JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– The petitioner is the occupier of a two storied building and the land at premises No.2, Dover Lane, Calcutta-700029 (hereinafter referred to as the said premises). The recorded owner of the said premises at all material times, was one Dr. Jogeswar Srimany and the petitioner became the occupier of the same after the former occupier, the Garrison Engineer, to whom the said premises was let out, had left. It has been stated by the petitioner that after the death of the erstwhile owner, Dr. Jogeswar Srimany, he has been paying rents to the estate of the said deceased. The petitioner has also stated how and in what manner he came to possess the said premises. It was also the case of the petitioner that the Respondent No.5, Birendra Nath Mohanty, was occupying a room in the said premises, with his permission and excepting that room, the whole of the said premises, was in his possession. It should be noted that the Rule, for non-compliance with the Court's order dated 29th January 1981, has been discharged against the said Respondent No.5. 2. It was the further case of the petitioner that although the Garrison Engineer had already left the said premises and this fact was known to all the authorities concerned, an order under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said 1971 Act), was issued to the said Respondent No.5, requiring him to vacate the portions of the said premises, as in his possession, within a stipulated time. The said Respondent No.5 took no steps against such proceedings, but the petitioner, who was not a party to the same, preferred an appeal under section 7 of the said 1971 Act. Such appeal was admitted, considering the existing interest of the petitioner in the said premises. The said Appeal was P. P. Act Appeal No.6 of 1975. 3. The said Respondent No.5 took no steps against such proceedings, but the petitioner, who was not a party to the same, preferred an appeal under section 7 of the said 1971 Act. Such appeal was admitted, considering the existing interest of the petitioner in the said premises. The said Appeal was P. P. Act Appeal No.6 of 1975. 3. It has been stated that during the pendency of the appeal and on the basis of the order passed thereon, when admittedly the petitioner was in possession of the said premises excepting the portion, which was occupied by the Respondent No.5, the impugned notice under the provisions of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), and more particularly under section 3(1) of the same, was issued by the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, Respondent No.2 on 2nd September 1975, stating that the Additional Land Acquisition Collector, Respondent No.3, had taken possession of the said premises on 3rd September 1975 and made over such possession to Respondent No.5. This act or action, the petitioner has stated, was done or taken, without serving the said order or any notice on the owner or on him, as the recorded occupier and as such, it has been claimed that there has been non-compliance with the said Act or the Rules as framed thereunder, which in their turn also made the proceeding void and irregular, but vitiated the same also, apart from the fact, that the entire proceeding, for such inaction should be considered as mala fide and taken in colourable use and exercise of power. It was also the further case of the petitioner that the purpose of requisition would not come within the meaning of the purposes as mentioned in the said Act. It was specifically contended that the purposes as mentioned, would not come within or would be covered by the words "maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community". It was also and the specific submissions of the petitioner that to set up an information-cum-reception centre, would not constitute a purpose, which would bring the requisition, within the essential prerequisites as required under the said Act and the purposes of the requisition, in this case, were not admittedly a purpose, essential to the life of the community, within the meaning of section 3(1) of the said Act. 4. 4. The said Act was incorporated, for making provisions for the requisition and speedy acquisition of land for a certain purpose and the same was incorporated as it was felt to be expedient to provide for the requisition and speedy acquisition of land for the purposes of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas, providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage and creating better living conditions in urban or rural areas by the construction or reconstruction of dwelling places in such areas or for purposes connected therewith and incidental thereto, and the expression "land", in terms of section 2(b1) would include benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth and also includes any encumbrance in relation to such land. 5. Section 3(1) of the said Act, which deals with "power to Requisition" and on the basis whereof arguments were advanced, I think should be reproduced. The same is as under:– 3(1). If the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community (or for increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas) or for providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage, or for the creation of better living conditions in rural or urban areas, not being*** an industrial or other area excluded by the State Government by a notification in this behalf by the construction