JUDGMENT The plaintiffs have alleged that one of his brothers has a ration shop near the Landsdowne Market, Calcutta. Defendant No. 2 Promod Kumar Gupta, has stalls Nos. 6 and 7 in Block 'H' of that market and he is a licensee under the Corporation of Calcutta. Promod Kumar was unable to run the stalls and he kept them it under lock and key. There was an agreement with the plaintiffs to transfer the licence of the stalls to the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs. 500/-. Pursuant to that agreement, the plaintiffs paid Rs. 500/- on 17.11.1967 and H. L. Gupta (defendant No. 1), father of Promod Kumar, granted a receipt on behalf of his son and accepted the amount. The transfer was dependent on the permission of the Corporation of Calcutta. Promod Kumar made an application to the Corporation for permission to make the transfer. Similar application was also made by the plaintiffs. The Superintendent of the Corporation of Calcutta granted such permission and directed the plaintiffs to submit a registered deed of transfer. Then the plaintiffs asked the defendant to execute a document. A lawyer's letter was also sent but no amount was taken. A false reply was given that Rs. 10,000/- must be paid as consideration for transfer of licence. The plaintiffs performed their part of the contract. The suit is for specific performance of contract. 2. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed a written statement alleging, inter alia, that there was no such agreement and hence, the suit was not maintainable. The agreement was to transfer the stall on payment of Rs. 10,000/-. But the learned Munsif believed the plaintiff's version and stated that the defendants version that the agreement was to transfer the stall for a sum of Rs. 10,000/-, was an afterthought. The, suit was decreed. An appeal was filed and it was dismissed. Hence, this second appeal by the defendants. 3. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the provisions of section 16 of the Specific Relief Act have not been complied with because the plaintiffs have not averred in the plaint that they were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. In the absence of such averment in the plaint the suit is liable to be dismissed. Licence is merely a privilege. In the absence of such averment in the plaint the suit is liable to be dismissed. Licence is merely a privilege. Reference has been made to section 456 (c) of the Calcutta Municipal Act in this respect. So, the alleged licence cannot he transferred and necessarily, no suit can lie for transfer of such right of a licensee. Reference has been made to pages 2 and 3 of Gale on Easement, 10th edition, to show that an easement differs from a licence. A licence unless coupled with a grant is not binding on the assignee of the licensor and is not generally assignable by the licensee. There is a difference between lease and licence. The well known case of (1) B. M. Loll v. Messrs. Dunlop Co., in AIR 1968 SC 175 has been referred to. At all events, the alleged agreement was signed by the agent, defendant No. 1, vide, chit Ext. 2. The agent acted beyond his power and the principal is not bound by the agent's action. Reference has been made to page 446 of the Law of Contract by Cheshire and Fifoot, 7th Edition, to show that the principal is bound by every contract or disposition of the property made by the agent with his authority. If a mm acts as an agent without any authority whatsoever, or if he exceeds his authority, the principal is not liable. Reference has been made to sections 197 and 227 of the Indian Contract Act. It has been lastly stated that the defendant's letters, Ext. A series, were not considered. So, for non-consideration of material evidence, the decision of the Court below cannot be supported. There was no consideration for the alleged transfer. 4. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents has referred to section 56 of the Easements Act and contended that no different intention was expressed expressly or impliedly and so, the alleged licence is transferable. Rule 65 of the Market Manual has been referred to show that Vendor can transfer his interest in the stall in the municipal market with the previous sanction of the authorities. An application was filed by the defendant No. 2 himself to the Market Superintendent on the 24th December, 1967, for granting a permission to make such transfer to the plaintiffs, vide the letter Ext. 1 (b). An application was filed by the defendant No. 2 himself to the Market Superintendent on the 24th December, 1967, for granting a permission to make such transfer to the plaintiffs, vide the letter Ext. 1 (b). This clearly shows that the agent had authority to contract on behalf of the principal, defendant No.2 and such contract made by the father on behalf of his son, who was the principal in this case regarding the disputed stalls, was ratified by the principal, defendant No.2. The case of (2) Fazaladdin v. Panchanan., in AIR 1957 Cal. 92 at page 95 has been referred to show that a single consideration may support more than one promise and may move from the promisee or any other person. The receipt, Ext. 2, granted by the agent, i.e., father (defendant No. 1), shows that contract was made for a sum of Rs. 500/- which was paid both towards the transfer of the stall Nos. 6 and 7 in Block 'H' of Lansdowne Market and also for the sale of the furniture and the equipments, noted in that receipt. So, the payment of Rs. 500/- supported the consideration for the contract to transfer the stalls and also to sell the movables, mentioned in that receipt. 