JUDGMENT G. Viswanatha Iyer, J. 1. Defendants in a suit for damages on account of destruction of the plaintiff's workshop and the articles therein by a fire spreading from a burning petrol lorry belonging to the second defendant, have filed these appeals. The trial court found that the fire was occasioned and spread on account of the negligence of the defendants. A decree for compensation amounting to Rs. 31,892.63 was granted to the plaintiff against all the defendants, the first defendant being the suppliers of petroleum, the fourth defendant being the licensee under the first defendant, the second defendant being the lorry owner and the third defendant the General Insurance Company, the insurer of the petrol tank lorry. On 20th January 1973 at about 7 a.m. the lorry filled with petrol reached the fourth defendant's pump premises at Thana near Cannanore. Under the terms of transport agreement the lorry driver has to connect the hose to the truck at the discharge point and open the valves on the truck to decant the petrol into the underground tank through the hose. Under the agree?ent entered into between the first and fourth defendant the property in the petrol product will pass to the fourth defendant at the time of the delivery of the product to the dealer. Under the Petroleum rules which have to be observed both by the transporting agency and the fourth defendant the decanting has to be supervised under the supervision of experienced responsible agent or supervisor. A few minutes after the hose was connected to the underground tank and the decanting of the petrol commenced, fire was noticed near the delivery end of the hose. The driver of the lorry, who after opening the valve of the lorry, had gone to wash his face noticed this fire from a distance. The cleaner who was by the side of the lorry pulled out the hose from the underground tank and though an attempt was made by the lorry driver to close the valve he could not succeed as by the time the fire has blazed and reached the valve. Immediately the driver rushed into his seat and drove the lorry out of the premises for about 50 feet. But by that time the flame had spread to his seat. So he left the vehicle there and ran for his life. Immediately the driver rushed into his seat and drove the lorry out of the premises for about 50 feet. But by that time the flame had spread to his seat. So he left the vehicle there and ran for his life. The flame raged high for four or five hours before it could be extinguished. 20 feet away from the spot where the burning lorry was parked was the plaintiff's workshop. From the lorry the fire spread to the workshop, reduced it to ashes and the articles in the workshop were all destroyed. According to the plaintiff it was on account of the negligence of defendants 1, 2 and 4 that the fire started and spread to the plaintiff's workshop. This incident was not denied by any of the defendant's. Each defendant's attempt was to put the blame on the other. No doubt the second defendant had also put forward a plea of force majeure. The first defendant contended that it had engaged an independent contractor, the second defendant to transport from their storage tank to the fourth defendant's pump. Hence it disclaimed liability for negligence, if any, of the second defendant. The second defendant contended that ' fire must have occurred by somebody throwing a lighted beedi or cigarette and hence he is not liable for the starting of the fire and that he made every attempt to save the petrol pump from fire and the damage that may have been caused to the plaintiff by the fire spreading to his workshop is an accident over which he has no control and therefore he is not liable. The fourth defendant contended that there was no negligence on his part. The damage occurred to the plaintiff because a burning lorry was removed from the premises to the nearby plaintiff's workshop by the second defendant's driver and the claim of compensation from him for damages is too remote. It cannot be said to be a direct consequence of the starting of the fire in his pump site. The lower court has found that defendants 2 and 4 were negligent and the first defendant cannot escape liability on the plea that they have engaged an independent contractor. It is also liable for the negligence of defendants 2 and 4. Consequently a decree was granted to the plaintiff to realise Rs. 31,892.63. The lower court has found that defendants 2 and 4 were negligent and the first defendant cannot escape liability on the plea that they have engaged an independent contractor. It is also liable for the negligence of defendants 2 and 4. Consequently a decree was granted to the plaintiff to realise Rs. 31,892.63. How far this is correct is the question that has to be decided in these appeals. 2. We have first to see whether there is any evidence regarding the cause of the fire. That it started at the delivery end of the hose, is sworn to by the driver examined as D.W. 3. How it started or the cause for it is something within the peculiar knowledge of the fourth defendant the licensee of the petrol pump and second defendant's employees, namely the driver and the cleaner. At the spot of decantation when the fire broke out, neither the driver of the lorry nor the fourth defendant or his responsible agent was present. According to the driver after connecting the hose to the underground tank he moved out to wash his face at a water tap little away. The fourth defendant's salesman examined as D.W. 6 says that after opening the mouth of the underground tank and attaching the hose to it he went to the office and saw the fire only later. The cleaner who was at the soot is not examined in the case. The driver on noticing the fire from the place where he was washing his face, rushed to the lorry and tried to close the valves to stop the flow of petrol from the tank into the hose. He further says that the cleaner pulled out the hose from the opening of the underground tank and in that process