Judgment Sia Saran Sinha, J. 1. This second appeal needs determination of a short point namely, that of limitation in the following circumstances. 2. The appellant in second appeal is the plaintiff. He has come to this Court against the judgment of affirmance passed by the lower appellate Court. The plaintiff-appellant was appointed as a temporary clerk in the Saharsa Collectorate on 1-12-1951. There were certain charges against him concerning his official duties. This led to the drawing up of a departmental proceeding against him. Sri V/s. V. Nathan, the District Magistrate, Saharsa, the appointing authority of the appellant, by his order dated 27-7-1961 discharged him from his service The Bihar and Orissa subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the 1935 Rules) made provision for appeal. Taking advantage of this provision, the plaintiff appellant challenged the order of his discharge before the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division. The Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division, however, dismissed the appeal by his order dated 7-9-1961, Even the order of the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Divsion was challenged by the Plaintiff-appellant before the Member. Board of Revenue; but this appeal too met the same fate, as it was dismissed by the Member, Board of Revenue on 24-3-1964. Rule 12 of the 1935 Rules empowered the State Government and the Heads of Department to call for departmental proceedings and pass appropriate orders thereon, as envisaged therein. This provision, as it appears, tempted the appellant to file a memorial before the State Government. He did so, but this memorial too was rejected by the State Government on 5-8-1965, which, as alleged, is said to have been communicated to the plaintiff-appellant after a considerable delay on 19-12-1965. After a considerable delay on 7-8-1968 the appellant instituted the instant suit for a declaration that the order of his discharge from service passed by the District Magistrate, Saharsa, on 27-7-1961 and the subsequent orders passed in appeal as also the entire proceedings ending in his discharge from service were void, illegal, inoperative and without jurisdiction and the plaintiff-appellant was entitled to continue in service as before with arrears of pay and other benefits allowable to him under the rules. 3. The Chief Secretary, the Member, Board of Revenue, Commissioner, Collector, S. D. O. as also the State of Bihar were impleaded as defendants. 3. The Chief Secretary, the Member, Board of Revenue, Commissioner, Collector, S. D. O. as also the State of Bihar were impleaded as defendants. They contested the suit by filing a common written statement refusing the claim of the plaintiff-appellant on grounds amongst others, that of limitation. 4. Both the trial Court as also the lower appellate Court on a consideration of the evidence adduced and the circumstances flowing therefrom held that the order of discharge passed against the plaintiff-appellant was void and illegal. The plaintiff-appellant was, however, non-suited and his suit was dismissed by both the two Courts below on the ground of limitation. Consequently, the only point that was pressed in this second appeal by the learned Counsel for the appellant was that of limitation. 5. Learned Counsel for both the parties were at one before this Court that the appropriate Article applicable to the instant case would be Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963) (hereinafter referred to as the Limitation Act). This is a residuary Article and it provides that any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule may be instituted within three years from the date when the right to sue accrues. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, the right to sue accrued to the plaintiff-appellant on 27-7-1961 when he was discharged from his service by the District Magistrate, Saharsa. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in Sita Ram Gael V/s. The Municipal Board, Kanpur and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 1936. The contention of Mr. Tara Kant Jha, learned Counsel for the appellant, however, was that in view of the provision of appeal and those in the nature of revision, as contemplated in Rule 12 of the 1935 Rules, the period of three years should be computed from 19-12-1965 when the order dated 5-8-1965 of the State Government rejecting the memorial of the plaintiff-appellant was communicated to him. It is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Tara Kant Jha, The case before the Supreme Court involved the interpretation of Sec. 58(1) of U. P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916). The appellant before the Supreme Court was appointed as an Overseer by the Municipal Board, Kanpur, with the approval of the Superintending Engineer, Public Health Department, Lucknow. It is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Tara Kant Jha, The case before the Supreme Court involved the interpretation of Sec. 58(1) of U. P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916). The appellant before the Supreme Court was appointed as an Overseer by the Municipal Board, Kanpur, with the approval of the Superintending Engineer, Public Health Department, Lucknow. He was confirmed by the Boards special resolution dated 2-7-1938, and continued in employ up to 19-3-1951, when a copy of the resolution No. 1723 passed by the Board on 5-31951, purporting to dismiss him from employ was handed over to him. This was done in pursuance of Sec. 58(1) of the said Act, which provided that a board may punish, dismiss or remove its Executive Officer by a special resolution supported by not less than 2/3rd members constituting the board, subject to his right of appeal to the State Government within 30 days of the communication to him of the order of punishment or dismissal. 6. Against the said resolution dated 5-3-1951 the appellant filed an appeal to the Uttar Pradesh Government on 7-4-1951, but was informed by a G. O. dated 7-4-1952 that his appeal had been rejected, which information was received by the appellant on 8-4-1952. Thereafter on 8-12-1952, the appellant filed the suit for a declaration that the order of his dismissal was ultra vires, illegal, and void and claimed a total amount of Rs. 10,951 in respect of damages, allowances for doing officiating work, bonus, arrears of salary and provident fund. The suit was contested primarily on the ground of limitation. Though the trial Court recorded a finding that the order of dismissal of the appellant was ultra vires on the ground that he was not given an opportunity of being personally heard by the Board, the suit was dismissed on the ground of its being barred by limitation. The matter was brought to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad where the finding of the trial Court on the point of limitation was affirmed and it is in these circumstances that by a special leave the matter was taken to the Supreme Court. 7. The matter was brought to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad where the finding of the trial Court on the point of limitation was affirmed and it is in these circumstances that by a special leave the matter was taken to the Supreme Court. 7. Sub-section (3) of Sec.326 of the said Act provided that no action such as is described in Sub-section (1) of that section shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. The suit filed by the appellant before the Supreme Court was time barred unless it could be said that the cause of action accrued on 8-4-1952 when the order dismissing the appeal was communicated to him by the Government. