Judgment S. Ali Ahmad, J. These appeals, which have been heard together and are being disposed of by this Judgment, are by the defendant. They arise out of three suits filed by the plaintiff, seeking eviction of the appellants from the premises, they were occupying under here as tenant. The case of the plaintiff-respondent is that the defendant defaulted in paying rent for the months of May, 1973 to December, 1973 for each of the suit premises, where after the plaintiffs served the defendant with notices under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for each of the suit premises. She says that in spite of the notice and request to vacate the premises, the defendant did not vacate them, and as such, the plaintiff was obliged to file the suits giving rise to these appeals. 2. The suit was contested by the defendants. Its case, inter-alia, was that rent for the months of May and June, 1973 was paid to the son of the plaintiff on 29-6-1973, who promised to send the receipt, but on account of an ulterior motive, he did not do so. With regard to rent for the months of July to December, 1973, it was said that the rent for these months were sent to the plaintiff by money orders, but they refused. A plea was also taken that the notices served under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act were not in accordance with law. 3. The Trial Court, on a consideration of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that rent for the months of May and June was paid as said by the defendant. With regard to the rent for the months of July to December, 1973, it was held that rents for these months were remitted by money orders addressed to the plaintiff, which were refused. On that basis, the Trial Court held that the defendant was not a defaulter. It, accordingly, dismissed the suits on appeal, the Lower appellate Court affirmed the finding and held that rent for the months of May and June was paid to the plaintiff. With regard to the rents for the months of July, 1973 to December, 1973, also it accepted the case of the defendant that rent for each month amounting Rs.670/- was remitted every following month. With regard to the rents for the months of July, 1973 to December, 1973, also it accepted the case of the defendant that rent for each month amounting Rs.670/- was remitted every following month. But, on the basis of the decision by a Bench of this court in the case of Rajendra Mohan Ghose, appellant versus Smt. Kaushalla Devi held that such remittance was invalid as according to it the defendant was obliged to send arrears also along with the rent for the month. Since that was not done, the Court below held the remittances to be invalid, and as such according to the Court below the defendant was a defaulter within the meaning of Section 11 (1) (d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. It, therefore, allowed the appeals and decreed the three suits for eviction. Thereafter, these three Second Appeals have been filed in this court. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant, in support of the appeals, contended that the view in the case of Rajendra Mohan Ghose appellant versus Smt. Kanshalla Devi. (Supra) that arrears of rent also have to be remitted every month along with the current rent, has been over-ruled by a Full Bench of this. Court in the case of Rajkumar Prasad, Appellant versus Uchit Narain Singh, Respondent. The Learned Counsel is correct. It has been held by the Full Bench that when tender by tenant is refused by the Landlord, then the tenant need not remit the entire rent due as arrears. 5. Mr. Shreenath Singh, Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents conceded to this position and said that he was not in a position to support the view taken by the Court of Appeal below in view of the Full Bench decision. He, however, contended that on the Case of the defendant himself and also on the finding the defendant is a defaulter in the three cases. According to him, therefore, the decrees should be affirmed although on different grounds. 6. The case as made out by the defendant, in his written statement, inter-alia, is that when the son of the plaintiff did not give receipt for the payments made towards the rent of May and June, the defendant started remitting rent, to the plaintiff by money orders. 6. The case as made out by the defendant, in his written statement, inter-alia, is that when the son of the plaintiff did not give receipt for the payments made towards the rent of May and June, the defendant started remitting rent, to the plaintiff by money orders. Accordingly, rent for the month of July was remitted in the month of August and the rent for the month of August was remitted in the month of September. Likewise the rent for the month of September was remitted in the month of October and so on. The two Courts have held that remittances, as said above, were made by the defendant by money orders. Mr. Shreenath Singh urged that notwithstanding these remittances, the defendant is a defaulter. 7. Section 11 (1) (d) provides that a decree for eviction can be passed where the amount of two months rent lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract Or in absence of such contract by the last day of the month next following for which the rent is payable Or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 13. That means that if the rent of two months is in arrear, then the tenant can be evicted unless he remits the rent under Section 13 of the Act. 8. Section 13 provides that when a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully payable to him by a tenant in respect of any building, the tenant may remit such rent and continue to remit subsequent rent, which becomes due in respect of the building by postal money order to the landlord. Mr. Shreenath Singh, therefore, urged that when the rent for the month of July, 1973 was sent by money order in the month of August, 1973, and was refused by the landlord, then the defendant should have remitted the rent for the month of July and subsequent months under Section 13 of the Act. According to him, since that was not done, the appellant has to be held to be a defaulter within the meaning of Section 11 (1) (d). 9. Mr. According to him, since that was not done, the appellant has to be held to be a defaulter within the meaning of Section 11 (1) (d). 9. Mr. Kailash Roy, on the other hand, contended that since notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the defendant on the 4th of August, 1973, it was futile to wait for a formal refusal of rent by the Landlord. He, therefore, contended that the defendant was justified in remitting the rent by money order, which should be deemed to be under Section 13 of the Act and if that be so then the defendant cannot be said to be a defaulter. ]n order to appreciate the respective arguments of the Learned Counsels, it is necessary to consider some cases on the point decided by this court. 