was filed by one Mustt. Jani Devi against the opposit party. On her death, she was substituted by Han Gopal, who is the petitioner in this revision application. Ejectment was prayed for by Jani Devi on the ground that the opposite party was a defaulter and that the suit house was required for running the business of her adopted son Hari Gopal. In the written statement which was filed after Hari Gopal had been substituted as plaintiff in place of Jani Devi, apart from denying the allegations relating to the defendants being a defaulter and the premises being needed bonafide, a point was taken that Hari Gopal was not the legal heir of Jaai Dsvi as he had not been adopted by observing ceremonies according to the Hindu Shastra. A point relating to non-maintainability of the suit had also been taken. It may be stated that while allowing substitution, the question relating to invalidity of adoption had been kept open. The trial court answared the contested issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. On appeal the decree has been set aside by the learned District Judge, Nowgong without going into the question of the defendant being a defaulter, or the premises being needed bonafide by the plaintiff, because prima facie the learned District Judgj was not satisfied if Hari Gopal had been duly adopted by Jani Devi. The learned Court held that the suit was not maintainable and that Hari Gopal could come up with a suit for ejectment after establishing his right as the legal representative of Jani Devi in a proper forum. 2. Feeling aggrieved at the dismissal of the suit, Hari Gopal first preferred second appeal to this Court, which was numbered as S. A. 74 of 1979. This came up before the Hon'ble Chief Justice on 15.9.80, and in view of decision of this Court in LPA. No. 11 of 1976 which has held that no further appeal lies from the decision of the first appellate Court, he dismissed the same. In the meantime however Hari Gopal had approached this Court in its revisional jurisdiction also. 3. This came up before the Hon'ble Chief Justice on 15.9.80, and in view of decision of this Court in LPA. No. 11 of 1976 which has held that no further appeal lies from the decision of the first appellate Court, he dismissed the same. In the meantime however Hari Gopal had approached this Court in its revisional jurisdiction also. 3. To clear the ground for bringing the petitioner's case within the ambit of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Shri N. M. Lahiri, who has argued the case for the petitioner, has urged that by leaving the question of determination of the petitioner being a legal representative of Jani Devi in some other proceeding to be instituted in a proper forum, the lear­ned District Judge failed to exercise a jurisdiction which is vested in him. Reliance is placed on Order 22 Rule 5, which reads: "5. Determination of question as to legal respresentative - Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant, such question shall be determined by the Court": 4. The legal position is thus indubitable and Shri Bhattacharjee appearing for the opposite party fairly states that it was incumbent on the part of the learned District Judgs him­self to finally decide this question. There is thus no initial hurdle in the way of the petitioner in approaching this Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. What had landed the learned District Judge in difficulty was the submission on behalf of the opposite party that Jani Debi being an Agarwalla by caste was governed by the Benares School of Hindu law which required inter alia prior permission of her husband to take Hari Gopal in adoption and also per­formance of Datta Homam and other Shastric rites. The learned District Judge also felt that there was no evidence of customary rules to be followed by a person like Jani Devi for taking in adoption any person. Being of the view that the suit before him was not the proper forum for establishing the title of the petitioner as an adopted son of Jani Devi, the learned Court left the matter to be decided in a proper forum. Being of the view that the suit before him was not the proper forum for establishing the title of the petitioner as an adopted son of Jani Devi, the learned Court left the matter to be decided in a proper forum. As under Order 22 Rule 5 the matter could not have been left for adjudication in some other proceeding, the same has to be deter­mined herein. 