JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been filed by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Appellant-corporation") under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as ' the Act") against the award dated August 17, 1976 given by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Judge, Jaipur City) (hereinafter referred to as the "Claims Tribunal") in Civil Misc. Case No. 39 of 1973. 2. On October 18, 1970 at about 10.30 a.m. a bus bearing No. RJZ 1524, owned by the Appellant-corporation, and driven by Jaipal Singh, Respondent No. 2, met with an accident on the Ram Bagh road, Jaipur, opposite S.M.S. Hospital near Santokba Durlabh X-ray clinic. In the said accident, the said bus hit a cycle. The cycle was being driven by Om Prakash Gupta, Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the "Respondent claimant"). As a result of the said accident the Respondent claimant suffered serious injury on his right leg, on account of which the right leg from above the knee had to be amputated. On 4th December, 1973 the Respondent claimant filed a claim before the Claims Tribunal wherein he claimed a sum of Rs. 5,25,000/- as compensation. The aforesaid compensation was claimed under three heads: Loss of wages Rs. 4,80,000/- Damages for pain and mental agony Rs. 20,000/- Expenses incurred in treatment Rs. 25,000/- 3. In the claim petition the Respondent claimant had impleaded the Appellant corporation, Shri Jaipal Singh, the driver of the bus and the Life Insurance Corporation as opposite parties. Subsequently by order of the Claims Tribunal dated 31st May, 1975 the Life Insurance Corporation was deleted from the array of parties. 4. In the claim petition the respondent claimant pleaded that at the time of the accident he was coming on bicycle towards Ajmeri Gate and was on the left side of the road and that the accident had taken place due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus by Respondent No. 2 and the Appellant-corporation, as the owner, is liable to pay the amount of compensation. 5. The Appellant-corporation contested the claim and denied that the bus was being driven rashly and negligently or at a high speed. 5. The Appellant-corporation contested the claim and denied that the bus was being driven rashly and negligently or at a high speed. On the other hand, it was pleaded that the accident took place due to the rashness and negligence of the Respondent-claimant who suddenly came on the road out of the women's hostel gate of the S.M.S. Hospital compound and that it was the Respondent-claimant who lost his balance and struck the bus although the driver had applied his brakes. The Appellant-corporation also disputed the amount of compensation claimed by the Respondent-claimant. It was further submitted on behalf of the Appellant-corporation that the claim was barred by time. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal, by its order dated 30th July, 1975, framed two issues. Issue No. 1 was as to whether the Respondent No. 2. had caused injuries to the Respondent-claimant on October 18, 1970 by rashly and negligently driving the vehicle No. RJZ 1524? Issue No. 2 was as to whether the claimant was entitled to the compensation and if so from which party. By order dated 28th November, 1975 a third issue as to whether there was sufficient cause for not presenting the claim within the prescribed period, was framed by the Claims Tribunal. 7. The Respondent-claimant, in support of his case examined 7 witnesses, including himself. The Appellant-corporation, on the other hand, examined the driver Jaipal Singh, Respondent No. 2. 8. The Claims Tribunal by its award dated 17th August, 1976 decided all the three issues in favour of the Respondent-claimant. The Claims Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the filing of the claim petition by the Respondent-claimant. The Claims Tribunal further held that the accident was caused as a result of rash and negligent driving of the bus by Respondent No. 2. As regards the compensation, the Claims Tribuual awarded a sum of Rs. 25,000/- towards loss of earning capacity and lessened future chances of promotion and for reduced capacity to work. A sum of Rs. 5,000/- has been awarded by the Claims Tribunal towards physical pain and mental agony. A sum of Rs. 3,475/- has been awarded as expenses for replacement of artificial limbs, and Rs. 2,500/- has been awarded as compensation for expenses incurred in treatment. Thus, the Claims Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 35,975/- to the Respondent claimant. 5,000/- has been awarded by the Claims Tribunal towards physical pain and mental agony. A sum of Rs. 3,475/- has been awarded as expenses for replacement of artificial limbs, and Rs. 2,500/- has been awarded as compensation for expenses incurred in treatment. Thus, the Claims Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 35,975/- to the Respondent claimant. Feeling aggrieved by the award of the Claims Tribunal the Appellant-corporation has filed this appeal. 