Judgment D.N. MEHTA, J.:---The plaintiff herein has been granted leave to sue in forma pauperi. The plaintiff has filed this suit against her step mother Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1 and her sisters Razia Begum, defendant No. 2, Tahera defendant No. 3 and Bilquis Begum, defendant No. 4. Bilquis Begum the 4th defendant died at Bombay in the month of August 1973. By an order of this Court dated the 4th March, 1975, the husband of Bilquis Begum was brought on record as defendant No. 4 and her minor son Abdul Qudus was brought on record as respondent No. 5. Shri R.N. Shah, the First Assistant Master has been appointed Guardian-ad-litem of the minor defendant No. 5. 2. The plaintiff has prayed for a declaration that the estate described in the Schedule marked Ex. 'B' to the plaint was the estate of her father Abdullakhan Khilji together with accretions thereto and property acquired which formed part of the estate. The plaintiff sought for a declaration that she was entitled to 7/32 share in and from the said estate of her father. The plaintiff has prayed that the estate of her late father be ordered to be divided by metes and bounds and necessary accounts of the profits of the estate be taken with effect from the date of the death of the said deceased and the amount found due and payable be ordered and decreed to be paid over to her. That necessary orders and directions be passed for the administration and supervision of the said estate and that enquiries be made and accounts taken for that purpose. The plaintiff has also prayed for a permanent injunction retraining the defendants from dealing with or disposing of or preventing or interfering with the plaintiff's entry, possession, use and enjoyment jointly with the defendants of the estate inclusive of the premises situated on the 3rd floor of Sawal House at 53, Masjid Street, Bombay, and from transferring, encumbering or alienating the same. Finally, the plaintiff has prayed for costs of the suit. 3. In her plaint, the plaintiff averred that she and the defendants were Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi sect and that she was the daughter of one Abdullakhan Khilji, who died in Bombay intestate, on or about the 8th of June, 1958. The 1st defendant was the widow of the said Abdullakhan Khilji being his second wife. 3. In her plaint, the plaintiff averred that she and the defendants were Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi sect and that she was the daughter of one Abdullakhan Khilji, who died in Bombay intestate, on or about the 8th of June, 1958. The 1st defendant was the widow of the said Abdullakhan Khilji being his second wife. The first wife of the said Abdullakhan Khilji Mariambai was the sister of the defendant No. 1. Mariambai was the mother of the Plaintiff and defendants 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4. The plaintiff stated that the said deceased died leaving behind as his only heirs and legal representatives, the plaintiff and the defendants, who were entitled to succeed to his estate. The plaintiff stated that defendant No. 1, being the widow was entitled to 1/8th share in the estate of the said Abdullakhan Khilji and the plaintiff and defendants 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4 were entitled to 7/32 share of the estate of the deceased respectively. 4. The plaintiff has then given a description of the various immovable and movable properties left by her father Abdullakhan Khilji. The plaintiff stated that during his life time, her father resided on the third floor of a building known as Sawal House situated at 53, Masjid Street Bombay, along with his family. The deceased was a tenant of the said premises in Sawal House consisting of five rooms admeasuring about 2500 sq. ft. The plaintiff stated that after the death of her father the said premises at Sawal House devolved on all the heirs and legal representatives who became entitled to use and occupy the said premises jointly as the heirs of the deceased. The plaintiff stated that none of the defendants 1, 2 or 3 at present occupied the said premises at Sawal House and that the said premises at Sawal House were unoccupied and vacant. The plaintiff stated that by her Advocate's letter dated 2nd January, 1969 she called upon the defendants to permit her to use the said premises at Sawal House as one of the heirs of the late Abdullakhan Khilji. By their Advocate's letter dated 1st February, 1969 the defendant denied the plaintiff's right to occupy Sawal House and contended that the entire Sawal House along with the said premises on the third floor had been purchased by defendants 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4. By their Advocate's letter dated 1st February, 1969 the defendant denied the plaintiff's right to occupy Sawal House and contended that the entire Sawal House along with the said premises on the third floor had been purchased by defendants 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4. The plaintiff submitted that the claim of defendants 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4 to the ownership of Sawal House was false. The plaintiff stated that the said property had been purchased by defendants 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4 out of the funds belonging to the estate of her late father and which funds came into the hands of defendants 1, 2, 3 and 4. 5. The plaintiff stated that her deceased father had purchased a property at Bapu Khote Street at its junction with Banian Street bearing Survey No, 2702 of Bhuleshwar Division. The said property was purchased by her father during his life time in the name of his first wife Mariambai. The plaintiff stated that in or about 1958 the plaintiff's father transferred the said property benami to and in the name of the 1st defendant, however her father continued to be the absolute owner thereof and recovered the income and profits and managed the property until the time of his death. The plaintiff stated that she was entitled to a share in the said property and in the income and profits thereof to the extent of her share in the estate of her father. 6. The plaintiff stated that her deceased father was also seized and possessed of another immovable property situated at 57-59-61 Masjid Street Bombay, being C.S. No. 3429 of Bhuleshwar Division. The said property was purchased by her father in the year 1956. The plaintiff stated that although her deceased father had purchased the said property out of his own moneys, in the Conveyance, the purchaser was shown as defendant No. 1. The plaintiff stated that this was a benami transaction and that the said property at all times belonged to her father and, therefore, the same formed part of the estate. 7. The plaintiff stated that apart from the immovable properties mentioned heretofore, her deceased father had earned a considerable amount of money from the business carried on by him as also from the income of some motor-taxis, which he owned. 7. The plaintiff stated that apart from the immovable properties mentioned heretofore, her deceased father had earned a considerable amount of money from the business carried on by him as also from the income of some motor-taxis, which he owned. The plaintiff stated that her deceased father left various immovables, ornaments and jewellery and cash of the aggregate value of about Rupees Two Lakhs. 8. The plaintiff stated that her deceased father at the time of his death was the absolute owner of immovable properties as also movables such as ornaments and jewellery, furniture and cash. The plaintiff stated that the defendants denied her right of a share in her father's property. The plaintiff stated that there were certain differences between her and the defendants over the choice of the man she married and that the defendants had colluded with one another in order to keep her out of the share in the estate of her father. The plaintiff stated that in the initial stages the defendants put her off from time to time on promises and assurances that she would be given a share in the estate of her father and that her interest was safe in their hands. The plaintiff stated she relied upon the assurances given by the defendants, since defendant No. 1 was her step-mother as also her mother's sister and was issue less and defendants 2 and 3 and original defendant No. 4 were her sisters. 9. The plaintiff stated that by her Advocate's letter dated 2nd January, 1969 and a second letter dated 20th January, 1969 she placed on record the various facts stated heretofore and called upon the defendants to render account and to pay her share in the estate of her deceased father as also to allow her to jointly use and occupy the residential premises at Sawal House. The plaintiff stated that she called upon the defendants to partition her father's estate by metes and bounds. The defendants by their Advocate's letter dated 13th February, 1969 falsely denied that the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji was seized and possessed of any immovable or movable property. The defendants falsely stated that the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in Sawal House since the same had been purchased by defendants 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4. The defendants by their Advocate's letter dated 13th February, 1969 falsely denied that the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji was seized and possessed of any immovable or movable property. The defendants falsely stated that the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in Sawal House since the same had been purchased by defendants 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the present suit praying for a declaration that the estate described in Schedule annexed as Ex. 