6. Though the stand taken before the learned first appe­llate Court on behalf of the defendant was that Mustt. Jani Devi was governed by the Benaras School of Hindu law which curbed the power of a widow to take a son in adoption as stated earlier, the same is not urged before me by Shri Bhattacharjee. This has been done keeping in view the Division Bench decision of this Court in Gigi Agarwalini v. Mt. Panna Agarwalani, AIR 1956 Assam 100. In a learned judgment, Sarjoo Prasad, C.J., after referring to various decisions on the subject which included many pronouncements of the Privy Council, summed up the position thus at p- 105: "The law as gathered from these decisions clearly indi­cates that no particular authority for the purpose of adoption is needed, is it necessary to perform any par­ticular ceremony in order to validate such an adoption, provided in fact a boy has been taken in adoption. The factum of adoption can in appropriate cases be proved even by a document for that purpose and by the conduct of the parties without any proof of any particular ceremony." 7. In that case challenge to the adoption by Mustt. Oigi, who was accepted as belonging to Saraogi community, was advanced on the grounds that she had no authority to adopt without her husband's permission and that a brothers' son could not have in any case been adopted by her. The challenge was not entertained because of the above position in law. 8. Both the sides accepted the aforesaid decision is having propounded the correct legal principle and argued tie case before me as to whether document and conduct of the parties prove the factum of adoption of Hari Gopal by Jani Devi. Before adverting to this aspect, it has however become necessary to say a few words about the decision itself. 9. With respect I say that some of the observations in Gigi are wide, nay, not even correct. Before adverting to this aspect, it has however become necessary to say a few words about the decision itself. 9. With respect I say that some of the observations in Gigi are wide, nay, not even correct. As the same has no bearing for the case at hand, I only wish to put my views on record and would leave the matter at that. My disagreement does not make a difference in this case because it was not disputed before me that Anat Ram, husband of Jani Devi, was a Saraogi, as stated by P.W.2. The word "Saraogi" is a corruption of the word "Sravak", or secular Jain, or the laity as observed in Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastri's Tagore Law Lectures 1888. As stated by the learned speaker, "Sravak" is one of the two broad classes in which the Jains are .divided the other being Yatis or Jains ascetics, It is an accepted position that the terms "Jain" and "Saraogi" are used interchangeably. It is also well-established that Saraogi or secular Jains got themselves sub-divided into numerous sects, most common of which are Oswals, Agarwals, Parwars (or Porwals) and Khandelwals. Thus, we have what may be called Jain Agarwals or Agarwal Saraogis. Jani Devi was one such person. What has been stated about non-application of rules of strict Hindu Jaw in so far as adoption by Jains except those originally coming from Madras and the Punjab is concerned would apply to all Jains. This has been conclusively laid down by the Supreme Court in Munnalal vs. Rojkumar, AIR 1962 SC 1493 , which dealt with adoption by Digambar Jains of Porwal sect in Madhya Pradesh. The Sup­reme Court referred to a large number of decisions beginning from 1833, which included pronuncements of the Privy Council in Sheokuar Bai vs. Jeoraj, AIR 1921 PC 77; Premraj vs. Chand Kanwar, AIR 1948 PC 60; and Magni Bai vs. Sugan Chand, AIR 1948 PC 177; and held in para 11 that these cases clearly showed that the custom is generally applicable to Jains all over India except the Jains domiciled in Madras and Pun­jab. This was so irrespective of the sect to which a particular Jain belonged. This was so irrespective of the sect to which a particular Jain belonged. It was also observed that where a custom is repeatedly brought to the notice of the courts of the country, the courts may hold that custom is introduced into the law without necessity of proof in each individual case. 9A. My caveat is to that part of Gigi's decision wherein it has been stated that this apply to all Agarwals, Jains or non-Jains. This view taken in Gigi owed its origin to a mis-conception which found place, if I may say so with profound respect, in the decision of Privy Council in Dhanraj vs. Soni Bai, AIR 1925 PC 778. It was observed there that Agarwals generally adhere to