JUDGMENT This writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the notification issued by the State Government, respondent no. 1, on 13th March, 1978 and 19th June, 1979, by which the private party respondents have been promoted on regular basis as Assistant Conservator of forests. The further prayer made by the petitioner is for the issuance of an appropriate writ quashing the order dated 13th March, 19n by which respondents 8 to 10 were promoted as Assistant Conservators of Forest, that dated 19th June, 1979 promoting respondents 11 to 25 to the said posts and that dated 29th December, 1979 promoting respondents 26 to 38 as Assistant Conservators, Forest, all over the head of the petitioner. These orders have been marked Annexure 1, 2 and 22 respectively. The further relief sought by the petitioner is that a writ of mandamus be issued to the official respondents to consider the case of the petitioner who admittedly is senior in the cadre of Range Officer, Forest, to all the respondents 8 to 38. The petitioner's case has been ignored as is apparent from the order dated 6th December, 1978 as contained in Annexure 3, passed by the Minister, Incharge, Forest Department, as communicated to the petitioner informing him that he was not eligible or qualified for the post of Assistant Conservator of Forest by promotion. One post of Assistant Conservator of Forest had been kept in reserve for the petitioner and by the Government order dated 6th December, 1978 aforementioned, that order of reservation has been rescinded and the post reserved for the petitioner has been dc-reserved. The petitioner bas, therefore, also prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ quashing the Government order as contained in Annexure 3. 2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this application are not in dispute. The petitioner along with respondents 8 to 38 was Range Officer, Forest, the petitioner ranking senior to all the respondents concerned. The matter with regard to the promotion from the post of Range Officer, Forest, to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forest was considered, as is incumbent to do under the rules in existence, by the Departmental Promotion Committee of which a Member of the State Public Service Commission is the Chairman, and the petitioner's case was recommended with a note that he was fit for promotion. A copy of the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee has been marked Annexure 20/1 to the writ petition and the petitioner's name finds place at serial no. 5 of the recommendation. Admittedly under the statutory rules in force the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee have the same status and effect as the recommendations of the Bihar Public Service Commission. In the meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee a Member of the Bihar State Public Service Commission was the President. Thereafter by a letter dated 21st February, 1979, as incorporated in Annexure 20 to the writ application, the Secretary of the Bihar Public Service Commission, as directed by the Commission, issued a letter to the authorities concerned, which is borne out by Annexure 20 to the writ application. Thus it will be seen that the petitioner was found eligible and fit for promotion to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forest. Nonetheless even before the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee Or the Bihar Public Service Commission could be received by the State Government, the Minister Incharge of the Forest Department passed an order on 6.12.1978, which was communicated to the petitioner under Annexure 3 aforementioned, that the petitioner was not qualified for the post and therefore, his case for promotion deserves no consideration. Incidentally in this connection we make a reference to rule 38 of the Bihar Forest Service Rules, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') which lays down that "the final selection of officers to be promoted shall be made by the Governor after considering the recommendations made by the Commission under rule 37." Rule 37 enjoins that the Commission shall examine all the papers forwarded to it by the Forest Department and thereafter send its recommendation in the matter of promotions to be made and that the suitability and fitness of the incumbents to be promoted and then send a report to the Governor. It may be a different matter whether these provisions were brought to the notice of the Minister Incharge by the departmental officers or not, but it cannot detract from the position that the learned Minister chose to shut out the doors of promotional avenues for the petitioner only on the ground that he was not eligible far promotion. 3. A very limited question of interpretation of a statutory rule is involved in this case. 3. A very limited question of interpretation of a statutory rule is involved in this case. The whole question is as to whether the petitioner, according to the Rules, is eligible and has got the requisite qualification for being considered to be promoted as an Assistant Conservator of Forest from the rank of Range Officer, Forest, in which grade and rank admittedly he is the senior most vis-a-vis respondents 8 to 38. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State in which a categorical stand has been taken that the petitioner has not been considered for promotion in spite of the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee and the Bihar Public Service Commission, merely on the ground that he did not fulfil the requisite qualifications as laid down by rule 3 (b) of the Rules. The only point on which the fate of this application depends is with regard to the true interpretation of the language of rule 3 (b). Although some other allegations have been made in the petition, we do not think it necessary to go into those questions in the view that we propose to take in this case which is purely legal. The whole of rule 3 of the Rules may usefully be extracted and quoted here: "3. The appointments to the service shall ordinarily be made by- (a) direct recruitment in accordance with rules in Part II of these rules by a competitive examination, to be held by the Commission, and (b) promotion in accordance with rules contained in Part V, of selected ranger- (i) who have obtained the honours or the high standard certificates at the Forest College, Dehradun, or at any State Forest School Or College, established for the training of Ranger students and who by unusual ability and industry in the course of their service as Forest Rangers have proved themselves fit for promotion; and (ii) who haw