'B' to the plaint was the estate of her father Abdullakhan Khilji. Secondly, for a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to 7/32 share in the said, estate and for administration of the estate under the supervision of this Court and for other ancillary reliefs. 10. Defendants 1, 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4 have filed a joint written statement. The defendants stated that the suit was barred by the Law of Limitation and that the same be dismissed. The defendants denied that the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji left any estate to be inherited by his heirs. Accordingly, the defendants contended that no question arose of defining the shares of the heirs to the alleged estate of the deceased. 11. The defendants stated that they resided along with the deceased in the rented premises on the third floor of Sawal House. The said flat consisted of five rooms. After the death of the deceased, the defendants continued to reside in the said premises. The defendants further denied that the tenancy devolved on all the heirs of the deceased. The defendants stated that the plaintiff got married during the life-time of the deceased and chose to stay separately with her husband. The defendants stated that at the time of the death of the deceased, the plaintiff was living separately with her husband. The defendants stated that defendant No. 1 was in occupation of one of rooms on the third floor of Sawal House. The defendants stated that the said building was purchased by a Conveyance dated the 22nd November, 1960 from Chandumal Tolaram and Kundanmal Tolaram by defendant No. 4 and three others as tenant-in-common. The defendants denied that the plaintiff was entitled to the joint use and occupation said premises at Sawal House. The defendants stated that the said building was purchased by a Conveyance dated the 22nd November, 1960 from Chandumal Tolaram and Kundanmal Tolaram by defendant No. 4 and three others as tenant-in-common. The defendants denied that the plaintiff was entitled to the joint use and occupation said premises at Sawal House. The defendants stated that the said property Sawal House having been purchased on 22nd November, 1960 by defendant No. 4 on behalf of herself and defendants 2 and 3, the plaintiff was no longer entitled to lay any claim to the tenancy of the said flat in Sawal House. The defendants denied that the said property was purchased by defendant No. 4 out of the funds belonging to the estate of the said deceased. 12. The defendants denied that the deceased at the time of his death was the absolute owner or entitled to or seized or possessed of any immovable properties or movables like furniture or ornaments or cash. The defendants denied that they had at any time colluded with each other or that they had kept the plaintiff on false promises to give her share as alleged. The defendants stated that the deceased had not left behind any property or estate whatever and, therefore, the question of giving any promise did not arise. The defendants denied having made any representations to the plaintiff that her share of inheritance was entirely secured with defendants 2 to 4 who were her sisters or defendant No. 1 who was her step-mother as also her aunt. The defendants denied having thereby induced or persuaded the plaintiff from claiming any partition of her share in the estate of the deceased. The defendants denied having won the confidence of the plaintiff by such representations and thereby having excluded her from the estate of the deceased. According to the defendants, the deceased had left no estate and therefore, there was no question of any division of his estate amongst his heirs, or of any representations or promises having been made to the plaintiff by the defendants. The defendants denied having held the estate of the deceased as trustees or agents on behalf of the plaintiff. 13. The defendants further denied that the deceased during his life time carried on any business or enjoyed any income from immovable properties or that he had any interest in motor-taxis as alleged by the plaintiff. The defendants denied having held the estate of the deceased as trustees or agents on behalf of the plaintiff. 13. The defendants further denied that the deceased during his life time carried on any business or enjoyed any income from immovable properties or that he had any interest in motor-taxis as alleged by the plaintiff. The defendants averred that since the time defendant No. 1 married to the deceased in the year 1951 till his death the deceased did not carry on any kind of business. The defendants denied the deceased having left any furniture or household goods. The defendants stated that by a Deed of Gift dated the 17th March, 1953 the deceased granted to defendant No. 1 as a gift the immovable property situated at the junction of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street. The defendants stated that by a declaration of Gift dated the 12th June, 1956 the deceased recorded that he had gifted all the ornaments jewellery, furniture and household effects to defendant No. 1. The defendants stated that the said gifts were made by the deceased during his life time and defendant No. 1 had taken possession of the properties so gifted to her. The defendants denied that the deceased had left ornaments worth Rs. 2,00,000/- or cash at the time of his death. The defendants denied that they had held ornaments and cash or other movables in trust for the benefit of all the heirs of the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji, as tenants-in-common. The defendants denied that the said Sawal House situated at 53, Masjid Street, Bombay, was purchased out of the funds or income belonging to the estate of the deceased or that any other immovable property was held by the defendants as trustees or as benamis for the plaintiff. The defendants denied the occupancy rights of the plaintiff in the said Sawal House. 14. The defendants stated that the property at the corner of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street was gifted by the deceased to defendant No. 1 pursuant to the Deed of Gift dated 17th March, 1953. The defendants denied that in 1958 the said immovable property was transferred by the deceased benami in the name of defendant No. 1. 14. The defendants stated that the property at the corner of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street was gifted by the deceased to defendant No. 1 pursuant to the Deed of Gift dated 17th March, 1953. The defendants denied that in 1958 the said immovable property was transferred by the deceased benami in the name of defendant No. 1. The defendants denied that the said property formed part of the estate of the deceased or that at the time of his death the deceased was the real or beneficial owner thereof. The defendants denied that the plaintiff was entitled to any share in the said property or to its income. 15. The defendants stated that the immovable properties situated at No. 57-59-61, Masjid Street and bearing C.S. No. 249 of Bhuleshwar Division was purchased by defendant No. 1 on 20th March, 1956. The defendants stated that defendant No. 1 was the absolute owner of the said property, she having purchased the same out of her own moneys. The defendants denied that the said property was purchased by the said deceased in the name of defendant No. 1. 16. The defendants stated that both the immovable properties situated at the corner of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street as also the properties bearing No. 57-59-61, Masjid Street, Bombay, were the immovable properties belonging to defendant No. 1. The defendants stated that defendant No. 1 was entitled to realise the rents and profits therefrom. The defendants denied that the deceased during his life time managed or recovered rents or profits therefrom until his death. The defendants denied that either all the properties formed part of the estate of the deceased or that the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4 became entitled to a share therein or to the income thereof. The defendants denied that the said properties ought to be partitioned or divided by metes and bounds. The defendants denied that defendant No. 1 held or managed the said properties as trustees or agents on behalf of the plaintiff or anyone else. The defendants stated that the plaintiff wanted to pressurise the defendants to submit to her unjust demands by the filing of the present suit. The defendants stated that the deceased did not leave behind him any immovable property or any movable property or cash or ornaments which could be partitioned amongst his heirs. The defendants stated that the plaintiff wanted to pressurise the defendants to submit to her unjust demands by the filing of the present suit. The defendants stated that the deceased did not leave behind him any immovable property or any movable property or cash or ornaments which could be partitioned amongst his heirs. The defendants denied that they had failed or neglected to render any accounts to the plaintiff of movable or immovable property left behind by the deceased. The defendants stated that the suit was false and vexatious and the same be dismissed with costs. 