Jainism and repudiate the Brahmanical doctrines rela­ting to obsequial ceremonies, the performance of Sharadha, offering of oblitions for the salvation of the soul of the decea­sed etc. This view had been taken by the Privy Council referring to Bhagwan Das vs. Rajmal, 10 Bombay H. C. R. 241. This decision is not available to me; but I have no doubt that it had dealt with Jain Agarwals as distinguished from Hindu Agarwals, if I may put it that way. This would be clear from the follo­wing quotation of the Allahabad High Court's judgment which was subject matter of appeal in Sheo Singh vs. Must. Dekho, (1878) 51A 87. The High Court's judgment contained the follo­wing general account of the history and religious tenets of Jainism as quoted at p. 107: "The parties are Saraogee-Agarwals, one of the numerous sub-divisions of the sects of the Jains. What little is known of the history of that sect is to be found collec­ted in the learned judgment of the Chief Justice of Bombay in Bhagvandas Tejmal vs. Rajmal. For upwards of eleven and twelve centuries they have seceded from the creed of the Vedas, and their religious tenets have more affinity with the precepts of the Budhists than with those of the Brahmanism..... "They differ particularly from the Brahmanical Hindus in their conduct towards the dead, omitting all obsequies after the corpse is burnt or buried. They also regard the birth of a son as having no effect on the future state of the progenitor, and, consequently, adoption is a merely temporal arrangement and has no spiritual object''. "They differ particularly from the Brahmanical Hindus in their conduct towards the dead, omitting all obsequies after the corpse is burnt or buried. They also regard the birth of a son as having no effect on the future state of the progenitor, and, consequently, adoption is a merely temporal arrangement and has no spiritual object''. The two other Privy Council decisions relied on mainly in Gigi, Premraj AIR 1948 PC 60 and Magnibai AIR 1948 PC 177 had dealt with cases of Jains of Khandclwal sect and Marwari Jain of Visa Oswal respectively. 9B. This is not an occasion to trace the history of Agarwals; but it is sufficient to say that it would be totally against the religious beliefs of Agarwals in general to say that they repudiate Brahmanical doctrines relating to perfor­mance of Shradha etc. and that among Agarwals adoption is a purely secular affair which view was expressed by Lala Chiranjilal in his article "Adoption among Marwari Agarwals" printed in the Journal section of the AIR 1937 at p. 80, which has been referred at p. 107 of Gigi. Agarwals are said to be descendants of Maharaj Agrasen who hid ruled Agroha a few thousand yean back. Basically they are followers of Hindu shastras and Brahamnical doctrines. Performance of Shradha is one of the indispensable functions of the Hindu Agarwal community of which alomost a judicial notice can be taken. Adoption among them is thus not only a secular arrangement of continuing line of ancestor, but has a religious basis also the same being due performance of Shradha and offering of oblations. It is stated that one of the descendants of Agrasen adopted Jainism and as such some of the Agarwals came to be jains also. Among the Agarwals we thus have, as a matter of fact, some who are Jains and others who are not so. The attitude to Shradha etc. taken by Jain Agar­wals can definitely not be applied to others. 10. Among the Agarwals we thus have, as a matter of fact, some who are Jains and others who are not so. The attitude to Shradha etc. taken by Jain Agar­wals can definitely not be applied to others. 10. This aspect need not be gone into further as in the case at hand we are concerned with Jain Agarwals and both the sides agreed before me that in such a case no authority for adoption by a widow is needed, nor is it necessary to perform any particular ceremony provided a boy had in fact been taken in adoption, to prove which document as well as conduct of the parties may be looked into. 11. So far as document is concerned, there is really a contemporaneous one in the case at hand, which is Ext. 1. a registered deed of adoption executed on 6.4.55 and regi­stered on 13.4.55 the adoption being according to the plain­tiff's side on 1.3.55. At the time of registration among others, P.W.2, Sitaram was present, who is a brother of late Jani Devi. Among the witnesses to this deed, we get P.Ws 3 and 5. Shri Lahiri submitted that this document by it self is sufficient to firmly establish the case