ORDER V. Khalid, J. 1. The petitioner is the landlord and the respondent the tenant. Rent Control Petition, O.P. 60 of 1976 was filed by the petitioner against the respondent on the ground of arrears of rent. The respondent took the building on lease as per rent deed dated 12th November 1974 agreeing to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 20 per mensem. Rent from January 1975 was in arrears. The petitioner demanded rent when the respondent filed O.A. 780 of 1975 before the Land Tribunal, Kottayam claiming kudikidappu rights. That application was dismissed on 15th December 1975. The rent control petition followed. The respondent appeared through his Advocate and filed his objections denying the tenancy and the claim for arrears of rent. He raised the question of kudikidappu again and moved the court under section 125 (3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act to refer his plea of kudikidappu to the concerned Land Tribunal. A reference was made by the Rent Control Court by its order dated 12th January 1977. The Land Tribunal held against the respondent on his plea that he was a kudikidappukaran and returned the records with its findings to the Rent Control Court. The case was thereafter posted for evidence to 23rd March 1978 on which date neither the respondent nor his advocate was present and no representation was made on their behalf. The petitioner and his advocate were present. The respondent was declared ex parte and the petition for eviction was allowed as prayed for with costs. The Rent Control Court directed that a copy of the order should be communicated to the respondent which direction also was complied with. No attempt was made by the respondent either to get the ex parte order set aside or the order of eviction avoided by depositing the arrears of rent claimed under section 11 (2) of the Act. The petitioner filed E.P. 220 of 1978 for execution of the order of eviction and notice was issued to the respondent. On receipt of notice, he appeared and filed objections to the effect that the order of eviction was not executable. The Execution Court rejected the objections raised and ordered delivery. The respondent took the matter in revision to the District Court. On receipt of notice, he appeared and filed objections to the effect that the order of eviction was not executable. The Execution Court rejected the objections raised and ordered delivery. The respondent took the matter in revision to the District Court. The District Court allowed the revision holding that the eviction order was passed without satisfying that a statutory ground for eviction existed and held that the order was inexecutable. Hence this revision. 2. The respondent's denial of the rent deed and the arrears of rent in his counter was only to establish his right as kudikidappukaran. The fact that the rent is Rs. 20 per month itself falsifies his case. He moved the Land Tribunal as per O A. 780 of 1975 for a declaration that he was a kudikidappukaran. He did not succeed. Before the Rent Control Court also he got a reference on this question and invited a finding against him by the Land Tribunal. It was thereafter that the case was posted for evidence and the ex parte eviction order passed. The complaint of the respondent before the execution court was that no evidence was adduced on behalf of the petitioner in support of the case that there were arrears of rent and therefore no ground was made out to, support the order of eviction. An order of eviction under The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 2 of 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) can be passed only on one or other of the grounds enumerated in section 11 of the Act. Since there is no finding by the Rent Control Court about the availability of any ground to support the order of eviction the order is without jurisdiction and hence non est. Under these circumstances, according to the petitioner, the execution court could go behind the order and refuse to execute it. This did not find favour with the execution court, but found favour with the District Court in revision. 3. The learned District Judge referred to the decisions in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471and Balakrishna Reddiar v. MadhavanPillai 1978 K.L.T. 495 and held that the Rent Control Court was not competent to pass an order for eviction either in invitum or with the consent of the parties but could do so only on a ground enumerated in the Act. If only the landlord-petitioner had filed an affidavit in support of the allegation made in the petition, the order would have been executable. According to the learned Judge though the respondent was worsted before the Land Tribunal twice, he did not admit the allegations in the petition. Mere allegation in the petition was not sufficient for passing an order of eviction. 4. The question for consideration is whether this approach on the facts of this case is correct. Are all ex parte orders not based on evidence, non est? Is there an obligation on a court, even when the opposite side is absent, to satisfy itself of the sufficiency of the ground urged for eviction? Every case has to depend upon its facts. 