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the right of appeal given to the appellant did not however involve the consequence that the order of dismissal could not be operative by its own force but would continue in abeyance until the decision of the appeal, once an appeal was filed by the employee so that it could be said that the cause of action arose on the communication of the dismissal in the appeal. Their Lordships further held that there was nothing in Section 58(1) which could lead to such a conclusion. That section only gave him a right to appeal to the Government but did not prevent him from filing a suit straightway challenging the validity of the resolution on any of the grounds available to him in law such as the non-observance of the principles of natural justice. In such a suit no question of the Court not giving relief on the ground of his failure to pursue another remedy would arise as in the case of writ proceedings. Nor did the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Sec. 58, which gave the Government power to keep the servant under suspension pending appeal lead to the consequence of holding that the filing of appeal operated to suspend the order of dismissal till the decision in the appeal. The result was that the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed. 8. Mr. The result was that the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed. 8. Mr. Tara Kant Jha submitted that the facts of the instant case were different from those before the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram Goel V/s. The Municipal Board, Kanpur and Ors. (supra), inasmuch as no relief was claimed in the letter case about reinstatement, the amount of claim being limited only to damages. As mentioned above, an amount of Rs. 10,951 was claimed by the appellant in Sita Ram Goels case in respect of damages, allowances arrears of salary etc. consequent upon a declaration that the order of dismissal was ultra vires, illegal and void. In substance and in effect the relief sought for in the instant case is similar, although reinstatement has been claimed consequent upon the declaration that the dismissal is wrong and ultra vires. Be that as it may, the provisions of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the said decision would equally apply to the instant case. An appeal was provided under the U. P. Municipalities Act in the same way as provided in the 1935 Rules. The Member, Board of Revenue disposed of the appeal on 24-3-1964. The suit of the plaintiff before this Court would be hit by the bar of limitation even if the acctual of the cause of action can be said to have extended to 24-3-1964. The powers conferred on the State Government or the Heads of Department, as the case may be, as envisaged in Rule 12 of the 1935 Rules, are in the nature of the supervisory or revisional powers. Being discretionary in nature, it entitled the authorities to call for the records of the departmental proceedings and reverse or alter the order passed by a subordinate authority in appropriate circumstances. Such discretionery powers as envisaged in Rule 12 of the 1935 Rules cannot be equated with the right of appeal, as envisaged in the earlier provision of the 1935 Rules. If, therefore, a discharged or dismissed employee hesitates from going to the Civil Court for reasons of his own and avails of the discretionery remedies to the authorities in the shape of Rule 12 of the 1935 Rules, he must do so at his own risk and peril and subject to legal consequences. If, therefore, a discharged or dismissed employee hesitates from going to the Civil Court for reasons of his own and avails of the discretionery remedies to the authorities in the shape of Rule 12 of the 1935 Rules, he must do so at his own risk and peril and subject to legal consequences. In view of the language in which the provisions of Rule 12 of the 1933 Rules are couched it can by no stretch of imagination be said that it was the intention of rule framing authority to lay down that the order of discharge passed by the dismissing authoricy or the appellate authority was not to become operative till the plaintiff exhausted the remedies available under Rule 12 of the 1935 Rules. The plaintiff appellant having failed to file the instant suit within three years of 27-7-1961, or even 24-3-1964, it has to be found that the bar of limitation as provided in Sec.113 of the Limitation Act shall apply and the suit would be barred by Limitation. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the discharge of the appellant having been made under a particular statute which provided elaborate remedy, the general provision of limitation laid down in the Act should be subject to the provision of the particular statute which would enable the plaintiff-appellant to count the period of limitation of three years from 19-12-1965, when the order of the State Government rejecting his memorial was communicated to him. I fail to appreciate this argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant. It is one thing that when a special statute provides a limitation, it has to prevail over the period of limitation provided in a general statute; but if no limitation is provided in the special statute, the provisions in the general statute have to be applied with all the rigours that are attached to the same. Question is what would be the meaning of the term "when the right to sue accrues" as mentioned in Article 113 of the Limitation Act, obviously, it would mean the date when the appellant is discharged from his service. In appropriate circumstances it might be said that the right to sue accrues when the appeals provided in the statute, which are in the nature of right to appeal, are exhausted. In appropriate circumstances it might be said that the right to sue accrues when the appeals provided in the statute, which are in the nature of right to appeal, are exhausted. This however does not help the appellant in the instant case as on his own showing the last appellate authority, namely, the Member, Board of Revenue, disposed of his appeal on 24-3-1964 and the suit filed by the plaintiff is much beyond three years from that date. 10. Mr. Tara Kant Jha raised yet another contention namely, that the appellant challenged before the Civil Court not only the order of the Collector dated 27-7-1961 but also the subsequent orders which confirm the orders passed by the Collector, Saharsa. Had there been a provision that the period of limitation would run from the date, the appeal or the appeals are disposed of, the position would have been different but in a case of the nature with which we are concerned, the prime question is as to when the right to sue accrued to the appellant. According to the plaintiff his dismissal was wrong. He claimed reinstatement with full back wages obviously with effect from 27-7-1961. This shows that the date of accrual of the cause of action was 27-7-1961 and it was so treated by the appellant and the period of three years would be counted therefrom. Even assuming that the cause of action shall stand extended to 24-3-1964, when the appeal was disposed of, the suit shall still be hit by limitation. The appellant cannot be allowed to escape the mischief of the bar of limitation by challenging the orders passed by the State Government on his memorial submitted to them. Thus, the suit has rightly been held to be barred by limitation by the two Courts below. 11. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs and the parties shall bear their own costs of this second appeal.