of Hari Gopal that he was adopted by Jani Devi. Whether the adoption was with the authority of Anit Ram who had died sometime in 1935-36 and whether all the ceremonies prescribed by Hindu Shastras were performed or not as alleged in the deed need not be gone into for the case at hand because of what has been stated above. Shri Bhattacharjee contendi that execution of Ext 1 by itself is not sufficient to clinch the issue as we have to bear in mind the conduct of the parties as well, as stated in the aforesaid quote from Gigi. Let the conduct therefore be also looked into. 12. On this as well Shri Lahiri urges that the fact that Hari Gopal used to stay over since his adoption, if not from earlier, with Jani Devi, and that near relations of Jani Devi had accepted Hari Gopal as the adopted son of Jani Devi, are positive acts of conduct showing acceptance of Hari Gopal as the son of Jani Devi. The fact of Hari Gopal staying with Jani Devi has been deposed by the plaintiff's witnesses. The fact of Hari Gopal staying with Jani Devi has been deposed by the plaintiff's witnesses. This would follow even from what was stated by D.W. 3, who ad­mitted that his brother had studied at Gauhati from 1954-55 to 1967 and at that time Hari Gopal was also studying with his brother. Now from the evidence of P. W. Hemraj, the natural father of Hari Gopal, we get that though he is a man from Nowgong, he had once come to Gauhati after the second World War to see if he could get settled there. He started some busi­ness in Manipuri Basti, but had to wind up the same after two years whereafter he went to Nowgong. Hari Gopal was also taken back but his grand-father late Sanchi Ram brought him back. The plaintiff's case being that the adoption was in 1955 and D.W- 3 having admitted that Hari Gopal had stayed at Gauhati from 1954-55 to 1967, the plaintiff's case that Hari Gopal had lived with Jani Devi after his adoption has to be accepted as true. Among the plaintiff's witnesses, there is P.W. 2. Sitaram, who, at already noted, is a brother of Jani Devi. He was one of the persons to be closely associated with the registration of Ext. 1. P.W. 3 is a person of the locality and has fully supported the case of the plaintiff. P.W. 5 is also a near relation of the parties and has deposed about what function had taken place at the time Hari Gopal was adopted. The natural father o Hari Gopal has also testified about the fact of adoption. Thus there is no challenge to the adoption of Hari Gopal by the kith and kin of Jani Devi. Opposite Party No. 1 is definitely a stranger in this regard. Still then he is within his rights to challenge the adoption, which according to Shri Bhattacharjee is not fully borne out by the conduct of Hari Gopal himself. He first refers in this connection to Ext. 7, which is a general power of attorney in favour of Hemraj. This is dated 12.2.65. My attention is invited to the endorsement of the Sub-Regis­trar speaking about the identification of Jani Devi who alone executed the deed, though it was meant for both Jani Devi and Hari Gopal stating that Jani Devi had been identified by Hari Gopal, son of Hemraj. This is dated 12.2.65. My attention is invited to the endorsement of the Sub-Regis­trar speaking about the identification of Jani Devi who alone executed the deed, though it was meant for both Jani Devi and Hari Gopal stating that Jani Devi had been identified by Hari Gopal, son of Hemraj. As against this endorsement, the clear recital in the body of the deed that Hari Gopal was an adopted son of late Anit Ram cannot however be ignored. Reference is then invited to a Vakalatnama of 1972, which is at p. 23 of File C-1 of the Title Suit, wherein Hari Gopal's father's name has been given as Hemraj. The writing however is not in the hand of Hari Gopal and as such it would be difficult to pin him down to all that has been written in the Vakalat­nama, especially as his admission. My attention is next invited to an affidavit of 1976 (as at p. 90 of the of said file) which was in support of a petition under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by Hari Gopal. In that affidavit however the deponents' name is written as "Hari Prasad'' whose father's name was given as "Hansraj". Apparently there are mistakes in both the names inasmuch as nobody has stated that Hari Prasad is also a name of Hari Gopal, nor is there anything on record to show that Hemrai has an alias in Hansraj. A perusal of the application however shows that Hari Prasad is the name of the defendant; as such some amount of casual-ness in drawing the affidavit is apparent. 