got his legs or limbs burnt. D.W. 6 swears that he rushed to the spot and closed the lid of the opening of the underground tank. Though D.W. 3 and D.W. 6 would state that the fire must have broken out on account of somebody lighting a match or throwing a lighted cigarette or beedi that is only their guess work. The cleaner would have been in a position to state how the fire started. As said earlier he is not examined. So the fact remains that there is no clear evidence to make out how the fire started. The cleaner would have been in a position to state how the fire started. As said earlier he is not examined. So the fact remains that there is no clear evidence to make out how the fire started. Because the fire broke out in the premises taken on license by the fourth defendant during the process of decantation it is for him and the second defendant to establish the cause of the fire and what precautionary steps they took under the Petroleum Act and the Rules and what steps they took to extinguish the fire. The Petroleum Rules contain provisions regarding precautions to be taken for transport of dangerous petroleum and also precautions to be taken at the time of filling and decanting petrol. We will examine those provisions at this stage. 3. Rule 63 of the Petroleum Rules provides that no fire or other artificial light capable of igniting inflamable vapour shall be allowed on any vehicle containing petroleum in bulk. No person shall smoke while on or attending such a vehicle. No article or substance capable of causing fire or explosion shall be carried on such a vehicle. Rule 64 provides that lorries transporting petroleum shall only be filled or discharged by means of metal pipes or armoured hose in which the armouring is electrically continuous throughout. Tanks containing dangerous petroleum shall not be filled or discharged at any place where the lorry is exposed to sparks. Rule 65 provides that adequate supply of dry sand or other efficient means of extinguishing fire shall be carried in an easily accessible position on every vehicle transporting petroleum in bulk by road. Rule 67 provides that every vehicle while engaged in the transport of petroleum by road shall be constantly attended by at least one person. Rule 72 provides that the owner of a vehicle used for the transport of petroleum who employs any person in connection with such transport shall be responsible that all necessary measures are taken to ensure that such person is acquainted with and carries out the provisions of the rules correctly. Rules 91 and 92 provides that precautions against fire, shall be taken in places where petroleum is stored. Smoking of any kind is prohibited in any installation or storage shed. Even carrying matches or fuses or other- production of ignition is prohibited while a person is working in an installation or storage shed. Rules 91 and 92 provides that precautions against fire, shall be taken in places where petroleum is stored. Smoking of any kind is prohibited in any installation or storage shed. Even carrying matches or fuses or other- production of ignition is prohibited while a person is working in an installation or storage shed. An adequate supply or dry sand or earth together with the necessary implements for its convenient application or other efficient means of extinguishing petroleum fires should be kept in every installation and in or adjacent to every storage shed. All operations within an installation or storage shed shall be conducted under the supervision of an experienced responsible agent or supervisor. 4. These precautions are intended not only to see that no fire starts either in the vehicle or in the place where petroleum is stored, but also for extinguishing the fire if it starts. None of the witnesses examined on behalf of the second respondent or the fourth respondent speak about having taken any of these precautions. Assuming that the fire started on account of reasons beyond the control of defendants 2 and 4 they have to see that the fire is extinguished and it is not allowed to spread. It is for that, fire extinguishers are required to be provided for both in the vehicle and in the storing place. Neither D.W. 3 nor D.W. 6 state that they operated or made use of or applied these extinguishers to extinguish the fire. It follows that this is a case where defendants 2 and 4 have failed to prove that they have performed their duty required of them in a situation like the one that happened when decanting the petrol. Therefore the doctrine res ipsa loquitur applies to the facts of this case. The scope of the doctrine has been detailed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. We will refer to a few of them. In State of Punjab v. M/s Modern Cultivators A.I.R 1965 S.C. 17 Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, observed thus at para 18: "It is not a principle which dispenses with proof of negligence. Rather it shifts onus from one party to another. It is a rule of evidence and not of liability. A too ready reliance on the maxim reinforce a fault liability and make it into an absolute liability. Rather it shifts onus from one party to another. It is a rule of evidence and not of liability. A too ready reliance on the maxim reinforce a fault liability and make it into an absolute liability. If absolute liability is to give way to fault liability, some fault must be established by evidence or must be capable of being reasonably inferred from the circumstances. It is not sufficient to say res ipsa loquitur because the danger is that facts may not always tell the whole story and if there is something withheld how can the thing be said to speak for itself? The principle which I consider reasonable to apply where fault has to be inferred from circumstances was best stated by Lord Porter and I respectfully adopt it. Speaking of res ipsa loquitur it was observed by Lord Porter in 1950-1 All ER 392 at pp. 394, 395 "The doctrine is independent on the absence of explanation, and, although