9. The Respondent-claimant has filed cross-objections to the extent the claim for compensation has been disallowed by the Claims Tribunal. 10. At the out set it may be observed that the Appellant-corporation has impleaded the Life Insurance Corporation as a Respondent in this appeal, even though the name of the Life Insurance Corporation had been deleted from the array of the parties by order of the Claims Tribunal dated 31st May 1975. The appeal, insofar as it relates to the Life Insurance Corporation, is, therefore, not maintainable. 11. The first contention urged by Shri R.N. Munshi the learned Counsel for the Appellant-corporation, was that the claim petition filed by the Respondent claimant was filed more than three years after the accident and that it was hopelessly barred by limitation and that the Claims Tribunal has erred in condoning the delay in the filing of the claim petition. 12. Section 110-A(3) of the Act which prescribes the period of limitation for filing a claim petition provides as under: No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. 13. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that the claim petition is to be filed within a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. The proviso, however, empowers the Claims Tribunal to entertain an application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The proviso, however, empowers the Claims Tribunal to entertain an application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. There appears to be consensus amongst the various decisions interpreting provisions of Section 110-A(3) of the Act that the provisions contained in the proviso to Section 110-A(3) should be liberally construed and that the strictness with which an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is dealt with cannot be the standard by which the exercise of discretion under the proviso under Section 110-A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act has to be regulated. (See: Pijush Kami Ghosh v. Smt. Maya Rani Chatterjee, 1976 A.C.J. 464 (Guj.) ; Hemalata Devi v. Sk. Lokman, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 361 ; Krishen Lal Trikha v. Jupiter General Insurance Co., 1977 A.CJ. 339(J&K.) ; P.S. Bhatnagar v. State of Punjab, 1977 A.C.J. 213 (P&H.) . The reason behind the aforesaid principle is that the object of the Act is to provide a suitable remedy to the person who has suffered damages as a result of a motor accident and the provisions of Section 110-A(3) should be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice where no serious negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputed to the claimant. In Vasava; Hiraben v. Ishwarbharti Karsanbharti Gauswami and Anr., 1971 A.C.J. 267(Cal.) it has been observed: Courts must always bear in mind that whereas refusal to condone delay might result in injustice by a meritorious matter being thrown out without trial, condonation of delay would at the highest result in decision of the matter on merits. Furthermore, no litigant ordinarily stands to benefit by instituting a proceeding beyond time and there is no presumption that the delay has been occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or that there was want of bona fides. The presumption, if any, would be just the other way round. It is true that in Ramlal's case : 1971 A.C.J. 267(Cal.) it was held that a party seeking condonation of delay will have to show sufficient cause not only for not instituting the proceeding on the last day but also to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. The presumption, if any, would be just the other way round. It is true that in Ramlal's case : 1971 A.C.J. 267(Cal.) it was held that a party seeking condonation of delay will have to show sufficient cause not only for not instituting the proceeding on the last day but also to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. However, as pointed out in Karinis case pedantic and unromantic approach should not be made to the matter and as observed in Ramaharan's case : 1977 A.C.J. 213(P&H.), the Court need not be over strict in expecting proof of the suggested sufficient cause. It is of paramount importance that the Courts should be aware that since this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection according to justice, commonsense and sound judgment and for advancing substantial justice, all factors including the status and background of the parties, the previous history, if any, of the litigation and the conduct of the parties therein upto date, the period of and circumstances leading to the delay and the probity of the suggested cause for delay, the quality of legal assistance, guidance and advice received by the defaulting litigant are all matters which amongst others must enter into consideration and the final decision must be arrived at in the over all light of all the relevant circumstances. It is against this background that we must approach the present case. 14. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. It is, therefore, necessary to examine as to whether the Respondent-claimant has been able to establish that there was sufficient cause for his not filing the claim petition till 4th December, 1973. 