long service, tried ability and probity, irrespective of their educational qualifications : " 4. We are not concerned in this case with the qualifications for direct recruitment. The case of the petitioner against the respondents vis-a-vis respondents 8 to 38 depends upon a thorough construction of the provisions of rule 3 (b) quoted above. We are not concerned in this case with the qualifications for direct recruitment. The case of the petitioner against the respondents vis-a-vis respondents 8 to 38 depends upon a thorough construction of the provisions of rule 3 (b) quoted above. The stand taken by the respondents is that clauses (i) and (ii) of rule 3 (b) must be read conjunctively and, if so read, the petitioner not being found to have fulfilled the criteria as laid down in clause (i) of rule 3 (b), was found to be ineligible and not qualified for consideration for promotion to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forest from the post of Ranger Officer, Forest, which he is substantively holding. The crux of the matter, therefore, is as to whether clauses (i) and (ii) have to be read conjunctively or disjunctively. On a plain reading of the two provisions we have no doubt in our mind that they have to be read disjunctively in spite of the use of the word "and" at the end of clause (i) of rule 3 (b). The reasons are manifestly simple. On an analysis of rule 3 as a whole it will be seen that sub-rule (a) contemplates a case of appointment by Gazette notification for which different norms have been set down. Sub-rule (b) of rule 3 deals with two classes of Range Officers, Forest, who would be eligible for promotion in cases of appointment by promotion to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forest. There is accordingly a classification made, a categorisation laid down under the two heads by which two classes of Ranger Officers Forest, have been laid down to be eligible to be considered for promotion, other things being equal. The first class or category is based upon educational qualifications, unusual ability and industry in the Course of service as Range Officer, Forest, and the second class or category consists of such Ranger Officers. Forest, who have had long service, tried ability and probity, irrespective of their educational qualifications. The first class or category is based upon educational qualifications, unusual ability and industry in the Course of service as Range Officer, Forest, and the second class or category consists of such Ranger Officers. Forest, who have had long service, tried ability and probity, irrespective of their educational qualifications. To put it in a layman's language, in one category it is the academic distinction coupled with unusual ability and industry that makes one fit for promotion, irrespective of the period of his experience in the service, whereas the second class Or category comprises of such Range Officers, Forest, who have had long service, meaning there by a long experience, and who are efficient with tried ability and whose integrity is beyond reproach, which falls within the term" probity", irrespective of the educational qualifications. 5. Learned counsel for the State contended that "irrespective of their educational qualifications" tantamounts to saying apart from and besides their educational qualifications. We are afraid this submission is not tenable. The word "irrespective" has no ambiguous meaning. It means not taking into account and/or without reference to Clause (ii) of rule 3 (b), therefore, clearly lays down that a person having long experience who has been found to be efficient and whose integrity is beyond question, shall be eligible for being considered for promotion without taking into account the educational qualifications of such Range Officer, Forest, while clause (i) lays emphasis on high standard of educational qualifications apart from unusual ability and industry, having no reference to long experience. Clause (ii) includes and embraces within the list of eligible Range Officers, Forest for promotion to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forest, giving weightage to the long experience, tried ability and probity without any reference to their educational qualifications. 6. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that since the word "and" has been used at the end of clause (1), both clauses (i) and (ii) must be read as conjunctive rather than disjunctive. This argument is wholly fallacious. As we have already observed above rule 3 (b) contemplates two categories or classes of Range Officers, Forest, who may be taken to be eligible for promotion. This argument is wholly fallacious. As we have already observed above rule 3 (b) contemplates two categories or classes of Range Officers, Forest, who may be taken to be eligible for promotion. The petitioner, on the admitted case of the parties, falls under clause (ii), but his Case has not been considered only on the ground that he does not fulfil the criteria laid down under clause (ii) of rule 3 (b) in so far as educational qualifications and distinctions are concerned. 7. The argument of learned counsel for the State must be held to be untenable at least on two grounds. Firstly when the criteria for promotion of two categories of Ranger Officers, Forest, have been laid down in rule 3 (b) in clauses (i) and (ii), naturally the word "and" will mean both the first category and the second category. Secondly, if we accept the contention of the respondent State that both clauses (i) and (ii) be read conjunctively and not disjunctively, it will lead to an absurdity and we shall have to hold that the subordinate legislative authority has used expressions which are wholly redundant and otiose. This will be in the teeth of the well established principle of construction of statutes and statutory instruments, for instance, if clauses (i) and (ii) are read conjunctively then the entire expression in clause (ii), namely, "irrespective of their educational qualifications", will be rendered a surplusage, otiose and nugatory. Under this head it is as well to emphasise that is in clause (i) itself where academic qualifications have been given weightage and the "terms" unusual ability and industry in the course of their service" is coupled with the educational qualifications. There would then be no question with regard to a Range Officer, Forest, having long service, tried ability and probity, which is required by clause (ii) if both the clauses are to be read conjunctively. It is a well established principle of construction of statutes and statutory instruments that to carry out the intention of the