17. On the above pleadings, the following issues were raised :--- 1. Whether the suit was barred by limitation ? 2. Whether the tenancy of the premises on the 3rd floor of Sawal House situated at 53, Masjid Street, Bombay, devolved upon the plaintiff, defendants 1 to 3 and original defendant No. 4 who became entitled to occupy the same jointly as heirs of the de ceased Abdullakhan Khilji ? 3. Whether the defendants 1 to 3 and original defendant No. 4 continued to hold and managed the entire estate left by the deceased as trustees and agents of the plaintiff for her share, claim, payment and interest in the estate of the said deceased ? 4. Whether the said property Sawal House was acquired from the estate of the deceased ? 5. Whether the deceased transferred the immovable -property situated at the junction of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street benami in the name of defendant No. 1 and whether the deceased continued to be the absolute owner thereof until and at the time of his death ? 6. Whether the immovable property situated at No. 57-59-61 Masjid Street, Bombay and bearing Cadestral Survey No. 3249 of Bhuleshwar Division formed part of the estate of the deceased ? 7. Whether the immovable properties as also the movables including jewellery mentioned in Exh. 'B' to the plaint formed part of the estate of the deceased ? 8. What were the assets and liabilities of the estate of the deceased ? 9. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to any and if so to what relief ? 10. Generally. 18. Issue No. 1 : The first issue in this suit which requires to be discussed and settled is the issue with regard to limitation. The deceased Abdullakhan Khilji died on 8th June, 1958. 9. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to any and if so to what relief ? 10. Generally. 18. Issue No. 1 : The first issue in this suit which requires to be discussed and settled is the issue with regard to limitation. The deceased Abdullakhan Khilji died on 8th June, 1958. The present suit was initially filed in the form of a pauper petition in the Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay being Pauper Petition No. 22 of 1969. The pauper petition was filed in the Bombay City Civil Court on 25th February, 1969. The pauper petition was thereafter converted into a suit being Suit No. 5246 of 1969. By an order of Bombay City Civil Court dated the 12th April, 1971 the plaint was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court under Order VII, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code. Thereafter the plaint was returned to the plaintiff on 18th May, 1971 by the Registrar of that Court. On 2nd July, 1971 the plaint was re-declared in the High Court and the plaint was lodged on the same day and was numbered as Pauper Petition No. 11 of 1969. Subsequently the pauper petition was numbered as Suit No. 789 of 1971. 19. It must be borne in mind that in the instant suit the property of the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji as claimed by the plaintiff consists of immovable properties as also movable properties like cash, ornaments, furniture and telephone. Shri Doctor, learned Counsel for the defendants submitted that the estate of a deceased Muslim under Mahomedan Law vested immediately in each heir in proportion to the share specified under the law. Shri Doctor urged that all the heirs claiming the estate of deceased became tenants-in-common The interest of each heir became distinct and separate. Shri Doctor further submitted that with regard to immovable property of a deceased Article 65 of the Limitation Act applied and with regard to the movables, Article 113 of the said Act applied. Under Article 65 the period of limitation with regard to immovable properties was twelve years and the limitation under the Article which applied to respect of movable properties was three years. Under Article 65 the period of limitation with regard to immovable properties was twelve years and the limitation under the Article which applied to respect of movable properties was three years. Shri Doctor contended that the suit in this Court having been filed in the year 1971 end the said Abdullakhan Khilji having died in the year 1958 the entire suit with regard to immovable properties as also movable properties was barred by the law of limitation and the suit should be dismissed on this ground alone. 20. In support of his submissions, Shri Doctor, firstly, cited a passage from Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law, 18th Edn., Page 36, where the learned author has observed :--- "The theory of representation is not known to the Mahomedan Law. Under its provisions the estate of a deceased person devolves upon his heirs at the moment of his death. The estate vests immediately in each heir in proportion to the share ordained by Mahomedan Law. As the interest of each heir is separate and distinct, one of a number of heirs cannot be treated as representing the others. As stated above, the heirs succeed to the estate as tenants-in-common in specified shares. When the heirs continue to hold the estate as tenants-in-common without dividing it and one of them subsequently brings a suit for recovery of his share, the period of limitation for the suit does not run against him from the date of the death of the deceased, but from the date of express ouster or denial of title; in other words, it is Article 144 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act, 1908 that applies, and not Article 123. The Privy Council has held that a suit for administration of the estate of a Mahomedan in governed as regards immovable property by Article 144 and as regards movables by Article 120." 21. It may be pointed out here that under the Limitation Act, 1963, Artical 65 is analogous to Article 144 of the old Act, and Article 113 of the limitation Act, 1963 is analogous to Article 120 of the old Act. 22. It may be pointed out here that under the Limitation Act, 1963, Artical 65 is analogous to Article 144 of the old Act, and Article 113 of the limitation Act, 1963 is analogous to Article 120 of the old Act. 22. Shri Doctor relied upon a ruling of the Privy Council in the case of (Mahomedally Tyebally v. Safiabai)1, reported in A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 215, wherein the Judicial Committee observed :--- "It was not contended before the Board that the plaintiff's suit is of the character mentioned in Article 106, Limitation Act. It is a suit against certain Mahomedan co-heirs by a person entitled to part of the interest of an heir and the High Court on appeal rightly held that to such a suit neither Article 106 nor Article 123 is applicable. The heirs of a Mahomedan succeed to his estate in specific shares as tenants-in-common and, the plaintiff's suit against the son and daughters of Ebrahimji for due administration of what came to their hands as property left by their father is governed as regards immovable property by Article 144 and as regards movables by Article 120." 23. Shri Doctor then relied on a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of (Khadersa Hajee Bappu v. Puthen Vecttil Ayissa Ummah)2, reported in I.L.R. 1911(34) Mad. 51 wherein the Full Bench was pleased to observe :--- "We agree with the decision in Umardaraz Ali Khan v. Wilayat Ali Khan, where it is held that Article 123 applies only when the suit is for a share of an estate which it is the legal duty of the defendant to distribute. In the case of a Mohammedan dying intestate the estate is at once vested in the heirs as tenants-in-common and there is no one charged by law with its distribution and as pointed out in Abdul Kader v. Ayishamma, it does not appear that in (Patcha v. Mohidin)3 or (Kasmi v. Ayishamma)4, I.LR. 15 Mad. 60 there was any contention that the defendant was not the lawful personal representative of the deceased. In Patcha v. Mohidin, I.LR. Mad. 57, the question whether Article 123 applied was not discussed or expressly decided but in Kasmi v. Ayishamma, I.L.R. 15 Mad. 60, the learned Judges do apply Article 123 but, as we think, wrongly. 15 Mad. 60 there was any contention that the defendant was not the lawful personal representative of the deceased. In Patcha v. Mohidin, I.LR. Mad. 57, the question whether Article 123 applied was not discussed or expressly decided but in Kasmi v. Ayishamma, I.L.R. 15 Mad. 60, the learned Judges do apply Article 123 but, as we think, wrongly. We think the answer to the question referred must be that Article 144 is applicable when the property is immovable and Article 120 when it is movable property." 