Order. The two accused in C.C.No.180 of 1579 now pending before the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Wadalckancherry, are the petitioners herein and they seek to invoke the inherent powers of this Court to auash the entire proceedings in the said criminal complaint. Both the petitioners are sisters, the first petitioner is said to be aged 52 and the second petitioner 4u. The case against them is that they, on 9th April, 1979, obstructed witnesses 1 and 2 in the charge-sheet who are respectively the Taluk Surveyor and the Revenue Inspector, from entering the compound in which the petitioners are residing by closing their gate and thus prevented and obstructed the above officers from discharging their official duties. It is alleged that it was for Surveying property comprised in Sy. No. 399 of Enkakad Village as per orders of the Tahsildar that these officers went there. On these allegations, a complaint was filed by the Taluk Surveyor before the Wadaak-k'ncherry Police Station, on the basis Of which a case was registered against the petitioners under sections 341 and 353 read With section 34, Indian Penal Code. On completion of investigation, a charge -sheet under the abovesaid sections was filed against the petitioners. When the petitioners appeared before Court, they denied having committed any offence and the case was subsequently posted for trial. 2. This charge-sheet filed against the petitioners and the subsequent criminal proceedings against them are sought to be quashed on more than one ground. The learned advocate appearing for them submitted that this is a clear case of abuse of process of Court, as the charge-sheef, the first information statement and all the relevant records supplied to the petitioners and sought to be relied on by the prosecution do not disclose any offence ounishable under section 353, Indian Penal Code. The Counsel also contended that this is an illustrious case where the prosecution deliberately wanted to evade the salutary provisions of section 195(1)(a). Criminal Procedure Code, by changing the label of the offence as one punishable under section 353, Indian Penal Code. 3. It is not disputed before me that the petitioners are lesiding alone in a house in the compound which the taluk Surveyor and the Revenue Inspector wanted to survey. Criminal Procedure Code, by changing the label of the offence as one punishable under section 353, Indian Penal Code. 3. It is not disputed before me that the petitioners are lesiding alone in a house in the compound which the taluk Surveyor and the Revenue Inspector wanted to survey. The Counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor took me thrtfugh the first information statement, charge-sheet and all the relevant documents which the prosecution wants to rely on in support of its case against the petitioners. Admittedly there is no allegation or averment either in the first information statement or in the statements recorded under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code, or in the charge-sheet that the petitioners assaulted witness Nos. 1 and 2 or used any criminal force against them. It is also not disputed that the only overt act attributed to the petitioners is that they closed the gate of the compound thereby obstructing witness Nos. 1 and 2 from entering the property. But the learned Public Prosecutor relying on the definition of force in section 349. Indian Penal Code, strongly contended that force need not be used against any person to attract section 353, Indian Penal Code, but it is enough if force is used against any substance as contemplated under section 349. Indian Peal Code. The argument advanced is that by closing the gate, witness Nos. 1 and 2 had to go back without entering the compound for surveying the property and therefore there was cessation of motion as contemplated under section 349, Indian Penal Code. The learned Public prosecutor appears to have forgotten the fact that assault or use of criminal force to any person is an essential ingredient of an offence punishable under section 353. Indian penal Code and that there is a clear distinction between ‘force’ defined under section 349 and ‘criminal force’ defined under section 350 Indian Penal Code. We are here in this case only concerned with the ingredients of an offence punishable under section 353, Indian Penal Code. Even the definition of ‘force’ under section 349, will not apply to the facts of this case. We are here in this case only concerned with the ingredients of an offence punishable under section 353, Indian Penal Code. Even the definition of ‘force’ under section 349, will not apply to the facts of this case. It was relying On the second part of the definition of ‘force’ under section 349, Indian penal Code, namely: “If a person causes to any ‘substance such motion or change of motion or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of the other's body” that the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that further has been used in this case by the petitioners by closing the gate. The prosecution has no case that by locking or closing the gate, any part of the gate came into contact with the body of witness Nos. 1 or 2. The cessation of motion contemplated under the section is not that of the person but that of the substance. As stated earlier, the records in the case do not disclose that the petitioners have committed any assault on or used criminal force as defined under section 350, Indian Penal Code against witness Nos. 1 and 2 or any other public servant. No doubt the records produced in this case and relied on by. the prosecution primarily and essentially disclose an offence perishable under section 186 , Indian penal Code for which a complaint as contemplated under section 195(1)(a), Criminal procedure Code is necessary. The bar contemplated under section 195(1)(a) is one affecting the jurisdiction which goes to the very root of the matter. No complaint in writing as contemplated under section 195(1)(a) Criminal procedure Code, has been filed in this case and there is considerable force in the contention of the petitioners that this is a clear attempt to get ever the bar under section 195(1)(a) Criminal Procedure Code, by giving the lable of section 353, Indian Penal Code to the facts of the case. The counsel pointed out that such practice has been deprecated by decisions of High Courts and also of the Supreme Court. 