or reconstruction of dwelling places*** in such areas (or for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto), the State Government may, by order in writing, requisition any land and may make such further order as appear to it to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning : Provided that no land used for the purpose of religious worship or used by an educational or charitable institution shall be requisitioned under this section. (1A) … … … (2) An order under sub-section (1) shall be served in the prescribed manner on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land in occupation (of an occupier, not being the owner of the land, also on such occupier). (1A) … … … (2) An order under sub-section (1) shall be served in the prescribed manner on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land in occupation (of an occupier, not being the owner of the land, also on such occupier). (3) If any person fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (1), the Collector or any person authorised by him in writing in this behalf shall execute the order in such manner as he considers expedient and may,–– (a) if he is a Magistrate enforce the delivery of possession of the land in respect of which the order has been made to himself, or (b) if he is not a Magistrate, apply to a Magistrate or, in Calcutta as defined in clause (II) of section 5 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, to the Commissioner of Police, and such Magistrate or Commissioner, as the case may be, shall enforce the delivery of possession of such land to him. 6. In terms of section 4(1) of the said Act, after the land is requisitioned under section 3, the State Government may use or deal with such land for any of the purposes referred to in section 3(1) as may appear to be expedient. 7. Apart from making his submissions on the basis of the infirmities as mentioned in the petition and the particulars whereof have been mentioned herein before, Mr. Basu, on a reference to the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said 1947 Act), contended that as the said 1947 Act, deals specifically with the requisition of premises and the same was a good law, not only on the date of incorporation of the said Act and still today, so the steps taken for requisition of the said premises under the said Act, was not only improper, but the same was inappropriate and void. 8. 8. The said 1947 Act was enacted to provide for the requisition and control of premises in West Bengal and under section 2(e) of the same, "Premises" means any building or part of a building or any hut or part of a hut and includes the garden, grounds and outhouses (if any) appertaining to such building or part of a building or hut or part of a hut and also includes a room or rooms in an hotel, boarding house or lodging house. 9. The original notice under section 3(1) of the said Act, has not been annexed or produced with the petition, but a certified copy of the same has been filed as an Annexure. The impugned notice was dated 2nd September 1975 and the Rule was obtained on 27th July 1976 i.e. after about 10 months and as and by way of explaining the admitted delay in moving this Court, it has been submitted that certified copies of the impugned order were applied initially on 11th November 1975 and then again on 13th November 1975 with necessary requisite stamps and folios and such certified copies were not supplied till 12th July 1976. It has been stated that this Court, could not be moved earlier than the date as mentioned above for want of the certified copies. The above statements have been made in paragraph 12 of the petition, which has been affirmed as submissions by the petitioner and the relevant dates as mentioned above cannot also be verified from the certified copy as filed as all the cages of the certified copy as filed, are blank. Thus, in my view, it is very difficult, rather it would not be safe to rely on the statements as made by the petitioner to explain the delay and that too when there has been no proper statement, on due affirmation. 10. The above fact having been pointed out to Mr. Basu, he contended that the technical plea of delay and more particularly when the same has not been taken by way of affidavit by the other side, should not be resorted to or the application should not be thrown out on that ground as admittedly; the taking of the action in the instant case under the said Act on the admitted existence of the said 1947 Act, was improper and unauthorised. 11. In support of his contentions Mr. 11. In support of his contentions Mr. Basu referred to the determinations in the case of (1) Abdul Majeed Qureshi v. Corporation of Calcutta & Ors., AIR 1967 Cal 174 . In that case, the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition, did not admittedly raise the point of delay and as such they were not allowed to urge such point, as the learned Judge felt that the question of delay being a question of fact, unless the same is appropriately pleaded, the other side would not be expected to reply to the same in their affidavit-in-reply. It has further been observed, that if such question of delay was duly pleaded, then perhaps the same would have been appropriately replied to in the affidavit-in-reply. But the facts in this case, are absolutely different. Here, the petitioner himself was aware of the delay and he has sought to explain such delay in his own pleading and as such, the Court can, in my