24. The same proposition of law was reiterated in the case of (Mt. Sharifa Begum v. Court of Wards)5, reported in A.I.R. 1940 Lahore 475 and in the case of (Mahomed Riasat Ali v. Hasin Banu)6, reported in I.LR. 21 Cal. 157 (P.C.). 25. Shri Bansal made a feeble attempt to urge that Article 106 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied in the instant case. Shri Bansal was unable to find support from any authority for this proposition. 26. Article 106 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act provides :--- "106. For a legacy or Twelve years When the legacy or share becomes pay- for a share of a residue able or deliverable. bequeathed by a testator or for distributive share of the property of an intestate against an exe- cutor or an administrator or some other person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate. On a reading of Article 106 of the said Act it becomes clear that the Article would apply only where a legacy or a share of a residuary property of an intestate was claimed by an executor or administrator or some other person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate. As has been pointed out by Mulla in the passage cited heretofore, the theory of representation was unknown to Mahomedan Law and under its provisions the estate of the deceased person devolves upon his heirs at the moment of his death. There was no intermediate vesting in anyone such as an executor or administrator as under the Indian Succession Act. That being so, I do not think that Article 106 will apply in the instant case, and support for this proposition can be found in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court cited heretofore. I must therefore, reject this submission of Shri Bansal. 27. That being so, I do not think that Article 106 will apply in the instant case, and support for this proposition can be found in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court cited heretofore. I must therefore, reject this submission of Shri Bansal. 27. Article 65 and Article 113 of Schedule I of the said Act provided as follows: "65. For possession of immo- Twelve years When the possession of the def- vable property or any endant becomes adverse to the interest therein based the plaintiff." on title. Article 113 lays down :--- “113. Any suit for which no Three years When the right to sue accrues." period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. 28. On the basis of the rulings cited heretofore, it appears that on the death of a Muslim his property devolves on the heirs in specified shares and they take the estate as tenants-in-common. The interest of each heir is separate and distinct and there is no principle of representation. It follows, therefore, that when one of the heirs files a suit for recovery of a share from the other heirs, who all hold the estate as tenants-in-common, then such a suit is governed by Article 65 of Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act so far as the immovable properties are concerned and by Article 113 of Schedule I so far as movables are concerned. The authorities of the Privy Council and of other High Courts support this proposition. Keeping this in mind one will have to consider whether the present suit with regard to movable and immovable Property was filed within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act. 29. The authorities of the Privy Council and of other High Courts support this proposition. Keeping this in mind one will have to consider whether the present suit with regard to movable and immovable Property was filed within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act. 29. Shri Bansal submitted that even if one were to take into consideration that Article 65 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act applied so far as the immovable property was concerned, for which the period prescribed was twelve years and Article 113 of Schedule I of the said Act applied so far as movables were concerned, for which the period prescribed was three years then the suit filed would be within time for two reasons; firstly, that the present suit must be considered to have been filed in the year 1969 when the suit was first filed in the Bombay City Civil Court and, secondly, urged Shri Bansal, the period of limitation would commence only from the date of the ouster or exclusion from the property and not before. Shri Bansal relied upon the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Article 14(1) provided : "14(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause or a like nature, is unable to entertain it." 30. The expression "good faith" has been defined in section 2(h) of the Limitation Act as :--- "2(h) "good faith" nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention." 31. Shri Bansal contended that the period to be computed would be from 1958 i.e. the date of the death of Abdullakhan Khilji till the finding of the pauper petition in the City Civil Court i.e. 2-7-1969. Calculated thus the suit would be within time so far as the immovable property was concerned. 32. Shri Bansal contended that the period to be computed would be from 1958 i.e. the date of the death of Abdullakhan Khilji till the finding of the pauper petition in the City Civil Court i.e. 2-7-1969. Calculated thus the suit would be within time so far as the immovable property was concerned. 32. Shri Bansal further contended that according to the plaintiff, from the time of her father's death till the suit was filed in the City Civil Court the plaintiff had from time to time called upon the defendants and in particular defendant No. 1 to hand over her share in her father's property. Defendant No. 1 however, had assured her that she would partition the estate after her sisters defendants 2 and 3 were married, and till then her share was secured with her. Shri Bansal stated that the first time that it can be stated that the plaintiff had been ousted from her father's estate by the defendants would be 1964 when defendant No. 1 filed a criminal complaint against the plaintiff and her husband Mohmoodkhan in the Presidency Magistrate's 15th Court, Mazgaon, being Case No. 213 of 1964. The 1st defendant had filed the complaint under sections 387, 505 and 506, I.P. Code. In the said complaint defendant No. 1 stated that the plaintiff and her husband frequently visited their place at Sawal House and pestered her and her three step-daughter demanding money from time to time. Defendant No. 1 stated that she was advised that the plaintiff was overpaid and that no more moneys were due and payable to the plaintiff and her husband. According to Shri Bansal this was the first occasion when defendant No. 1 had denied her liability to give her share to the plaintiff. Shri Bansal, therefore, stated that at best it can be stated that time began to run as and from 1964 when defendant No. 1 filed the above complaint. 33. Shri Doctor has opposed the contention of Shri Bansal that time spent in prosecuting the previous suit filed in the Bombay City Civil Court should be excluded under the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act. According to Shri Doctor it could not be stated that the plaintiff had prosecuted the suit diligently or in good faith. Shri Doctor stated that the plaintiff had admitted in her cross-examination that her claim was for more than Rs. 25,000/-. According to Shri Doctor it could not be stated that the plaintiff had prosecuted the suit diligently or in good faith. Shri Doctor stated that the plaintiff had admitted in her cross-examination that her claim was for more than Rs. 25,000/-. Even so, the plaintiff filed the suit in the Bombay City Civil Court although the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. Shri Doctor, therefore, contended that it could not be stated that the plaintiff had prosecuted the suit with due deligence or in good faith and, therefore, time taken for prosecuting the previous suit in the Bombay City Civil Court ought to not be excluded under section 14 of the said Act. Shri Doctor relied upon a ruling of this Court in the case of (Govind Sadashiv Pathak v. Sadashiv Shivrao Nisal)7, reported in A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 93 wherein Chagla, C.J., was pleased to observe :--- "But the more serious difficulty is that section 14(2) requires the prosecution of the earlier proceeding in good faith. Now, "good faith" as contemplated by this sub-section is not the said good faith as contemplated under the Bombay General Clauses Act............While the Bombay General Clauses Act emphasises "honesty" and ignores the factor of negligence, the Limitation Act emphasises not "honesty" but the fact that due care and attention has been given to the prosecution of the earlier application ............Further, section 14(2) also requires that the earlier application should not be tenable by reason of defect of jurisdiction in the Court to which the earlier application was presented. But in this case, apart from the question of any defect in jurisdiction in the Poona Court, the application was not maintainable at all because the application was to execute a decree which was non-existent." 