it is the duty of the defendants, if they desire to protect themselves, to give an adequate explanation of the cause of the accident, yet, if the facts are sufficiently known, the question ceases to be one where the facts speak for themselves, and the solution is to be found by determining whether, on the facts as established, negligence is to be inferred or not." Again in Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1848 the scope of rule has further been explained. According to these decisions the doctrine res ipsa loquitur cannot be indiscriminately applied in situations where all the facts are not known. They will have application only if all the facts are known and there is no explanation from the defendants as regards their part in the incident. Here as stated earlier there is no explanation as to how the fire occurred, and what steps they took to extinguish it are not stated by defendants 2 and 4 and therefore it is a case where the burden is not discharged by them. Consequently the fault must be attributed to defandants 2 and 4. 5. The next argument of the fourth defendant "one of the appellants is that the damage claimed by the plaintiff is very remote and cannot be said to be occasioned by his negligence. Consequently the fault must be attributed to defandants 2 and 4. 5. The next argument of the fourth defendant "one of the appellants is that the damage claimed by the plaintiff is very remote and cannot be said to be occasioned by his negligence. Put it differently the argument is that the damage to the plaintiff's workshop is not the direct result of the negligence of the fourth defendant. It was only because the lorry driver removed the lorry from the pump site and put it near the plaintiff's workshop, the fire spread and destroyed the workshop of the plaintiff. This, it is argued, cannot be attributed to the negligence of the fourth defendant. How far this contention of the fourth defendant is sustainable has to be considered. The consideration of the aspect of this case calls for the statement of the nature of the duty and the foreseeability of the consequence by the fourth defendant. This is commonly known as the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1865) 3 H and C 774 The classic statement of the doctrine is "We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." This principle is controlled by the following observations in the same case which reads as follows: "He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to' the plaintiff's default; or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists here it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient." This principle has been worked out in detail in later decisions and applied not only to things which are likely to cause mischief but to variety of other things like fire, gas and explosion which are characterised as dangerous things. With regard to fire the criterion of liability is this: Did the defendants bring things likely to catch fire and keep them there in such a condition that if there is such a fire the fire would be likely to spread to the plaintiff's land he is liable. With regard to fire the criterion of liability is this: Did the defendants bring things likely to catch fire and keep them there in such a condition that if there is such a fire the fire would be likely to spread to the plaintiff's land he is liable. See Mason v. Levy Auto Parts of England Ltd. (1967) 2 Q. B. 530. With this qualification liability is the same as the liablility in Rylands v. Fletcher (1865) 3 H and C. 774. 6. As shown above the defendants have a duty to take all precautions required of them under the law when they bring in dangerous things like inflammable petrol. They have failed to show that they discharged their duty in this regard. So this is a case where the liability fastens upon them and it can be based on both negligence and nuisance. 7. The argument of the fourth-defendant-appellant is that the damage to the plaintiff is not the direct result or natural consequence of his negligence and so he is not liable. According to the appellant his breach of duty to take precautions has given no more than an occasion for an independent act of the driver and that act being the immediate cause for the plaintiff's damage he is not liable. First of all it cannot be said that the act of the second defendant's driver was entirely independent. In a desperate situation in which he was, he wanted to save the petrol bunk from any damage and that will be the natural impulse of any reasonable man. Secondly the fourth defendant should have foreseen these things. 8. To what extent foreseeability should go is the question? It is true that no defendant is responsible ad infinitum for "all the consequences of his wrongful conduct however remote in time and however indirect the process of causation." The law must necessarily draw a line beyond which everything that follows from a wrongful act cannot be compensated. But in view of the diverse circumstances under which damages are seen caused in the modern society the old concept of making the defendant liable only for the immediate conseqnence of his negligence has undergone a change. Now there are two competing views of the test of remoteness of consequence. According to the first the consequences are too remote if a reasonable man would not have foreseen them. Now there are two competing views of the test of remoteness of consequence. According to the first the consequences are too remote if a reasonable man would not have foreseen them. According to the second if a reasonable man would have foreseen a damage as likely to result from the act, then he is liable for all the direct consequences suffered by the plaintiff, whether a reasonable man would have foreseen them or not. Professor Winfield in his treatise on the law of Torts has discussed these two competing views with reference to decided cases and also traced the course the two concepts have travelled and how earlier