view, even without such point being taken by the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition, took into the relevant facts and circumstances as pleaded, in purporting to explain the delay and come to its own conclusion on the point, viz. whether delay has been sufficiently or duly explained. Thus, the Calcutta decision as cited by Mr. Basu, in my view, has no application in this case. 12. Mr. Basu, then contended that the law or the rule of interpretation, being that when there was a specific Act, viz. the said 1947 Act, making provisions for requisition of premises, so the steps taken in respect of the said premises, under the said Act, was void and irregular, so even if there has been some delay, the Court should interfere and such delay would be no bar or act as an estoppel in maintaining this proceeding. In support of such submissions Mr. Basu relied firstly on the determinations in the case of (2) The Sales Tax Officer, Benaras & Ors. v. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf, AIR 1959 SC 135 . In fact, specific reference was made by Mr. Basu to the following observations :–– Whether the principle of estoppel applies or there are circumstances attendant upon the transaction which disentitle the party to recover back the monies paid by him depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. v. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf, AIR 1959 SC 135 . In fact, specific reference was made by Mr. Basu to the following observations :–– Whether the principle of estoppel applies or there are circumstances attendant upon the transaction which disentitle the party to recover back the monies paid by him depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No question of estoppel can ever arise where both the parties are labouring under the mistake of law and one party is not more to blame than the other. Estoppel arises only when the plaintiff by his acts or conduct makes a representation to the defendant of a certain state of facts which is acted upon by the defendant to his detriment; it is only then that the plaintiff is estopped from setting up a different state of facts. Even if this position can be availed of where the representation is in regard to a position in law, no such occasion arises when the mistake of law is common to both the parties. The other circumstances would be such as would entitle a Court of equity to refuse the relief claimed by the plaintiff because on the facts and circumstances of the case it would be inequitable for the Court to award the relief to the plaintiff. These are, however, equitable considerations and could scarcely be imported when there is a clear and unambiguous provision of law which entitles the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. 13. Mr. Basu then and secondly referred to the determinations in the case of (3) Bhanwarilal v. Rajasthan State & Ors., AIR 1953 Rajasthan 180, wherein it has been observed amongst others that in a case where an illegal tax is being levied, mere delay in making an application against the illegal levy should not deter the High Court from passing an order under Article 226, if it is found that the tax is being levied without any authority of law. On the basis of the citations as mentioned above, Mr. Basu wanted to establish that since the requisition under the said Act was void and illegal, in view of the existence of the provisions for requisition of premises under the said 1947 Act, which was a special Act, the action as taken, was absolutely illegal and unauthorised, so the delay in moving this Court, against such illegal act, would not be fatal. If the action as taken under the said Act was illegal, then the cases as mentioned above may help the petitioner and not otherwise. We shall thus have to find out the effect of the requisition under the said Act, in the light of the submissions as recorded hereinbefore and also on the basis of the application of the rule "Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant", which has been observed by Earl of Selbond he, in the (4) Vera Cruz case, (1884) 10 AC 59, "that now if anything be certain in this that where there are general words in a later Act, capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subject specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. "Later, in the cases of (5) R. v. Bridge, (1890) 24 QBD 609, (6) Attorney v. Exetor Corporation, (1911) 1 KB 1092 and (7) Harlow v. Minister of Transport, (1951) 2 KB 98 it has been observed that wherever Parliament in an earlier statute has directed its attention to an individual case and has made provision for it unambiguously, there arises a presumption that if in a subsequent statute, the legislature lays down a general principle, that general principle is not to be taken as meant to rip up what the Legislature had before provided for individually, unless an intention to do so is specially declared. In the words of Viscount Haldane "we are bound to apply a rule of construction, which has been repeatedly laid down and is firmly established". On the basis of the above and also on the basis of the discussions on Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant, as in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (Eleventh Edition), Mr. Basu contended, the said Act should be construed as not repealing the said 1947 Act, which was directed towards a special object or a special class of objects. It was further contended by Mr. Basu that the