34. Shri Doctor also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan v. The State of Bombay)8, reported in A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 767 wherein Their Lordships were pleased to hold :--- "The plaintiff knew all the time that the value of the properties involved in the suit, was much more than Rs. 5000/- which was the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge's Court. 5000/- which was the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge's Court. Can an omission in the plaint to mention the value of the properties involved in the suit, be brought which the condition of "due care and attention" according to the meaning of "good faith" as understood in the Limitation Act? It has to be remembered that it is not one of those cases which usually arise upon a revision of the valuation as given in the plaint on an objection raised by the defendant contesting the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit. Curiously enough, the defendant had not raised any objection in his written-statement to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit. Apparently, the plaintiff was hard put to it to discover reasons for having the case transferred to another Court. The question is whether the plaintiff did it dishonestly or that his acts or omission in this connection, were mala fide. On the other hand, the question is whether, given due care and attention, the plaintiff could have discovered the omission without having to wait for about ten years or more." 35. Relying on the above authorities Shri Doctor submitted that the plaintiff ought to have known that her claim was for an amount exceeding Rs. 25,000/- and that the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court did not exceed Rs. 25,000/- and the plaintiff should not have filed her pauper petition in that Court in the first instance. Shri Doctor contended that it could not be stated that the plaintiff had prosecuted the prior suit with "due diligence and in good faith." 36. Shri Bansal has relied upon a ruling of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Brij Mohan Das v. Mannu Bibi, wherein learned Judges observed :--- "In my opinion the judgment in Ramjiwan Mal v. Chand Mal imposes a restriction on the application of section 14 of the Limitation Act which was not contemplated by the legislature. It is perfectly conceivable that there may be a bona fide mistake as to the proper Court in which a suit should be instituted. The Judges of this Court know for instance how difficult it is to define the boundary line which separates the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts from the jurisdiction of the Courts of revenue. It is perfectly conceivable that there may be a bona fide mistake as to the proper Court in which a suit should be instituted. The Judges of this Court know for instance how difficult it is to define the boundary line which separates the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts from the jurisdiction of the Courts of revenue. Had the legislature intended to put on section 14 of the Limitation Act the narrow interpretation which has been placed upon it in the ruling referred to above, I should have expected to find inserted in it, or in the last clause of section 3 of the Act, a proviso the effect that nothing should be deemed to have been done good faith which is done by reason of a mistake of law and not by reason of a mistake of fact." Shri Bansal also relied upon a ruling of the Calcutta High Court in the case of (Obhoy Churn Nundi v. Kritartha Mov Dossee)9, reported in I.LR. 7 Cal. 284 wherein it was held :--- "After this case had been in the Subordinate Judge's Court for about seven months, he came to the conclusion that the suit was over-valued, and, therefore, returned the plaint that it might be filed in the Munsif's Court, which was done on that very day. In special appeal it is contended, that the time during which the suit was pending in the Subordinate Judges Court ought not to be allowed to the plaintiff; and that, if disallowed, her claim is barred by limitation. We agree with the lower Court that the present case is covered by the 14th section of the Limitation Act, there being no reason to suppose that the plaintiff was not acting bona fide in instituting her suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge." 37. Now the question whether a suit was prosecuted with due diligence faith is a question of fact in every case. It is true that the plaintiff has admitted that she was aware that her claim in the share of her father's estate was in the region of Rs. 2,00,000/-. However, if there is one thing apparent from the evidence of the plaintiff it is that she is an illiterate woman further that she is not an intelligent one. Therefore, even if the plaintiff knew that her claim exceeded Rs. 2,00,000/-. However, if there is one thing apparent from the evidence of the plaintiff it is that she is an illiterate woman further that she is not an intelligent one. Therefore, even if the plaintiff knew that her claim exceeded Rs. 25,000/- she could not have known about the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court. If, therefore, time began to run from the date of the death of Abdullakhan Khilji i.e. in 1958 till the suit was filed in 1969 then the period covered would be about 11 years and, therefore under Article 65 the suit would be within time so far as the immovable properties were concerned. The suit, however, would be barred by limitation so for as movables were concerned. 38. There is another aspect from which the question of limitation has to be considered in this case. Shri Bansal submitted that so for as the question of limitation was concerned, the first time that the plaintiff was expressly excluded or ousted from her share in her father's estate was when the complaint dated the 23rd September, 1964 was filed wherein the 1st defendant declared that the plaintiff had been over-paid and no more moneys were due and payable to her. Shri Bansal's submission is based on sound reason. I agree with Shri Bansal that time would begin to run from the year 1964 and as the suit was filed in the year 1969, the suit would, therefore, be within time so far as immovable properties were concerned under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. However, even from this point of view the suit with regard to movables would be time-barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, since the period of limitation is three years. Even if one were not to exclude the time taken or prosecuting the pauper petition in the City Civil Court under section 14 of the Limitation Act, on the basis of this reasoning the suit would be within time so for as the immovable properties were concerned. I, therefore, hold that so far as the immovable properties are concerned, the suit is filed within time under Article 65 of the Limitation Act and so far as the movable properties are concerned, the suit is time-barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. 39. The plaintiff in this suit has examined herself and three others witnesses. I, therefore, hold that so far as the immovable properties are concerned, the suit is filed within time under Article 65 of the Limitation Act and so far as the movable properties are concerned, the suit is time-barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. 39. The plaintiff in this suit has examined herself and three others witnesses. The 1st defendant examined herself and the case on behalf of the defendants was closed thereafter. However, after the defendants' case was closed, Shri Bansal made a written application that defendants 2 and 3 Razia Begum and Tahera Begum should be examined by the Court in the interest of justice. I allowed this application and thereafter Tahera Begum was examined as a Court witness No. 1 and Razia Begum was examined as Court witness No. 2. 