Judgment M.P.Verma, J. 1. The defendants first party are the appellants. The plaintiffs had filed the suit for the declaration of title and recovery of possession with mesne profits. The plaintiffs claimed the suit land by virtue of a purchase through a registered sale deed dated 11-1-960 (vide Ext. 1) executed by one Mossamat Jhapno. Defendants first party also claimed the suit land as bataidars and on the basis of having acquired the right therein, being in possession over the same for more than twelve years, as settled raiyats of the village. 2. The trial court found the case of the defendants first party as having been proved and found that in view of the right acquired by the defendants first party over the suit land as settled raiyats being in possession for more than twelve years and thereby held that the defendants first party were exempted from being ejected therefrom which eventually resulted in the dismissal of the suit. 3. The lower appellate court reversed the finding regarding defendant No. 1 being a bataidar. It also held that the defendants first party had neither made a specific case in the pleading as to the date of having come in possession as a bataidar nor was evidence to that effect led in the court at the trial stage. The lower appellate court further held that the only case of defendants first party was that they were cultivating the suit land from the life time of Mossmat Dayawati, the mother of the last male-holder in the family, namely, Pratap Singh. Dayawati died some time in the year 1956. 4. The lower appellate court also held that Mossamat Jhapno, wife of Pratap Singh had not lost title to and possession of the suit land. The registered sale deed referred to above, conveyed a good title, in the plaintiffs. The lower appellate court gave a further finding that the plaintiffs could not be able to prove possession of their vendor within twelve years prior to the institution of the suit and hence they were entitled to a declaration of title thereto and since Sec.145 Cr. P.C. proceeding ended in favour of the defendants first party, they were entitled to recovery of possession thereof. 5. The main contention before this Court put forward by Mr. P.C. proceeding ended in favour of the defendants first party, they were entitled to recovery of possession thereof. 5. The main contention before this Court put forward by Mr. Guru Sharan sharma, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants first party, who have come in appeal, is that the findings of the lower appellate court are erroneous and in view of the bar imposed by proviso to Sec. 48C of the B T. Act as amended in 1970, the plaintiffs suit under no condition be decreed. 6. The lower appellate Court has in clear terms held that the mischief of Section 48C of the B.T. Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended in 1970 could not be attracted, since the title claimed by the plaintiffs is said to have passed in the year 1960, and has also held that the provisions are not retrospective The lower appellate court has been further specific that defendant No. 1 has not been able to prove his continuous possession for twelve years on the suit land as a bataidar and so it was found immaterial by the lower appellate Court whether the proviso to Sec. 48C of the Act was retrospective or not. Questions for consideration are whether it is an acquisition by bataidari by occupancy rights by the defendants first party and also with regard to the effect of the proviso to Sec. 48C of the Act. Admittedly, both are independent questions and not inter-connected. The lower appellate Court says that the defendants first party are not the bataidars and the defendant No. 1 was looking after as an agent of Jhapno Devi and not in the capacity as an independent bataidar giving right of acquisition as such followed by the occupancy right over the suit land. 7. In the evidence of the defendants witnesses relied upon by lower appellate Court for negativing the case of the defendants first party and in the counter evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses to the same effect, the counsel for the defendants first party-appellants has not at all been successful in pointing out any error of record in that regard. My attention was drawn to the statement made by Jhapno Devi in a proceeding under Sec.145 Cr. P. C, but it is Sant to mention that the proceeding ended in favour of defendants first party. This statement is Ext. My attention was drawn to the statement made by Jhapno Devi in a proceeding under Sec.145 Cr. P. C, but it is Sant to mention that the proceeding ended in favour of defendants first party. This statement is Ext. F. No such presumption of any bataidari can be drawn on an isolated statement made by Jhapno Devi in a proceeding under Sec.145 Cr. P. C. She has not been examined in the trial Court. 8. What has been seriously contended is the application of the proviso to Section 48C of the Act as amended in 1970. The question raised is whether it was for plaintiffs to prove that they did not possess more than 5 acres of irrigated and 10 acres of non-irrigated land to avoid the attraction of bataidari rights to the appellants or it will be sufficient for the plaintiffs to prove that their vendor had only 6 or 7 bighas of land. Admittedly, this amendment cams into force by the Bihar Act 8 of 1970. It has been contended that it has not got any retrospective effect and in my view, rightly contended that this amendment has got no retrospective operation, but at the same time, I am in full accord with the findings arrived at by the lower appellate Court that in view of the appellants having failed so establish their case regarding continuous possession over the suit land for more than twelve years, the question of retrospectivity or otherwise of the provisions of proviso to Sec. 48-C of the Act has got no material significance. 9. As stated above, in view of the findings arrived by the lower appellate Court to which the defendants first party appellants, in my view, have not been able to assail before this Court either by reference to evidence or of law, I hold that the appeal is without any merit. 10. Thus, in the view that I have taken, I find no merit in this appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.