legislature or a subordinate legislative body, it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions "or" and "and" one for the other. As Maxwell has pointed out in his book The Interpretation of Statutes, 10th edition, page 238, "the 43 Eliz. 1. As Maxwell has pointed out in his book The Interpretation of Statutes, 10th edition, page 238, "the 43 Eliz. 1. c. 3 for instance, in speaking of property to be employed for the maintenance of 'sick and maimed soldiers,' referred to soldiers who were either the One 'or' the other, and not only to those who were both. "and again at the same page Maxwell goes On to say "The 1 Jac 1, c. 15, which made it an act of bankruptcy for a trader to leave his dwelling-house 'to the intent, or, where by his creditors might be defeated or delayed,' if construed literally, would have exposed to bankruptcy every trader who left his home even for an hour, if a creditor called during his absence for payment. This absurd consequence was avoided and the real intention of the legislature was beyond reasonable doubt effected by reading 'or' as 'and' so that an absence from home was an act of bankruptcy only when coupled with the design of delaying or defeating creditors" 8. In apt cases, therefore, "and" may be construed as meaning "or" and vice versa. For instance, in the case of The King v. Governor of Brixton Prison-Exparte Bidwell, 1937 (1) K.B. Dn. 305 at page 313 it has been observed- "It is contended on behalf of the accused that the warrant for his apprehension should have been endorsed not only by one of the magistrates of Bow Street Police Court, but also by a Secretary of State. That contention, as I understand it, is based entirely upon the word 'and' which occurs in the second category of the authorities who are empowered to endorse warrants by S. 3 of the Act of 1881." Having analysed the ambit, scope and purport of the relevant statutory provisions involved in that case, the King's Bench Division of the High Court held that the word "and" in the circumstances of the case must be read as a disjunctive word and as a substitute for "or". This case has been followed by the Indian Courts also. For instance, a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Amulya Chandra Roy and ors v. Kumar Pashupati Nath Malia and anr. 55 C.W.N. No. 385 (F.B.), has considered this question. Section 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act was under consideration before the Full Bench. This case has been followed by the Indian Courts also. For instance, a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Amulya Chandra Roy and ors v. Kumar Pashupati Nath Malia and anr. 55 C.W.N. No. 385 (F.B.), has considered this question. Section 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act was under consideration before the Full Bench. An expression used in that statutory provision was "attachment and sale". It was argued that "and" must be read as conjunctive and not disjunctive. Repelling that argument, the Full Bench held that the statutory provision being a remedial provision, inserted for the benefit of tenants, it should be construed in a broad sense and the word "and" in the expression "attachment and sale" must be taken to have been used in the sense of "and/or" so that protection intended to be given to the tenant by the legislature will extend to all movable and immovable properties of the tenant other than the tenancy in arrears. It was further held that this interpretation was not unwarranted by the actual language of the section and was in consonance with the underlying object of the legislature. 9. As we have pointed out earlier, the question of the term "and" being interpreted as a conjunctive term of expression or a disjunctive one, is not very much material because if there are two categories or classes of Range Officers, Forest, who have been set down to be eligible for being considered for promotion, the two classes have to be described as Category A and Category B. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument that the need for such a construction does arise, as has been pressed upon us by the learned counsel for the State relying upon the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State wherein this point has been taken regarding the conjunctive nature of the expression, we feel obliged to deal with this part of the submission as the second part of our reasoning in the aforesaid paragraphs. Viewed in either way, there seems to be no substance in the contention of learned counsel for the respondent State, nor any justification in law for the stand taken in the counter-affidavit, namely, that the petitioner's case cannot be considered as he does not fulfil the criteria as laid down in clause (i) of rule 3 (b). Viewed in either way, there seems to be no substance in the contention of learned counsel for the respondent State, nor any justification in law for the stand taken in the counter-affidavit, namely, that the petitioner's case cannot be considered as he does not fulfil the criteria as laid down in clause (i) of rule 3 (b). Since the petitioner admittedly fulfils the criteria of qualifications laid down in clause (ii) of rule 3 (b), having long service, tried ability and probity, his case having been recommended by the Departmental Promotion Committee and the Bihar Public Service Commission, the shutting out of the doors in his face for the promotional avenue, cannot but be described as arbitrary. 10. In the result, therefore, we are constrained to allow this application and quash the order dated 6th December, 1978 as contained in Annexure 3 by which the petitioner has been held to be not qualified for the post of Assistant Conservator of Forest, de-reserving the post which was reserved for the petitioner. We further direct for issuance of a writ of mandamus to respondents 1, 2 and 6 commanding them to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forest. It goes without saying that if and when the petitioner is taken in the cadre of Assistant Conservator of Forest, the matter of inter-se seniority between him and respondents 8 to 38 would be considered with effect from the date when the first batch of respondents S to 10 was given effective promotion. 11. We are informed at the Bar that the petitioner is going to retire on 28.2.1982. In that view of the matter it is advisable, and we so direct, that the petitioner's matter be considered and final order passed by the 10th January, 1982, failing which such of the respondents who are responsible for delaying the matter may be proceeded against in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. Application allowed.