40. Before I deal with the various issues raised in this suit and the evidence led by the parties, it will be pertinent to set out here an important admission made by defendant No 1 in the course of her cross-examination. In her cross examination (at page 35) defendant No. 1 stated :--- "It is not correct that my husband was a very rich man and was worth somewhere between 10 to 15 lacks. My husband did not leave any cash at the time of his death. He left some immovable properties and jewellery." Now it is unfortunate that the cross examination did not pursue this aspect further in order to elicit which was the immovable property left behind by the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji and what was the jewellery which formed part of his estate. Since no further details were brought out in the cross examination it will, therefore, be necessary for the Court to find out as to whether the deceased had left any immovable property and jewellery which formed part of his estate. It may also be pointed out here that in their written statements, the defendants had taken the plea that the deceased had not left any estate whatsoever. The 1st defendant in her examination-in-chief did not reiterate this plea. In cross-examination, however, she made a definite admission that the deceased had left some immovable properties as also jewellery. Their case in the written-statement that the deceased had not left any property which could form the estate of the deceased and devolved upon his heirs appears to have been given up. 41. In cross-examination, however, she made a definite admission that the deceased had left some immovable properties as also jewellery. Their case in the written-statement that the deceased had not left any property which could form the estate of the deceased and devolved upon his heirs appears to have been given up. 41. There is one other fact which needs to be set out here. The plaintiff Firdose was married to Mahmoodkhan sometime in the year 1956. It appears that after her marriage she went to live with her husband and was not a frequent visitor to the house of her father who lived in Sawal House situated at Masjid Street. According to the defendants, prior to his marriage with the plaintiff, Mahmoodkhan was engaged to the plaintiff's sister Bilquis Begum, original defendant No. 4. However, the plaintiff eloped with Mahmoodkhan and got married to him. According to the defendants the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji was extremely displeased with this act of Firdose and after her marriage the deceased never permitted her to visit him nor did he ever, talk to her. These allegations have been denied by the plaintiff. However, according to her after she married and till the death of her father she was a regular visitor at Sawal House. These few facts need to be stressed for the reason that the plaintiff is not well conversant with the facts regarding the estate lift by her father and in her evidence she has exaggerated the extend of the estate left behind by her father. According to her father was a very rich man and had left about Rs. 22,00,000/- in cash. This is obviously an exaggeration and even if true there is no evidence to support this claim. I shall now deal with the immovable properties referred to by the plaintiff as belonging to her father and which he left behind at the time of his death. 42. Issue No. 5: With regard to property at Bapu Khote Street bearing S. No. 2702 of Bhuleshwar Division, the plaintiff has given a very garbled and a confused version. In her examination-in-chief she stated that her father owned an immovable property at the junction of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street. There was a house situated thereon No. 2709. Her father had purchased this house in the year 1939. In her examination-in-chief she stated that her father owned an immovable property at the junction of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street. There was a house situated thereon No. 2709. Her father had purchased this house in the year 1939. This property was purchased jointly in the name of her father and her mother Mariambai when she was a child and that her father had made a gift of this property to her mother Mariambai when she was a child. She stated that she did not know whether there was any writing with regard to this property but she stated that this property was also the subject-matter of the suit. She further stated that the property at Bapu Khote Street belonged to defendant Nos. 1,2,3 and her deceased sister original defendant No. 4 and herself. She stated that the property at Bapu Khote Street after the death of her mother Mariambai was divided into two. One part was gifted to her sisters and herself and one to Siddique Begum. However, defendant No. 1 retained possession of the entire property. The plaintiff admitted that the property which was gifted to her and her sisters did not form part of this suit. She also stated that she did not remember the date when her father had gifted half the portion of the property at Bapu Khote Street to defendant No. 1, although she had come to knew of this fact before the filing of the suit. 43. Defendant No. 1 in her evidence, however, has given a clear and a correct picture of the transaction relating to the property at Bapu Khote Street. It appears that there were two properties, one, at the junction of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street and the other at Bapu Khote Street. The property at the junction of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street was purchased by the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji in 1937 and by a Deed of Gift dated 17th March, 1953 he had made a gift of that property to Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1. The Deed of Gift had been tendered and marked as Ex. No. 6. Now it may be pointed out that with regard to this Deed of Gift it is not the plaintiff's case that this is a fabricated document. She has not challenged her father's signature thereon and, therefore, this Deed of Gift dated 17th March, 1953 (Ex. The Deed of Gift had been tendered and marked as Ex. No. 6. Now it may be pointed out that with regard to this Deed of Gift it is not the plaintiff's case that this is a fabricated document. She has not challenged her father's signature thereon and, therefore, this Deed of Gift dated 17th March, 1953 (Ex. No. 6) must be accepted as a genuine document. 44. Shri Bansal, however, has contended that this is not a gift in consonance with the provisions of section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. Under section 122 of the said Act, a gift was complete only after it was accepted by or on behalf of the donee and such acceptance must be made during the life time of the donor and while he was still capable of giving. According to Shri Bansal, there was nothing in the Deed of Gift which indicated that this gift had been accepted by Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1. It may, however, be pointed out that the acceptance by a donee need not be in express words. In regard to a gift the acceptance may also be implied by a subsequent act or conduct of the donee. In the instance case it is the plaintiff's case that the defendant No. 1 all along treated this property at the junction of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street as her own and had received the rents thereof. I, therefore, do not find much substance in this submission of Shri Bansal. I must, therefore, hold that the property at the junction of Bapu Khote Street and Banian Street belongs absolutely to Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1. 45. With regard to the property at Bapu Khote Street, it appears that this property was purchased in the name of Mariambai, the mother of the plaintiff and defendants 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4. After Mariambai's death, the property devolved on the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji, his son Yusuf and his daughters, the plaintiff and defendants 2,3 and original defendant No. 4. After Yusuf's death in the year 1948, his share devolved on his father Abdullakhan Khilji. Abdullakhan Khilji gifted away his share in that property to his four daughters i.e. plaintiff, defendants Nos. 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4. The Deed of Gift dated the 27th June, 1952 has been tendered and marked as Ex. No. 7. After Yusuf's death in the year 1948, his share devolved on his father Abdullakhan Khilji. Abdullakhan Khilji gifted away his share in that property to his four daughters i.e. plaintiff, defendants Nos. 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4. The Deed of Gift dated the 27th June, 1952 has been tendered and marked as Ex. No. 7. This property, however, is not the subject-matter of the suit and the plaintiff does not claim this part of the property as her father's estate. 46. Issue No. 6 : This issue relates to the property bearing No. 57-59-61, Masjid Street Bombay. The plaintiff in her evidence has stated that her father owned this immovable property at 57-59-61 Masjid Street and the building thereon was known as Azam Building. According to the plaintiff, this building was purchased out of the proceeds of the electrical goods shop situated at Princess Street which was owned by her father and which was sold by him. The plaintiff stated that the rents of this building also were collected by Siddique Begum defendant No. 1. 47. Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1, stated that this property was purchased by her during the life time of her husband, in the year 1956. She stated that she had paid the purchase price and not her husband. She had borrowed an amount of Rs. 8,000/- from M/s. Poonamchand and Co. and the rest of the moneys came out of her 'Meher'. She stated that he had also sold some of her jewellery. Defendant No. 1 stated that she used to manage this property even during the life time of her husband and collected the rents thereof. She denied that her husband had purchased this property with his money and that her name was only mentioned in the Conveyance as "benami" as alleged by the plaintiff. Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1 has produced the Conveyance dated 20th March, 1956 with regard to this property situated at 57-59-61 Masjid Street, Bombay. It has been tendered and marked as Ex. No. 8. The Conveyance supports the facts stated by Siddique Begum, defendant 1, in her evidence and there is no reason to doubt the same. I, therefore, hold that the property at 57-59-61 Masjid Street, Bombay bearing S. No. 3429 of Bhuleshwar Division is the absolute property of Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1. 48. Issued Nos. No. 8. The Conveyance supports the facts stated by Siddique Begum, defendant 1, in her evidence and there is no reason to doubt the same. I, therefore, hold that the property at 57-59-61 Masjid Street, Bombay bearing S. No. 3429 of Bhuleshwar Division is the absolute property of Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1. 48. Issued Nos. 2, 3 and 4 : This brings me to issues Nos. 2, 3 and 4 which refer to the 3rd floor flat of Sawal House situated at 53, Masjid Street, Bombay. The deceased Abdullakhan Khilji was a tenant of the 3rd floor of Sawal House, Masjid Street Bombay. The flat consisted of five rooms, each with an independent entry. Accroding to the plaintiff, the tenancy of Sawal House stood in the name of her father. The plaintiff stated that in 1960 the name of Sawal House was changed to Commercial House. In 1960 the four tenants residing in the said building purchased the building from the then landlords for a sum of Rs. 18000/-. The plaintiff stated that Sawal House was not purchased in the name of her father, but in the name of her deceased sister Bilquis Begum the original defendant No. 4. However, Bilquis had purchased the ¼th share in Sawal house out of the moneys left by her father Abdullakhan Khilji. The plaintiff stated that at the time when Sawal House was purchased Bilquis was not employed nor did she carry on any trade or business. Bilquis had no source of income apart from the money left by the deceased Abdulllakhan Khilji. 49. The plaintiff has also examined one Mohammed Hanif Siddiqui who owned a shop on the ground floor of Sawal House and who was one of the purchasers of Sawal House. Siddiqui stated that in 1952 this building was owned by Abdul Majid Sawal. In 1957 Sawal migrated to Pakistan and the property was taken over by the Custodian of Evacuee Property in 1957. In the same year one Chandumal Toolaram become the new landlord. In 1960 all the tenants of the building jointly purchased it from Chandumal Toolaram. The four tenants formed an association for the purpose of purchasing the building. Bilquis Begum joined in her capacity as a tenants of the 3rd floor, further stated that even after the purchase of the said building, the rent receipts continued to be in the name of Abdullakhan Khilji. The four tenants formed an association for the purpose of purchasing the building. Bilquis Begum joined in her capacity as a tenants of the 3rd floor, further stated that even after the purchase of the said building, the rent receipts continued to be in the name of Abdullakhan Khilji. He stated that there were in all five rooms on the 3rd floor. That four rooms had been let out by Siddique Begum and only one room remained in her occupation. Siddique stated that Siddique Begum collected her ¼th share from the income of Sawal House. 50. Siddique Begum, the 1st defendant stated that the 3rd floor of Sawal House was purchased by Bilquis, original defendant No. 4. Bilquis purchased this property on her behalf as also on behalf of her sister Razia Begum and Tahera Begum. She stated that the declaration dated 14th of February, 1961 (Ex. No. 10) had been signed by Bilquis in her presence. In this declaration, Bilquis stated that Sawal House property had been purchased for a sum of Rs. 18,000/- under Conveyance dated 22nd November, 1960 (Ex. No. 3). She further stated that she and her co-purchasers had spent a sum of Rs. 16,000/- on heavy repairs to the said property and that her contribution to the repairs was Rs. 4,000/-. She stated that she had contributed Rs. 4,000/- on behalf of herself as also her sisters Razia Begum and Tahera Begum. She stated that in the declaration she along with her sisters Razia Begum and Tahera Begum had also contributed equally towards the purchase of Sawal House and that her sisters Razia Begum and Tahera Begum were equally entitled to the share in the immovable property. This declaration is dated the 14th of February, 1961 and marked as Ex. No. 10. 51. In cross-examination Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1 stated that her husband Abdullakhan Khilji was the tenant of Sawal House on the 3rd floor and his entire family resided there. There were five rooms on the 3rd floor. She stated that four of the rooms were let out on the 3rd floor by her step-daughter Bilquis, original defendant No. 4 and not by herself. Defendant No. 1 denied that the four occupants had paid a large amount as deposit. She stated that she was not aware whether the occupants had paid any deposits at all. She stated that four of the rooms were let out on the 3rd floor by her step-daughter Bilquis, original defendant No. 4 and not by herself. Defendant No. 1 denied that the four occupants had paid a large amount as deposit. She stated that she was not aware whether the occupants had paid any deposits at all. Defendant No. 1 stated that the Bill Collector collected the compensation from the occupants and paid the same to her. Defendant No. 1 stated that she paid the compensation to her step-daughters Tahera Begum and Razia Begum. Defendant No. 1 admitted that the rent receipts in respect of the 3rd floor were made out in the name of her husband ever after the building had been purchased and even at present the rent receipts stood in the name of her husband. She stated that she old not pay any share from the rents of Sawal House to Bilquis as Bilquis did not ask for the same. The plaintiff stated that she had a share in the ownership of the Sawal House property. She, however later resiled from that position and stated that she did not have her share in the Sawal House but she stated that she only occupied a room in the Sawal House. This she did in her capacity as a tenants Bilquis, Razia and Tahera, She stated that she paid rent to these although she did not have any rent receipts. 52. Now from the evidence of the plaintiff as well as of the 1st defendant it would appear that the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji was a tenant the entire 3rd floor of Sawal House, consisting of five rooms. The deceased continued to be the tenant of Sawal House till the date of his death and the rent receipts continued to be in his name even after his death. Although the 1st defendant has claimed as also Tahera Begum and Razia Begum that Bilquis had purchased the ¼th share in Sawal House, there is no evidence adduced to support this claim. The plaintiff has stated that in 1960 when the conveyance with regard to Sawal House, was executed, Bilquis was unmarried, she was unemployed and she did not earn anything. The plaintiff's evidence, therefore, that Bilquis had paid out of the moneys left by Abdulla Khan Khilji appears to be probable. The plaintiff has stated that in 1960 when the conveyance with regard to Sawal House, was executed, Bilquis was unmarried, she was unemployed and she did not earn anything. The plaintiff's evidence, therefore, that Bilquis had paid out of the moneys left by Abdulla Khan Khilji appears to be probable. Razia and Tahera in the year 1960 was only school girls and they, therefore, could not have had any income of their own. The plaintiff's evidence, therefore, that Sawal house was purchased out of the moneys left by her father Abdullakhan Khilji appears to be probable and reasonable. If the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji was a tenant of Sawal House, then the plaintiff as one of his heirs would also have right of occupation in the said house at least to the extent of her 7/32 share. If the ¼th share was purchased out of the moneys belonging to the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji, then the plaintiff would also be entitled to the ownership of Sawal House to the extent of the 7/32 share out of the ¼th share belonging to the four sisters. It is not disputed that four of the five rooms have been let out to certain occupants and at present only one room remained in the possession of Siddique Begum, defendant No. 1. The plaintiff has claimed that Siddique Begum had accepted from the occupants large amounts as deposits. There is, however, no evidence in support of this claim. Shri Bansal has stated that I should also decree a 7/12 share in the amount of the deposits. However, in the absence of any evidence this claim cannot be entertained. 53. Shri Doctor has contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to occupy any part of the flat on the 3rd floor of Sawal House as a tenant, in view of the fact that she was not living with the deceased at the time of his death. However, in the absence of any evidence this claim cannot be entertained. 