JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, C.J. - These are 3 applications u/s 482 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 directed against framing of charge against each of the Petitioners on different counts by the Special Judge of Bhubaneswar. 2. Petitioner in Criminal Revisions 207 and 208 of 1978 Sri Harekrushna Mahatab was the Chief Minister of the State of Orissa from 19-10-1956 to 24-2-1961. A charge-sheet was filed against him in 1977 following investigation by the Criminal Bureau of Investigation on the basis of a First Information Report lodged in 1973 alleging that while the Petitioner was Chief Minister and at his instance (i) instalment of Kendu leaf leases for the year 1958 had been postponed beyond the due dates; (ii) remission of 20 per cent of the royalty to Kendu leaf lessees was granted in the year 1959; (iii) leases for the year 1960 were granted by enhancing the existing rate of royalty by 15 per cent which was a favour shown to the lessees; and (iv) in consideration of receipt of Rs. 6,00,000/- from the Kendu leaf traders by way of gratification, these benefits had been extended to them. It may be pointed out that Mr. Justice J.R. Mudholkar, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, was appointed for preliminary verification of certain allegations against the Ministers of the State who were in office prior to 1961. On the basis of the preliminary report, Mr. Justice Saraju Prasad, a retired Chief Justice who was then practising as a Senior Advocate in the Supreme Court, was appointed Commission of Enquiry and he in his report of 1972 pointed out that the Petitioner's conduct with reference to the aforesaid matters was not proper. A First Information Report was lodged in 1973 and the matter was handed over to the C.B.I. for investigation. In 1977 charge-sheet was submitted for offence u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947, and u/s 161, Indian Penal Code in the Court of the Special Judge, Bhubaneswar. This came to be registered as T.R. Case No. 6/77. Lengthy arguments were advanced before the Special Judge on behalf of the parties in regard to framing of the charge. This came to be registered as T.R. Case No. 6/77. Lengthy arguments were advanced before the Special Judge on behalf of the parties in regard to framing of the charge. It was pointed out on behalf of the Petitioner that steps complained of were taken following unanimous decision of the Cabinet and the Petitioner never had any role to play. Decisions of the Cabinet, even if inappropriate or improper, are not open to investigation and the Petitioner is not accountable for any decision taken bona fide which turns out to be inappropriate in retrospect. Protection under Article 163(3) of the Constitution was sought. The Special Judge by order dated 3-5-1978 framed charges u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and declined to frame a charge u/s 161, Indian Penal Code as it was clearly barred by time with reference to Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure. Criminal Revision No. 207 of 1978 seeks to assail the framing of the charge and the Petitioner has asked us to quash that charge and the proceeding in exercise of inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. Sri M.K. Rahaman, Petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 242 of 1978, was the General Manager of the partnership firm known as "M/s. Sirajuddin & Co". Before Petitioner Sri Harekrushna Mahatab become Chief Minister, Md. Sirajuddin, a partner of the firm, had applied for grant of certain mining leases and had also proposed to set up a ferro-chrome plant at Bhadrak. In April 1956, the Government of India came forward with an Industrial Policy Resolution. Under it, chrome ore could no more be leased out for private purpose and w s reserved for exploitation in the public sector or by the State. After the Resolution, a private ferro chrome plant could not be set up. Yet, Petitioner Sri Harekrushna Mahatab as Chief Minister passed orders for grant of mining lease to Md. Sirajuddin by overruling the views of the Industries Department and the Minister holding the relevant portfolio. This enabled Md. Sirajuddin to exploit chrome ore mines and export ores and earned huge profits at the cost of the State. It was further alleged that the Industries Department wanted insertion of certain restrictive clauses in the lease deed, but Petitioner Sri Harekrushna Mahatab directed complete relaxation of the terms with a view to securing pecuniary benefits to the lessee. Sirajuddin to exploit chrome ore mines and export ores and earned huge profits at the cost of the State. It was further alleged that the Industries Department wanted insertion of certain restrictive clauses in the lease deed, but Petitioner Sri Harekrushna Mahatab directed complete relaxation of the terms with a view to securing pecuniary benefits to the lessee. The matter came to light as alleged by the prosecution following the preliminary report of Mr. Justice Mudholkar and the findings of the Saraju Prasad Commission furnished in 1972. On the basis of the view expressed by Mr. Justice Saraju Prasad, a First Information Report was lodged and the enquiry was made over to the C.B.I. Charge-sheet was submitted against the Petitioners for offences