5. Notice to the opposite side is given to make available to the court his assistance in meeting the case of the petitioner. In the absence of the respondent the court will be perfectly justified in passing an order of eviction on the materials available. If only the petitioner had filed an affidavit stating that the averments in the petition are true, the objection now raised would not have been available to the respondent. It is always desirable for courts to insist upon an affidavit in ex parte matters. It is not at the same time necessary for such a court to discuss the case on merits to satisfy itself that a ground existed to enable it to pass an order of eviction. It is true that averments in the petition cannot take the place of evidence. That is why in ex parte matters ex parte evidence either in the form of an affidavit or oral evidence is insisted upon. 6. Though the order in this case was passed on the averments in the petition without formal ex parte evidence an examination whether the execution court had sufficient materials before it to direct execution to proceed is necessary. The normal rule is that the execution court has to obey the decree which is put in execution. Seldom can the execution court go behind the decree and decline execution. There may be rare and exceptional cases where this could be done. But that is only on proof of want of jurisdiction in the sense that the order sought to be executed does not legally exist. The question is whether this case is one such. 7. Seldom can the execution court go behind the decree and decline execution. There may be rare and exceptional cases where this could be done. But that is only on proof of want of jurisdiction in the sense that the order sought to be executed does not legally exist. The question is whether this case is one such. 7. It is not as though the respondent did not have any remedy available. The Rent Control Court took extra care to direct that the order of eviction shall be communicated to the respondent and it is seen that this direction was complied with. Under the provisions of the Act the respondent could file an application to get the ex parte eviction order set aside. In addition to this, under section 11 (2)(c) of the Act, the tenant has liberty to get the order of eviction avoided by depositing the arrears of rent either within one month of the order of eviction or within such further period as the court deems fit. The application for eviction in this case was made after issuance of a registered notice. The respondent in his counter questioned the sufficiency of this notice. Though the order of eviction was passed on 23rd February 1978 the order was put in execution only long thereafter. 8. It is against this background that execution was laid. The execution court had before it the fact that the respondent had moved the Land Tribunal to get his right as kudikidappukaran declared in his favour which is an admission of the petitioner's right in the property and the lease. He again moved for reference under section 125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act during the pendency of the rent control petition for a finding that he is a Kudikidappukaran which again evidences the fact that the petitioner is the landlord of the property. The Rent Control Court had before it the finding that the respondent was not a kudikidappukaran. It had necessarily to accept the finding. This finding affords evidence about the right of the petitioner. These materials were before the execution court when it directed execution to proceed. Though the ground of arrears of rent was denied by the respondent in the counter, his absence on the day, the case was posted, has to be deemed to be an implied admission by him of the existence of the arrears of rent. These materials were before the execution court when it directed execution to proceed. Though the ground of arrears of rent was denied by the respondent in the counter, his absence on the day, the case was posted, has to be deemed to be an implied admission by him of the existence of the arrears of rent. The execution court could, on the materials before it, assume that the Rent Control Court was satisfied about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. Under such circumstances the executing court is bound to proceed with the execution and cannot go behind the decree. The executing court cannot be allowed to go beyond that limit because to do so would be in the words of the Supreme Court "to exalt it to the status of a super court sitting in appeal over the decision of the rent court". 9. The respondent's counsel referred me to the case reported in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others A.I.R. 1974 S.C.471 That case related to an order of eviction passed on compromise. As per the compromise the tenant agreed to give possession on 30th September 1968. Since the property was not surrendered on that date execution was levied. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the Bench observed as follows: "Construing the provisions of sections 12, 13 and 28 of the Bombay Rent Act in the light of the public policy which permeates the entire scheme and structure of the Act, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Rent Court under this Act is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statutory grounds mentioned in sections 12 and 13 is a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court under those provisions. Even parties cannot by their consent confer such jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do. The existence of one of the statutory grounds mentioned in sections 12 and 13 is a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court under those provisions. Even parties cannot by their consent confer such jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do. ** ** ** ** In view of what has been said above, it is clear that the general principles enunciated by this Court in cases referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant, are a relevant guide for determining whether in a particular case the consent decree for possession passed by the Court under the Bombay Rent Act is or is not a nullity. But the case in hand is not in line with Bahadur Singh's case, (1969) 2 S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi's case, (1969) 2 S.C.R. 1048 =( A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838) and Ferozi Lai Jain's case, (1970) [3 S.C.181 = (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794) (supra). On facts, they are distinguishable from the instant case. In those cases, there was absolutely no material, extrinsic or intrinsic to the consent decree on the basis of which, the court could be satisfied as to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. ** ** ** ** From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. (emphasis