15. In paragraph 14 of the claim petition, the Respondent-claimant has given his explanation for not filing the claim petition within the period of limitation prescribed and has submitted that on 18th October, 1970, the right leg of the claimant was amputated as it was necessary for the safety of his life, and, thereafter, the claimant remained under heavy bandage upto one year. The claimant has further stated that due to shortage of blood and constant mental worries he developed Tuberculosis and had to be treated in T. B Sanitarium, Vrindaban, where he remained as indoor patient for one year. The claimant has further stated that due to shortage of blood and constant mental worries he developed Tuberculosis and had to be treated in T. B Sanitarium, Vrindaban, where he remained as indoor patient for one year. Thereafter, he was taken to Ahmedabad for fixation of the artificial leg which work was completed on 23rd July, 1973, but the said artificial leg was not working properly and the claimant started standing in the artificial leg only in the second half of October, 1973. 16. In support of his aforesaid case, as set out in the claim petition, the Respondent claimant has examined himself and has deposed that immediately after the accident, he was taken to S.M.S. hospital where his right leg was amputated and that he remained in the said hospital for one month. After discharging from the hospital he went to his house at Hindaun where the wound had to be dressed for 8 to 9 months by private doctor because there was pus formation in the wound and that thereafter, so he developed Tuberculosis and he got himself treated for the same by a private doctor at Hindaun for 6 to 7 months but it could not be brought under control and then he got himself admitted as an indoor patient in T.B. Sanitorium, Vrindaban, where he stayed for one year 3. (1975) 16 Guj. L.R. 835 4 : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 215 and that after that he went to Ahmedabad for getting an artificial leg fitted, and that, at Ahmedabad he had to stay for about 3 to 4 months and that he returned from Ahmedabad to Hindaun in August, 1973 and in the end of November 1973 he came to Jaipur and met Shri Banwari Lal, Advocate, who advised him to file a claim petition and to collect necessary papers for that purpose and that thereafter, he collected the necessary papers within 3-4 days and he filed a claim petition on December 4, 1973. 17. In support of his aforesaid statement the Respondent claimant has produced a certificate Ex. 17. In support of his aforesaid statement the Respondent claimant has produced a certificate Ex. 1 dated 30th October, 1973 issued by the Medical Superintendent, T.B. Sanitarium, wherein it is stated that the Respondent-claimant was an indoor patient in the Sanitarium from 11th March, 1972 to 2nd March, 1973 for treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis and that he had been having treatment as an out door patient for Pulmonary Tuberculosis since 31st August, 1973. The Respondent-claimant has also produced a certificate (Ex. P.W. 6/1) issued by Dr. Mithlesh Kumar Sharma wherein it is stated that Dr. Sharma had been dressing the wound on the leg of the Respondent-claimant from December 1970 to August 1971 and that the Respondent claimant started having fever and cough and he was treated for the same for nearly 8 months; but since he could not be cured he was sent to T.B. Sanitarium at Vrindaban for treatment. 18. Dr. P.K. Sethi (A.W. 1), Professor and Head of Department, Orthopedics, S.M.S. College, Jaipur has stated that the Respondent-claimant had been admitted in the S.M.S. Hospital on 18th October, 1970 with crush injury on the right thigh and required amputation on the thigh above the middle and as there was no option but to amputate it, the thigh was amputated on the same day. Dr. Mithlesh Kumar Sharma (A.W. 6) has stated that he had been bandaging the wound on the right thigh of the Respondent-claimant from December 1970 till October 1971 and that he had also treated the claimant for fever and cough for about 8 months thereafter and since the Respondent-claimant could not be cured he was sent to Vrindaban for treatment. During the course of cross-examination he corrected himself and stated that he had been bandaging the wound on the right thigh of the Respondent-claimant from December 1970 to August 1971. Shri Banwari Lal, Advocate, (P.W. 5) has stated that two to four days prior to the filing of the claim petition the Respondent-claimant had met him and that he had advised him to file the claim petition and to collect the necessary papers for that purpose and that on the Respondent-claimant furnishing the necessary papers he had prepared claim petition. 