said Act, which was a general statute and a later law, has not abrogated the earlier special statute viz. the said 1947 Act, by mere implication. Mr. Basu also contended that since the term Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant contemplates that "where there are general words in a later Act viz. It was further contended by Mr. Basu that the said Act, which was a general statute and a later law, has not abrogated the earlier special statute viz. the said 1947 Act, by mere implication. Mr. Basu also contended that since the term Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant contemplates that "where there are general words in a later Act viz. the said Act here, capable of reasonable and sensible application, without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation viz. the said 1947 Act in this case, the Court should not hold that the earlier special Act is indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words as used, and that too without any indication of a particular intention to do so. 14. The powers of requisition under the said Act, have been quoted hereinbefore and under the provisions of the said 1947 Act and more particularly under section 3(1), such premises as defined in section 2(e) therein, can be requisitioned for "public purpose" which again has been defined in section 2(ff), as including provisions for residential accommodation for employees of the State Government, where the provision of such accommodation is, in the opinion of the State Government, necessary in the interest of public service. Thus, it cannot be doubted that the powers of requisition under the said 1947 Act, are much more restricted and limited than those under the said Act. In fact, public purpose has not been defined under the said Act and the purposes for requisition or for which power can be exercised are mentioned in section 3(1) itself. The above being the position and when the said 1947 Act makes provision for requisition of premises in a restricted way and manner, the same or the existence of the same, cannot be a bar to use the power of requisition under the wider powers under the said Act. 15. The said Act, which has been found to be intra vires, by a series of decisions of this Court, on the basis of the preamble, which lays down the purposes of incorporation, cannot be employed for purposes other than those as mentioned and deals with requisition and speedy acquisition of properties. 16. In view of the above, the arguments advanced by Mr. Basu, on the term of Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant, should fail. 16. In view of the above, the arguments advanced by Mr. Basu, on the term of Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant, should fail. I also hold that the Supreme Court and the Rajasthan High Court judgments have also no manner of application to this case, specially when, in this case, there was or has been no case or any occasion of labouring under a misconception or proceeding on the basis of a law, which was not invalid or illegal. I find that the delay in this case has not been appropriately explained and the petitioner has not also been able to establish his diligence, which is a prerequisite, for interference by the Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In fact, in the facts of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner was guilty of, laches in not explaining duly, the unreasonable delay in moving this Court. It is true that for moving an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, there is no statutory limitation prescribed, but, before exercising powers under the Article and to interfere in a case, the Court has every right to be satisfied about the diligence of the person claiming the relief. A writ of Mandamus, which has been asked for in this case amongst others, is not a writ of right. It has been observed in the Bench determinations of this Court, in the case of (8) Satya Narayan Nathani v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1957 Cal 310 , that a person invoking such special jurisdiction of this Court for the extraordinary remedy, by way of a writ is required to be diligent. That was a case under the provisions of the said 1947 Act and the requisition order under section 3(1) of the same being challenged, it was observed on the facts of that case, that the High Court would not be inclined to the assistance of a petitioner by a writ, if he comes to Court after six months of the order complained of and more particularly on the view that if a person, viz. the owner of the premises allows possession under the requisition to mature for six months, he would not be entitled to get the necessary assistance from the Court, to have such right investigated and protected. the owner of the premises allows possession under the requisition to mature for six months, he would not be entitled to get the necessary assistance from the Court, to have such right investigated and protected. The facts of this case, though not under the said 1947 Act, but under the said Act, are the same as in the Bench determination as referred to hereinbefore and as such, I hold that the bar or restriction as sought to be suggested or imposed, by such determination, would also apply in this case. Above being the position, the arguments advanced by Mr. Basu and so also the Rule, should fail. I thus discharge the Rule. There will be no order as to costs. Stay of operation of the order as prayed for, is refused.