Judgment R.S. Singh, J. 1. THIS writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 4-12-1979 dismissing the petitioners' revision. 2. THE facts of the case, in brief, are that after the finalisation of the allotment of chak proceedings and putting the chak-holders in possession over their respective chaks an application was moved on 10-7-1979 by respondent no. 3 on the allegation that in front of his house the petitioners have got their chak no. 243 which was carved out on plot nos. 394, 395 and 396 etc. According to respondent no. 3 at the time of allotment the Assistant Consolidation Officer provided a public pathway from north to south on the eastern side on plot no. 394 etc., chak no. 243, but the same has been demolished by the petitioners. Therefore, it was prayed that public pathway be restored and if possible a fresh general public pathway be provided on the eastern side of chak no. 243 in the interest of the villagers and the petitioners may be compensated with the Gaon Sabha land which will be in the interest of general public. An objection was filed on behalf of the petitioners contesting the aforesaid application on several grounds including that the application is not maintainable at this stage and that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to provide a public pathway. By another application one more ground was alleged that the application was highly belated. The Consolidation Officer considered the application of respondent no. 3 and the objection of the petitioners and came to the conclusion that the public pathway, chakroad or nali in public interest can be provided at any stage on the claim of any tenure-holder. The Consolidation Officer after overruling the objection of the petitioners directed the Assistant Consolidation Officer to make local inspection and to report about the necessity and justification for providing a public pathway. Against the order of the Consolidation Officer the petitioners preferred a revision which was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid orders of the Consolidation authorities before this Court in this writ petition. 3. THE main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent no. 3 had made an application for providing a private pathway for him for going from his house to his cattle-shed. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid orders of the Consolidation authorities before this Court in this writ petition. 3. THE main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent no. 3 had made an application for providing a private pathway for him for going from his house to his cattle-shed. According to him such an application after the finalisation of the chak proceedings was not maintainable as it was highly belated and the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to consider the same. He in support of his contention has relied on a decision reported in Sri pat v. Haridwar, 1980 AWC 146. 4. IT has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the application for providing a public pathway which was moved on behalf of respondent no. 3 was for a public pathway and not for a private pathway. IT was further contended by the learned counsel that the consolidation authorities had jurisdiction to entertain such an application at any stage to provide a public pathway in public interest. In support of his contentions he relied upon the decisions reported in Rajpati Tewari v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, CMW No. 8605 of 1978 D/- 28-2-1980 (Alld.) and Smt. Lal Dei v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, CMW No. 7996 of 1979 D/- 20-8-1980 (Alld.) I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. In the case of Sripat v. Haridwar (Supra) it was held that no provision has been pointed out under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act or the rules framed thereunder for providing a rasta or nali to any private tonure-holder. Therefore one of the disputes between the parties appears to be as to whether the application of respondent no. 3 was for providing a public pathway or for a private rasta and the other dispute is as to whether the application for providing a rasta after the finalisation of the allotment of chak proceedings is maintainable and the consolidation authorities have jurisdiction to provide a rasta at this stage. From the perusal of the application of respondent no. 3 dated 10-7-1979 it does not appear that respondent no. 3 has claimed a rasta in his own interest and from the allegations and the prayer made in this application it is quite clear that public pathway has been claimed In the interest of the village people. From the perusal of the application of respondent no. 3 dated 10-7-1979 it does not appear that respondent no. 3 has claimed a rasta in his own interest and from the allegations and the prayer made in this application it is quite clear that public pathway has been claimed In the interest of the village people. The Consolidation Officer has rightly treated this application for providing a public rasta as is clear from the perusal of his judgment. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the application of respondent no. 3 was for providing a private pathway does not appear to be correct. In this view of the matter the decision relied upon by the petitioners and reported in Sripat v. Harldwar (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case as it deals with a case of a private pathway. 5. IN Rajpatl Tewart v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra) it has been held that "IN my opinion it is a necessary power in the consolidation authorities to provide path, road etc. to a tenure-holder with a view to carry out the purposes of the Act". IN Smt. Lal Del v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra) this Court dealing with a case of providing a public rasta upheld the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation to that effect. 6. IN view of the aforesaid discussions it cannot be said that in this case the view taken by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is erroneous. Therefore, the writ petition has no force and is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.