4. The wording of section 353, Indian Penal Code, makes it clear that assault of use of criminal force to a public servant while he was dinghies duty as such is a necessary ingredient of that offence. The counsel pointed out that such practice has been deprecated by decisions of High Courts and also of the Supreme Court. 4. The wording of section 353, Indian Penal Code, makes it clear that assault of use of criminal force to a public servant while he was dinghies duty as such is a necessary ingredient of that offence. Under section 349, Indian Penal Code a person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body, etc. What is contemplated under section 353, Indian Penal Code, is not merely use of force but use of criminal force to any person mentioned therein. Even under section 349, Indian Penal Code, cessation of motion contemplated was that of the substance which was caused to move. This again indicates that what was mainly intended under the section was use of force to any parson. To attract the definition of ‘criminal force’ under section 350, Indian Penal Code, there must be intentional use of force to any person, without that person's consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used. In other words, the criminal force contemplated under this section is intended to mean criminal force as applied to a person and not as applied to an inanimate object or substance. There is an essential distinction between the offences punishable under sections 353 and 186, Indian Penal Code. The ingredients of the two offences are distinct and different. While the further is a cognizable offence, the latter is hot. A mere obstruction cr resistance unaccompanied by criminal force or assault wilt not constitute an offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code. Where an accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his duties, section 186: Indian Penal Code, is attracted. But under section 353, there must be in addition to the obstruction use of criminal force or assault to the public servant while he was discharging his duty. Where an accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his duties, section 186: Indian Penal Code, is attracted. But under section 353, there must be in addition to the obstruction use of criminal force or assault to the public servant while he was discharging his duty. It may also be noted that the quality of the two offences is also different. While section 186 occurs in Chapter × dealing with contempt’s of the lawful authority of public servants, section 353 appears in Chapter XVI which deals with offences affecting the human body. This is also clear indication that use of criminal force contemplator under Section 353, Indian Penal Code, is against a person and not against any inanimate object. There is considerable force in the contention of the Counsel for the petitioners that the offence really disclosed from the records is only one punishable under section 186, Indian penal Code, and that by giving a label of section 353, Indian Penal Code, the prosecution wanted to circumvent the salutary provisions in section 195(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code. In support of his contention the counsel relied on the decision in Durgacharan v. State of Orssa1where the Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 195 , cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, on the ground that the latter offence is a minor one of the same character, or by describing the offence as one punishable under some other section of the Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of the offences mentioned in section 195. This is a clear instance where the prosecution wanted to evade the provisions in section 195 by charging the petitioners under section 353, Indian Penal Code; In Dr. S. Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh2 while dealing with a similar question, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible for the prosecution to rap a serious charge and select one which does not require the procedure under section 195 , Criminal procedure Code; and that if the offence was under section 106, Indian Penal Code, a complaint in writing was necessary. Admittedly in the instant case there is no complaint in writing of the public servant made to the Court as contemplated under section 195(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code. In the absence of a complaint as contemplated under section 195(1), although an offence under section 186 Indian Penal Code, is disclosed from the records, prosecution against the petitioners cannot be continued, as there is a specific prohibition to take cognizance of the offence punishable under section 186 , India penal Code, except upon a complaint in writing under section 195(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is allowed and the entire proceedings in C.C. No. 180 of 1979 now pending against the petitioners before the Judicial Magistrate of I class, Wadakkancherry, are hereby quashed. Petition allowed; proceedings quashed.