JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J. - The question referred to this Full Bench is as follows : "Whether in the case of a Government servant whose services are terminated by an order which is subsequently adjudged by courts to be void, the period of Limitation under Article 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963 runs from the date of re-instatement of the Government servant in service in pursuance of the courts order declaring the termination to be void or on the first of every month as if the termination order had not been passed at all ? 2. This question arises in the following circumstances. The respondent no. 1 Ram Prasad Chowdary was a temporary Government servant. His services were terminated by an order dated October 24, 1967. That order was impugned by him in this court by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. That petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge but it was allowed in special appeal wherein it was held : - "We uphold the appellants contention that the order (Annexure 8) was bad in law and did not effect termination of the service He is therefore, entitled to be treated as still continuing in service." 3. The judgment of the learned single Judge was set aside and the writ petition was allowed quashing the order of termination of service. The petitioner then joined the service on October 10, 1973. He however resigned on July 20, 1974. He preferred a claim for salary before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal in June 1976. That claim was allowed by the Tribunal with effect from October 24, 1967 on ward. The state has challenged that order of the Tribunal in the instant writ petition on the ground that the Tribunal fell in error in allowing salary to the respondent no. I with effect from October 24, 1967 inasmuch as the claim for a period of exceeding three years was barred by Article 7 of the Limitation Act. When the matter came before a Beach consisting of two Judges of this court various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this court were cited and as the question was found to be of great importance the same has been referred to this Bench. That is how this question came before us. 4. When the matter came before a Beach consisting of two Judges of this court various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this court were cited and as the question was found to be of great importance the same has been referred to this Bench. That is how this question came before us. 4. At the time of the hearing of the arguments the learned counsel for the parties conceded that the question stands fully answered by a decision of the Supreme Court in Maimoona Khatoon and Another v. The State of U.P. and another, AIR 1980 SC 1773 , wherein it has been laid down that "in case where an employee is dismissed or removed from service and is reinstated either by the appointing authority or by virtue of the order of dismissal or removal being set aside by a Civil Court, the starting punt of limitation under Article 102 of the Limitation Act of 108, would be not the date of the order of dismissal or removal but the date when the right actually accrues, that is to say, the date of the reinstatement by the appointing authority where no' suit is filed or the date of the decree where a suit is filed and decreed. 5. In view of the law declared by the Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that where an employee is dismissed or removed from service and is reinstated either by the appointing authority or by virtue of the order of dismissal or removal being set aside by a decree passed by the Civil Court or by an order parsed in a writ petition the stating point of the limitation would be not the date of the order of dismissal or removal but the date when the right actually accrues, that is to say the date of the reinstatement by the appointing authority where no suit or writ, petition is filed or the date of decree where a suit is filed and decreed or the date of the order allowing the writ petition and setting aside the order of termination. The question referred to as is answered accordingly. 6. Let the papers be laid before the Bench concerned for decision of the writ petition.