u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and u/s 120-B, Indian Penal Code against Petitioner M.K. Rahaman. With the question of framing of charge, several contentions were advanced on behalf of the Petitioners. The learned Special Judge by his order dated 3-5-1978 overruled the objections and directed charge to be framed u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as also u/s 120-B, Indian Penal Code against Petitioner Sri Harekrushna Mahatab and only u/s 120-B against Petitioner M.K. Rahaman. Criminal Revision No. 208/78 is by Sri Harekrushna Mahatab and Criminal Revision No. 242/78 is by M.K. Rahaman asking for quashing of the charges and the proceedings against them in exercise of powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. When these, revisions came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court, they were referred for disposal by a Division Bench. That is how these revisions have now come before us. 5. Admittedly, the events with reference to which the prosecutions have been launched took place between 1958 and 1960. By the time the First Information Report was lodged in 1973, more than 13 years had elapsed. Investigation took 4 more years and charge-sheet came to be submitted in 1977. Charges were framed in the- year 1978. By now, there has already been a lapse of more than 20 years in regard to both the sets of charges. The impugned orders of the learned Special Judge do not indicate that he was aware of the fact that charge was being framed about 18-19 years after the events complained of. Charges were framed in the- year 1978. By now, there has already been a lapse of more than 20 years in regard to both the sets of charges. The impugned orders of the learned Special Judge do not indicate that he was aware of the fact that charge was being framed about 18-19 years after the events complained of. Though on behalf of the Petitioners the self-same contentions which had been advanced before the Special Judge were reiterated, after hearing counsel at length we are of the view that these revisions should be allowed and the prosecutions including the charges framed therein should be quashed mainly on the ground of delay. 6. Admittedly, both the events which led to framing of charges in the two cases were of the years 1958 to 1960. The matter was brought to light following the report of the Saraju Prasad Commission. Though the report came in 1972, the First Information Report was given only in 1973. The investigation continued for 4 years and only in 1977 charge-sheet was filed. As already indicated, by now more than 20 years have elapsed from the events. In this setting, it is for construction whether the prosecutions should be allowed to continue. In the case of Machander Vs. State of Hyderabad Bose, J., speaking for a Division Court, observed: We are not prepared to keep persons who are on trial fer their lives under indefinite suspense because trial judges omit to do their duty. Justice is not one sided. It has many, facets and we have to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. While it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it is even more necessary to see that persons accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go. In the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go. In the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab Gajendragadkar, J; (as the learned Judge then was) observed: It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. In the case of Pramatha Nath Taluqdar Vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar delay of 5 years initiating a fresh prosecution was found to amount to harassment of the accused persons. In Union of India v. G.K. Apte 1971 S.C.D. 882, the question for consideration was whether quashing of criminal charges in exercise of inherent powers was justified. The principle in the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab was approved. In the case of State of U.P. v. Kapil Deo Shukla 1972 S.C.D. 709, Shelat, J. spoke for the Court thus: 14. In a recent case of proceedings for alleged perjury, this Court held that lapse of a long time, in that case of ten years, was a proper ground for holding that launching of a prosecution was Chajoo Ram Vs. Radhey Shyam and Another. Similarly, in Machander Vs. In a recent case of proceedings for alleged perjury, this Court held that lapse of a long time, in that case of ten years, was a proper ground for holding that launching of a prosecution was Chajoo Ram Vs. Radhey Shyam and Another. Similarly, in Machander Vs. State of Hyderabad, where an order of conviction u/s 302 was set aside by this Court for failure to examine the Appellant u/s 342 of the Code, a remand was declined on the ground that the accused had been arrested in 1950 and had been on his trial one way or the other for over four and a half years. xx xx xx xx xx xx xx These observations and the refusal to order remand on the ground of the trial having protracted for four and a half years apply with equal and perhaps with greater force in the present case since the Respondent has been kept in suspense of a trial for twenty years and more. It was pointed out in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, . In the exercise of this wholsome power (under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure), the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed, The saving of the High Court s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a satutary public purpose which is that a Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours' of that salient jurisdiction. There are two Sin le Judge decisions of this Court which have been brought to our notice and may now be referred to. In both these cases being Mala Mohan Rao v. Principal, M.K.C.G. Medical College 46 (1978) C.L.T. 408 and P. Chiranjivi v. Principal, M.K.C.G. Medical College 47 (1979) C.L.T. 126, some of these decisions of the Supreme Court were referred to and relied upon for quashing charges on the ground of long lapse of time. In the later case, Ray, C.J. observed: The Petitioner is alleged to have committed the offences in 1964 when he took his admission into the Medical College, Berhampur on the basis of Exts. 1, 2 and 3. He completed his medical course and passed M.B.B.S. Examination in 1970. Two years thereafter, that is in 1972, the present complaint was filed. Thus, the structure of the prosecution is based on materials which came into existence eight years prior to filing of the present complaint. It took four more years to collect and adduce evidence and to frame charges against the Petitioner. In the meantime, two more years ha e gone by. Petitioner has become, in the meantime, a fullfledged doctor and no other blemish or criminal activity has been attributed to the Petitioner since the date of his admission into the college till now. As yet, no iota of evidence has been adduced that he manufactured or fabricated the nativity certificate, Ext. 1, or used it falsely knowing it to be untrue or false. To allow the criminal proceeding to continue further after a long lapse of time of fourteen years from the date of alleged commission of offence would amount to permitting a Court proceeding to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and would not, at this stage, achieve any salutary public purpose. Oil the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, such continuance constitutes gross abuse of process of Court. Oil the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, such continuance constitutes gross abuse of process of Court. It is thus imperative for securing the ends of justice that this criminal proceeding should no longer be allowed to stand. We may also refer to a recent decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Prithvi Raj and Anr. v. State of Haryana 1981 Cr. L.J. 984. The First Information Report in that case was registered against the accused in the year 1969. Charge-sheet was given in 1979 and charge was framed in 1980. The Court was of the view that continuing the criminal proceeding after a lapse of 11 years from the date of the alleged commission of offence would amount to a Court proceeding to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and would not achieve any salutary public purpose. 7. These weighty authorities undoubtedly support the stand of the Petitioners that the criminal proceeding after more than 20 years of occurrence should not be continued. 8. It was brought to our notice that with reference to the mining dispute the main witnesses are no more. Even Mr. Bohidar for the prosecution accepted the position that the most important witnesses were Mr. K.D. Malaviya, the Union Minister, and Mr. Dinabandhu Sahu, the Minister concerned of the Orissa State. Both of them are admittedly dead and the prosecution would not be in a position to bring their evidence on record. It was pointed out in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others that: 8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the Respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State Counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the Respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the Respondents with the crime however skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the Respondents with the crime however skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the Respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. One of us in the case of Ranjit Kumar Samantray and Others Vs. State of Orissa also exercised jurisdiction u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing a proceeding where it was found that there was no prospect of a conviction. 9. In view of the fact that important witnesses would not be available to support the prosecution on account of their death, we are inclined to agree with the submission made at the bar on behalf of the Petitioners that the prospect of conviction in the second case becomes remote. 10. Petitioner Sri Harekrushna Mahatab is already above the age of 80 years. He is no more in active politics. 11. In the premises indicated, we are inclined to take the view that continuing the prosecution in these cases against the Petitioners would indeed be a harassment and it is meet and proper that in exercise of our inherent powers we quash the charges and the proceedings to relieve them therefrom. 12. All the three revision applications are accordingly allowed. The charges framed by the Special. Judge are set aside and the criminal proceedings against the Petitioners are quashed. N.K. Das, J. 13. I agree. Final Result : Allowed