10. First in the series is the decision in Purushottam Das Kapoor, Appellant versus Baijnath Prasad Sah, Respondent, Ramaswami C.J. and Untwalia, J. (as they then were) held as follows :- "If the Landlord refuses to accept the rent which is tendered by the tenant, then the statute further provides that the rent may be remitted or deposited in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Statute." 11. That means the precondition according to this case for a valid remittance under Section 13 is refusal by the Landlord to accept the rent. 12. Next is the case of Mahabir Prasad Saraogi & others, Appellants versus Bibhuti Mohan Bhattacharjee and others, Respondents, In this case the respondent first tendered the rent for the month of October, 1962. That was refused by the plaintiffs. The tenants, therefore, remitted the rent for the months of October together with rent of November, 1962. In this Case also, therefore, there was first refusal by the Landlord to accept the rent, which was followed by remittance under Section 13. Mr. Kailash Roy, however, placed stress on a sentence at page 84 of the report. "Therefore, in my opinion, a tender by the tenant to the Landlord before remitting rent by postal money order is not a condition precedent to such remittance." 13. This observation, in my opinion, was obiter because immediately after that sentence, the Learned Judge proceeded to examine as to whether there was an earlier refusal by the Landlord or not. It is significant that Mr. This observation, in my opinion, was obiter because immediately after that sentence, the Learned Judge proceeded to examine as to whether there was an earlier refusal by the Landlord or not. It is significant that Mr. Justice Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha (as he then was) while agreeing with the order passed by Mr. Justice S.P. Singh, did not agree with the view that an earlier refusal is not necessary for a valid tender under Section 13. In his short and separate judgment, the Learned Judge made it clear that since the tender was refused by the Landlord, the remittance under Section 13 was valid. 14. The case of Madholal and other Appellants versus Madan Mohan Agrawalla and others, Respondents is yet another case. Untwalia, C.J. (as he then was) held in this case that in order to escape liability of eviction under Section 11 (1) (d) by resorting to Section 13 (1) the circumstances of the remittance or deposit of rent must fall within the ambit of Section 13 (1), i.e. prior refusal by the Landlord of rent tendered within time. This decision also unmistakably leads to the conclusion that remittance or deposit under Section 13 should follow an earlier tender by the tenant and refusal by the Landlord. 15. Last in the series IS the decision of Rajkumar versus Uchit Narain Singh (Supra). This case was referred to the Full Bench as it was thought that there was some contradiction in the two Division Bench cases, referred to above, i.e., A.I.R. 1973 Patna 83 and A.I.R. 1975 Patna 154. The Full Bench was of the view that there was no inconsistency much less any contradiction in terms between the two Bench decisions. It was also of the view that an earlier refusal is a precondition to a valid remittance under Section 13 of the Act Mr. Kailash Roy, however, strongly relied on a sentence in paragraph 13 of the Judgment. The sentence reads as follows :- “If the tenant apprehends that with some ulterior motive, the Landlord could refuse to accept the rent the purpose of making a default within the meaning of rent Act, he may remit by postal money order by 'the last day of the month next falling. That would make the remittance valid within meaning of Section 11 (1) (d).” 16. Mr. That would make the remittance valid within meaning of Section 11 (1) (d).” 16. Mr. Kailash Roy urged that in this case there was sufficient justification for the appellants to think that the rent will not be accepted. He, therefore, remitted the rent by money order, and that was refused. According to him, therefore, this should be deemed to be valid payment within the meaning of Section 11(1)(d). I do not think that the Learned Counsel is correct. What I have quoted above cannot be read in isolation. The earlier part of the same paragraph makes abundantly clear that what the Learned Judge meant was that on refusal the tenant can remit the rent under Section 13 and again in latter portion of the same paragraph it has been said that in order to escape liability of being evicted on the ground of nonpayment of rent as expressly provided in Section 11(1)(d), the rent must be validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 13. The conclusion, therefore, On the basis of these decisions is that the remittance under section 13 of the Act can be made only if rent has first been tendered or refused by the Landlord. In this case, it is not the case of appellant that rent for the month of July to December was offered and refused. The remittances, therefore, made by him towards the rent of July onwards, cannot be said to be under Section 13 of the Act. 17. Mr. Kailash Roy alternatively urged that the remittance sent in August towards the rent of July should be treated to be tendered not under Section 13, but under the ordinary law. Since the Learned Counsel submitted, that that was refused, appellant was entitled to remit rent for the subsequent month under Section 13. This point has also no substance. 18. Section 13 provides that in case the Landlord refuses to accept rent then the tenant may remit such rent, i.e. refused rent and continue to remit any subsequent rent, which becomes due in respect of the said building. It is accepted position that the amount remitted in September was not towards the rent of July, which was refused, but it was for the month or August. This does not fulfil the requirement of Section 13. Therefore, it is not possible to accept this contention of Mr. Roy also. 19. It is accepted position that the amount remitted in September was not towards the rent of July, which was refused, but it was for the month or August. This does not fulfil the requirement of Section 13. Therefore, it is not possible to accept this contention of Mr. Roy also. 19. For the reasons discussed above, I hold that the defendant appellant have defaulted in payment of rent for the months of July to December, 1973. He is, therefore, liable to be evicted. The decree passed by the Court below is, therefore, sustained although for different reasons. 20. In the result the Appeal fails and is dismissed but without costs. Appeal dismissed.