supplied) ** ** ** ** Be that as it may, in cases where an objection as to the non executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity, is taken, the Executing Court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis of which, the Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to the existance of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. (emphasis supplied) All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the Rent Court could have - as distinguished from must have -been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a supreme court sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court".' I have quoted the relevant passages in extenso to bring into sharp focus the limits of the execution court set out by the Supreme Court. The above observations give the necessary guidelines to the execution court to consider whether, in a given case even though the original court had not rested its order of eviction on any ground under the Act, on the existing materials whether the order of the Rent Control Court was proper. 10. The respondent's counsel brought to my notice Balakrishna Reddiar v. Madhavan Pillai 1978 K.L.T.495. There the executability of a compromise order for eviction passed by; the Rent Control Court arose for consideration. In that case an order for eviction was passed on a compromise by which the tenant agreed to surrender the property on a particular date. Since he did not vacate the building after the expiry of that date execution application was filed. Narendran, J., held that in that case on its facts the order of eviction was inexecutable. The facts of this case are not similar to the case on hand and therefore the principle laid down there is not applicable to this case. 11. It. Narendran, J., held that in that case on its facts the order of eviction was inexecutable. The facts of this case are not similar to the case on hand and therefore the principle laid down there is not applicable to this case. 11. It. will not be correct to lay down as a general proposition that a compromise order for eviction is inexecutable. Each case should depend upon its own facts. The facts of a case may reveal the existence of grounds for eviction and the compromise may have been entered into because the tenant found it difficult to contest. In such cases it cannot be said that a compromise order is inexecutable. A compromise order can be passed without the existence of any ground for eviction also. Over zealous landlords may by the clever device of a petition lull the tenant to inaction by persuading him to agree to a compromise with a promise to give him a fairly long time for surrender of the property. When the tenant agrees for such an order, he sleeps over his rights to avoid the order of eviction by deposit of the arrears as in the Kerala Act. It is necessary to guard against victimisation of innocent "tenants by unscrupulous landlords. In compromise orders the tenant is without his remedy to avoid the order except on grounds of fraud or such other vitiating circumstances. It might be even argued that he has no right of appeal since the order is an agreed order. Not so in the case of an ex parte order. The tenant against whom such an order is passed has the right to file an application to set aside the ex parte order, to avoid the order by deposit of rent under section 11 (2) (c) of the Act or to file an appeal against such order. In this case the Rent Control Court took the additional precaution to direct communication of the order to the tenant. To say that an order of eviction passed under such circumstances, would still be a nullity, would be to render proceedings in the court a mockery. 12. I would like to rest my conclusion on an additional ground. An ex parte order of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent alone differs from similar orders on other grounds. To say that an order of eviction passed under such circumstances, would still be a nullity, would be to render proceedings in the court a mockery. 12. I would like to rest my conclusion on an additional ground. An ex parte order of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent alone differs from similar orders on other grounds. An ex parte order of eviction on any other ground can be avoided only by satisfying the court of valid reasons why the tenant was absent on the hearing date. But an ex parte order of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent can also be avoided by deposit of rent under section II(2)(c) not only within the time within which an application to set aside the ex parte order has to be filed but either within one month of the order or within such extended time as the court grants. These safeguards go a long way against the plea based on the inexecutable character of the order. 13. If the respondent's case is to be accepted, then it would be placing the landlords in an unenviable position. Tenants will be better off when eviction petitions are filed in allowing ex parte orders to be passed against them so that they can sit back and wait for the execution petition which they can oppose. The object of the Act is to prevent unreasonable eviction. It will not be in furtherance of the object of the Act to encourage objections of the kind made in this petition, for the Act does not imperil the rights of the landlords to this extent not exalt the rights of the tenant to the point of destroying the landlord's rights. The courts have a duty to respect the scheme of the enactment to prevent unreasonable eviction but no duty to extend misplaced sympathy and scuttle the process of law. The court below committed an error of jurisdiction in refusing to allow execution to proceed. It should have found that there were sufficient materials to hold that the rent control court could have passed an order of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. I set aside the order of the court below and allow this revision petition. The respondent is given time till 1st October 1981 to surrender the property. No costs.