the second view overtook the first one and how the first one is trying now to show an upper hand. According to him the second view can be stated thus: "The reasonal foresight is relevant to the question 'Was there any legal duty owned by the defendant to the plaintiff to take care'? It is irrelevant to the question, If the defendant broke a legal duty, was the consequence of this breach too remote'? What ought to have been reasonably contemplated, goes to culpability, not to compensation'." (See page 116 of Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 11th Edition). The leading case on the second view is In re Polemis (1921) 3 K.B. 560. In that case a charterer and a ship owner were under the charter excepted from liability for fire. During the voyage the benzine in tins loaded in the ship leaked and there was a good deal of vapour. At a port of call the servants of the charterer negligently let a plank drop into the hold while they were shifting the cargo. A rush of flames at once followed and the ship was totally destroyed. The fire exception clause did not contain an express statement that it covered negligence on the part of the servants. ' As the fall of the plank was due to the servants for whom the charterers were responsible the latter was held liable for all the direct consequences of the negligence even though they could not have been reasonably anticipated. This is the law in India also. In Indian General Navigation and Railway Co. Ltd. v. The Eastern Assam Co. Ltd. (1921) 611 I.C.14. This is the law in India also. In Indian General Navigation and Railway Co. Ltd. v. The Eastern Assam Co. Ltd. (1921) 611 I.C.14. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J., has stated the principle thus at page 26: "It is well settled that negligence is the effective cause of an injury when it has in fact brought about that injury as a direct and natural consequence; when negligence has been established, liability follows for all the consequences which are in fact the direct and natural outcome of it, whether the injury is a consequence that was foreseen or not". At page 17 His Lordship further observed: "The second test is open to the serious objection that the precise form of injury cannot generally be foreseen. The second test has consequently, been explained to signify, not that the particular result should have been foreseen, but that the wrong doer might, by the exercise of ordinary care have foreseen some injury might result from his negligence." This statement of the law accords with fairness and commonsense. If one is negligent and there is a breach of duty to take care and injury results, it is no answer to say that the particular injury caused could not be foreseen. It is important to observe that a negligent act may be the effective cause of an injury though it may not be proximate in point of time; if it is the particular incident in a chain of events, which has lead to the injury, one cannot escape from liability. 9. This concept of liability for negligence is now slowly changing and giving place to a narrower concept in England and two leading cases decided by the Privy Council suggest that. The first case is Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Mortis Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd. (1961) A.C. 388 commonly known as Wagon Mound No. 1 case where the Judicial Committee had occasion to examine the concept of liability over again. In that case a ship called Wagon Mound has chartered by the Overseas Tankship Co. The ship was engaged for transporting fuel oil It was moored at an Oil Co.'s Wharf in Sydney Harbour for the purpose of taking on fuel oil. In that case a ship called Wagon Mound has chartered by the Overseas Tankship Co. The ship was engaged for transporting fuel oil It was moored at an Oil Co.'s Wharf in Sydney Harbour for the purpose of taking on fuel oil. By the carelessness of the charterer's servants large quantity of fuel oil was spilt on to the water and after few hours this had spread to another Wharf belonging to Mortis Dock and Engineering Company 600 feet away. In the latter wharf another ship by name Corrinal was under repair. Welding operations were being carried out on that ship. The Manager of the Mortis Dock Co. became aware of the presence of the oil in the water. So he stopped welding operations and enquired of the Oil Co.'s wharf whether the operations can be safely continued. The result of this enquiry coupled with his own belief as to the non-inflammability of the fuel oil in the open, led him give instructions to the welding operations to continue though with all precautions to prevent inflammable material from falling into the oil. Two days later the oil caught fire and extensive damage was done to the Mortis Dock Engineer's Wharf. The finding of the court was that (1) it was unforeseeable that fuel oil spread on the water would catch fire and (2) some unforeseeable damage was caused to Mortis Docks Wharf from the spillage of the oil in that the oil has got into the spilways and interfered with their use. The case was dealt with on the footing that there was a breach of duty but that the damage caused was unforeseeable. The Supreme Court of North South Wales followed the Re Polemis case and held that the Overseas Tankship Co., liable. But the Privy Council reversed their decision and held that Re Polemis case can no longer be regarded as good law. According to them "It is the foresight of the reasonable man which alone can determine responsibility". In a later case Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship Co. P. and Y. Ltd. (1966) 2 All. E.R. 709 called the Wagon Mound No. 2 the matter was reagitated in a different form. The plaintiffs here were the owners of two ships which were severely damaged by the same fire which caused damage to the plaintiff in Wagon Mound No. 1. P. and Y. Ltd. (1966) 2 All. E.R. 709 called the Wagon Mound No. 2 the matter was reagitated in a different form. The plaintiffs here