53. Shri Doctor has contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to occupy any part of the flat on the 3rd floor of Sawal House as a tenant, in view of the fact that she was not living with the deceased at the time of his death. Shri Doctor relied upon the definition of the word "tenant" under section 5(11)(c)(i) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which defined a tenant, inter alia, as :--- "5(11)(c)(i)---in relation to any premises let for residence, when the tenant dies, whether the death has occurred before or after the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Act, 1978, any member of the tenant's family residing with the tenant at the time of his death, or, in the absence of such member, any heir of the deceased tenant, as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court." It is difficult to accept the contention of Shri Doctor for the reason that the plaintiff does not claim the occupancy in Sawal House under the Bombay Rent Act. Her claim was based on the fact that she was one of the heirs of the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji and she claimed the right of inheritance to the tenancy vested in the heirs on the death of her father. The provisions of section 5(11)(c) could not supersede the right of inheritance to the tenancy vesting in the heirs on the death of the tenants under the personal law of parties. Support for this proposition can be found in a ruling of this Court in the case of (Rajaram Brindavan Upadhyaya v. Ramraj Raghunath Upadhyaya)10, reported in 1977 U.C.R. (Bom.) 538 : 80 Bom.L.R. 12, wherein Their Lordships held: "We hold that the provisions of section 5(11)(c) of the Rent Act are not meant to supersede the right of inheritance to the tenancy vesting in the heirs on the death of the tenant, under the personal law of the party." Shri Doctor's contention must, therefore, be negative. I am, therefore, of the view that so far as the tenancy of Sawal House is concerned, the same devolved upon the plaintiff along with defendants 1, 2 and 3 and original defendant No. 4 and that they are entitled to the premises as tenant-in-common and that they have a right of occupying the same jointly as the heirs of the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji. The plaintiff will also be entitled to a 7/12th share out of the ¼th share of Sawal House as the plaintiff and defendants 1, 2, 3 and original defendant No. 4 become the joint owners of the ¼th share in Sawal House. The plaintiff will also be entitled to her share in the rents received by defendant No. 1 of Sawal House from the year 1960 when Sawal House was purchased by the four tenants jointly. Issue No. 2 will, therefore, be answered in the affirmative to the extent of the plaintiff's share in Sawal House is concerned. Issue No. 4 will have to be answered in the affirmative. 54. Issue No. 7: Issue No. 7 relates both to immovable as well as movable property. I have already dealt with the immovable properties. I shall now deal with the movables. With regard to the movables, Siddique Begum, defendants No. 1 stated that during his life time the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji had gifted jewellery, furniture and radiogram to her. Defendant No. 1 produced the declaration of Gift dated 12th June, 1956 which has been tendered and marked as Ex. No. 9. It will be relevant at this stage to refer to the declaration of Gift (Ex. No. 9). The declaration (Ex. No. 9), stated that out of love and affection for his wife Siddique Begum, Abdullakhan Khilji had gifted away to her the gold ornaments weighing about fifty tolas as also other jewellery including two pairs of diamond ear-clips and one pair of diamond ear-rings. The declaration further stated that the deponent had also gifted away to Siddique Begum furniture, wooden as well as steel, a radiogram and a radio and she was the absolute owner of all the above mentioned goods. 55. In her cross-examination, Siddique Begum stated that her husband owned certain jewellery which he later gifted to her i.e. jewellery consisting of 2/3 diamond rings, and three pairs of diamond ear-rings. 55. In her cross-examination, Siddique Begum stated that her husband owned certain jewellery which he later gifted to her i.e. jewellery consisting of 2/3 diamond rings, and three pairs of diamond ear-rings. One of the diamond rings she had presented to the plaintiff's husband and some of the other items she had gifted to Razia and Tahera. 56. Siddique Begum also stated that pursuant to an order of the Bombay City Civil Court an inventory was made of the contents of the Locker of the Bombay Mercantile Co-operative Bank. The Locker contained some items of jewellery and cash worth Rs. 15,000/-. These belonged to Tahera. Tahera Court witness No. 1 stated that the jewellery found in the safe deposit locker belonged to her. She was married in 1967 and she had received some jewellery as gift from her relatives, some of whom were in Kuwait. Razia Begum, Court witness No. 2 also deposed to the same effect. Now it may be mentioned that although Siddique Begum, Tahera Begum and Razia Begum all deposed that the jewellery found in the Mercantile Co-operative Bank Locker belonged to Tahera which she had received as gift during her wedding, there is no evidence in support of their claim. No gift or has been examined nor any document produced in support of their claim. The list of inventory (Ex. "B") indicates that the jewellery was of considerable value. There were bangles and neckless studded with rubies, emeralds and pearls. None of the witnesses has produced any evidence with regard to the value of this jewellery. However, on a cursory look through the list would convince one that this jewellery must be worth a fortune. Although Siddique Begum has produced a Deed of Gift (Ex. No. 9). It is clear that the items gifted to her under the declaration of Gift (Ex. No. 9) do not form part of what was found in the Locker, a list of which is marked as Ex. 'B'. It would, therefore, appear that this jewellery also belonged to the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji. However, in view of the fact that I have held that the claim of the plaintiff, with regard to the movables is time-barred, the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in this jewellery. 57. Two further items need to be mentioned. 'B'. It would, therefore, appear that this jewellery also belonged to the deceased Abdullakhan Khilji. However, in view of the fact that I have held that the claim of the plaintiff, with regard to the movables is time-barred, the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in this jewellery. 57. Two further items need to be mentioned. The plaintiff in her evidence said that her deceased father owned two taxis, which were plied by taxi-driver engaged by him. She has also stated that her father owned an Electrical Goods Shop situated at Princess Street. This shop was sold by her father in the year 1951, according to the evidence of Javeri, P.W. 3, who was the owner of the building in which the shop was situated. With regard to the taxis, there is no evidence adduced by the plaintiff at all and, therefore, her mere statement in her evidence cannot be of much use and so far as Electrical Goods Shop, it was sold, as I have pointed out earlier, as far back in 1951. There is no evidence with regard to the amount of consideration. The plaintiff stated that the building situated at 57-59-61 Masjid Street was purchased out of the proceeds of the Electrical Goods Shop. This does not appear to be true as this immovable property was purchased by defendant No. 1 out of her own moneys. The plaintiff's claim with regard to the taxis and the Electrical Goods Shop must be negatived. 58. My answers to the Issues are : Issue No. 1 : The Suit is time-barred so far as movable property is concerned. The suit is within time so far as immovable property is concerned. Issue No. 2 : In the affirmative. Issue No. 3 : In the affirmative so far as Sawal House was concerned. Issue No. 4 : In the affirmative. Issue No. 5 : In the negative. Issue No. 6 : In the negative. Issue No. 7 : In the affirmative only in so far as Sawal House was concerned. Issue No. 8 : The assets consisted of ¼th share in Sawal House. There were no liabilities. 59. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for her 7/32 share in the ¼th share of Sawal House, as also to the rents accrued therefrom. Issue No. 8 : The assets consisted of ¼th share in Sawal House. There were no liabilities. 59. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for her 7/32 share in the ¼th share of Sawal House, as also to the rents accrued therefrom. The suit will be referred to the Commissioner for taking accounts for ascertaining the amounts of rents received by defendant No. 1 from Sawal House from the date of its purchase in 1960. Decree in favour of the plaintiff for posses sion of one room. The Court receiver to hand over one room in his possession to the plaintiff. After the possession of one room is handed over to the plaintiff, the Court receiver to stand discharged on payment of his costs, charges and expenses. Court receiver to deposit with the prothonotary and Senior Master any amount lying with him to the credit of the suit. Further orders with regard to costs reserved. 60. On the application of Shri Doctor the order with regard to the possession of the room to be handed over to the plaintiff stayed till 4-8-1981. -----