19. The Claims Tribunal has placed reliance on the statement of the Respondent-claimant as well as Dr. 19. The Claims Tribunal has placed reliance on the statement of the Respondent-claimant as well as Dr. Mithlesh Kumar Sharma and has held that from the evidence adduced by the claimant it is established that upto August 1971 the wound on the right leg of the Respondent-claimant was being dressed, and thereafter, the Respondent-claimant suffered from Tuberculosis and was taken to Vrindaban where he was treated upto March 1973 and in April 1973, the Respondent-claimant was taken to Ahmedabad for fixing of artificial limbs and he remained there for 3 to 4 months, and that again he had to go to Vrindaban for treatment and remained there. The Claims Tribunal, therefore, held that the Respondent-claimant had been able to establish that there was sufficient cause to condone the delay in the filing of the claim petition. 20. Shri R.N. Munshi, the learned Counsel for the Appellant-corporation, has submitted that no reliance should be placed on the testimony of the Respondent-claimant and Dr. Mithlesh Kumar Sharma. In that regard Shri Munshi has pointed out certain contradictions between the evidence of the Respondent-claimant and Dr. Mithlesh Kumar Sharma with regard to the period during which Dr. Mithlesh Kumar Sharma was dressing the wound on the right leg of the Respondent-claimant. I have examined carefully the statement of the Respondent-claimant as well as the statement of Dr. Mithlesh Kumar Sharma and I find that there is no such contradiction between the two statements. Dr. Mithlesh Kumar, in examination-in-chief has stated that he was dressing the wound till October 1971, but during the course of cross-examination he corrected himself and stated that the dressing of the wound was done by him till August 1971. The aforesaid version of Dr. Sharma is supported by the certificate Ex. P.W. 6/1 issued by him wherein he has stated that he was dressing the wound from December 1970 till August 1971. 21. Shri Munshi has urged that no explanation whatsoever has been given for the failure on the part of the Respondent-claimant to file the claim petition after his return from Ahmedabad in August 1973. The aforesaid submission of Shri Munshi also cannot be accepted because from the certificate (Exhibit 1) issued by the T.B. Sanitarium, Vrindavan, it appears that the Respondent-claimant had been undergoing treatment for Pulmonary Tuberculosis as an out door patient since 31st August, 1973. The aforesaid certificate was issued on October 31, 1973. The aforesaid submission of Shri Munshi also cannot be accepted because from the certificate (Exhibit 1) issued by the T.B. Sanitarium, Vrindavan, it appears that the Respondent-claimant had been undergoing treatment for Pulmonary Tuberculosis as an out door patient since 31st August, 1973. The aforesaid certificate was issued on October 31, 1973. This would mean that till 30th October, 1973, the claimant was undergoing treatment for Pulmonary Tuberculosis at Vrindavan. In the circumstances, it is not reasonable to expect the Respondent-claimant to give up his treatment and to rush to Jaipur for the purpose of filing the claim petition and the Claims Tribunal was justified in taking the view that the Respondent-claimant had been able to establish sufficient cause for the delay in the filing of the claim petition. In my opinion, the discretion exercised by the Claims Tribunal in condoning the delay in filing the claim petition cannot be said to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously so as to justify interference in appeal. The contention urged by Shri Munshi that the claim petition was barred by limitation cannot, therefore, be accepted. 22. The second contention urged by Shri Munshi was that the Claims Tribunal has erred in holding that the accident had been caused on account of the negligence on the part of Respondent No. 2, the driver of the bus. The case of the Respondent-claimant was that he was going on the cycle on the left side of the road and the bus driven by Respondent No. 2 hit him from behind as a result of which the left front wheel of the bus ran over the right leg of the Respondent-claimant. In support of his aforesaid case, the Respondent-claimant, apart from examining himself, has examined two other witnesses, viz., Shivcharan Lal P.W. 2 and Gordhan, A.W. 4, who have deposed that they had seen the incident and that at the time of the incident the Respondent-claimant was driving the cycle on the left side of the road along the foot-path and that the bus driven by the Respondent No. 2, came from behind and hit the Respondent-claimant as a result of which the Respondent-claimant fell down and his leg came under the wheel of the bus. In addition to the aforesaid oral evidence the Respondent-claimant has produced a copy of the F.I.R. (Ex. 2) which was lodged by Gordhan with the police soon after the accident. In addition to the aforesaid oral evidence the Respondent-claimant has produced a copy of the F.I.R. (Ex. 2) which was lodged by Gordhan with the police soon after the accident. In the said F.I.R. it is stated that the Respondent-claimant was coming on the cycle and the bus driven by Respondent No. 2 came at a very fast speed and hit him from behind as a result of which the claimant and the other two children who were on the cycle fell down and suffered injuries. The case of the Appellant-Corporation, on the other hand, is that the accident had taken place due to the rashness and negligence of the Respondent-claimant, who suddenly came out of the women's' hostel gate of S.M.S. Hospital compound and on seeing him Respondent No. 2 applied his brakes but the claimant lost his balance in the haste to cross the road and struck the bus. In support of his aforesaid case, the Appellant-Corporation has examined the driver, Jaipal Singh (R.W. 1). 