13. This is all that is brought to my notice by way of con­duct of Hari Gopal which is said to be at tangent with his assertion that he was adopted by Jani Devi, widow of Anit Ram in 1955. The aforesaid acts do not have the strength of outweighing the conduct to which my attention has been invited by Shri Lahiri-the former are rather stray acts done casually and even wrongly. These cannot be relied to undo a thing which had taken place in 1955 and had been accepted by the relations, far and near, of Jani Devi. The fact of adoption was duly recorded very soon after it had taken place in Ext. 1. All the persons asso­ciated with Ext. These cannot be relied to undo a thing which had taken place in 1955 and had been accepted by the relations, far and near, of Jani Devi. The fact of adoption was duly recorded very soon after it had taken place in Ext. 1. All the persons asso­ciated with Ext. I have supported the case of adoption of Hari Gopal by Jani Devi. Hari Gopal thereafter stayed with Jani Devi and severed his relation with his natural family. This being the position, I have no hesitation in holding that the factum of adoption of Hari Gopal by Jani Devi has been adequately proved by the petitioner. 14. This leaves for consideration the next question agitated before me. This is about maintainability of the suit at the hand of Jani Devi. It is urged by Shri Bhattacharjee that if Hari Gopal had been adopted by Jani Devi, even in 1955, the same would relate back to 1935-36 when Anit Ram had died. As such it is Hari Gopal who had become the owner of the suit property inasmuch as even the Hindu Woman's Right to pro­perty Act, 1937 cannot come to the assistance of Jani Devi, as that Act had come into force with effect from 14.4.37 and had no retrospective effect. In view of this, according to Shri Bhatta­charjee, Jani Devi could not have instituted the eviction suit in 1970. By referring to Kumar Krishna Prasad vs. Baraboni Coal Concern, AIR 1937 PC 251, it is submitted that section 116 of the Evidence Act would not stand in the way of the defen­dant in challenging the title of Jani Devi if the same had come to an end after the defendant had been inducted in the premises. As the tenancy had been taken in 1953 and the adoption was in 1955, it is urged that though the defendant had admitted in Ext. 6 that he had taken lease from Jani Devi, he is not estopped from pleading that the title of Jani Devi had come to an end after the lease had been taken. 15. As the tenancy had been taken in 1953 and the adoption was in 1955, it is urged that though the defendant had admitted in Ext. 6 that he had taken lease from Jani Devi, he is not estopped from pleading that the title of Jani Devi had come to an end after the lease had been taken. 15. For the case at hand it is not necessary to go into this aspect of the matter because as fairly pointed out by Shri Bhattacharjee himself, the definition of "landlord" in the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, to which reference has also been made by the learned trial Court means a person who is "for the time being receiving or entitled to receive rent". The defendant's own case being that he had been paying rent regu­larly to Jani Devi, she did become the land-lady of the permises and the suit for eviction at her hand cannot be resisted on the ground that she could not have filed the same. Thus, the suit as filed originally cannot be held to be non-maintainable. 16. The result is that the petition is allowed by holding that Hari Gopal is an adopted son of Jani Devi and the suit as filed was maintainable. The impugned order is therefore set aside. As the learned District Judge did not enter into the discussion of issue No. 2; "Whether there is ground for eject­ment of the defendant"? let the same be decided by him on the basis of the evidence already on record. It may be stated that eviction was prayed for on the ground that the defendant is a defaulter and the suit premises is needed bonafide. As the suit was filed in 1970 and already a decade has passed, the learned District Judge to whom the case is being remanded would dispose of the matter within a period of four months from the receipt of the records by him, which would be sent back with due despatch. As agreed to by both the sides, the appeal may now be disposed of the learned District Judge, Kamrup at Gauhati; and so let the records be sent back to him under intimation to the District, Judge, Nowgong.