were the owners of two ships which were severely damaged by the same fire which caused damage to the plaintiff in Wagon Mound No. 1. The action was brought alternatively for negligence and in nuisance. The trial judge found that the careless spillage of oil on waters created public nuisance, that the plaintiff have suffered special damage by fire and as such they have a cause of action against the defendants. But since the liability in nuisance did not depend upon the fore-seeability the plaintiffs were given a decree for the damages sustained by them. The case on the footing of negligence was found against on the basis of the decision in Wagon Mound No. 1. On appeal to the Privy Council their Lordships held that the foreseeability is as much an essential element in determining liability for nuisance of the class to which the case before them' related as it is in negligence and that in order to justify recovery it was not sufficient that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was the direct result of the nuisance if that injury was in the relevant sense unforeseeable. On this conclusion the appeal by the defendants was allowed, but the appeal by the plaintiffs was also allowed on the ground that the defendants could have reasonably foreseen the consequence of damage to the plaintiff owing to their negligence. 10. There is scope for difference of opinion of this court and hence it is unnecessary for us to go into this point in detail, According to us even at present, any curtailment of the liability stated by Sir Asutosh Mukherjee, J. in Indian General Navigation and Railway Co. Ltd. v. The Eastern Assam Co. Ltd. (6) is not called for. There is no unfairness in it. So the fourth defendant cannot escape liability on the ground that the injury to the plaintiff could not be foreseen. 11. Next we have to consider to what extent by the intervening act of the driver in removing the lorry from the pump premises and leaving it 20 feet away from the plaintiff's workshop, the responsibility of the fourth defendant remains or continues. 11. Next we have to consider to what extent by the intervening act of the driver in removing the lorry from the pump premises and leaving it 20 feet away from the plaintiff's workshop, the responsibility of the fourth defendant remains or continues. In other words the question is whether despite the intervening act of the driver, the fourth defendant can be made answerable to the plaintiff's damage. The principle that applies is this: The result which the intervening act brought about and which the defendant's act or default alone would not have otherwise produced is within the risk created by him. The intervening act is the normal incident of the risk created by the negligence. The conduct of the driver was most reasonable. If the burning lorry was not removed the fourth defendant's petrol pump would have been destroyed by the fire. So his normal reaction was to avert it and so he attempted to take the lorry to an open space but could not proceed beyond 50 feet and as a result the fire from the lorry spread to the plaintiff's workshop and destroyed it. The normal human conduct exhibited by the driver is in the circumstances within the risk created by the negligence of the fourth defendant and also by the driver. So both cannot escape liability to compensate the plaintiff's damage. The second defendant is responsible for the negligence of his driver and so he also Cannot escape liability. The third defendant is the insurer of the lorry. The insurance is an all-comprehensive one for Ks. 75,000. The Insurance Company has a case that more than Rs. 60,000 had been paid to the second defendant towards this policy amount. The correctness of it has not been considered by the trial court. We only hold that the third defendant's liability is limited to the insurance amount minus the sum already paid to anybody else under the policy. This will be ascertained in execution before the third defendant is called upon to pay any amount under the decree. 12. Then remains the consideration of the point raised by the first defendant-appellant. Its case is that it has engaged an independent contractor, the second defendant, to transport the petroleum and for the latter's negligence, it cannot be made liable. This contention cannot stand. 12. Then remains the consideration of the point raised by the first defendant-appellant. Its case is that it has engaged an independent contractor, the second defendant, to transport the petroleum and for the latter's negligence, it cannot be made liable. This contention cannot stand. The duty cart upon the first defendant to take all precautions in arranging filling, transporting and discharging inflammable petroleum, is non-delegable. His duty is to provide that care is taken in the above matters. It is no defence for him to say that he has delegated the task to an independent contractor if the latter failed to fulfil his duties. The work which the first defendant has entrusted to the second defendant under Ext. B-1 agreement is an extra-hasardous act that is, acts which in their very nature involve in the eye of law special damages to others. He cannot escape liability by delegating the performance to an independent contractor. He has not merely a duty to take care but a duty to provide that care is taken see Honeywill and Stain Ltd. v. Larkin Bros. Ltd. (1934) 1 K. B. 191. It follows the first defendant was also rightly held responsible to compensate the plaintiff. 13. In these appeals there is no dispute regarding the quantum of damages assessed by the lower court. Hence all the defendants have been rightly made liable by the lower court. In the result subject to a modification that the third defendant, Insurance Company, is liable only to the extent of the policy amount minus the amount if any already paid by the third defendant towards the risks covered by the policy, the decree of the trial court is confirmed and all the appeals are dismissed with costs.