5. The first point is whether the suit will fail for non-compliance with the provisions of section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. Clause (c) of section 16 and the Explanation 2 (ii) indicate that the plaintiff must aver in the plaint about his readiness and willingness to perform the contract. Clause (c) enjoins that it is necessary to aver that the plaintiff was willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which is to be performed by him. In the para 14 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have stated that they have performed their part of the contract, paid Rs. 500/- towards the transfer of the stalls and the value of the movable, noted in the receipt, Ext. 2, sent letter to the Superintendent for granting a permission to make a transfer, made demands for execution of a documents in pursuance of the contract to transfer the stall and sent Advocate's letter to the defendant to perform their part of the contract. 2, sent letter to the Superintendent for granting a permission to make a transfer, made demands for execution of a documents in pursuance of the contract to transfer the stall and sent Advocate's letter to the defendant to perform their part of the contract. Hence, so far as the essential terms of the contract are concerned, the plaintiffs were not required to do anything more in that respect except to file a' suit for specific performance of contract. Hence, the submission in this respect cannot be accepted. It is, therefore, held that the provisions of Clause (c) and of Item (ii) of the Explanation to section 16 of the Specific Relief Act have been substantially complied with by the plaintiffs. 6. Then about the second question whether the alleged licence can be transferred. Section 56 of the Indian Easements Act says that unless a different intention is expressed 9r necessarily implied, a licence to attend a place of public entertainment may be transferred, but save as aforesaid, a licence cannot be transferred by the licensee. In. this case, there is no express or implied intention to the contrary. On the other hand, the letter written by the licensee, defendant No.2, on 14.12.1967 to the Superintendent for according permission to transfer the stall to the plaintiffs, vide letter Ext. 1(b), clearly shows that the licensee intended to make a transfer. Hence, this branch of the argument also cannot be accepted. 7. The next question arises whether the agent has exceeded his authority. The findings of the learned Munsif are that the agent had authority to make such contract and the agent did not exceed his authority. The further finding is that the contract made by the agents was ratified by the principal or course, there is no specific finding by the learned Appellate Court affirming these findings. But a reading of the judgment of the Appellate Court shows that those findings were impliedly affirmed. 8. It appears from the oral and documentary evidence that father (defendant No. 1) was acting as the agent of the licensee, defendant No.2. As an agent, the father made the contract to sell the stalls and the equipment noted in the receipt, Ext. 2, to the plaintiffs. Such contract was expressly ratified by his son by writing the letter, Ext. It appears from the oral and documentary evidence that father (defendant No. 1) was acting as the agent of the licensee, defendant No.2. As an agent, the father made the contract to sell the stalls and the equipment noted in the receipt, Ext. 2, to the plaintiffs. Such contract was expressly ratified by his son by writing the letter, Ext. 1 (b) to the Superintendent on 14.12.1967 to accord sanction because he wanted to transfer his right, title and interest to his relations, Dasarath Shaw, Ram Balak Shaw and Nanda Kishore Shaw of 40/2, Beltola Road. Hence, sections 197 and 227 of the Indian Contract Act cannot stand the appellant in good stead in this respect. Hence, this submission will also fail. 9. Then about the last submission made by the appellants that the alleged contract to transfer the stall was made without consideration because Ext. 2 relates to transfer to movables only. Now, the plain reading of the receipt, Ext. 2, shows that it is related to both transfer of the stall and also of the mavables kept in the stall. So the payment of Rs. 500/- supported the• consideration for both and not for the transfer of the movables only. The learned Munsif considered the Advocate's letter, Ext. A series, and stated that the defence version, that the alleged contract had been made for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- and not for a sum of Rs. 500/- was an afterthought. That Court took up the point for consideration, whether the consideration was for Rs. 500/- or there had been agreement to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. It was held that it had been agreed upon between the parties that Rs. 500/- would be paid towards the transfer of the licence and for the sale of the furniture and equipment, noted in the receipt, Ext. 2. The learned 1st Appellate Court dismissed the appeal in view of the endorsement made in this receipt, Ext. 2. It cannot be stated that the sum of Rs. 500/- had been paid by the plaintiffs to the agent, defendant No. 1 only to transfer the movables and furniture kept in the stalls in question and I find accordingly. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to the costs.