23. Shri Munshi has submitted that no reliance should be placed on the testimony of Shivcharan Lal for the reason that his name is not disclosed in the F.I.R. lodged with the police and his statement was also not recorded by the police and he was also not examined as a witness in the criminal case. I have perused the statement of Shivcharan Lal. The said witness has stated that on the date of the accident he was staying at Santokba Dharamshala just opposite the S.M.S. Hospital in connection with the medical treatment of his child. He has stated that the police had made inquiries from him but he was not examined in the criminal case. There is no reason to discard the testimony of Shivcharan Lal on the mere ground that he was not examined in the criminal case and his name was not disclosed in the F.I.R. specially when the F.I.R. was recorded by a third person Gordhan who did not know Shivcharan Lal. In the F.I.R. it is, however, mentioned that a number of persons had collected at the scene of the accident soon after the accident. 24. Shri Munshi has also submitted that there are contradictions between the statement of the claimant recorded before the Claims Tribunal and his statement recorded by the police. In the F.I.R. it is, however, mentioned that a number of persons had collected at the scene of the accident soon after the accident. 24. Shri Munshi has also submitted that there are contradictions between the statement of the claimant recorded before the Claims Tribunal and his statement recorded by the police. In this regard it may be observed that the Respondent-claimant during the course of cross-examination, has denied having made the alleged contradictory statement before the police and the Appellant Corporation has not taken any steps to prove that the Respondent-claimant had made such a contradictory statement before the police during the course of investigation. In the circumstances, it is not possible to hold that there is a contradiction between the statement made by the Respondent-claimant before the Claims Tribunal and the statement made by him before the police. 25. Moreover, I find that Jaipal Singh (R.W. 1) during the course of cross examination, has stated that the accident had taken place on the left side near the footpath. This belies the case of the Appellant Corporation and supports the case of the Respondent-claimant that at the time of the accident he was driving the cycle on the left side of the road and the bus hit him from behind. In the circumstances it is not possible to say that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the Respondent-claimant and a mere reasonable inference would be that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver of the bus. In my view, therefore, the Claims Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the accident was caused on account of the rash and negligent driving on the part of the Respondent No. 2, the driver of the Appellant Corporation. At the time of the accident the bus was coming from Tonk to Jaipur and it cannot, therefore, be disputed that at the time of the accident Respondent No. 2, was driving the bus during the course of his employment with the Appellant Corporation. The Appellant Corporation is, therefore, liable for the loss suffered by the Respondent-claimant on account of the injuries caused to him as a result of the negligence on the part of Respondent No. 2. 26. The Appellant Corporation is, therefore, liable for the loss suffered by the Respondent-claimant on account of the injuries caused to him as a result of the negligence on the part of Respondent No. 2. 26. As regards the quantum of compensation that has been awarded by the Claims Tribunal Shri Munshi has submitted that the Claims Tribunal has erred in awarding sum of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation towards loss of earning capacity and lessened future chances of earning and reduced capacity to work. In my view, there is no substance in the aforesaid contention. From the evidence of Dr. P.K. Sethi (A.W. 1) it is established that as a result of the amputation of the right leg from above the knee the disability suffered by the Respondent-claimant is 70 per cent. The Claims Tribunal, has observed that the age of the Respondent-claimant was about 25 years and he could reasonably be expected to live to the age of 50 years. The Claims Tribunal has thus awarded Rs. 25,000/- as compensation for loss of earning capacity and lessened future chances for promotion for a period of 25 years. In other words, the Claims Tribunal has awarded compensation @ Rs. 1,000/- per year, i.e., less than Rs. 1007-per month. In my view, the aforesaid compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal cannot be held to be excessive in the facts and circumstances of the case. 27. Shri Munshi has also submitted that the award for Rs. 5,000/- as damages for physical pain and mental agony is on the high side. I am unable to accept the said contention. The Respondent-claimant has lost the right leg completely and had to remain under medical treatment for more than two years. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the award of Rs. 5,000/- towards physical pain and mental agony cannot, therefore, be held to be excessive. 28. Shri Munshi did not challenge the award of compensation under the head of medical expenses and the expenses for replacement of artificial limbs. 29. Thus, none of the contentions urged by Shri Munshi in support of the appeal of the Appellant Corporation merits acceptance. 30. Now, I may take up the cross-objections submitted by the Respondent-claimant. 28. Shri Munshi did not challenge the award of compensation under the head of medical expenses and the expenses for replacement of artificial limbs. 29. Thus, none of the contentions urged by Shri Munshi in support of the appeal of the Appellant Corporation merits acceptance. 30. Now, I may take up the cross-objections submitted by the Respondent-claimant. Shri Munshi has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the cross-objections on the ground that the provisions contained in Order 41, Rule 22 Code of Civil Procedure which provide for filing of cross-objections do not apply to motor accident claims submitted under the Act. The aforesaid contention urged by Shri Munshi cannot be accepted in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Dewalal and Ors., 1977 A.C.J. 150(Raj.) . wherein it has been held that the Respondent can file cross objections in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act by invoking Order 41, Rule 22 C.P.C, because when the statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court.In support of the cross-objection, Shri Garg, the learned Counsel for the Respondent-claimant, has submitted that the sum of Rs. 25,000/-that has been awarded by the Claims Tribunal on account of loss of earning capacity and lessened future chances of promotion and for reduced capacity to work, is too low. Shri Garg has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Tinsukhia Flour Mills v. Shiv Prakash, 1980 A.C.J 356(Raj.) wherein this Court has up-held an award whereby a sum of Rs. 50,000/- had been awarded as compensation in a case involving permanent disability arising out of amputation of the left leg. Shri Garg has submitted that in the present case also Rs. 50,000/- should be awarded as compensation. I have examined the decision of this Court and in Tinsukhia Flour Mills v. Shiv Prakash, 1980 A.C.J. 356(Raj.) and in my opinion the said decision does not lend assistance to the case of the Respondent-claimant. In Tinsukhia Flour Mills case2 the age of the claimant who had suffered the injury was about 14 years and the learned Judges have also laid emphasis on the fact that he had good academic record. In Tinsukhia Flour Mills case2 the age of the claimant who had suffered the injury was about 14 years and the learned Judges have also laid emphasis on the fact that he had good academic record. In the present case, the age of the Respondent-claimant as about 25 years and the academic record of the Respondent-claimant was also not very good. Moreover, the additional factor in the present case is that the Appellant Corporation has given employment to the Respondent-claimant. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think that this is a fit case for interference with the award made by the Claims Tribunal and to enhance the amount of compensation that has been awarded by the Claims Tribunal. 31. Shri Garg has also submitted that the award of Rs. 5,000/- made by the Claims Tribunal with regard to the physical pain and mental agony is also very low and should be enhanced. It is true that the Respondent-claimant has lost his leg and he had been undergoing treatment for a considerable period. But in the facts and circumstances of the present case it is not possible to hold that the award of Rs. 5,000/- made by the Claims Tribunal is low and that it should be interfered in appeal by this Court. As regards the award of Rs. 2,500/- for medical expenses, Shri Garg has not been able to point out any evidence on the record on the basis of which it can be said that the expenses incurred by the Respondent-claimant for his medical treatment were more than Rs. 2,500/-. 32. For the reasons, aforesaid I am of the view that there is no substance in the cross-objections. 33. In the result, the appeal as well as the cross-objections are hereby dismissed. The Respondent shall be entitled to his costs in the appeal. 34. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- has been paid to the Respondent-claimant under the orders of this Court dated November 30, 1976. The executing court while executing the award will take into account the aforesaid payment. *******